Ordinary & extraordinary resistances : the struggle for land and space by the Palestinian citizens of Israel by Plonski, Sharri
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plonski, Sharri (2015) Ordinary & extraordinary resistances : the struggle for land and space by the Palestinian 
citizens of Israel. PhD Thesis. SOAS, University of London. 
 
 
 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/id/eprint/20385 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this PhD Thesis are retained by the author and/or 
other copyright owners. 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge. 
 
This PhD Thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder/s. 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
 
When referring to this PhD Thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the PhD Thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of 
submission) "Full PhD Thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD PhD Thesis, 
pagination.
  
 
 
 
 
ORDINARY & EXTRAORDINARY 
RESISTANCES: 
THE STRUGGLE FOR LAND AND 
SPACE BY THE PALESTINIAN 
CITIZENS OF ISRAEL 
 
SHARRI PLONSKI 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD  
2015 
 
 
 
Department of Development Studies 
SOAS, University of London 
2 
 
Declaration for SOAS PhD thesis 
 
I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of SOAS, 
University of London, concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the material presented for 
examination is my own work and has not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any 
other person. I also undertake that any quotation or paraphrase from the published or 
unpublished work of another person has been duly acknowledged in the work which I present 
for examination. 
 
 
Signed: ____________________________  Date: _________________ 
 
 
  
3 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the dialectic relationship between ‘power’ and ‘resistance’ through the 
lens of the struggle for land and space, by the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Ever in 
contention, ever in conversation, dynamics of power and resistance dislodge, dislocate and 
displace one another, transformed through their intersections and interactions. Thus to 
understand Palestinian-citizen struggle is to see it in dialogue with the trajectories of the 
Israeli hegemonic order: in which the indigenous Palestinian is always othered, outside and 
absent; a threat to be removed and replaced, despite (or even because of) their inclusion in the 
political and spatial organisations of the state. There is no room for the indigenous Palestinian 
within the state’s dual rationales of ethnic-nationalism and settler-colonialism. And yet, there 
is a never-ending encounter between the Zionist state and subaltern Palestinian-citizen, 
essential to the shape and journey of both. This encounter produces the particular story, the 
particular space, in which both are housed, the lines and boundaries of which are articulated 
and disrupted through unique spatial and social relations.  
The analysis stems from a three year exploration of three cases of community land-struggles: 
a popular movement for housing rights in Palestinian neighbourhoods of Jaffa-Tel Aviv; an 
enduring protest-movement against the Judaization project in the Galilee region; and the 
existential struggle for land rights of Bedouin communities in the Naqab desert. Their stories 
are a window into the unique reverberations of Zionist hegemony as it clashes with a real, 
contextualised, material history; with a Palestinian community surviving, resisting, 
antagonising and engaging the structures of power. Through investigating their moments of 
containment, contention and transgression, we unravel how resistance is entangled with the 
structures of power; and how the lines that determine this relationship are challenged, 
unveiled and disarticulated, and even transcended and transformed. 
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A Word on Language 
 
In this thesis, Arab terms and names have been transliterated into English, based primarily on 
their appearance in English language media sources. As well, the thesis primarily uses the 
English translations for most place names, as is the case of Jaffa and Acre. At the same time, 
when there is some contestation as to how a place-name is ‘translated’, the direct Arabic 
transliteration is used. This was the case with the use of the term ‘the Naqab’, which is the 
Arabic name for the desert region in which and for which the Bedouins’ land struggles take 
place. The term has been ‘Hebraised’ on Israeli maps, as ‘the Negev’. In this manuscript, 
‘Negev’ only appears when taken from a direct quote or title of a document. In this way, this 
thesis attempts to take into account the fabric of language politics that reproduce relations of 
power in the Israeli/Palestinian context, and intersect with the use of maps, signs and symbols 
towards the colonisation of Palestinian space.  
It should also be noted that the English transliteration of the Arabic and Hebrew names of 
interlocutors to this study respects the individuals’ spelling of their own names. In some cases 
this has informed the use of different spellings of the same family name. The differences are 
footnoted, when the names appear for the first time in the manuscript.  
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Map: Cases of Ordinary & Extraordinary Resistances 
 
 
  
Source: Map Design by Keith Cook, in Jonathan Cook, Disappearing Palestine: Israel’s 
Experiments in Human Despair, 2008; ‘Cases’ (Red & Blue Boxes), author’s addition  
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Introduction: The Ordinary and Extraordinary Resistances of the 
Palestinian Citizens of Israel 
 
A Day of Rage in Haifa 
 
 
  
Haifa Anti-Prawer Movement Demonstration 
“Demonstrators Running Away From a Police Water Canon” 
Source: Manor, Keren, Activestills.org/972 Magazine, November 30
th
, 2013 
 
 
Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defence of Arab Land and Housing Rights, 2007. 
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On July 15
th, 2013, the Palestinian citizens’ of Israel’s collective leadership, known as the 
High Follow-Up Committee, announced a national strike day against a programme of planned 
evictions of the Bedouin-Arab
1
 community, living in the the Naqab, the southern desert 
region of the country. The spark for the strike was the passing of the Draft Law to Regulate 
Bedouin Settlement in the Negev
2
, through a first-round reading
3
 in the Israeli Knesset 
(Israel’s parliamentary body). The Draft Law was based on a planning document devised by 
the Prime Minister’s Director of Planning, Ehud Prawer. On the basis of this document, 
30,000 to 40,0000 out of approximately 90,000 Bedouin Arabs, who live in villages 
unrecognised by the state, are facing mass forced displacement; and more than 250,000 
dunams
4
 of their traditional land holdings will be expropriated by the state.  
The call for solidarity by the High Follow-Up Committee was taken up by Palestinian-
citizen
5
 activists from across the country. They turned the single strike day into months of 
public protest activities, working alongside the Bedouin communities and some Jewish-
Israeli activists to cultivate what they came to call ‘the Anti-Prawer Movement’. The protests 
were given the name ‘Days of Rage’, inspired by actions that had overthrown leaders 
throughout their Middle-Eastern neighbourhood. The protests, which took place every few 
weeks with increasing numbers and intensity, were mobilised in multiple cities; 
simultaneously and collectively demanding an end to the plan and the colonial, ethno-
national logic that produced it. The campaign continued to grow, reaching its peak on the last 
‘Day of Rage’ (Nov. 30th, 2013), when thousands of protesters invaded the streets of Israel, 
the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and in demonstrations in cities throughout the globe. Mere 
days later, the Knesset backed down, the Plan was frozen, and a key battle was won.   
The Anti-Prawer Movement marked a new (re)turn in the Palestinian citizens’ struggle in 
Israel. While everyday and explosive acts of protest are a common feature of Palestinian life 
                                                          
1
 The terms ‘Bedouin-Arabs’ or ‘Naqab-Bedouin’ are used throughout this thesis, to reflect the way the 
community most often refers to itself. This is with full acknowledgement that the Bedouins of the Naqab are 
part of the wider Palestinian people and the regional Bedouin-Arab Community, which includes those who were 
expelled from the Naqab in 1948, and those who are part of the larger desert landscape in the region.  
2
 Details of the Draft Law can be found in the table on Israel’s Legal-Land Regime that appear in the 
Appendices to this thesis; in addition, a map proposing the borders and limits to Bedouin space that act as an 
addendum to the Law is included as Appendix 3.4.  
3
 Draft Laws in Israel pass into Legislation after three readings before the entire plenum. After the first round, 
the draft is sent to the appropriate committee – in this case, the Committee for Interior Affairs and Environment 
– to be prepared for second and third readings. 
4
 A ‘dunam’ was the traditional unit of land area utilised by the Ottoman Empire. The unit is still in use in many 
areas that were once included in the Ottoman sphere of influence, including Israel. One dunam of land is the 
equivalent of one square kilometre. 
5
 The term ‘Palestinian citizen(s)’ is shorthand for ‘Palestinian citizen(s) of Israel’; each is used interchangeably 
throughout this thesis, in reference to the core interlocutors of this study. 
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inside the Israeli state, these tend to be segregated to particular enclaves, localised within the 
politics of place and the stakeholders who live there. The exception to this are the annual 
events that commemorate Palestinian heroes and memories, which have long since stopped 
being intrinsically disruptive to the Israeli-Jewish public sphere. The last nationally 
organised, collective stand against the state’s treatment of Palestinian communities in Israel 
took place in 1976; an event commemorated as Land Day. The Palestinian-citizen leadership 
called a national strike then, too; the first of its kind. Its catalyst, much like the one that took 
place in 2013, 40 years later, was the expropriation of land. The state had planned to 
confiscate 21,000 dunams of land for Jewish settlement in the north of the country, in the 
Galilee, where the majority of Palestinian citizens of Israel were – and still are – 
concentrated. Events were organised across the country, at a period in time when the 
community was less vocal, less connected, more vulnerable and more afraid (with good 
reason: 6 protesters died on Land Day in 1976). They succeeded. The state gave up its plan, 
and a new politics began taking shape among the Palestinian citizens of Israel.  
With the new wave of collective protest again anchored in land (many call the Bedouins’ 
campaign ‘the last Palestinian stand over land’), an underlying ethos of Palestinian struggle 
inside Israel is unveiled. For an indigenous community, living in, surrounded by and 
integrated within the structures of a settler-colonial state – the same state that “ethnically 
cleansed” its peoples from the territory they share (Pappé, 2006)6 – the key impetus for their 
collective struggle is and always will be about land: land as space, land as identity, land as 
memory, land as resource, land as home. At the same time, Palestinian-citizen struggle, from 
Land Day through to the Days of Rage, is constantly evolving, in its methods, tactics, 
interlocutors and targets. The struggle confronts the state to provoke new boundaries and sites 
of conflict, which in turn produce new voices and ways of challenging the dynamics of 
power. The locus of these transformations, in their relationship to particular geographies of 
resistance, forms the core focus of this research.  
                                                          
6
 The term Ethnic Cleansing is used here in reference to the systematic expulsion of Palestinians from vast areas 
of Palestine, and the frameworks created to prevent their return. The conceptualisation of the events of 1948 as 
Ethnic Cleansing is debated extensively in the body of literature on the Zionist state. The debate primarily pivots 
around the question of ‘purpose’ – did the Zionist militias intend to forcefully and violently expel Palestinians 
from their territory, or was this an ‘accident of war’, as the state and Zionist historians contend (Pappé, 2006)? 
This research works with a historical analysis that includes the expulsion of people, irreversible destruction of 
places, expropriations of land and the definitive prevention of the return of displaced refugees to their homes. 
Intention converges with results that changed the demographic reality in Palestine, and thus Ethnic Cleansing is 
an apt lens through which to understand the state’s actions. More extensive discussion of this topic, and the 
surrounding myths and debates, can be found in Pappé (2006), W. Khalidi (1988), Robinson (2013) and Morris 
(1987), among many others.  
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Paradoxes and Dialectics – the Palestinian Citizens of Israel 
Israel’s Palestinian citizens were segmented from the larger Palestinian people in the 
aftermath of a war that forever shifted the political and demographic conditions in Palestine, 
at the moment when the Zionist settler-colonial project formally became the state of Israel in 
1948
7
 and the refugee Palestinian population was born (Bishara, 1993).  For over a year
8
, the 
Jewish militias performed what has been named their ‘War of Independence’, clearing the 
territory of infrastructure and people that could challenge Zionist sovereignty, destroying 
more than 500 villages and expelling more than 750,000 Palestinians in the process (Pappé, 
2011). The new regime then constructed a legal-political lexicon through which to cement its 
dominion over the spoils of war – 78% of ancient Palestine – and ensure that the erasures 
taking place would be irreversible (Robinson, 2013). The Palestinian citizens at the heart of 
this study are those who remained in the state after this Nakba (Catastrophe)
9
 that emptied 
Palestine of a majority of its people; descendants from the approximately 160,000
10
 who 
struggled to retain and reclaim space within Israeli-controlled territory, as they became 
integrated in and integral to the political project of the Zionist state.  
In this thesis, these internal Palestinians – who number approximately 1.6 million and make 
up 20% of Israel’s population in 2014 – are discussed primarily through their struggle to 
disrupt and transgress the spatial and political frame in which they are contained. This 
struggle is entangled in an ongoing, dialectic relationship with the Israeli state, and the 
processes used to maintain Zionist territory. The trajectory of this relationship begins with the 
                                                          
7
 The series of events that led to Israel’s establishment are discussed throughout this thesis (including the long 
historical process of settling and colonising the country), but this statement refers explcitily to the events of 
1947/1948. These begin with the UN’s November 29th, 1947 announcement (known as UN Resolution 181) of 
its plan and map for the partition of Palestine into two national entities, one Jewish and one ‘Arab’ (see 
Appendix 3.1 for details of the map); then continue with the dissolution of the British Mandate in Palestine 
(May 14
th
, 1948), the declaration of the Jewish Leadership, led by future Prime Minister Ben Gurion, of the 
Jewish state (Eretz Israel) on the same date, the 1948 War that expelled over 750,000 Palestinians (Pappé, 
2011); and end with the official signing of the Armistice Agreements in 1949 with the Arab states which had 
taken part in the 1948 War. Details of these events are discussed explicitly in multiple studies of Palestine, 
including Pappé (2006), W. Khalidi (1988), Robinson (2013), Morris (1987), among many others.   
8
 As discussed below, Israel’s military campaign began several months before the British dissolved their 
Mandate in Palestine and the war with the surrounding Arab states began; for details see Pappé (2011), W. 
Khalidi (1988).  
9
 The term ‘Nakba’ refers to the entire spectrum of actions that led to and then entrenched the expulsion of the 
Palestinian people from Palestine. These include the 1947 Jewish militia activities that targeted Palestinian 
villages in Jewish majority-held territories before the 1948 War (also known as the Israeli War of 
Independence); the 1948 War itself, and in particular the violent destruction and depopulation of villages in 
areas the militias sought to conquer; and the post-1948 legal and political discourses that constructed the status 
of Palestinian people as refugees, dispossessed of their homeland.  
10
 This number, like the number of Palestinian refugees forcefully expelled in 1948, is contested in the multiple 
sources that discuss Palestine. However, as it is one of the most reproduced statustics in such texts, it is used 
here. 
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state’s pre-1948 legacies. The attempts of the Zionist settlement project to “purify” the 
landscape, and create an ethnically exclusive colony on top of an indigenous population 
(which greatly outnumbered the immigrant community), lives on in the state’s relationship to 
the Palestinian citizens (Zureik, 1979; Shafir, 1989; Kimmerling, 1983; Abdo & Yuval-
Davis, 1995; Piterberg, 2001; Pappe, 2006; among others). The Zionist settler-colonial 
programme is built into the DNA of the state (Robinson, 2014). Its hallmark is the 
dispossession of indigenous Palestinians from the land, a process and practice that has been 
incorporated into all social, political and spatial relations in Israel. An aesthetic expressed in 
“spatial apartheids”, with definitive limits for who lives where, how and with whom (Falah, 
2003). However, this relationship is not an innate product of the violence of the colonial 
paradigm, through which the Palestinian citizens are mere victims of the Zionist project in 
Palestine
11
. Rather, their shared journey has been articulated, disarticulated and rearticulated 
in a spectrum of encounters, anchored in the specific and ambiguous position of Palestinians 
who were incorporated into the Jewish-Zionist state.    
After 1948, the Palestinian citizens became colonial subjects of the Israeli state, demarcated 
from the Palestinian majority in the region, and included – as a new ‘Arab-Israeli’ minority – 
in its political, social and physical structures; albeit excluded from any decision-making 
powers about their lives, or their futures, within the state. These citizens evolved as a 
paradox, part of the state, but incommensurate with its logics, in which there is no ‘Palestine’ 
and no ‘Palestinians’. The state built its frameworks around them, producing an internal 
Palestinian frontier; an enclosed population whose material and ideological ties to the 
Palestinian people (outside) and roots (inside) were immediately severed.  Through the lens 
of the state, these ‘Arab-Israelis’ were constructed as the ethnic other, eternally linked to the 
conflict outside. As a result, they were treated as a fifth column and demographic time bomb, 
whose presence undermined the Jewish territorial project to redeem Eretz Yisrael and turn it 
anew into the Jewish homeland. To protect its space, land and legitimacy from the internal-
external Palestinian threat, the state anchored its entire legal lexicon in the bifurcation of 
‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’, and enshrined privilege, rights and ownership according to this 
distinction.  
                                                          
11
 The innate link between the structure of the settler-colonial/ethno-national state and the forms of victimisation 
it imposes on the Palestinian citizens, is a common thread throughout the body of literature on this case. The 
debate surrounding this approach to the social-political context in Israel is further elaborated below, and in the 
following chapter. As well, for some examples of this argument, see: Lustick (1980); Yiftachel (1999); Kedar 
(2003); Pappé (2011); White (2012); Naamnih (2013); Molavi (2013); and Hamdan-Saliba (2014).  
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The initial constructors of Zionist statehood formalised the process of inclusion and exclusion 
in two key laws, which established separate, hierarchical legal categories for Jewish and 
Palestinian citizens. These were The Law of Return (1950), which stipulated that all Jews can 
immigrate to Israel on the basis of an innate right to nationality in the Jewish state; and The 
Nationality Law (1952), which stipulated who has access to citizenship, differentiating 
between those who have the right of ‘Return’ as nationals (Jews), and those who needed to be 
registered and naturalised, based on their presence in the country at the time of the state’s 
establishment (Arabs)
12
. This institutionalised the confiscation and control of the Israeli space 
and assigned the state, not to its ‘citizens’, which included Arabs and Jews, but, exclusively, 
to the Jewish people, whether inside or outside the country
13
.  
The state then developed a series of ‘containers’ through which to maintain these tensions. It 
orchestrated a 20 year military regime that prevented free movement and access to the state’s 
social, economic or political institutions. A legal and planning machinery was then devised to 
outline and constrict Palestinian space within the state, evolving into the primary constrictor 
of Palestinian growth and development, after the military administration was dismantled in 
1966. In parallel to these, the state designed a “procedural democracy” that hid the essence of 
the state’s erasures, discriminations and exclusions in liberal mechanisms and neutral, rights-
based rhetoric (Robinson, 2013)
14
. These came to constitute the matrix through which land 
and people have been colonised in Israel, constructing the basic outlines within and against 
which the Palestinian citizens have negotiated their identities, narratives and experiences of 
the Jewish state.  
The state has built this system in order to protect itself from its internal Palestinian other, 
creating boxes and ghettos that aim to segregate and remove Palestinians from its core 
territorial project. However, this is not the whole picture, as the lines and borders produced 
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 See Robinson (2013) for a recent discussion of how the laws were developed and promulgated into the 
essential framework of Israel’s legal regime; see also previous dealings with the topic in Lustick (1980); 
Kretzmer (1990); Rouhana (1997); Kedar (2003); Hussein & McKay (2003); and Holzman-Gazit (2007).  
13
 In addition to the citizenship/nationality division, this process was orchestrated, in part, by granting a share of 
the state’s power and authority to the same extraterritorial Jewish organisations that bankrolled the Zionist 
settler-project before the establishment of the state (i.e. the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Federation). In 
light of their particular involvement in planning, settlement and land-policy, Israel’s Palestinian citizens are 
prevented from purchasing, leasing, or using land in around 80% of the country (Yiftachel, 1999). See also 
Kedar (2003); Lustick (1980); and Hussein & McKay (2003) for further elaborations of this argument. 
14
 Details of these legal and planning mechanisms are explored in the individual case chapters, and (as 
mentioned above) tables of the most relevant land and planning laws are included in the Appendices section of 
this thesis. There are, technically, hundreds that constitute the full list of laws affecting land and space in Israel.  
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through the logics of Judaisation
15
 constantly evolve in everyday and catalytic encounters 
between the state and its Palestinian citizens. These internal others are still present, still part 
of this place, and still have claims on it; which is why the state works so hard to excise them 
from it. In response, the Palestinian citizens fight to carve themselves from the erasures of the 
state, resisting ongoing efforts to strangle, remove and replace them. This research is 
concerned with how this othered community – contained, excluded, internal and threatening – 
pushes against these boundary lines. It examines the unruly practices of collective and 
individual protest, resistance and dissonance, looking for how Palestinian citizens inform and 
engage the lines the state has constructed to hold them. It looks for the inevitable clashes 
between Israeli state power and Palestinian-citizen resistance on these border-lines, which are 
activated and unveiled as they are challenged and encroached upon. These points of 
contention – the sites of contact, conflict, resistance and struggle – between Palestinian 
citizens and the ethno-national, settler-colonial Israeli state, are pivotal in understanding how 
the subaltern other engages with the system of power, and informs the trajectory of this 
relationship as well as the colonial geography that surrounds them.   
Anchoring the Research – a Lacuna in the Field 
There is a preoccupation among critical researchers of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, to see 
this group mainly in terms of their victimisation by the Israeli state, and what this 
victimisation means to understanding the Zionist, settler-colonial framework in which they 
are situated. This body of research, exemplified in the works of Zureik (1979), S. Jiryis 
(1976), Lustick (1980), Shafir (1989), Rouhana (1997), Yiftachel (2006), Ghanem (2001), 
White (2009) and Pappé (2011), has been exceptionally important to changing the way 
research on Israel is developed. These studies have participated in challenging the tradition of 
academic myopia to the histories and experiences of Palestinian citizens. They have also 
broken down the theoretical and political walls that prevent linking the Zionist state to the 
larger bodies of work that deal with colonialism, conflict, apartheid/ethnic regimes and 
power. However, there is a tendency in these studies to disregard the multiple, contradictory 
and evolving relations that constitute both the state and the Palestinians within it, in order to 
critique the production of the Palestinian subaltern in Israel. Moreover, as these researchers 
emphasize the Palestinian-citizen community’s victimisation by the system, they tend to 
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 The terms ‘Judaisation’ and ‘Judaise’ are discussed extensively throughout this thesis, as the particular 
expression of Zionist colonisation. It has taken different forms throughout the territories under Israeli control, 
but primarily refers to the methods by which Palestinian space is reconfigured by Jewish ‘presence’, either 
through direct settlement, or mechanisms of spatial and political control.  
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overlook their agency in and resistance to the strucures of the Zionist state. Through this 
prism, the structure of power becomes intrinsic and permanent; and its victims, in the words 
of Ian Lustick (1980), ‘passive’, ‘acquiescent’ and ‘quiet’. We lose sight of the ordinary and 
extraordinary resistances that have become endemic to Palestinian life in Israel, and how 
these contribute to and change the dynamics of power. 
This research attempts to introduce empirical study of Palestinian-citizen struggle in light of 
these silences. It works with different locations of Palestinian struggles for land and space in 
order to examine the evolving contradictions that stem from a multiplicity of modes of 
exclusion and inclusion. These locations are sites through which to examine the contact 
zones; to understand the essence of what it means to struggle from ‘inside’ the state’s 
political paradigm, while at the same time being outside it. By ‘inside’, this study does not 
propose that Palestinian citizens are integrated or assimilated into the state, nor that they seek 
to be. That said, it does acknowledge the complexity of this history: Some communities and 
individuals did and do look for their survival within the state’s framework, and some 
unintentional results of Palestinian-citizen resistance integrate the community further into the 
system of power. Rather, ‘inside’ refers to the community’s steadfast and enduring 
resistances against a multitude of erasures; to their ongoing and embedded Sumud
16
, as 
Palestinians within the state.  
There is a need to unveil Palestinian-citizen struggle on the seam lines of inclusion and 
exclusion; to acknowledge and analyse how Palestinian space is reclaimed within Israel, and 
the multiple forms, practices and arenas in which it takes place. Seeing these practices as part 
of the trajectories of both the state and Palestinian experiences of the state, contributes a new 
lens on how we see relations of power – in this context and in the larger field of study that 
looks at resistance and struggle in general. It contributes new understandings of ethnic 
regimes, settler-colonial states and systems of domination, assuming that it is not only the 
greed
17
 for land, space, resources and control, but the encounter with the resistant and 
resilient indigenous community, ethnic other and dominated groups, that drives these 
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 The Arabic term Sumud appears throughout this thesis and is discussed more extensively in the following 
chapters. The term was initially conceived in reference to a category of non-violent resistance developed within 
the Palestinian context. It means ‘steadfastness’ or ‘resilience’ and is often used to describe Palestinian struggles 
that are, literally, ‘grounded’, in holding onto their lands, against appropriation by the state.   
17
 Understanding systems of domination in terms of their “greed" for land and capital, stems from the literature 
on settler colonialism, discussed in the next chapter. See in particular Veracini (2010), Ram (1993) and Shafir 
(1989), for more elaborate analyses in utilising this prism.   
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projects. It endeavours to argue that structures of power are not permanent, that change is part 
of history, and that the agents of change come from multiple places, people and actions.  
Situating Struggle in Land and Space – Questions and Potential Answers 
“In response to the Israeli establishment’s efforts to Judaise Palestinian space and 
consciousness, the Palestinian movement in all of its currents has worked to entrench 
Palestinian steadfastness and dignity. Despite the various processes facing Palestinians in 
Israel, (we) have remained strong and held our heads up high. For decades, the Israeli 
authorities have played a carrot-and-stick game to transform Palestinians into a servile 
minority called “Arab-Israelis”; a minority with no connection to their Palestinian identity, 
with a collective amnesia of their relationship with the land around them and of the ongoing 
crimes committed against them and most importantly, loyal to their jailers.” 
Sami Abu Shehadeh & Fadi Shbayta, ‘Jaffa: From Eminence to Ethnic Cleansing’, 2009, 
p.13 
This research explores the complexities of Palestinian-citizen struggle, contained and 
embedded within the Zionist, settler-colonial state. It is a study of how the subaltern, ethnic 
other, which is both inside and outside the hegemonic political order, engages and reshapes 
the truncated arenas in which this struggle is housed. It looks at the web of relations that are 
activated through the encounter between the coloniser and colonised. That is, the ethnicised 
borders, the stratification of rights and access, the bifurcation – and bombardment – of space 
and peoples; but also the sites of contention, the enclaves of everyday resistance and survival, 
and the public acts of protest and provocation. The emphasis is on the shared frontiers, and 
the lines that determine the locus of power and resistance in the control and ownership over 
land and space. Through this lens, this research seeks to unravel the puzzle, not merely of 
how power and resistance impact one another, but how each transforms the other in an 
ongoing dialectic of entanglements, negotiations, permeations and clashes.  
In essence, this thesis explores how structures of Israeli state power are disrupted, challenged 
and changed through the Palestinian citizens’ perpetual struggle for land and space. It works 
with the complexities of subaltern resistance, which is both inside and outside, integral and 
external to the Zionist paradigm. It also contributes to an attempt to shift focus away from 
debates on the shape and structure of the State, which tend to dominate this field of study
 18
. 
A series of questions have acted as the anchor for this research. They ask: What impacts and 
shapes Palestinian-citizen resistance to the power dynamics of the settler-colonial/ethno-
national state? How do we categorise ordinary and extraordinary resistances, in a context 
where struggle is intrinsic and everyday? Is it possible to reclaim and radicalise Palestinian 
                                                          
18
 These debates are discussed more extensively in Chapter One. 
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spaces within the Zionist state; if so, how and when? And, finally, how does Palestinian-
citizen resistance impact, engage, subvert and transcend the borders constructed to contain it?  
To answer these questions, the thesis examines three contemporary cases of Palestinian 
community land struggles. The first is a popular movement for housing rights – and thus 
survival – in Palestinian neighbourhoods of Jaffa-Tel Aviv, a primarily Jewish metropolitan 
city; the second is the Palestinian citizens’ enduring protest movement against the Judaization 
project in the Galilee region, since Land Day; and the third is the struggle for land rights by 
the Bedouin-Arab communities living in the Unrecognised Villages of the Naqab, discussed 
above as the essence of the anti-Prawer demonstrations. Individually and collectively, these 
three cases exemplify the dialectic encounter investigated through this research: the multiple 
processes employed in the colonial appropriations of Palestine, and the evolution of an 
endogenic, indigenous struggle over land and space, in response.  
Each of these cases shares and contributes to the overarching experience of what it means to 
be Palestinian in Israel. Each case is contained within and inducted into the political and 
spatial order of the State. Each represents the material expression of this tension, persisting as 
Palestinian enclaves, ghettos and frontiers; spaces that are always under siege, increasingly 
constricted and strangled, intentionally segregated from and illegitimate within the 
hegemonic order. Each produces ‘struggle’ in relation to the deep chasms and fractures that 
colour the ethno-national, settler-colonial landscape; and is anchored in the fight for 
Palestinian land and space within the Judaising enclosures of the Israeli state.  
At the same time, the State built particular containers into its colonial geographies, in relation 
to the different communities it encountered in these particular places. Therefore, the cases 
each hold their own spatial and social relationships. These, in turn, have produced different 
lines and borders with the State, as well as different forms of struggle through which to 
engage, provoke and challenge them. For example, the Jaffa case describes struggle, as it is 
evolved by a poor and weakened community, from within space it shares with middle and 
upper classes of Jewish-Israelis, at the centre of the country. The community’s struggle is 
about claiming a place to be Palestinian, against and within the daily siege it encounters as a 
neighbourhood inside the Mixed City
19
 of neoliberal, cosmopolitan Tel Aviv. The Galilee 
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 The spatial configuration of the ‘Mixed City’ is a label devised by the Israeli state for urban spaces in Israel 
that include a ‘substantial’ number of Palestinian residents in a primarily Jewish settlement. The label is used for 
the purpose of devising appropriate services and infrastructure for a ‘bi-national’ community, in a country where 
very few arenas are considered officially ‘mixed’. The significance and impact of the Mixed City on the struggle 
of Palestinian citizens is discussed extensively in the case chapter on Jaffa (Chapter Two). 
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case describes struggle that has evolved from the periphery of the country, in an area in 
which the Palestinian citizens make up the demographic majority and have built their social 
and political structures away, but never removed from the power centres of the state. The 
Northern struggle functions to bolster the borders that maintain the space as a stronghold 
against Judaisation; and that protect and strengthen the residents’ capacity for autonomy vis à 
vis the Zionist political project. The Naqab case describes resistance as it evolves in places 
the state erased from the map, from within ‘non-spaces’ allegedly outside the regulations of 
law and planning. It deals with the paradox of the Bedouins’ struggle to be recognised 
in/through formal institutional mechanisms that are explicitly anchored in the erasures of 
Palestinian indigenous space.  Each case unveils a unique and extensive spectrum of 
resistance practices, in light of the dialectic of spatial-social relations. At the same time, they 
collectively describe the repertoires of a political practice situated in and against Israeli 
Zionist productions of space. These necessarily include ‘ordinary’, ‘everyday’ acts of 
Palestinian-citizen resistance and the ‘extraordinary acts’ of protest that bring the 
interlocutors of this struggle into direct contact with the borders that contain them. As shall 
be discussed throughout this thesis, for Palestinian citizens of Israel, struggle is an innate part 
of their lives, and thus acts of contention include those that resist erasures in daily life, as 
much as those that mobilise thousands into the street. Each can become either ordinary or 
extraordinary ‘moments’, in their ability to disrupt and reshape the constantly evolving 
boundaries that the state constructs in its attempts to contend with challenges to its spatial 
controls.  
Palestinian-citizen resistances build from and are layered into one another, as a spectrum of 
intersecting actions. The anti-Prawer demonstrations were borne out of the resilience and 
resistance of the Bedouins living in unrecognised spaces for more than 60 years. Land Day 
developed out of long-term, everyday and politicised struggles against the Judaisation 
project. Conscious and unconscious, organised and unorganised practices are anchored in the 
cases of Jaffa, the Galilee and the Naqab; and, together, they engage in the larger, collective 
project to push back the state, to reclaim and hold onto Palestinian spaces, each in their own 
way.  
At the same time, the different spatial-social locations of Palestinian resistance are not 
exclusively informed by their relationship with the Zionist settler project. A grid of multiple 
subjectivities is articulated in the act of carving out Palestinian space in Israel. National 
identity intersects with and is mediated by divisions of gender, ethnicity, religious practice 
24 
 
and affiliation, class and geography; but also, because of the schisms of 1948, divisions 
between the urban and the rural, and between those able to remain on their land and those 
who were displaced, further determine one’s experience, position and status within the 
resistance community. Sharpened by the stratifications of the colonial space, these divisions 
inform the way resistance is experienced, performed and perceived. They take us beyond the 
monolithic analysis of ‘Palesitnians’ as homogenous group20, and enable a more complex 
understanding of the dialectics of struggle and power. Within each case, there are intra-group 
tensions and fragmentations, power struggles between dominant and subordinant groups, 
shifting alliances and opposing positions and politics: Women take up different leadership 
roles in the struggle in Jaffa than they do in the Northern political sphere. Secular and 
religious divides play an important role in the Galilee case, but are less relevant in 
discussions of the Naqab. Hierarchies are entrenched in the possession of land in the Naqab, 
but not as much in Jaffa. It is beyond the scope of this thesis –whose focus is on the dialectics 
of struggle and power between Palestinian citizens and the state – to highlight and compare 
these different intersections and divisions, within and between cases. However, they do play 
an intricate part in understanding the Palestinian communities at the heart of this study, and 
are part of the stories of resistance discussed in the forthcoming chapters
21
. 
Evolving Methods of Inquiry 
“What is a map? For the colonizer, it was a plan of action and a testament to conquest. It 
was a blank piece of paper awaiting those who were allowed to draw lines. Lines were 
supposed to be clear, marking boundaries…In such times, mapping becomes a form of 
resistance. But in the era of GIS and GPS, maps do not only describe physical features. The 
map indexes debt, deprivation and destruction that the colonial power would prefer to remain 
invisible—so that these conditions are recognized as normal and acceptable, as if they are a 
part of the landscape itself.”  
Michael Hardt, ‘Palestine: Cartography of an Occupation’, 2013 
This study evolved in the process of collecting the stories of struggle that constitute the major 
focus of this thesis. Each case holds together the multifarious actors and actions that drive 
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 While beyond the scope of this research, the same intersectional analysis must be applied to Jewish-Israelis, in 
light of their different experiences of the state’s colonial legacy, which in turn informs their different 
perspectives on and contributions to Palestinian-citizen struggle. For additional research on intersectional 
subjectivities and divisions within Israeli-Jewish society, see Abdo & Yuval-Davis (1995), Kleiman (1987), 
Shafir (1989), Tzfadia & Yacobi (2011) and Natanel (2012, 2014).     
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 For additional discussion and research on intersectional divisions within Palestinian communities (all of 
which intersect with the settler-colonial bifurcations of people and space), see Jamal (2011) and Ghanem (2001) 
on fragmented politics; McGahern (2011) and Cook (2012c) on religious divisions; on spatial-class divisions, 
see Yacobi (2011) and Raja Khalidi (1988); and for a gendered analysis of Palestinian-citizen struggle, see 
Hamdan-Saliba (2014). For a narrative, literary view of the divisions in Palestinian communities, see Sayed 
Kashua’s (2006), Let it Be Morning.       
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resistance; and methods of inquiry involved the comprehensive collation of data from an 
extensive range of individuals, practices, documents, plans, policies, maps, images and 
performances from each of the cases. Resistance, as shall be discussed throughout this thesis, 
is chaotic, ongoing and difficult to capture in a set of boxes, episodes, moments or linear 
‘movements’. The cases offer a concrete anchor through which to investigate and understand 
Palestinian struggle as it develops, evolves and transforms; in its many moments of ordinary 
and extraordinary resistances.  
Data collection began in the summer of 2011, with a set of semi-structured interviews with 
key interlocutors
22
 from each of the cases. These offered initial insights into the histories and 
evolutions of the different land struggles, which snowballed into more interviews, visits to 
different sites of contention, and access to different tools and arenas of protest. A mosaic of 
practices and practitioners unfolded as I was invited to join demonstrations, community 
events, public performances and campaign movement meetings, from each of the cases. 
However, the essence and shape of this research only took concrete form as I toured the 
different sites of struggle, with guides from within the different communities. These 
interlocutors shared the histories of their homes, narrating their experiences with the 
structures of power, while unveiling the multiple layers that constitute Palestinian space.  
Through the lens of Atef Abu Rabia, a local Bedouin-Arab resident and activist from the 
Unrecognised Villages, I visited the spatial apartheids embedded in the Naqab. He introduced 
me to the harsh reality of Bedouin living-space, which exists outside the legality and 
protections of the state, and includes daily demolitions and extensive state violence, as well 
as living without water, municipal infrastructures or state services. With him, I saw the kind 
of struggles that have emerged on the ground to resist and redefine the state’s vision for 
‘dealing’ with the unruly and ungovernable Bedouin settlements.  
I walked through Jaffa’s Palestinian ghetto-neighbourhood, Ajami, with Sami Abu 
Shehadeh
23, a resident and key activist in the protest against the community’s ‘quiet transfer’ 
from the neighbourhood. He spotlighted the sites of ethnic gentrification alongside the 
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 The term ‘interlocutor’ is intentionally used throughout this thesis in lieu of ‘interviewee’. The term more 
accurately captures the active and ongoing dialogue between mysekf and those who guided my study of 
Palestinian-citizen struggle. Those individuals whom I interviewed, visited and observed in sites and acts of 
protest were not objective observers of nor passive participants in social phenomena, but stakeholders in the 
production of struggle in this context. The term further acknowledges these actors as essential links between the 
struggle, as it is practiced, and my way of conceptualising and writing about it.  
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 It should be noted that a second ‘Abou Shhadeh’ appears in this study, under this different spelling. The 
interlocutor’s name is Abed Abou Shhadeh, and he is Sami’s first cousin. The distinct spelling is not an 
accident. It respects the way each spells their own name in English, in articles, on facebook and in their email 
addresses.  
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condemned buildings that house the weakest residents of the neighbourhood. I saw evidence 
of the erasures of the city’s Palestinian past, overtaken by Jewish memorials, symbols, 
famous names and images. He also took me through the sites that house the community’s 
political theatre; the streets, buildings and public squares where Palestinian identity and 
protest reclaim the urban space.  
Shadi Shbeta
24
, a resident of the Galilee and part of its professional political community, took 
me through the cities and villages that make up the alienated Palestinian enclave. He exposed 
me to the infrastructure of ‘separation’: the gated agricultural communities that house the 
limited number of Jews that live in the region; the spatial, social and economic differences 
between Nazareth, the largest Arab city in Israel,  and Upper Nazareth, a Jewish settlement 
town with infinitely more resources and development potential than its ‘lower’ neighbour; 
and the highways, railway lines and utility works that run through the landscape, dividing 
Arab localities and infringing on their growth and land-usage. He also took me to his home 
town, which is embroiled in a battle against the state and its Jewish neighbours, in an attempt 
to reclaim lands that were appropriated for Jewish settlements 60 years previously. 
These journeys unveiled the material articulations of power and struggle, in space and daily 
life. However, they were not the only ones. I visited the sites of villages destroyed during the 
Nakba and afterwards, in the Galilee and in the Naqab. On multiple occasions, I visited the 
site of a village in the Naqab called al-Araqib. The village has been destroyed more than 65 
times in four years, as its residents continue to inhabit it, protesting its destruction by 
continuously attempting to rebuild it. I visited the Mixed City of Acre, whose old city is 
struggling against similar acts of gentrification and Jewish infiltrations as Jaffa. I also visited 
Haifa more than a dozen times, as a witness to its evolution as the new centre for Palestinian 
political action and professional politics. I visited Rahat and Lakiya, both ‘Planned 
townships’ in the Naqab; as well as Karmiel and Saknin, which feature as key sites of conflict 
in the chapter on the Galilee. Finally, I spent a day in the town of Jisr al-Zarqa, the only 
Palestinian-citizen locality to retain its lands on the Israeli coast. This town is dealing with 
the impact of a long history of social and political exclusions, expressed acutely in a wall that 
divides it from one of the country’s richest Jewish localities, a neighbourhood of Caesaria 
where Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu has his own house. Walking through this town, 
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 It should be noted that there is also a second ‘Shbayta’ in this study, whose name appears in public fora 
according to this alternative spelling. The interlocutor’s name is ‘Fadi Shbayta’ and he is an activist from the 
Jaffa case.     
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one is exposed to the essence of spatial apartheid in Israel, and its impact on one of Israel’s 
weakest and poorest communities.   
Between July 2011 and July 2014, I interviewed over one hundred different interlocutors 
from the cases; many of whom I spoke to on more than one occasion, and some of whom I 
continue to speak to, asking questions and following up with details they shared while I was 
still in the field. Several have also read different versions of the case chapters, and continue to 
offer advice and insight into what is happening on the ground. I interviewed 
residents/activists from the different sites of struggle, as well as politicians, planners, lawyers, 
academics, employees and directors of Palestinian-citizen NGOs, and journalists involved in 
the different struggles.  
The interviews were held primarily in Hebrew and English, although several were conducted 
in Arabic. As a non-Arabic speaker, I worked with Arabic-speaking ‘guides’ from the local 
communities I visited; individuals active in the community, and able to act as both 
interlocutors and translators. In particular, this was a key component of conducting interviews 
in the Naqab, which were held primarily in Arabic, with non-professional and grassroots 
activists and residents. However, even when language wasn’t an issue, I entered new 
communities with key leaders from the different struggles. This enabled me to move past 
many of the innate obstacles that come with being an outsider, without the ability to speak the 
local language. This was especially poignant as an Israeli-Jewish woman, whose position of 
ethnic privilege will always act as a potential barrier to developing trust in this context. This 
was also the main reason I interviewed several key interlocutors multiple times, coming back 
every few months to advance my conversations with local activists, and unravel some of the 
performances and tropes that I encountered in my first meetings. Working slowly and 
gradually to break down many of the walls that tend to persist between researcher and 
community, Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian-citizen, I gained access to critical materials, 
insights and individuals that would have otherwise been restricted to me. At the same time, I 
recognise that language, nationality and distance may always mediate my relationships in 
Israel/Palestine. These are issues I continue to invest in and attempt to work beyond, by 
strengthening my local connections, learning Arabic and expanding my knowledge of the 
communities with which I work.  
Over these last three years, I visited each community of activists and residents multiple times, 
sitting in tents, in houses, in public and open spaces, listening to stories of oppression and 
resistance. Additional observations were gleaned through the documentation of the different 
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practices of protest and their perceived impact on Israeli policy. These were taken from civil 
society reports, newspaper articles, youtube videos, government policy documents, UN and 
international foreign ministry documents
25
. I also joined protests, attended sit-ins and 
conferences, and participated in workshops and public community meetings; I sat in cafes, in 
theatres, in universities, in parks. I observed the safe and unsafe spaces for community 
resistance; and the norms, habits and provocations of Palestinian political practice. Finally, 
woven throughout these materials and experiences are the maps, the physical plans, the 
boundaries, the borders and the aesthetics of the dialectic encounters of power and resistance, 
in space.  
Brought together, the micro-moments of the cases coalesce as a window into the 
entanglements of power and resistance; how they inform, produce and reproduce the other. 
They describe how struggle intersects with the colonial programme, and, more importantly, 
unveil the processes by which the structures of power are disrupted, transcended and 
transformed. At the same time, I do not negate the fact that this lens stems from my own bias 
and position within this conflict, as a Jewish Canadian and Israeli woman, integrally tied to 
the country, by law and through family. As a non-Zionist, I seek ways through which to 
change the country, and the relations of people on the ground. For this reason, I attend 
protests, work with advocacy organisations, and have developed my professional career in 
human rights and Israeli/Palestinian politics. I am looking at the struggle of Palestinians as 
both a diagnostic of resistance, and as a diagnostic of power; for how the structures of the 
ethnically exclusive and racist settler-colonial state can be challenged and reshaped, for the 
sake of a genuinely shared space. I have worked with theoretical and empirical triangulations, 
coming back to my research community often for advice and checks to my analysis and 
argument. However, I acknowledge that I am also working with my own assumption and 
hope that the acts of struggle I witnessed can disarticulate the field of force that surrounds 
them, and thus contribute to changing its path.  
Structure of this Thesis 
The thesis is structured to develop and evolve the story of Palestinian struggle. It moves from 
a theoretical discussion of how struggle engages, intersects with and transforms relations of 
power, into the empirical details of how Palestinian citizens encounter the Israeli state. It 
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 The majority of materials were in English, Hebrew and Arabic. As a reader of Hebrew and Arabic (in addition 
to English), I translated much of these myself, and worked with translators for some of the longer materials in 
Arabic. 
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aims to understand struggle as a vehicle of change, and the thesis concludes as a window into 
how this ‘change’ evolves through acts that retain and reclaim Palestinian spaces inside 
Israel. 
Chapter One reviews the main bodies of literature that analyse the dialectics of power and 
struggle. It develops a conceptual framework, in light of the particular context of Palestinian 
citizens, as present and absent, included and excluded, within and yet outside the political and 
spatial structures of the Zionist state. The main debates deal with questions of hegemonic 
power, and the spectrum for resistance, contentious politics, and spatial struggles that develop 
in relation to the settler-colonial/ethno-national order.  
Chapters Two through Four make up the bulk of the thesis. They unveil the moments and 
trajectories of Palestinian-citizen struggle, as they evolve in each case; first in Ajami/Jaffa, 
then the Galilee, and finally, in the Naqab. Each chapter chronicles a story from the case that 
exemplifies the complexity of the community’s relationship with the state. In the Jaffa Case, 
the chapter starts with the tale of a resident of Ajami fighting against her eviction from the 
neighbourhood. In the Galilee Case, the chapter follows the story of Land Day as the initiator 
of a new set of social and spatial relations between its Palestinian residents and the state. In 
the Naqab Case, the chapter starts with the explosive destruction and extensive resilience of 
al-Araqib, and the village’s intersections with a long term struggle for recognition by all 
Unrecognised Villages. Each chapter then moves on to discuss how the particular bounded 
space evolves, impacts and frames relations of power; how these relations are activated and 
informed by the community’s resistance practices; and how the struggle, itself, is embedded 
in and interacts with the space in which it is housed. However, more than anything, each 
describes the lived-experience of the Palestinian citizens’ struggles, and their ordinary and 
extraordinary resistances against the borders that attempt to confine and define them. 
The fifth and final chapter offers a comparative analysis of the three cases. In it, a theory is 
articulated for how to understand struggle in its relationship with power, and the spaces that 
are produced and transformed in the encounter and entanglement between them.  
A Last Thought about Borders and Shared Space 
“No border can really pass between these two peoples, because the land is one, and the story – 
convoluted and complex as it may be – is shared by both.”  
Hillel Cohen, 1929: Year Zero of the Jewish-Arab Conflict, 2013 
The colonial story is all about building borders: dividing communities, restricting their access 
to resources, and ensuring they don’t encounter one another except under strictly imposed 
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conditions. As Yuval Ben-Ami (2012), an Israeli-Jewish blogger, political activist and travel-
writer, explains through his journey through/to the borders, Israel, itself, is obsessed with 
them. There is a ‘Blue Line’ that separates Israel from Lebanon, marked by an electric fence 
and border guards. There is a ‘Green Line’, the most well-known of Israel’s boundary lines, 
which separates Israel from the Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; a border 
fence and checkpoints mark the majority of these divisions, and outposts with gunmen sit at 
intervals along each side. There is even a ‘Red Line’ running through East and West 
Jerusalem, to remind us of where Jordan once ended and Israel once began, and which 
effectively continues to split the city by language, by appearance, by religion, by municipal 
services and by rights (Ben Ami, 2012). Finally, there is a 20 foot wall that separates Israeli 
‘seam territories’ – land inside the West Bank, beyond the Green Line – from Palestinian 
occupied territories and people.  
However, the essence of this research is consumed with the internal fixtures and lines that 
bifurcate space – and life – inside Israel: the blue lines that appear on planning documents as 
a way of surrounding Palestinian localities and defining their rights and limits to 
development; or the roads and train lines that bypass Arab towns and further incise the 
landscape between those who use the space, and those who control it. There are ‘lines’ that 
are abruptly clear, as with the wall that divides Jisr al-Zarqa from Caesarea; or the ones that 
divide rich Jewish neighbourhoods from poor Palestinian ones within the Mixed Cities of 
Lydda and Ramle. There are those that are less visible, like the lines that protect Jewish space 
in Tel Aviv from infiltration by Palestinian residents of Jaffa, but not the other way around. 
Finally, there are those that don’t exist at all, as with the Unrecognised Villages that have no 
borders, no jurisdictions, nothing to distinguish them from the allegedly ‘empty space’ 
around them.  
These borders express the state’s desire to protect itself from its internal paradox; from the 
spaces inhabited by its own citizens, their histories, their experiences and their ongoing 
claims to this place. The borders are activated, as these citizens challenge, transgress and 
disarticulate the way in which the state attempts to assert its colonial map onto Palestinian 
spaces. However, as this thesis clearly demonstrates, the Palestinian citizens are not so easily 
containable or erasable, and encounters with them – in the entanglements of resistance and 
power, but also in the everyday experience of sharing space – are inherently part of the living 
and lived experience of both peoples.  
31 
 
There is a clash between the colonial story and the reality on the ground. The desire to 
segregate and separate the Zionist project from the material reality of a shared-geography is 
impossible. Through this study, we unravel what this means for the trajectory of Palestinian-
citizen resistance, for a people surrounded by borders, and yet are integral to the production 
of this space. The remaining chapters of this thesis constitute an attempt at resolving this 
puzzle. 
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Chapter 1: Dialectics of Power and Resistance – Theoretical Concepts 
“In politics, the siege is a reciprocal one, despite all appearances, and the mere fact that the 
ruler has to muster all his resources demonstrates how seriously he takes his adversary.”  
Antonio Gramsci, ‘Excerpts from the Prison Notebooks’, 1999, p.496 
Introduction – The theoretical acid test  
In this thesis, the theoretical terrain traverses the dialectics of power and resistance. 
Following the perennial statement in Michel Foucault’s work on this subject, struggle and 
power are ever in conversation, ever in contention; framing, shaping, reforming and 
reshaping one another. Resistance and power are relational, each clashing with and 
permeating their other. At times, they move with perfect fluidity, at times they dislodge, 
dislocate and displace one another. But they are always moving, always unfinished; changing 
through their intersections and interactions (Tripp, 2013). The debates that are explored here 
are anchored in these moments of engagement, alternating as sites of struggle and 
acquiescence, resilience and transformations. The foundational dispute is in how to 
understand resistance: its agents and trajectories, its obstacles and impacts. At its core, this is 
a question about how struggle evolves; how it encounters the dynamics of power and 
domination; and how it changes the trajectory of social and political relations, of which it is a 
part. This is the essential lens through which this thesis explores the evolving resistances of 
the Palestinian citizens of Israel, embedded in and surrounded by the matrix of ethnic, liberal-
colonial logics of the Israeli state.   
In this thesis, Palestinian-citizen struggle is approached without abstracting from the socio-
political context in which it takes place. The theoretical discussion of power and resistance 
are immediately anchored in their exercise by particular actors, in a particular territory, 
through the social relations that emerge in this place, through their particular encounters. To 
theorise resistance is to understand the structures within and against which it emerges; it does 
not function in a vacuum. It is lived, experienced, produced and transformed by real people, 
their bodies and lives existing in real places
26. To quote David Harvey (1989), “the acid test 
of any set of theoretical propositions comes when we seek to relate them to the experience of 
history and to the practice of politics.” (p.73)  
Thus, the starting point for understanding the dialectic trajectories of power and resistance is 
the historical-material fact of the symbiotic relationship of Israeli and Palestinian 
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 This paraphrases Henri Lefebvre’s (1991) disdain for the semiotic fetish for abstractions, in which he 
explains: “This space was produced before being read; nor was it produced in order to be read and grasped, but 
rather in order to be lived by people with bodies and lives in their own particular urban context.” (p. 143)   
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nationalisms, identities, narratives and lived and living experiences – despite the attempt of 
Zionist historiographers to erase the connection (Kimmerling & Peled, 2003; Shafir, 1989; 
Kretzmer,1990; Piterberg, 2008; Cohen, 2013; Lockman, 1996). As Gershon Shafir (1989) 
argues in his analysis of the settler-colonial legacy of the Israeli state, "it was essentially in 
the context of this national conflict that both the Jewish and Arab sides assumed their modern 
identities. It transformed the Jewish immigrants into Israelis, and the inchoate Zionism of 
Eastern Europe into the concrete practices of Israeli state and nation formation. The Arab 
residents of Palestine developed their own distinct nationalism and became Palestinians in the 
same context.” (p.5) In accordance with Shafir, it is in the clash between the two, their 
physical and ideological conflicts in and over space that power and resistance take form. 
More complex analyses also allow for multidimensional encounters between the two, as in 
Lockman’s (1996) study of Arab and Jewish labour relations during Mandate Palestine, 
where he argues that conflict is not the only determinant in the production of Israeli-
Palestinian relations. Others allow for larger frames of impact, as is the case in Rashid 
Khalidi’s (2010) study of the construction of Palestinian identities, in which he argues that 
Palestinian identity has been shaped by much more than its contest with Zionism; he 
references other colonial powers, and the Arab world as key interlocutors in this process. 
However, it remains clear that in ‘reading’ the social and political landscapes of Israel-
Palestine, the structures and apparatuses of Israeli power are a window into how Palestinian-
citizen resistances have been framed, trapped as they are within Israeli space. They are also a 
window into the tools and capacity of these communities to challenge and transcend limits, 
borders and boundaries defined by the state. From the grounded analysis of how power and 
resistance intersect atop the Israeli-Palestinian landscape, it will be possible to develop a 
conceptual analysis of struggle through its engagement with and transformation of the arena 
of power in and against which it functions.  
Part I – The Dialectics of Power and Resistance 
The chapter that follows is an attempt to understand struggle as a grounded, real and 
relational experience; to see it in terms of its intersections with the field of force that both 
surrounds and permeates it. The key theoretical challenge, then, is to analyse the Palestinian 
citizens as part of the trajectories of Zionist-Israel, as opposed to outside them; and yet to 
challenge the range of literature that utilise this same lens to invisibilise Palestinian citizens, 
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or see them as silent, disengaged or acquiescent to the systems of power and domination
27
. 
Here we understand the resistance of Palestinian citizens through their direct and insidious 
engagements with the structures that maintain their subordination within the Jewish state; 
‘structures’ that seek to separate, marginalise and contain a threat that its own national-
imaginations help to create, and ‘engagements’ that are politicized, conscious, powerful and 
radical, and getting louder with each passing day. As Antonio Gramsci (1999), quoted above, 
explains, a ‘siege’ is always reciprocal, breeding its other, its challengers. The struggle of 
Palestinian-citizens of Israel has evolved in response to an ongoing siege, which attacks their 
presence within the legal, political, geographic and narrative arenas of the state. Palestinian-
citizen politics are part of and inherent to the system they challenge; even as those politics 
manifest with unique voices, identities, needs and methods of struggle. Thus, the key debates 
in this section attempt to understand resistance through the space it inhabits, within the 
internal Palestinian frontier. The starting point – a well-travelled and still polarised academic 
terrain – is an analysis of the Israeli state, and the position of Palestinian citizens within it.  
Power and Hegemony: The Israeli State  
Constructing Consent – Through the Lens of Antonio Gramsci 
A range of buzzwords characterise the debates housed within the question of ‘what is Israel’. 
The spectrum includes conceptualisations of the Zionist state as a system of apartheid, as 
settler-colonialism, as an ethnocracy, as a liberal-settler state and even as an ethnic or Jewish 
democracy. The core of this debate begets the question of how deeply the policies 
surrounding the Jewishness, and thus exclusiveness of the state, run. The first step is in 
understanding this system – and the state – as a hegemonic order, a product and evolving 
process of an internalised and entrenched belief system. Hegemony is a loaded concept and 
one that accompanies many of the debates surrounding the labels, mentioned above
28
. 
However, it also offers a window into the depth and breadth of Zionist ideology, not only 
within Israel, but among Jews throughout the world; particularly in its nuanced exploration 
by Gramsci (1999) in his Prison Notebooks. To understand Zionism as a hegemonic project is 
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 See for example Rabinowitz (1997), in his embedded study of Palestinian citizens in Nazareth, and Lustick 
(1980), in his more general analysis of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, for this limited view of relations of 
power and resistance in Israel. See also Ranajit Guha (1997), Chakrabarty (2000) and Chakravorty-Spivak 
(1988), each studying peasant resistances in India, as well as James Scott (1984; 1990), who studies resistance-
practices of rural communities in Malaysia, for the limitations they also place on ‘subaltern’ resistances in 
colonial and post-colonial contexts; in their desire to give voice to subaltern struggle within the silencing 
discourses of elite readings of revolutionary processes, they limit their analyses to subaltern actions that remain 
outside and disengaged from the hegemonic order.  
28
 See Peleg (2004; 2007), and Yiftachel & Ghanem (2004), for their use of ‘hegemony’ as an analytical tool 
through which to understand the production of the Israeli state and its relationship with its Palestinian-citizens. 
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to understand Palestinian struggle in light of the entrenched walls and boundaries of the 
system against which and through which it evolves. It is to understand its ambiguities and its 
difficulties, in its peculiar existence outside and inside the Zionist political order; as the 
constructed other and – in light of the external conflict with the Palestinian people – an innate 
threat, in dialectic conversation with the hegemonic state.  
The term ‘hegemony’ has multiple uses, at times describing the systems of domination that 
are imposed by a single state over others; or a single class over the rest of society, through a 
set of simple alliances (Mouffe, 1979). In Gramsci, however, hegemony takes on more 
nuanced meaning. For him, the eternal puzzle is situated in understanding how a system of 
rule is produced and maintained; how it evolves through the praxis of individuals and groups 
that interact with the structures in which they are embedded, and, thus, how it can be 
changed. He conceives of hegemony as the capacity of one group to articulate the needs and 
interests of others, and integrate them within its world-view. Legitimacy is gained through a 
negotiation of interests, and in this way becomes more than the expression of a class-alliance. 
While coercion and force are an integral part of this negotiation, it is primarily grounded in 
the struggle for and attainment of active consent, through which a complex, contradictory and 
discordant ensemble of social relations is re-articulated as the collective will and common 
sense of society (Gramsci, 1999, p.690). This is what Gramsci calls an ‘historic bloc’, and the 
basis for cultivating a new ideological terrain, through which to see, experience and 
understand the world (ibid). What is especially relevant here for understanding how 
structures of power are challenged and changed is the process by which hegemony is 
constructed.  
In his analysis, Gramsci recognizes that the struggle for hegemony implies more than a 
mystification of the masses, and their implicit acquiescence to the dominant ideology of the 
ruling power (Mouffe & Laclau, 1985, p.4). Instead, the process by which consent is 
constructed is dynamic and complex. It involves the cultivation and articulation of a 
collective will, based on the mutual imposition of social norms from above, by those who 
legislate law and society; and from their living practice from below, by the masses (Gramsci, 
1999, p.438-439). Collective will becomes a material and ideological lens, activated and 
normalised through conscious as well as coerced and spontaneous consent, and integrated in 
all aspects of society, through the domains of civil and political life (ibid, p.502). In 
Gramsci’s thinking, hegemony is a living-praxis, an integral world-view that is internalised, 
reproduced and practiced through social relationships in society. 
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With understanding Gramsci’s hegemony as internalised, constituted, embodied and reproduced in the 
everyday practice of agents in social space, a complimentary theoretical terrain can be found in the 
work of French Sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977, 1984, 1990) conceptualisation of habitus. 
Habitus is Bourdieu’s “dispositional theory of action” (Wacquant, 2011, p.85), which – as is the case 
with Gramsci’s hegemony – recognises that while action is not merely the product of a personal will 
or individual, subjective choice, “agents are not passive beings pulled and pushed about by external 
forces, but skilful creatures who actively construct social reality." (ibid) In Bourdieu’s (1990) notion, 
habitus is “a product of history”, constituting and constituted by individual and collective practices 
(p.91). It functions as a “schemata” of dispositions, perceptions, preferences, tastes and appreciations, 
which are the product of collective and individual history (Bourdieu, 1977). It is further mediated and 
reconstituted through its constant interactions in the ‘social field’ (Bourdieu, 1984), which in turn, as 
Yuval-Davis (2011) explains, is further structured by “symbolically mediated relations of power.” 
(p.3) Durable and transposable, active and unconscious, habitus is “structured and structuring” 
(Bourdieu, 1990, p. 52); it both shapes and is shaped (and then reshaped) by practice. In this thesis, 
habitus is integrated into the theorisations of hegemony, in line with Charles Tripp’s (2013) 
discussion of the ‘norms and habits of power’. This analysis offers a way to understand how 
hegemony is structured, mediated, reproduced and disrupted in social space, as it is embodied and 
practised by individual agents
29
.  
Thus, hegemony is constructed, as opposed to determined or inevitable (ibid, p.450). It is a 
developing ‘organism’ that evolves, changes and is transformed, through its engagement with 
struggle (ibid, p.331). As a result, it is an unfinished and porous political process that is the 
story not of one group, or of an alliance of several, but of all elements in society, whether 
they are inside or outside, friend or enemy (ibid, p.358)
 30
. It is on this point that we begin to 
understand the relationship of the Palestinian citizens to the Israeli hegemonic order. Even 
those groups subaltern to the hegemonic project, which neither consented nor contributed to 
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 Brief discussions in this thesis of the ‘habitus’ of bifurcated space (in the Galilee) and neoliberal, Judaised 
space (Jaffa) follow this thinking, and appear in the forthcoming case chapters. However, in addition to 
Bourdieu’s own work, see Wacquant (2011, 1996), Gomez (2007), Goringe & Rafanelle (2007) and Swartz 
(1997), for a more complete discussion of habitus, and its associated concepts. These include but are not limited 
to: ‘field’ (the structured space of objective relations, in which the individual habitus intersects with and is 
constituted by ‘the social’ (Gomez, 2007)); ‘capital’ (taking multiple forms, ranging from economic to social, 
symbolic and cultural capital, it is articulated as a range of ‘capabilities’ that inform the agent’s relative position 
and power in a particular field (Wacquant, 1996)); ‘practice’ (the site of the dialectic encounter and intersection 
of structure and agent, it is the embodiment of habitus (Bourdieu, 1990; Gomez, 2007)); and ‘strategy’ or 
‘strategic action’ (the site of struggle within the field of practice; it is informed by the intended and reflexive 
interacting interests, decisions and movements of agents, seeking to strengthen their relative position in the 
social field (Bourdieu, 1990; Gomez, 2007)). 
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 Additional analyses of Gramsci’s expansive understanding of hegemony, and the dialectic evolution of the 
hegemonic project, can be found in Mouffe (1979); Laclau & Mouffe (1985); Butler, Laclau & Zizek (2000); 
and Chalcraft & Noorani (2007). 
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its construction, are contained within the system; as they engage with it, challenge it and 
attempt to disarticulate and reshape it.  
Hegemony, the Case of Israel and Its Other 
The evolution of the Israeli state is informed by the same hegemonic trajectory Gramsci 
describes, in which its Jewish settler-community developed a deeply internalized and over-
arching logic, produced through a long-term project of nation-building and cultural 
construction (Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003). According to Yiftachel & Ghanem (2004), Zionist 
hegemony intersects the ideological with the material, lived experience with mythical 
legacies
31
. It has grown out of a dual rationale of ethnic nationalism and settler-colonialism, 
with land as the nexus of economic and political power. Zionist-Jewish hegemony functions 
at all levels of society, articulated as an inherent, natural and legitimate ethnic exclusivity 
over the right to and control over the state. Under this skewed logic (Peleg, 2007; Yfitachel, 
1999; Ghanem, 2010), the state – its land, its institutions, its bureaucracy – not only belong 
exclusively to the Jewish people, but are in service of the perpetuation and propagation of this 
ethnic hierarchy. The result has been the construction of a highly segregated and stratified 
society, in which the ethnic other, and the space they inhabit, is targeted for de-legitimisation, 
removal and replacement.  
Here there is no room for the indigenous Palestinian, and yet, the Palestinian communities 
that were still present in Israel after the Nakba, were incorporated into the state’s political 
project. Through their inclusion, the state constructed an additional hegemonic veil that 
enabled its self-representation and self-imagination as a Jewish and democratic-liberal 
society
32
; despite the fact that Israel’s ‘democratic’ programme privileged one ethnic group 
over another and cultivated separate spheres of rule in its dealings with its heterogeneous 
ethno-national groupings. The hegemonic order became intertwined with the construction of 
a liberal image, created through the fact of granting citizenship to the Palestinian other. This, 
in turn, integrated Palestinian citizens into the system, and determined their use of and 
dependence on its mechanisms. However, their inclusion was predicated on the fact that 
Palestinian citizens must be maintained as a minority, contained and segregated from the 
external Palestinian threat (Achcar, 2004; Shafir & Peled, 2000; Lustick, 1980). This has 
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 See also Piterberg (2008) for discussion of the intersection of Zionist history with biblical myths to construct 
the present-day structures of the Israeli settler-colonial state. 
32
 The foundational idea of a ‘Jewish and Democratic’ Israel stem directly from Ben Gurion’s ‘Declaration of 
Independence’ in 1948 (State of Israel, 1948). This is one of the most debated conceptualisations borne of 
Zionist hegemony, and will be discussed further, below.  
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entrenched the pre-state Zionist-ethos of settlement, control, separation and segregation, in 
the preservation of the demographic balance of Jew to non-Jew in all areas of the state, 
through each leg of policy change since 1948; literally turning the Palestinian ‘body’ into a 
demographic threat (Steinfeld, 2012). Moreover, the state relies on its antagonism with the 
other, with the threat it constitutes to the system, to cultivate a seemingly intractable 
collective-belief in exclusively Jewish rights to the state, hidden within and bound to the 
liberal-methods it has evolved for protecting them.  
In Patrick Wolfe’s (1999) study of the indigenous experience of settler-colonialism in 
Australia, he asks what happens to the indigenous population when the colonial order isn’t 
dependent on the exploitation of native labour; in his assessment, their marginalisation and 
peripheralisation become endemic to the system, and they ultimately disappear into it. In 
Israel, likewise, Palestinian labour was explicitly excluded from participation in early 
settlement development, dooming them to the periphery, if anywhere at all (Shalev, 2000; 
Kimmerling, 1983). However, where the story differs is that the Palestinians that remained 
after the Nakba were still needed, and used, as a symbol of the democratic process in Israel 
(Robinson, 2013). They became a key factor in the global legitimization Israel received, and 
in garnering consent from its own supposedly liberal constituencies, for whom a democratic 
veil was and still is to some degree essential. Based on a diligent examination of archival 
documents from the first decade after the establishment of the state, Robinson (2013) 
explains that the system, at its core, is an essential paradox. Jewish conquest of land and 
labour is pursued while “extending individual political rights to those Arabs of Palestine who 
remained after 1948 – to bind voting Palestinians to the state while simultaneously denying 
them access to it.” (p.198) Its first leaders, stemming from the community of Zionist 
founding elites, established Israel’s external democratic image while developing a coherent 
set of laws that would “render Palestinian citizenship and suffrage meaningless.” (ibid)  
Palestinian-citizen struggle pivots on this ambiguity, in which the state is veiled in its liberal-
project; and through which has bound and subsumed the Palestinian community within it, 
even as it is inherently and systemically excluded. Naamnih (2013) and Piterberg (2001) take 
this idea further, explaining that citizenship was in fact used as a way to create an unseen and 
excluded minority, without the capacity to challenge the state except in ways that sanction 
and reproduce the veil of Zionist-liberal hegemony.  
Yet, seeing Palestinians as essential to the production of Zionist-Jewish hegemony is not to 
assume their mystification, apoliticisation or their genuine incorporation into the system, as 
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part of the hegemonic bloc or collective will. Extensive debates and documents that attribute 
to this fact, fill the Palestinian-citizens’ social, political and academic networks33. Of 
particular note, in 2006, a representative-group from across the spectrum of Palestinian-
citizen society published a series of papers, known as The Future Vision Documents
34
, in 
which they collectively asserted their rejection of the ‘Jewish-democratic’ construct, and the 
position it articulates for Palestinian communities within Israeli society.  
That said, the subordinate, subaltern group need not consent to the hegemonic paradigm, in 
order to be impacted by or included within its range of influence (Chalcraft and Noorani, 
2007); or vice versa. The very fact that the Palestinian citizens exist within this space implies 
that their engagement with the state, and their living experience as citizens, are shaped by 
Israeli hegemony. They have evolved a social and political consciousness, and thus their 
struggle, in direct response to the shape, scope and scape of the material and ideological 
constructions of the Zionist-hegemonic project. It is a struggle by ‘the excluded other’, ‘the 
enemy’, ‘the fifth column’ and ‘internal threat’; responding to an entrenched hegemonic 
process that has come to define itself both in terms of that threat and in light of the liberal-
veil that is infused with the Palestinian-citizen community’s presence, language and culture. 
The hegemonic project has been shaped by both the inclusion and exclusion of Palestinian 
citizens from the political organization of the state (Shalev, 2000); which, as a ‘minority-
group’, has (some) access to the political and legal infrastructure that enshrines and cultivates 
Jewish privilege. The chasms and contradictions caused by this relationship are expressed 
both in terms of the overt, direct challenges of and resistance to the state; and implicitly, in 
the uncomfortable space within which Palestinian citizens are contained. They innately and 
immediately challenge the different blocks upon which the state has built its project of 
consent: that is, of a faith in a liberal democracy, which is, at its core, anchored in the idea, 
and absolute protection of a Jewish haven in Palestine.   
The Hegemony of the Democracy Debates 
“The crisis facing democracy in the Jewish state is as old as the state itself. Israel’s 
development as a liberal settler-state was the outcome of the imperative to establish a 
colonial rule of difference within a liberal order imposed largely from the outside – to 
find a legal way to partition the population and thus facilitate the colonization for 
exclusive Jewish use… Liberal settler rule relied on a combination of legislated 
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 Additional examples of which can be found in Badil’s quarterly publication, al-Majdal, titled, The Paradox of 
Using the Law of the Oppressor (2014); and Mada al Carmel’s publication, Jadal, on the same topic, 2 years 
earlier, The Masters’ Tools: Palestinian Citizens Appeal Within the Legal System (2012). 
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 For further discussion of the Future Vision Documents, see Chapter Three, on the Galilee case. 
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privilege, practices of informal discrimination, and the creation of territorial zones 
where the standard rules of governance did not apply.”  
Shira Robinson, Citizen Strangers, 2013, p. 198  
With Israeli hegemony turning on the paradox of its democratic self-imagination, much of the 
literature on Israel/Palestine has been seized by debates on this topic. Questions by a mass of 
social scientists, legal scholars, historians and political analysts, let alone an endless array of 
activists and advocates, target the structure of the state, its regime and its legitimacy. This 
discourse has often been limited to a political and polemic debate, ultimately directed at 
bolstering or pulling back the hegemonic veil surrounding Israel’s democratic nature. For 
example, Yiftachel’s (1999, 2006) foundational works in which he conceptualises Israel as an 
ethnocratic regime
35
 – in which ethno-nationalism, settler-colonialism and ethno-classism 
converge in a system in which one ethnic group captures and dominates contested territories 
and power structures – are directed primarily towards a debunking of Zionist hegemony over 
Israeli politics. Fifteen years later, Shira Robinson’s (2013) extensive treatise of Israel’s 
liberal programme for colonising Palestinian lives and territories during the Military Regime, 
is still preoccupied with this debate. Moreover, many of the authors who focus on the 
Palestinian experience of the Israeli state, for example, Rouhana (1997), Ghanem (2010), 
White (2010), and Pappé (2011)
36
, also target the same realm of discourse; working to prove 
that Israel is not a democracy, to its internal and external audiences.  
There is good reason for this. Even if the academic discussion has lain bare the system of 
power, the political system is still entrenched in the hegemony of Zionism and the logic of 
ethnically defined power structures, as well as the need to protect and defend them. There are 
extensive examples of this in the public and political spheres of the state. These include, but 
are not limited to, the Committee for Higher Education’s (CHE) 2011–2013 (unsuccessful) 
campaign to close down Ben Gurion University of the Negev’s Politics Department for its 
‘anti-Zionist’ bias and direct criticisms of the state; the attempts by ‘neo-Zionist’ para-
governmental groups like Im Tirtzu (‘If you will it’) and its cohorts, to vilify Israeli civil 
society groups for their support of Palestinian human rights and ‘anti-Israel’ propagandizing; 
and the attempts to ban MK Haneen Zoabi from running in the national elections in 2013, for 
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 Yiftachel’s theorisation of ‘ethnocracy’ and the ‘ethnocratic regime’ appears throughout his writings, but the 
foundational and most extensive can be found in his (1999) Ethnocracy: The Politics of Judaizing 
Israel/Palestine and his (2006) Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine.  
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 Amal Jamal’s (2011) Arab Minority Nationalism in Israel: the Politics of Indigeneity is one of a handful of 
exceptions to the rule. His appraisal of the state and the debates as to its structure is included in his work, in 
order to understand Palestinian struggle, as opposed to unveiling the paradoxes and contradictions of Israeli 
hegemony. 
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her participation in the Mavi Maramara protest against the siege on Gaza
37
. Each example 
serves to highlight the hegemony of Zionist, exclusionary discourses in Israel, and 
exemplifies their clear dissonance with characteristics normally associated with a liberal-
democracy (freedom of expression, freedom of association, and freedom of political protest).  
The democracy debate is an attempt to unveil the contradictions of the Zionist imaginations; 
and can be seen as an integral component of Palestinian-citizen struggles over the years. It is 
a useful means of understanding the system’s influence on the tools, tactics and spaces of 
Palestinian-citizen resistance: this is what informs the communities’ uses of state institutions, 
demanding rights and protections on the basis of the state’s democratic claims; and their 
multi-layered attempts to unveil the democratic myth, and tear large fissures in the imagined 
balance between Jewish and democratic values in Israel, and thus negate the system’s global 
and local legitimacy. However, as Rabinowitz (2001), in his analysis of ‘trapped minorities’, 
contends, the majority of the ‘democracy debate’ literature gets lost in the audience and the 
structures it seeks to unveil, and loses sight of the Palestinian experience of and engagement 
with the hegemonic project. As Rabbinowitz (2001) explains, through this lens “the 
Palestinian citizens of Israel become a case from which to generalize about the nature of the 
state. The state thus remains the primary unit of analysis. The subjective view of the 
minorities is secondary – more a tool with which to think and analyse than a focus of 
attention in its own right.” (p.69)  
This thesis does not seek to resolve nor dismiss the long-standing debate on the structures of 
the Jewish-Zionist state. Acute and extensive analysis of this topic has been developed  by a 
range of critical researchers, including Nadim Rouhana (1997), Elia Zureik (1979), Oren 
Yiftachel (1999; 2006), Shira Robinson (2013), Gabriel Piterberg (2008), Gershon Shafir 
(1989), and a plethora of others. In their work they have sufficiently challenged the idea that 
a state can be labelled a democracy, while its laws, conceptual logic and social and economic 
relations privilege one ethno-national group over the other. When the spotlight shifts away 
from the debate, and towards Palestinian experiences of and in the state, the regime is easily 
conceptualised, not in terms of a package of meagre political rights, but the entrenchment of 
stratified relations, along ethnic, territorial, and class lines; and the methods Palestinians have 
devised for challenging them.  
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(2011), and Sheizaf (2012), respectively. 
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The paradigm through which to understand the clash of Palestinian citizens with the 
hegemonic state is their historical and material experience of the Zionist territorial project, 
primarily based on analyses developed by the above authors
38
. The starting point for this 
relationship is the Zionist transformation of the Jewish Diaspora from an ethnic identity to a 
national project. The formation of the Jewish ‘nation’ and the setting up of an autonomous 
political community was inherently linked to their development of a territorial community; 
which, as Benvenisti argues, sought to legitimise the Zionists’ presence in Palestine, through 
material and spiritual propriety of Palestinian lands (2000). The crux of this colonization 
process was in settling the land, through the cultivation and use of a Jewish labour force, 
while excising Palestinian labour from Jewish-owned lands
39
. As Zureik (2010) explains, 
“neither of these issues was resolved without ethnic separation, exploitation and downright 
dispossession.” (p.6) Its legacy, then – from the first settlements in the 19th century through 
the establishment of the state and up until today – is the ethnicisation of capital, nationhood, 
citizenship and belonging. Its ethos was and is expressed, like so many settler-colonial 
projects, in the displacement and erasure of the indigenous populations which came before it, 
through its greed for the Palestinian landscape (Veracini, 2010; Ram, 1993; Shafir, 1989); 
and in its absolute conviction of the righteousness of the project (Sparrow, 2014). Thus, the 
distinct character of the Israeli state incorporates a link between a colonial and ethnic logic, in 
which ethnic hierarchies manifest explicitly in the appropriation of and control over land
40
; 
and is reproduced in the bifurcation of labour, capital and space (Shalev, 2002). Moreover, as 
Yiftachel & Ghanem (2004) contend, these mirror-processes of Judaisation and de-
Arabisation are at the core of the state's relationship to its Palestinian citizens.  
The myths upon which ‘Jewish and democratic’ hegemony is built are disarticulated in any 
analysis that, as Shafir & Peled (2002) argue, “includes both Jews and Palestinians” (p.33). 
The boundaries of analysis should extend to the limits of Israel's effective rule, turning 
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 Others to be added to this list include Ram (1993); Veracini (2010); Stasiulis & Yuval-Davis (1995); and 
Woolfe (2012). 
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 At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that the project of labour segregation was never complete. 
Many agricultural communities continued to use Palestinian labour; and, as Lockman’s (1996) research 
demonstrates, industries that were established during the Mandate period, incorporated both Jewish and 
Palestinian workers.   
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 Ethnic hierarchies are not limited to the state's relationship to its Palestinian citizens; the immense gaps that 
exist between the original European (Ashkenazi) settlers, and the next generations of Jewish immigrants from 
North Africa & the Middle East (Mizrahi), the Ex-Soviet Union and Ethiopia, evolve out of the same colonial 
structure, and were spatialised as marginal and peripheral expressions of those hierarchies. However, this 
discussion is beyond the scope of this work, and will only be discussed briefly within the case chapters, where 
relevant. See Yacobi & Tzfadia (2011), Abdo & Yuval-Davis (1995), Shafir (1989), and Kedar & Yiftachel 
(2006), for further discussion of the topic. 
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interests, rather than ideas, into the prime moving power of history; and actions and their 
results, rather than intentions and their ideological justifications, into the focus of social and 
historical analysis (ibid)
 41
. In fact, as Wolfe suggests, in seeing the state in terms of the 
struggle by its victims, a key tool is constructed with which to bypass the polemics of the 
debate on the nature of the state, and its rubric of colonial and ethno-nationalist privileging
42
. 
Through this lens, it is possible to understand Palestinian struggle in light of the community’s 
experience and prevention of attempted erasures by Israeli-Zionist conquest, expulsion and 
replacement – and the resulting apartheid logic of Israeli political and physical geography43. 
It becomes possible to understand the Palestinians in terms of their survival in and reclaiming 
of this space; their resistance emerging from within and against the integrated and embedded 
colonial geographies of the hegemonic state (Yacobi, 2012). 
Anti-Colonialist Struggle, Trapped Within the Colonial Space  
It is from here that the dialogue truly emerges, between the field of force and its subaltern 
struggles. According to Yiftachel & Ghanem (2004), Peleg (2007), and Benvenisti (2000), 
the ethnocratic state is predicated on the creation and containment of a threat. That threat 
entrenches the collective political will, and reifies the legitimacy of its system of privileges 
and protections in the common sense of all social and economic institutions. In the work of 
Gramsci (1999), Mouffe (1979) and Foucault (1978)
44, this ‘threat’ is the ‘other’, constructed 
in contravention to the system and structures of power, and yet is inherently part of them. The 
system that shapes itself through struggle, through engagement with its other, also defines 
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 This statement exists in contrast to the historical exceptionalism often attributed to Israel’s settler project, due 
to its social-nationalist philosophy, the tragic history of the global Jewry and their mythic claims to the land 
(Veracini, 2010). 
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 See Zureik (2010), as well as Piterberg (2008) for similar discussions of this topic. 
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 As shall be discussed in the following chapters, the nature of Israel’s internal apartheid laws and logics are 
understood in terms of their spatial configurations and impacts on its citizens, as opposed to the political 
integration of its minorities, with an (allegedly) ‘equal’ vote to the Zionist state. See Hass (2013) and Abu-Freih 
(2012) for additional discussion of this topic. 
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 Foucault is mentioned here, because he theorises resistance as an essential part of the relations of force. 
Through his “genealogy” of power (Foucault, 2003), he unveils its disciplinary nature as being dispersed and 
difused, circulated and exercised through our subjecthoods, our bodies, our language and practice (1978, 1979, 
1991, 1997, 2003). For Foucault, power is everywhere, hidden in the norms of discourse, law, social rules and 
self-discipline; until resistance subverts or diverts its limits and unveils its violences. However, even as he 
argues that power is shaped, activated and disrupted by resistance, and that resistance is as ubiquitous as power, 
his spotlight is on what resistance is against (the limits and lines of power), as opposed to what resistance 
produces or changes in the structures of power (Pickett, 1996). Thus, while Foucault’s work is discussed at 
different points in this thesis in support of its central concepts, the emphasis throughout this manuscript is on 
Gramsci’s conceptualisations of resistance, as it encapsulates the agonisms of struggle, as well as what is 
reconstituted and rearticulated through its contestations to the flow of power. A further discussion of both the 
strengths and limits of Foucault’s analysis (the majority of which focuses on the expansive, productive and often 
total nature of power) can be found in a large array of literature; for some examples see Fraser (1981), Pickett 
(1996), Heller (1996), Taylor (1984), and Wickham & Kendall (2008).      
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itself by and through it
45. Thus this ‘threat’ becomes integral to the creation of an expansive 
hegemony, even as it struggles with and against it. As discussed above, that threat, that other, 
in this story, is unarguably the Palestinian demos, which evolved in conjunction with, or 
rather directly counter to the Zionist national entity (Piterberg, 2008). The Palestinian 
citizens, in light of their connection to the larger demos, became a fifth column, and were 
seen as a direct threat to the territorial project on Palestinian lands. However, this group, so 
often overlooked in the study of Palestinian and Israeli politics, also became the foundational 
‘other’ in the trajectory of Zionist praxis, which shapes and is shaped by this relationship. As 
discussed above, this is the ultimate paradox of the Israeli political system, and the source of 
the constant crises and instability inherent in such a project (Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004; 
Peleg, 2007); because its foundation in the absolute spiritual and material control of state and 
land is so vulnerable when the excluded other, the Palestinian threat, is included (and 
needed). 
The internal Palestinian community, with its own spiritual and material claims to ‘Israel’, 
which includes an ongoing and historical presence on the land (Sand, 2009; 2012), is in 
contravention with the Zionist logic of the Jews’ legitimate and historical right to this place. 
As a result, the very space this group inhabits is a target, designated by Zionist hegemony as 
the ethnic frontier: to be conquered, contained, and continuously strangled and encroached 
upon. The Judaization of Israel’s map engendered the severing of Palestinian ties, inside and 
outside the state’s semi-formalized boundaries, cutting any possible line of congruity between 
internal and external threats to Jewish sovereignty and statehood. The Palestinian citizens 
became ‘trapped’ in Israeli space (Rabinowitz, 2001), cut off from one another; cut off from 
the rest of their exiled populous and segmented from the rest of their ‘fellow citizens’ due to 
their othered-ness. The precarity of this position emerges in the image of the Palestinian 
ghetto, as the intentionally and necessarily exiled periphery at the edge of Israeli spaces, 
throughout the country (Yiftachel, 2009b). In physical terms, Palestinian-citizen space exists 
as segmented neighbourhoods in the Mixed Cities, as hidden and unrecognised villages in the 
Naqab, or as an entire ‘black hole’ periphery in the Central Galilee; each in its own way, 
living off the grid of economic, social and political power of Jewish-Israel. 
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 This paraphrases a long discussion in Gramsci (1999), elaborated in Chalcraft & Noorani (2007) and Mouffe 
(1979), on the question of how hegemony is shaped and re-shaped through an ongoing process of struggle with 
competing ideologies. This discussion has been re-interpreted here, as a way to understand the ‘other’ as integral 
to creating a more expansive, integrative and entrenched hegemonic order. 
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Continuing from above, in the hegemonic discourse, the ‘other’ evolves its own ethos in 
struggle with that of the hegemonic bloc. As an indigenous group targeted for removal, their 
resistance becomes embedded in remaining. As land is stolen and re-settled in mass amounts, 
so land becomes integral to the subaltern’s sense of survival. As the state seeks to infiltrate 
their strongholds, the other seeks to keep them out. Most importantly, as the state denies their 
very identity as Palestinians, so that identity, through its symbols, language, narratives and 
memorialisations, becomes paramount to their struggle. Thus, the essence of Palestinian-
citizen struggle – mirroring the hegemony of political Zionism – is the fight to maintain their 
presence, their symbols, their identities, their memories and their rights to and in this place; 
which are also always under siege, threatened and threatening to the state.   
However, this is not enough to understand the evolution of Palestinian citizens’ struggle over 
the last six and a half decades, which responds to both its physical and ideological positioning 
by and within Zionism. First, it is necessary to layer back in the colonial construction of 
stratified and segmented spaces, the ethnocratic regime’s ethnicization of capital and politics, 
and the mythology of liberal democracy embedded in Israel’s hegemonic story. On top this, it 
is also necessary to discuss the ongoing conflict between the state of Israel and the 
Palestinian ‘parent’ nation (Rabinowitz, 2001), as well as the subsequent ‘divorce’ of the 
Palestinian citizens by the rest of the Palestinian people, particularly their political 
leadership
46
. Finally, it is necessary to incorporate an understanding of how, where and with 
whom the Palestinians live their daily lives, develop their communities, and grow as part of 
the Israeli state, as excluded and included citizens. Only then is it possible to build some 
understanding of the complex realm inhabited by Palestinian citizens, and the truncated arena 
from within which Palestinian citizens’ resistance is negotiated. It is from here that the story 
of this thesis truly begins.  
The Context for ‘Authentic Resistance’ 
Two circles of debate frame the essential puzzle of this thesis, as to the nature of Palestinian 
citizens’ resistance, its relationship to the state and the Zionist project, and its ability to 
transcend – and even transform – imposed limits and boundaries. One occurs within the 
larger body of literature surrounding the themes of power and resistance, particularly in 
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 This is slowly being repaired, albeit mostly at a grassroots level, as with the Boycott, Divestment and 
Sanctions (BDS) movement, in which an overarching call for Palestinian rights include those of the Palestinian 
citizens for equality under the Israeli state. At the level of leadership in the oPt, this process is not necessarily 
being replicated, as 2014 negotiations with Israel around the future of the Palestinian state clearly indicated. No 
Palestinian citizens were included in the negotiations, and their needs were not mentioned in the main categories 
for ‘final status’ negotiations.  
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reference to subaltern groups. The other has evolved from within the case itself, mirroring the 
theoretical debate in the conversations and everyday practice of the different practitioners and 
participants of struggle. The circles converge on the question of what kind of resistance, 
under which circumstances, engenders what kind of changes. 
‘Resistance’ has traditionally been conceptualised in both academic and activist discourses, in 
terms of a set of fixed actors, arenas, practices and goals. Practitioners and historians alike 
conjure pictures of large-scale upheavals, mass social mobilisations and revolutionary 
movements as the sole constructions and constructors of social and political change. This bias 
in the literature tends to limit the scope for analysis to the revolutionary moment, and 
prevents looking at social movements in the making, when things are messier, less easily 
categorized, and functions in micro-steps and micro-politics
47
. Interestingly, this contrasts 
with the process Gramsci describes as essential to constructing hegemony; in which the other 
permeates and disarticulates the system from within all spheres of action, and all structures of 
society; what Mouffe (1979) has labelled ‘hegemony from below’. Thus, just as the system 
exists in all avenues of life, struggle and revolution cannot be held or contained by a 
particular few, in a limited arena of practice.   
That said, there are a number of authors who do speak of the slower, more integrative, and 
essentially unseen travels of resistance; several of whom have evolved their own discipline 
on the topic, called ‘Subaltern Studies’48. This community of authors49 shift the spotlight to 
the trench-like warfare of everyday struggles against authoritarian systems; or rather, they 
shift the story from the language and lens of the colonisers, to that of the subaltern, turning 
them from objectified other to historical subject (Chakravorty-Spivak, 1988). The study of 
the subaltern – the ‘non-hegemonic’, the non/excluded classes – began a breakdown of the 
categories of power and class-relations as they have been determined by Western thinkers
50
, 
and opened up the space to see struggle in multiple movements and spheres, according to 
alternative readings of political change. Amidst this body of work, resistance is seen in 
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 This bias is also discussed in Bayat (2010) in his work on ‘non-movements’; and Tarrow (1998), in their work 
on silenced actors and voices in much of the research on social movements. 
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 See Chakrabarty (2000) for a brief overview of the field, and its contributions to the tradition of seeing history 
‘from below’ and beyond the elite readings of anti-colonial movements in the (post)colonised/peripheried world. 
The original group looked explicitly at Indian historiography, but the field has broadened to include the stories 
of all who might fit the category of ‘marginalised’ and ‘dominated’ other, within a range of oppressive systems. 
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 A long list of authors contribute to the ‘Subaltern Studies’ Literature, including James Scott (1985); Dianne 
Singerman (1995); Douglas Haynes & Gyan Prakash (1991); Lila Abu-Lughod (1990); Lori Allen (2008); Asef 
Bayat (2010); and Salwa Ismail (2013). 
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For example, Chakravorty-Spivak (1988) challenges Foucault and Deleuze; and Guha (1997) directs his work 
at all ‘colonialist’ and ‘elite-nationalist’ erasures of subaltern experiences. 
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relation to the social context, to power and to the field of force in which they participate; but 
also as a process, found in a range of contentious actions, instigated by a spectrum of 
individuals (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004; Abu-Lughod, 1990; Pickett, 1996). It can be 
conscious and unconscious, public and private, collective and individual, active and passive, 
developed by both ordinary and extra-ordinary resistors, whether or not they are recognized 
as such.  
In sum, as Haynes and Prakash (1991) explain, resistance is characterized in these works, 
more by the ways in which it challenges and unravels the system, than by the conscious, 
collective or coherent intention towards social change. The lens and language of revolutions 
are widened to incorporate the messy process of the everyday and sometimes unintended 
struggle, which in turn determines a new methodology for analysing change. The implication 
of which is that – at least to some degree – the system can be disarticulated in the minutia of 
ordinary and individual actions. In other words, the same actors othered and seemingly 
silenced by the hegemonic project, impact the system through a process of slow 
encroachment that incrementally – and yet integrally – reshapes it (Bayat, 2010). Regarding 
the colonial and ethnocratic construction of Palestinian-citizens’ presence and space, it is 
relevant to consider how they resist the hegemonic system in their everyday lived-experience 
of it, as well as through large scale, collective acts of public protest. Both sets of actions 
reveal the community’s direct and indirect entanglements with control, containment and 
ghettoization. Together, they become a lens through which to unravel how multiple layers of 
struggle engender transformation of the system and the truncated spaces in which they are 
housed.  
There is a long debate as to the capacity of non-revolutionary acts of resistance to shift the 
trajectories of the system they challenge. The discussion primarily revolves around differing 
interpretations of the limits of hegemonic ‘power’, and the ways power and resistance engage 
and relate to one another. The starting point is the process by which hegemony is established. 
As discussed above, it evolves out of and in struggle with the previous order, always from 
within society, permeating its layers and levels until it is internalized individually and 
collectively, and becomes the natural order of things (Mouffe 1979; Mouffe & Laclau, 1985; 
Roseberry, 1994). Building from this understanding of the hegemonic project, resistance, 
which evolves out of the hegemonic order, never exists external from it, and is ever in 
dialogue with it. It seeks its legitimacy by antagonizing the system, breaking its hold, and 
filling the chasms and fissures left open by the losing hegemon. The process then repeats 
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itself, as a new class seeks to disarticulate and rearticulate the hegemonic order, in struggle 
with the previous one. The repercussions of this are discussed in Richard Day’s (2005) 
analysis of the ‘new’ transnational social movements. He argues that the project of struggle, 
in so far as it attempts to be counter-hegemonic, is never separate from the previous order. It 
emulates the forms and practices of the dominant hegemony in order to replace it, thereby 
negating its capacity to truly transform the reigning system. This is echoed in Mouffe’s 
(1985) description of counter-hegemony "(whose) objective is not to reject the system and all 
its elements but to rearticulate it, to break it down to its basic elements and then to sift 
through past conceptions to see which ones… can serve to express the new situation.” (p.192) 
The hegemonic order, thus, continues to reproduce and reshape itself in a seemingly endless 
cycle, and the field of force seems insurmountable. Accordingly, hegemony becomes so 
pervasive, so complex and resilient, that in its reciprocal relationship with resistance, 
hegemony determines all lines and limits to struggle, including the spaces within which it 
acts and the length to which ‘counter-hegemonic’, or even ‘non-hegemonic’, action is even 
feasible. Hegemony through this lens, in so far as it is incomplete and constantly evolving, 
becomes an all-consuming, nebulous space, integrating “progressive actions and ideologies 
into itself, thus retaining the power of the dominant class.” (Chalcraft & Noorani, 2007, p.9) 
Such a view seems to negate any strategy coming from below; in particular, that which 
incorporates actions that evolve through the institutions that house and perpetuate the 
hegemonic project (Day, 2005). It also informs deep criticisms of both intellectual analyses 
and practical work that conceptualises such activities as potential arenas for change. 
A polar argument has been developed in the work of James Scott (1985) and several of his 
colleagues in the Subaltern Studies cohort, who frame subversive actions of the ‘weak’ as 
weapons against hegemonic systems. Scott developed his analysis through his investigations 
into the rebellious, and what he called ‘survivalist’ actions, of poor rural communities in 
Malaysia – actions that included ‘slander’, ‘false-compliance’, ‘sabotage’ and ‘foot-
dragging’. He saw the subaltern’s lack of belief in the dominant order as proof of their ability 
to act outside and beyond, even counter to its hegemony; as if the subaltern community 
functions within a separate political terrain, unimpinged by the spheres of power that 
surround them. In light of which, Scott is heavily critiqued for divorcing hegemony from its 
material and political anchors, expressed in the containment and control of the subalterns’ 
lives, labour, and the spaces they inhabit (Roseberry, 1994; Haynes & Prakash, 1991). 
According to Mitchell (1990), Scott dismisses the relations of power and inequalities that 
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exist in society, and also inform the type of resistance, the ‘choice’ of weapons and, in the 
case he describes, the oppressed group’s lack of direct engagement with those in power. 
However, despite the existence of other, much more nuanced discussions of similar 
phenomena of resistance, Scott is not the only one taken to task in this range of critiques.  
Vivek Chibber (2013), a Marxist scholar of social and political history, takes this critique to 
its furthest end, delegitimising the entire field of Subaltern Studies for what he sees as a 
misdiagnosis of capitalist power and the constraints it places on those trapped within it; the 
fallacy of which, he alleges, is inscribed in their foundational argument that a separate 
politics exists for those who are left out of the system of capitalist reproduction. Rabinowitz 
(2001) and Mitchell (1990) argue similarly that all such actions – the minute, the individual, 
the local and the institutional, reminiscent to those found throughout the Palestinian citizens’ 
arsenal – merely give the illusion of agency, while reinforcing the radical asymmetric power 
relations that limit subaltern resistances to their truncated corners. As Rabinowitz warns in 
his analysis of the Palestinian citizens’ case, this small-scale resistance "is the paradoxical 
vehicle that reinforces complicit reproduction of the system.” (p.180)  
A plethora of activists and academics take up this stream of thought, of a hegemony that is 
ever-corrupting and impenetrable; and yet paradoxically articulate a strategy for change that 
dislocates the dynamic relationship of power and resistance. On one hand, hegemony 
functions in all layers and all institutions of the dominant system; and thus all actions taking 
form within the structures, are coercive. Resistance – counter-hegemonic or otherwise – that 
passes through the system can only ever mirror the hegemonic order, and reproduce as well 
as reinforce the system of oppression inherent in it. Thus, according to this group of thinkers, 
struggle that seeks to overcome a system of hegemony must disengage from it. Either in 
Day’s (2005) conception of a minor-politics, that is always outside and fragmented from the 
structures of power; or as a mass revolutionary movement that clashes with the system from 
above and outside it, as conceptualised by Rabinowitz (1997), Martieu (2009) and Payes 
(2005). 
Within this paradigm, to use legal, civil, market, bureaucratic, cultural or parliamentary 
politics in service of a minority resistance, is to corroborate and legitimize the relations of 
power in society. As Jamal (2012) contends – utilising the specific example of court-based 
struggle – appeals to and through this system, even when they challenge state policies, 
legitimate its principles. He continues: 
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“It is true that they utilize gaps in the legal and judicial philosophy in order to transform it 
and challenge its fairness. However, a new dialectical relationship emerges where contention 
and legitimation become inherently interdependent. When litigation challenges the system, it 
grants it the right and even the duty to intervene in disputes between its own logic and 
alternative ones. The result is that, through judicial act, the court system legitimates its own 
logic—the dominant logic of the state—even when it criticizes the policies enacted by agents 
of this logic. This is a catch-22 that cannot be overcome when playing by the dominant rules 
of the game.” (p.2) 
In the context of Israel and its Palestinian citizens, where so much of the resistance tool box 
is concentrated in the use of these ‘hegemonic tools’, such actions are implicated in more 
than just the reproduction of ethnic discrimination and inequality of outputs or outcomes. 
Palestinian citizens are precariously positioned on the inside, integrated into a system in 
which the Judaisation/de-Arabisation programme is veiled in the hermeneutics of liberality 
and law. Accordingly, in order to use these tools effectively, ‘politics’ (which involves the 
overt naming of the system’s colonial, ethno-national ethos) are allegedly sanitized in order 
to fit within the language and logic of the ‘Jewish and Democratic State’51. Thus, through this 
lens, resistance practices with the capacity to change the boundaries and structures of 
hegemony, whether individual or collective, fragmented or cohesive, conscious or 
unconscious, must exist outside the flattened political space that sanctions and is thus 
sanctioned by the state. Within this frame, there is only one type of ‘authentic’ resistance.  
There is an alternative reading to that of a hegemony that is all-encompassing, and that of a 
resistance practice that is inherently corrupted by the hegemonic order, when developed from 
within its tools and arenas. Mouffe (1985), Roseberry (1994), Haynes & Prakash (1991), and 
Chalcraft & Noorani (2007) find something else in their readings of Gramsci’s work and his 
theorising of hegemony. They see the perpetual struggle in hegemony as a potential window 
through which the non-hegemonic and counter-hegemonic can act. Rather than obtuse, the 
hegemonic order is constantly changing and evolving into something new. Consent is active, 
even if spontaneous and internalised, and thus can be negotiated, transformed, and reshaped. 
Moreover, the slow process of encroaching state institutions, apparatuses and spaces, is 
critical to hegemonic transformation and inherent to a dialectic relationship between 
resistance and hegemony. This does not simply imply that they impact one another, but that 
they each evolve and transform the other. Thus, ‘authentic resistance’ is indeed possible; and 
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seems to exist in the clash, the struggle, the moment of exchange between the powerful and 
the subaltern.   
The essence of the tension between resistance and hegemony is in the space they inhabit 
together. This is particularly true in the case of the Palestinian citizens, who are inherently 
vulnerable to and contained within the hegemonic system; which is likewise vulnerable to the 
other and their counter-claims to the same space, territory and history. If struggle evolves out 
of, with and against this system, then its agents, the Palestinian citizens, are not deluded, 
passive captives of the state; yet their activities and organizations are not "autonomous 
expressions of subaltern politics and culture.” (Roseberry, 1994, p.360) Their tools, targets 
and goals necessarily develop from their positioning within the hegemonic project of the 
state. Thus, "what hegemony constructs is not a shared ideology, but a common material and 
meaningful framework for living through, talking about and acting upon the world (ibid, 
p.364)”. Therefore, we can see how "forms and languages of protest or resistance must adopt 
the forms and languages of domination in order to be registered or heard.” (ibid) At the same 
time, one must ask, by whom is it being heard or registered? When does the language become 
radical, and when do the dynamics shift and reshape themselves?  
It is clear that Rabinowitz and his cohort are correct in arguing that hegemony defines a 
common language, logic, and structure of practice; and that Palestinian-citizen politics 
navigate the language of an ethnically exclusive system, in which certain spaces necessarily 
corroborate the Zionist hegemonic narrative. However, there are a series of authors who 
would support the argument forwarded through this study, that the use of hegemonic tools 
does not necessarily constitute the programme of legitimization that these authors and 
activists describe. Moreover, the use of a hegemonic instrument in political struggle does not 
mean it is used hegemonically (De Sousa Santos, 2002; O’Brian, 1996; Sfard, 2009; 
Fitzpatrick, 2014). Lisa Hajjar (2013) argues that her work engages legal frames and 
terminology to disrupt her government’s hegemony over its legal narratives. Avinoam Meir 
(2005), an anthropologist and expert on Bedouin spatialities, follows a similar logic when 
describing the Bedouin leadership’s use of public planning channels in Israel, to unveil, 
challenge and change hidden Judaisation policies in the Naqab. As does Tripp (2013), in the 
way he ascribes the use of public art as means to subvert authoritarian control and dominance 
of public space. A set of articles by Palestinian activists, published in Majdil (Badil, 2013), 
continue this trend,  explaining that while the law is among the Masters’ tools for 
colonisation, segregation and oppression – and by extension, so are all Israeli state 
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institutions – it can and should be used surgically in the service of Palestinian struggle. 
Charles Tilly (1977), one of the founding thinkers in theories of social movements, likewise 
concludes on the basis of his analysis of 19
th
 century insurgent activities of a ‘Mutual Aid 
Society’, that radical action can evolve from within state-sanctioned spaces for collective 
organising, particularly in a context where repressive policies are used to subdue and contain 
forms of collective resistance.  
Accordingly, several of the above authors see the emancipatory and empowering capacity of 
these tools as part of a spectrum of integral actions that mobilise and move through multiple 
social and political realms (De Sousa Santos, 2002; O’Brian, 1996; Sfard, 2009; Elian 
Weizman, 2013). Moreover, to maintain the disarticulating capacity of hegemonic tools, it is 
necessary to link struggle inside and outside state-sanctioned ‘boxes’ for protest; to engage 
from within and without, through multiple forms, opportunities and languages. Thus, within 
the Palestinian-citizen context, there is potential for radical change through the links that exist 
between legal actions and political mobilization, between claims to individual rights and 
community-based recognition, and between rights-based discourses and the rejection of a 
Zionist democracy (Jamal, 2005; 2006; 2008).  
There is always a danger in working within the hegemonic project. However, radical action 
doesn’t necessarily come through ‘disengagement’ from the spaces hegemony inhabits. In the 
hegemonic context, the ‘subaltern’ are inherently excluded and included, contained and under 
siege, separate and yet in dynamic contention with the structures of power. Thus, tactics of 
resistance are both potentially reproductive and transformative. However, they are always 
part of, and in tension with the system that surrounds them (Fitzpatrick, 2014). The issue, 
according to Chalcraft (2014), in his analysis of contentious politics in the Middle East, is 
‘creativity’, in the capacity of an action to transgress the norms of thinking and practice; or as 
Tripp (2013) explains, to interrupt the norms and everyday practices of power. While some 
arenas are more conducive to what Chalcraft (2014) calls ‘unruly resistances’, they still must 
engage the system – activating and unveiling its frontiers and limits in the process – in order 
to transform it. Moreover, in a context where the integral expression of the system of power 
is the segregation and colonisation of space, ‘authentic resistance’ is to be found in the 
disarticulation and transgression of physical and ideological borders. Thus, the analysis of 
Palestinian struggle inside Israel is anchored in its encounters with those boundaries.  
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PART II – Struggle as the Unit of Analysis 
The story of Palestinian resistance is necessarily conceptualised in light of its relationship to 
the hegemony of Zionism over and through Israeli state and space; struggle cannot be 
separate from the field of force against, upon and within which it acts. However, there are 
limits to this analysis. The most salient of which is the long-standing practice of seeing 
Palestinian citizens only in terms of their victimisation by this state, which in turn minimises 
the complexity and heterogeneity of the Palestinian-citizen experience of Israeli hegemony; 
the fact that space, collective and personal experiences, and different arenas for action exist 
and are reshaped by the process of struggle
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. The oft-quoted myth of an acquiescent and 
subordinate Palestinian community in Israel that stems from this lens (Lustick, 1980) has 
been shattered by the newer, more radical contentious politics that will be discussed 
throughout this thesis: Practices that include the politicised academic contributions of 
Palestinian-citizen intellectuals and professionals; the collective production and key 
articulations of the Future Vision Documents by Palestinian-citizen civil and political society; 
the provocative actions of parliament leaders and grassroots activists; and the absolute 
resilience of even the weakest communities to ongoing attempts at displacement. To 
approach struggle as ‘the unit of analysis’, however, is not to ignore its engagement and 
permeations with the field of force. Rather, it is a means through which to shift the spotlight 
from a diagnostic of power to a diagnostic of resistance, and begin to see its intricacies, its 
messiness, its practices, its transformations and its impacts on the trajectories of power.    
As many of the Subaltern Studies scholars point out, it is the micro-politics of the case that 
offer a window into how history and power unfold, and the particularity of contexts and 
cultures of resistance take form
53
. The subalterns become agents, as opposed to ‘objects’ 
externalised and victimised by their social and political relationships. Their tactics and 
strategies are intentional acts, as much as they are informed by the structures that surround 
them. As Tilly (1977) explains, through this “bottom-up approach”, it is possible to identify 
the ways in which “ordinary people organise” around their own needs and experiences (p.8-
8). In other words, it is possible to see them as agents of change who intersect with and 
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inform the field of force they inhabit. As opposed to seeing resistance as being shaped 
exclusively by hegemonic structures, we begin to see a political order that is transformed by 
its attempts to contain, repress and harness these multiple forms of struggle (Chalcraft, 2008). 
The last half of this chapter foregrounds debates that attempt to analyse struggle – and its 
agents – through the internal moments and movements of collective and fragmented actions, 
and thus highlight struggle as the practice of real people, with lived-experiences of resistance, 
even as they act in dialogue with the space that surrounds them.    
Social Movements and Contentious Politics  
Taken broadly, the literature that constitutes theories of ‘social movements’ and ‘contentious 
politics’ attempts to explain the evolution of collective action as harbingers of social and 
systemic change. These two intersecting bodies of work are among the core theoretical terrain 
for an analysis of struggle. Much like the literature on hegemony, power and resistance 
discussed above, much of their disciplinary contributions examine the contexts and catalysts 
that promote the dissolution and reshaping of political systems. The focus for both is on the 
drivers of change: the different arenas, opportunities, resources, and intra and inter-
community relations, which enable new contenders for power to emerge, overtake and 
transform the incumbent system. Moving from an initial narrow lens on social movements as 
conceived within Western/European historical contexts, the field has broadened to 
comparative research of a full spectrum of ‘contentious episodes’. This range allows authors 
to compare peasant uprisings, civil rights movements and large scale revolutionary 
mobilisations; finding the same mechanisms and processes that animate movements and set 
change in motion, throughout the repertoire of contentious politics.   
The essential debates of this literature can be found in the ongoing turf wars between what 
Doug McAdam & Sydney Tarrow (2011), key theorists of social movements and contentious 
politics, label the ‘structuralists’ and the ‘culturalists’ or ‘constructivists’. The structuralist 
group, of which Tarrow and McAdam (as well as Charles Tilly) had traditionally been a part, 
is so called for the methodological model it has forwarded. The model is based on the idea 
that certain social and political structures are necessarily present, as causal or correlational 
variables in propelling social movements, and thus their potential to incur social change. Six 
basic categories were identified – and later expanded on – as key to understanding the spark 
and momentum of certain movements for change. Tilly (1977) gave them shape, but they 
appear in every treatise on the topic. Briefly, they are: 1) ‘Interests’, referring to the level of 
shared advantages and disadvantages the population feels it is likely to experience as a 
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consequence of their participation in a particular movement (ibid, p. 3-4). 2) ‘Organisation’, 
referring to the level of and capacity for the development of a common identity and unifying 
structures, within the movement population (ibid). 3) “Mobilization”, which describes the 
extent of a movement’s resources and its capacity for increasing collective acquisition and 
control over additional resources (ibid, p.3-5). 4) “Collective action”, the extent to which the 
action is jointly conceived and pursued as movement towards a common good (ibid). 5) 
“Framing”, referencing the different ways a movement and its agents articulate their goals, 
impacts, achievements and failures (ibid). And finally, the one that, according to Goodwin & 
Jasper (2004) – theorists from the ‘culturalist’ group – receives the most attention, 6) 
“opportunity” (and its reversal “threat”), which describes the relationship between a 
“population’s interests and the current state of the world around it (Tilly, 1977, 3-5)”.  In 
other words, ‘political opportunity’ refers to the way in which the system itself intersects with 
the momentum of the movement, wherein fluctuations and crises are understood to facilitate 
or hinder the capacity for challengers to emerge and contend for power, against both 
repressive and open political spaces, within both “safe” and “unsafe” political arenas.     
It is important to note that Tilly’s initial categorisations were a first attempt to find the 
common denominators in social movements; to find links across time and space that could 
explain their radical potential. It was also a call to others to contribute ethnographic and 
empirical studies that would strengthen and expand his categorical analysis. Despite this, the 
field was ultimately hijacked by an attempt to fit everything into these six “black boxes”; and 
further stifled by the field’s prioritisation of the experience of Western nation states within 
social movement theory and history (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2003; Bayat, 2010). The 
reverberations of these containers assert themselves in field-based analysis of social 
movements on the ground. For example, Shany Payes’ (2005) comprehensive and 
foundational empirical analysis of Palestinian NGOs in Israel gets bogged down in whether 
Palestinian NGO-based activism can be ‘categorized’ as a social movement, on the basis of 
these broadly-stroked limits. It is these confining parameters that led to the strongest critiques 
of the ‘structuralist’ mechanisms. 
As discussed in Jasper & Goodwin (2004), there are two key realms of criticism attributed to 
the Structuralist canon: First, that it is guilty of opening its lens too wide and too far, creating 
a tautology in order to make large-scale ‘N’ comparisons, despite calls for the ethnographic, 
bottom-up approach Tilly (1977) claims it perpetuates. Within this conceptualisation, there is 
almost no space for the idea that a movement has a unique and idiosyncratic culture. On the 
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basis of this, the critics make their second point, that there is a paradoxically narrow reliance 
on structural explanations of agency. Opportunities for and constraints on mobilisation are 
pre-existing structures, as opposed to creations of the movements themselves. Accordingly, 
the model becomes a formula that inherently ignores the ways in which the movements’ 
members affect and articulate collective action, and thus affect and change, not just what 
happens within the movement, but within the political environ, as well.   
That said, as mentioned above, the theory doesn’t end with these models. As far back as 
Tilly’s foundational work (1977) and as far forward as McAdam and Tarrow’s more recent 
writing on the Dynamics of Contention (2011), there is both acknowledgement of and an 
attempt to work with these criticisms. Tilly’s own assertion is that he was trying to find a 
balance between understanding structural-social relations as predictors of group interests in 
the long-run, and yet rely as much as possible on the groups’ own articulation of their 
interests and behaviour in the short-run
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. McAdam & Tarrow (2011) explain that they have 
been trying to respond and contribute to the “cultural side of things (p.4)”, since the 1990s, 
with their attempts to investigate the unbounded, more fluid links between structure and 
agency.  
The new trend, initiated by McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly (2003) with what they labelled 
‘Dynamics of Contention’, opened the aperture of the social movement field to investigate 
the more relational, less static ‘variables’ and ‘mechanisms’ that appear throughout the 
spectrum of collective actions, albeit in different sequences. In their work, they offer a new 
way of thinking about and comparing the different moments, wherein individuals and groups, 
both those contained in ‘normal’ political channels and those that transgress the typical 
political order, set out to disrupt, ‘transgress’ and, ultimately, break down the system of 
oppression. In this new canon of work, the focus on cohesive movements shifted to 
‘episodes’, or continuous streams of contention. Instead of the individual categories of 
interests, organisation, mobilisation, and opportunity, they looked at the relational spectrum 
of ‘mechanisms’, or those events that alter social and political relations in a given society, 
and ‘processes’, which refers to the regular sequence in which such mechanisms appear in 
contentious, collective, and unruly actions. McAdam et al then break down ‘mechanisms’ to 
differentiate between the external impacts, internal collective and cultural impacts, and 
relational impacts that stem from building links across different communities and geographic 
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arenas. In other words, they attempted to give those scholars looking at hegemonic 
contestation, a more holistic way of understanding the way structures and agents intersect to 
disarticulate and reshape a system, than they had in previous iterations of the ‘social 
movement agenda’ (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2003).  
There is a robust and tangible offering in both the structural and cultural schools of thought; 
their mutual focus on the ‘who, why, when and what’ of struggle and resistance informs thick 
and detailed analyses of how agents and systems change in light of contentious actions. The 
culturalists delineate the particularity of experiences within a movement; the ‘structuralists’, 
today, look at the intersections between agents and the mechanisms that spark, mobilise, 
constrain and support a movement’s growth, impact and limits. Both are relevant lenses to the 
particular cases of struggle discussed in this thesis. On the one hand, the culturalists offer 
tools for understanding the idiosyncratic nodes and modalities of each case, foregrounding 
particular boundaries, histories, agents and experiences of and within the colonising 
Judaisation project. Using this lens, stakeholders from the Jaffa case define and frame their 
movement in relation with the urban, ‘mixed’, neoliberal context that seeks to swallow and 
remove them; political agents in the Galilee determine their struggle from their primarily all-
Arab enclave, a frontier on the edge of Jewish Israel; and the Bedouins of the Naqab’s 
Unrecognised Villages define theirs from outside, from unseen non-spaces, emptied by the 
Judaisation project. The structuralists broaden this picture, seeing these ‘moments of 
struggle’ as part of the larger spectrum of mechanisms that frame Palestinian politics within 
and beyond the Israeli state, and to social movement processes, in general. This is a critical 
contribution toward dissolving the lines Israel has placed around each case, and the larger 
lines that determine Israel as a unique, idiosyncratic context.  
At the same time, both sets of literature are rigid and bounded; both require ‘boxes’, either to 
encourage comparison – as with the structuralists – or, as is the case with the culturalists, to 
distinguish the agents of one territory, one case, from another. As a result, there is very little 
fluidity or flexibility in methodology and thus in what it captures and what it sees. In 
particular, inherent limits are set by its ‘who’, ‘what’ and ‘when’ containers. In his treatise of 
‘non’ social movements and resistances in the Middle East, Asef Bayat (2010) explains this 
essential gap: The adherence to the conscious, collective, coherent and episodic moments of a 
movement for social change is immediately blinded to the way dominant systems respond to 
and shift in light of resistance that is ordinary, everyday, passive and fragmented. This bias is 
acknowledged throughout the work of the contentious politics cohort, particularly its volume 
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on the silenced voices in social movement literature (Tarrow, 2001). However, it is never 
resolved, and is perhaps unresolvable, due to an inherent myopia to processes as opposed to 
products; dialogue and dialectics, as opposed to binaries of structures and agents, threats and 
opportunities. It cannot articulate the messy, complex reality that is incorporated within a 
culture of resistance, as something that is always happening, and is part of all aspects of the 
life of struggle.  
This is not to say that Bayat (2010) and his cohort ever resolve the issue either. They often 
get stuck in the opposite perspective, stemming from the impetus to describe a separate 
subaltern politics and a separate enclave for resistance. For example, in Bayat (2010) – as 
with Scott (1985) and Guha (1997), discussed above – there is an ever-present dichotomy 
between the passive, resilient, and subversive struggles of the urban poor in the Middle East 
and the collective, conscious, organised movements that develop within the technologically 
advanced and politically open societies of the West; as if the contexts never mix. In addition 
to being a dated assessment of Middle East struggles, Bayat’s (2010) analysis misses the way 
in which non-movement intersects with movement; collective with individual resistance; 
activism with the practice of everyday life. At the same time, his method, which opens a lens 
onto a culture of resistance that interacts within specific spaces, as a movement for presence 
and place, is more open to seeing these intersections than the containment that seems to be 
inherent in the social movement/contentious politics literature.  
Ultimately, just as hegemony is never static and containable, components of struggle do not 
fit into neat boxes. It is this practice that turns the ‘movement’ into a thing-in-itself, and 
defines a narrow unit of analysis that misses the dialogue between power and resistance, 
between the episodic moments and everyday-ness of contentious actions. This lack of insight 
is most clearly exposed in the endless debate between the Social Movement ‘Culturalists’ and 
‘Structuralists’, as to whether agents drive structures or structures drive agents (Goodwin & 
Jasper, 2004); a debate that cannot see the way each intersects and permeates the other. As 
has been discussed extensively above, power and struggle function as part of a field of force 
that is constantly evolving in response to this interaction. Struggle is therefore relational, as 
are the movements, agents and arenas that participate in it.   
In this particular context – as well as anywhere that a revolutionary process is still in motion 
– resistance doesn’t end when the immediate threat has been relieved, or the momentum of 
protest has reached its conclusion. Struggle, in its dialectic relationship with power, needs to 
be understood as disruptive and yet fluid, ongoing and constant, because the system of power 
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is likewise fluid, integrated and unrelenting. In this light, struggle constitutes the episodic and 
everyday, extraordinary and ordinary, conscious and passive; it explodes in waves, but is also 
always present. As will become clearer in the case chapters that follow, struggle is embedded 
in every aspect of Palestinian life in Israel, permeating and permeated by the hegemonic state. 
It is threatening and threatened, segregated and linked, inside and outside. An additional lens 
is therefore needed through which to articulate this dialectic of relations, in which resistance 
is trapped in Zionist space, and must constantly respond to it. Through this lens, hegemony is 
most clearly unveiled on the borders, at the point of contact and conflict, disarticulation and 
disruption; where the powers of the state and the resistance of subaltern Palestinians clash 
and are most clearly in tension. In the section that follows, these dynamics are explored 
through the fluid and contextualised lens of spatial theories, which see struggle as a culture 
and a way of life, embedded in and expressed through/by the space in which it is housed. 
What’s Space Got to Do with It? Struggle as a Spatial Relationship 
“Social space can in no way be compared to a blank page upon which a specific message has 
been inscribed. Both natural and urban spaces are, if anything, ‘over-inscribed’: everything 
therein resembles a rough draft, jumbled and self-contradictory.” 
Henri Lefebvre, ‘The Production of Space’, 1991, p.142 
The starting point for any discussion of ‘space’ is the seminal writings of Henri Lefebvre. In 
his work, he sets himself the task of finding a unitary theory for understanding the social 
relationship we have with and within the space we inhabit. He argues, in accordance with a 
Marxist theory of social relations, that every society and hence every mode of production 
“produces a space, its own space.” (Lefebvre, 1991, p.11) The space is appropriated from its 
natural form, manipulated, reshaped, produced and then reproduced; but for a revolution of 
the system to be complete, a new space must be – and is – produced. In this theory, there is 
no abstract space, removed from its practice, its reproduction, its representation. There is no 
ideology, no system of thought, without a space to which it can refer, and “whose vocabulary 
and links it makes use of, and whose code it embodies.” (ibid, p.44) Any system can be 
understood to create its own geography, and thus the study of geography is the study of a 
system (Harvey, 1989).  
At the foundation of the body of work developed by Lefebvre –as well as the spectrum of 
literature that came after – is his “dialectic triad” of conceived, perceived and lived space, 
which together inform the ‘production of space’ (Lefebvre, 1991). Conceived space refers to 
the way the system is conceptualised and represented in society, by those who build, plan, 
and design it. The conceived space belongs to the hegemonic classes, to those who dominate 
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the system and both overtly and subversively invest the space with its signs and symbols of 
power (ibid, p.40). Perceived or representational space is linked to the production and 
reproduction of economy and society (Karplus & Meir, 2014). It describes the realm of those 
who use space, often passively, unconsciously, who reproduce it and represent it in symbols, 
icons and images (Lefebvre, 1991, p.39). Lived space is an evolving spatial practice; a slow, 
dialectic relationship between a system of relations – a society – and its expression, its 
articulation, its “secretion” in space (ibid, p.38).  ‘Lived space’ is the social experience that 
transforms the space that was conceived, and deciphers the space, as it is perceived. Thus 
space is both produced and transformed through the social relations that evolve with and 
within it. 
In many ways, Lefebvre describes the production of space as an inevitable and internalised 
practice of social relations, in a specific time and place. However it is also conscious and 
intentional. The act of spatial production is conceived and not just lived or perceived. It is a 
spectrum of unconscious and conscious productions that must be understood and retained as a 
dialectic, as both product and process; a dialogue of relations all happening at once. As 
Lefebvre (1991) explains:  
“(Space) is a product to be used, to be consumed; it is also a means of production; networks 
of exchanges and flows of raw materials and energy fashion space and are determined by it. 
Thus the means of production, produced as such, cannot be separated either from the 
productive forces, including technology and knowledge, or from the social division of labour 
which shapes it, or from the state and the superstructures of society.” (p.85)55  
Much like the process through which hegemony evolves, the production of space is active, 
but as it is articulated, represented and reproduced, it expresses a common sense of the 
collective will of society, and becomes something assumed, hidden, unseen. As will be 
discussed throughout this thesis, the process through which Israeli space has been colonized 
by Zionist hegemony, exemplifies this triad: the conscious, conceived project, in which space 
has been reshaped, redefined, redesigned, and internalised. It becomes intrinsically 
understood and unquestioned, only then to be reshaped and reconceived, as space is lived, 
challenged, produced and reproduced once more. This is embodied in the policies of 
Judaisation, discussed above, as expressed, for example, in the mapping project Meron 
Benvenisti (2000) describes in his book, Sacred Landscapes. He describes how his father was 
tasked, as part of a team of cartographers, archaeologists, and historians, to‘re-discover’ the 
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biblical map of Israel, and rename the new Israel, accordingly, and in the process, erase the 
names of places that had evolved in this space between ‘the exodus’ and ‘the return’. This 
map has become the map of Eretz Yisrael. It is taught in schools, hangs in government 
offices, and is depicted in Israeli road maps and atlases. It is the essence of Israeli ideology, 
and has been abstracted from the original project, in which a group of technocrats set out to 
re-map the territory in the name of Zionist ideology and its need for a new space within 
which to articulate itself.  
Space and Struggle 
The essential legacy of Lefebvre – and the foundation of his work – is in the idea that 
“struggle is inscribed in space”, integral to the production of social relations, which are ever-
changing and changeable (Lefebvre, 1991, p.55). Mirroring the debates surrounding 
hegemony and resistance, above, he argues that ‘spaces’ – and thus social relations – are 
never closed, absolute, or finite constructions. They are constantly transformed through the 
process of spatial practice. His inheritors, among whom include Bayat (2010), Scott (2009) 
and Holston (2010), argue similarly that space, and thus the system that has produced it, 
changes through our relationship with it. Through both unconscious and conscious actions, 
space that is conceived ‘from above’ is usurped and re-imagined from below, which in turn 
encroaches and reshapes the system as a whole; although, Lefebvre also argues that the 
system does not truly change until the space is fully transformed.   
Resistance in this canon seems to articulate a similar logic to the Subaltern Studies literature 
discussed above, in which the problem of disarticulation is resolved, not through the 
overarching revolution and destruction of space, but through the production of ‘difference’. 
In this work – which moves away from Lefebvre’s more limited contention that ‘users’ are 
passive, producers are active – the subaltern and the marginalised carve out their separate 
spheres, innately and inherently, as they live in contrast to the hegemonic order. Theorised as 
inscribing one’s ‘place’ onto and in contravention with abstract and imposed ‘spaces’ 
(Massey, 1994; Fenster, 2004; Safa Abu Rabia, 2009)
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, the sphere of difference is imbibed 
with the material, aesthetic and ideological expressions of ‘other’. As forwarded by David 
Harvey (1989, 2003, 2012), a keen follower of Lefebvre’s work, the construction of 
‘difference’ - in its rebellions and insurgent clashes with the borders of hegemonic order – is 
infused with the capacity to un-mask and unveil the spatial order; to de-fetishize space and 
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articulate its link to the system and mode of production that disenfranchises its inhabitants 
from their rights to conceive, produce and control the space in which they live.    
The expression of ‘other’ and ‘difference’ is often discussed by these same authors, in terms 
of its ‘threat’ to the system of power, embedded and represented in space. James Holston 
(2010) works with this analysis in his study of ‘insurgent’ citizenship, as a response to 
modern planning mechanisms in Brazilia. For him, this idea is expressed as the displacing or 
reclaiming of imposed space – the ideal of the modern planning model – with its polar-
opposite, lived space; space that evolves through the experience of living in it. In Bayat 
(2009), space, particularly authoritarian space, is challenged through the illegal encroachment 
and appropriation of public space – ‘the street’ – by those who are not represented by it, or 
even formally permitted to share it. In Tripp (2013), overtaking such spaces directly 
challenges the symbolic and real representations of power. In the context of Israel-Palestine, 
this dissonance and threat to the hegemonic order is often ascribed to the conscious and 
unconscious re-writing, re-mapping, re-experiencing and re-imagining of the Zionist scape as 
Palestinian, which is other and outside the system, and appears as an essential component of 
this thesis, as well. That said, there is something unsatisfactory in this theorisation of 
resistance as merely ‘difference’. Antagonistic as ‘otherness’ may be, it does not, on its own, 
disrupt and disarticulate a system of power and structures of hegemony. Looking in particular 
through the lens of this study, it is not merely the ‘otherness’ of Palestinian presence and 
resistance that disrupts the flow of Zionist hegemony; particularly its impact on and control 
of Palestinian space.   
As has been discussed above, the hegemony of state Zionism is – by its own framing and 
through its interaction with Palestinian struggles – threatened by the internalised presence of 
a Palestinian spiritual and material claim to the land. As such, the state has evolved a matrix 
of laws and policies to remove the threat, and where this has proved impossible, to contain it, 
bombard it and overwhelm it. That containment – the creation of Palestinian enclaves inside 
Israel – is at the heart of the problematic of seeing ‘difference’ as the core subaltern project. 
The creation of an alternative, but isolated, autonomous identity within the larger scape of 
power, does not inherently penetrate the state’s structural make-up. In so far as the state 
continues to separate and segment Palestinian-citizen society, from its own people, and from 
the Jewish majority, this spatial practice describes a way for the hegemonic order to continue 
to function, in relation to resistance and difference. Rather, it is when they come into contact 
that disruptions may and do occur. As discussed extensively above, struggle evolves with and 
63 
 
within the system. If ‘difference’ is to be conceived as transformative and disruptive, it does 
so only in so far as it clashes, engages and permeates the hegemonic order, of which it is part 
and with which it must always share the space. Scott (2009) convincingly argues that the 
cultivation of ‘different’ space can be and often is, in and of itself, part of the resistance 
toolbox. However, in Israel, where othered space has become essential to the hegemonic 
spatial order, separate space, even if seemingly autonomous, cannot be considered 
exclusively as a ‘choice’ of the subaltern community, although it is not necessarily only 
imposed from above. As Scott (2009) explains, such spaces of non-governance, of 
autonomous identity, are no longer possible; not that they ever were in Israel. Accordingly, as 
will come to the fore in the chapters to follow, no space in Israel is ungoverned, unsurveyed 
or unseen.   
The literature that will guide much of this thesis comes from the work of critical geographers, 
urban theorists and planners, anti-colonialist scholars and other analysts of space, working in 
Israel/Palestine. Authors, such as Safa Abu Rabia, Mark Levine, Tovi Fenster, Haim Yacobi, 
Oren Yiftachel, Gazi Falah, Yuval Karplus, Avinoam Meir, Meron Benvenisti, Michael 
Warschawski, Eyal Weizman and countless others, who articulate a politics of space and 
struggle, as they assess the aesthetics of the conflict. There is a strong contrast to be made 
between Lefebvre or Harvey, who articulate a Marxist meta-theory of space which is then 
applied to particular configurations of spatial relations, particularly in their work on cities; 
and these field-based theorists, who start with the space itself, and then frame their analysis 
on the basis of the physical landscape. This can be attributed to the fact that the unit of 
analysis for theorising space in Israel/Palestine is always the conflict; whereas, for Lefebvre 
and Harvey, the unit of analysis is the system itself – the mode of production and the space 
that it necessarily produces. But, then again, in Israel/Palestine, this means the same thing. 
The Israeli-Palestinian theorists articulate a particularly persuasive language of metaphors, 
through which to conceptualise the lived-spatial practice of the conflict; and many have 
appeared throughout this chapter and will take theoretical and practical form throughout this 
thesis: the ethnic frontier, the ghetto, the Judaisation and de-Arabisation of land and space, 
elastic borders and trapped minorities. Beyond the vivid imagery, these are tools through 
which to break down the material articulations of Zionist hegemony, and, thus, Palestinian 
struggle. They are also tools with which to re-understand how Palestinian resistance comes 
into contact with the Zionist field of force. In light of which, the Palestinian struggle for land 
and space is re-analysed, here, as a social relationship that produces and is produced, shaped 
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and reshaped through this struggle; which is, in turn, lived, perceived and conceived, ever in 
tension, ever in dialogue with the boundaries of settler-colonialism and the liberal-
ethnocractic state. Converging Scott (2009) and Lefebvre (1991), through this lens, 
Palestinian space in Israel is always a target of hegemonic power and always a tool of 
resistance.  
The lens of space is another way of seeing struggle, in its relationship with the matrix of 
power and hegemony. It is a way to understand the ‘other', as it clashes with boundaries and 
borders carved out by the resister and enclosed by the enforcer. It is a way of seeing the 
system contend with the threat that is both inside and outside, and with which it is always in 
tension. It is also a window into how that system is challenged and changed, shaped and 
reshaped through struggle that is embedded in the everyday, the lived and unseen; alongside 
how it is disarticulated in direct protest and contention. To reiterate the point made by 
Holston (2010), Bayat (2010) and Scott (2009), above, no conceptualisation of space is 
imposed without clashing with the lived-experience of the ‘user’. Colonial appropriation is 
permeated and disrupted by indigenous presence; Zionism by Palestinianism; core by 
periphery; majority by minority; hegemonic power by subaltern resistance. This is the 
essence of this research’s understanding of the Palestinian culture of resistance. The coming 
chapters will explore these intersections through specific cases, where struggle is 
extraordinary and ordinary, and both are inherent to Palestinian life inside Israel. 
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Chapter 2: Jaffa – Popular Struggle in the Mixed City 
 
  
Erasing Palestinian Ajami  
This map of the Ajami neighbourhood, shows (in red) approximately half the homes threatened with 
demolition or eviction by the Amidar Housing Company.  
Source: The Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands and Housing, 2007 
 
 
Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defence of Arab Land and Housing Rights, 2007. 
Map of Evictions and Demolitions – Ajami 
Neighbourhood, Jaffa-Tel Aviv 
66 
 
The Story of Struggle and Space in Jaffa 
The Spark 
On Thursday, March 10
th
, 2007, Ester Saba came home to find an eviction notice tacked to 
the front door of her apartment. The notice explained that on Sunday, March 13
th
, a bailiff 
would be coming with police, empty boxes, and a moving truck, with the full authority of the 
state and her landlords behind him, to move her, her three children, her husband and all their 
belongings out to the street. The essential tone of the notice was that the Palestinian family 
living on these premises was in breach of their contract with the landlord due to a series of 
violations. Accordingly, the Saba family’s continuing presence in the property is illegal and 
hence criminal; trespassers on state-owned and controlled space. It would soon-after come to 
the fore that Ester Saba’s family was one of 497 (one out of four Palestinian families in Jaffa) 
that had received a near-identical version of the same notice, and threatened with forced 
eviction from their homes. 
The backdrop to this story is the neighbourhood in which the Saba house was built, whose 
residents are descendant from a group of “3900 souls” that remained in the city after the 
catastrophes of 1948 (Omar Siqsiq, 2012). This particular and contextualised Nakba emptied 
the city of 95% of its pre-war Palestinian population, including its elites, its intellectuals, and 
its nationalist-leaders; and with them, the city’s position as the urban, cultural and political 
centre of the Palestinian-Arab world (Levine, 2005; Cohen, 2011; Monterescu, 2009). Those 
who were left behind were rounded up into Ajami, one of the dozens of neighbourhoods and 
villages that once made-up Arab-Jaffa
57
. The neighbourhood was then surrounded by a chain-
link fence and became etched in the discourse of state and community, as the Ajami ghetto 
(Abu Shehadeh & Shbayta, 2009; Piterberg, 2008). This ‘fence’ marked the spatial borders 
for the matrix of colonial and ethnocratic policies that evolved around and inside it, long after 
it was removed in 1949. Today, when ‘Jaffa’ is discussed as Arab space, this truncated 
version, a 10 km grey-zone on the edge of the Tel Aviv metropole, is what is meant. Ester’s 
struggle is for and in this neighbourhood, set within lines drawn by an evolving encounter 
between the state and the Palestinian community living there. As her story unfolds, so, too, 
do the trajectories of those encounters and the ways in which they each transform the other. 
A multitude of processes fed and feed into the ghettoization of Ajami; the starting point for 
which was the official status constructed for both properties and residents. The urban space 
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 More than 26 villages were immediately destroyed and swallowed by Tel-Aviv in the aftermath of the 1948 
war and the annexation of Jaffa (Levine, 2005). 
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became the spoils of war, and its properties absorbed by the state under the label Absentee 
Properties, named for the Law
58
 created to transfer legal ownership of Palestinian-owned 
properties to the state. The Law was based on a technicality, applying to any properties that 
had been left ‘empty’, for any length of time, between November 29th, 1947 and May 19th, 
1948. Jaffa was captured on May 13
th
, 1948; the fate of its leftover people and properties 
therefore determined on the same day. These were then transferred to the state’s “Custodian” 
for Absentee Properties, the Development Authority, allegedly to be held in trust until such 
time as the conflict is resolved and property-issues are settled
59
.  The same Law produced the 
civil status for those who were allegedly ‘absent’, including those who remained and were 
contained within walls and fences, spread out across the country; a status enforced by a 
military regime that lasted up to 20 years in some areas,and ensured they were unable to 
reach their ‘absentee properties’. This group became the ‘present absentees’, a legal frame 
that articulates the paradoxical experience of Palestinians who were ‘present’ within the 
borders of the state after 1948; and yet forever ‘absent’, excluded and outside the legal-land 
system that had been built around them (Piterberg, 2001). Jaffa’s Present Absentees were 
moved into Ajami’s Absentee Properties, and have lived ever since in the dual-limbo this 
status represents: refugees from their own homes, holding onto properties of other refugees 
who cannot return to them
60
.  
Management of Absentee Properties throughout the country was sub-contracted out to the 
company Amidar, a pseudo-public enterprise, whose board membership is monopolised by 
the Israel Lands Authority (ILA) and its managing council
61
. Today, they are still Ester 
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 Jaffa’s Absentee Properties were initially appropriated under the Abandoned Areas Ordinance (1948), which 
remanded the fate of ‘abandoned’ areas to the jurisdiction of the state (Allweil, 2013). The Absentees Property 
Law evolved out of these emergency ordinances and determined how such property was to be treated within the 
legal-land lexicon, while creating a civil category for the people with claims to them (The Absentees Property 
Law, 1950). Further details can be found in the table on the Legal Land Regime, in the Appendices to this 
thesis. 
59
 In a 2009 Land Reform, the state established conditions by which some of these properties could be sold on 
the public market, most in the urban centres of the country. This act assigned a fait accompli to the claims of 
hundreds of Absentee Owners in Jaffa. The Land Reform is discussed more comprehensively in Chapter Three 
and in the table on legal land statutes that appear in the Appendices to this thesis. 
60
 This status was also assigned to residents who remained in their own homes, but who were considered absent 
during the capture of Jaffa, as was the case of several interlocutors of this study; see in particular Siqsiq (2012). 
61
 Amidar manages the largest percentage of Israel’s public housing. Its shareholders include: The Jewish 
Agency (50%); followed by the government (20%), the JNF (20%), and five housing companies (10%) 
(Amidar, accessed 2013). The ILA manages all ‘public land’ in Israel, which includes state property, as well as 
land holdings of the JNF and the Development Authority. Known as ‘Israel Lands’, 93% of all land in Israel is 
qualified as such (Israel Lands Authority, accessed 2013). Further details on ‘Israel Lands’ and the laws that 
outline their administration can be found in the tables in the Appendices to this thesis.   
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Saba’s landlords62. While the state – through Amidar – maintains proxy-ownership of the 
properties, the tenants were inducted into what is called “a protected tenancy scheme”. The 
tenant pays a minimal and fixed rental contract throughout their lifetime, so long as they 
continue to live in the property and have no ties to any other property. However, the tight 
restrictions to life under ‘protected tenancy’, which include a multitude of bureaucratic 
constrictions, have informed a lack of control over the property and how life develops within 
it. For example, any change to or repair of the property, any change to the lease, and any 
change to the circumstances of the residents, each require express permission from the 
landlord (which was never forthcoming).  
As Amir Badran (2012), a lawyer engaged in the housing struggle, explained, the contracts 
encourage their violation, and contribute to the precarity of Jaffa’s residents. Moreover, while 
the contract may be passed onto the next generation, again under immensely restrictive 
conditions, the third generation – Ester’s children – have no claims, nor access to capital that 
may contribute to their purchase of another property. There has been much scrutiny of how 
the different hierarchies of class and privilege have been configured through the uneven 
distribution of property and land-access across different Palestinian and Jewish-ethnic 
groups
63
. On the basis of this, a link can and should be made between circles of poverty and 
their roots within ‘protected tenancy’, further discussion of which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, it is directly relevant to see the production of these contracts as a method for 
encouraging a vulnerable and weak community to maintain a temporary and ephemeral 
position within the law, and in this place.  
“Protected Tenancy” acts as part of a matrix of formal and informal policies that work to 
contain and shrink Palestinian presence in the city. The initial modalities of which include the 
annexation of Jaffa to Tel Aviv in 1950, the influx of thousands of Jewish refugees in the 
decade that followed, and the subsequent planning – or rather ‘unplanning’ – of the 
neighbourhood, as a ‘slum clearing zone’. This status, which remained intact until 1992, 
prevented the development of public services, the building of private or public infrastructure, 
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 The Development Authority Properties have changed hands several times since 1948; passing first to Amidar, 
then to Arieli, Gadish and Amidar again, making ownership claims even harder to trace and substantiate 
(Allweil, 2013; Siqsiq, 2012).  
63
 There are many discussions of the hierarchies of privilege borne out of the Zionist-territorial project, and 
reified in property and land ownerships. The subaltern position of the dispossessed/non-land-owners is 
articulated throughout Yiftachel’s work on ethnocracy (1999, 2006), but also in Kedar (2003), Shafir (1989), 
Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis (1995), and Kallus & Law-Yone (2002). An intentional bi-product of the settler-
colonial legacy in Palestine/Israel, land and property are essential in the frame of Zionist legitimacy; to be 
without it is to be peripheral to or outside the system.     
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the processing of permits for home rennovations, or the expansion of neighbourhoods. The 
residents lived off the grid, building without permits, and establishing public works, services 
and schools, without state budgets or permission. Moreover, the lack of official plans did not 
prevent the city from demolishing more than 3000 units (70% of Ajami’s buildings) 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as part of an unsanctioned radical construction project to 
turn Ajami’s beachfront into a 5-star resort area (called the Jaffa Slopes Project)64.  
The plan failed – in large part due to a legal and public struggle led by Jaffa’s community 
leadership, a popular and unofficial community council organised in the form of an NGO, 
known as Al-Rabita: the League of Arabs in Jaffa. However, Ajami was left strewn with the 
rubble of the buildings. The neighbourhood became an unofficial landfill, while the state and 
Amidar set about selling off what was left; the majority, dellapidated and collapsing 
properties. In the 1990s, when new municipal plans were orchestrated to “strengthen” 
(meaning to replace) Jaffa’s ‘weaker’ demographic, and gentrify the buildings, the poor 
Palestinian residents were in no position to fight it. The illegal construction and long-term 
neglect of contracts from both landlord and tenant engendered the community’s vulnerable 
status and further informed the new methodology for marginalising, and then emptiying 
Palestinian urban space. Today, as the neighbourhood finds itself being advertised as a 
popular real-estate investment to wealthy Tel Avivians, the ghettoisation of Ajami is 
conceived and cultivated as an easy target. 
Ester’s Story65 
On that fateful day in March, Ester, notice in hand, went to see Gabi Abed, the head and one 
of the founders of al-Rabita. Al-Rabita was established in 1979, with the mandate to unite the 
fragmented communities of Jaffa, regardless of denomination or political affiliation. They 
have been working to improve the lives of Jaffa’s Palestinian residents, challenging their 
neglect by the state, and what they call a project of ‘quiet transfer’. The organisation works 
through local actions that focus on education, culture, community and infrastructure 
rehabilitation, legal support, and most importantly, issues related to housing (Payes, 2005; 
Abed, 2011; Siqsiq, 2012, Sami Abu Shehadeh, 2011). That night, a community-wide 
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 Local Master Plan – Jaffa Slopes No. 2236 was submitted to the municipal council and housing ministry in 
1965; implementation began immediately, although its approval, in truncated form, was only confirmed in 1995 
(Goldhaber, 2010; Rajagopalan, 2002). Details of the plan, as well as others impacting the neighbourhood, can 
be found in the table of relevant planning documents in the Appendices section of this thesis. 
65
 The description of the events that surround Ester Saba’s eviction and the catalysis of local actions are 
compiled from various interviews, including Ester Saba (2012), Fadi Shbayta (2011), Gabi Abed (2012) and 
Hana Amouri (2011), among others.  
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meeting was called where Ester was invited to share her story and through which she called 
for help.  
Those present speak of light bulbs flashing on – boundaries that had been veiled through 
daily life and spatial practices, became suddenly clear: the meaning of the crisis; its links to 
past legacies of removal and replacement; the existential nature of the threat and the absolute 
imperative to stop it (Hana Amouri, 2011; Fadi Shbeta, 2010; Yudit Ilani, 2011). Plans to 
stop the eviction were put into immediate action. First, an activist entourage, both Jewish and 
Palestinian, gathered at Ester’s home from Saturday afternoon onwards. Over a hundred 
people congregated there, barricading it against the ten or so officers that showed up on 
Sunday morning. In parallel time, a lawyer was discovered among the network, who offered 
to take the case pro bono, and who wrote an immediate request for an Order Nisi
66
. The 
lawyer’s brief was run over to the court by three young activists. As one of whom, Hana 
Amouri (2011), who became a key leader of the current struggle, remembers:  
“The judge was fascinated or shocked by us, I think. He wasn’t used to having people like us 
at the court... And this made him act a bit more human. He liked us enough to approve the 
Order Nisi.”  
The unruly ‘shock’ to the system sent the activists back to Jaffa and the Saba household, 
where their comrades had been holding off the bailiff, with good news. The on-going legend 
of this story is that during those long hours, settled in Ester’s living room, an idea and a 
programme of action came into being (Ilani, 2011). It was quickly understood that the 
problem had far-reaching tentacles. Everyone knew of someone with an eviction or 
demolition order hanging over their heads. Within days, someone from the group managed to 
pry the number ‘497 families’ from Amidar67; a number that doesn’t even include the 
additional 200 families living in municipal public housing under similar conditions of 
illegality and vulnerability. The conversation centred on the link al-Rabita had been making 
since it opened its doors, and the methods for challenging them: that this is not an accident of 
neoliberal gentrification, or a problem of individuals acting outside the law. This was a crisis, 
and it was systemic, historical, collective and intentional, especially when considering that 
the infractions now being targeted took place more than 30 years before the notices of 
eviction appeared (Weitzer, 2007; Ibrahim, 2008).  
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 A legal term, and a tactic often employed in Palestinian-related struggles against the state. It is “a conditional 
order which is to be confirmed unless something be done, which has been required, by a time specified (Black’s 
Law Dictionary, Free Online Legal Dictionary, accessed 2013)”. 
67
 See Yitzhak (2007) (annexed document in Ibrahim, 2008), for details of Amidar’s report on ‘squatted 
properties’.  
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The Sabas’ living room witnessed the forming of Jaffa’s ‘Popular Committee for the Defence 
of Land and Housing Rights’. The Popular Committee, with its mix of Palestinian and Jewish 
residents, activists, intelligentsia, and political representatives, among others, henceforth 
became the core network for a concerted campaign against the on-going erasure of 
Palestinian-Jaffa. Their essential discourse and centre of practice were infused with the 
singular goal of Ajami’s survival as a Palestinian neighbourhood. Ester and her family was 
their first case.  While, at the time of writing, the story is still unresolved, Ester continues to 
fight her cause at court and challenge the shifting methods used by the state in its attempts to 
evict her. She has battled them back, and still remains in her home. As she told me: 
“My struggle is to stay here. I gave birth to my children here. I raised them here. I will die 
here.” (Saba, 2012) 
The Dialectics of Jaffa – Palestinians in the Mixed City 
The housing struggle sparked in the events surrounding Ester Saba’s eviction notice becomes 
an acute lens for understanding the dialectic relationship of power and resistance, in Jaffa. 
The locus of this encounter is the ongoing, systemic and constant siege on Palestinian space. 
The siege – and its activation and intersection with Jaffa’s culture of resistance – is an 
inherent component of the anomalous spatial organisation Jaffa represents. Jaffa is a 
neighbourhood within the ‘Mixed City’; an Israeli categorisation for an urban context, 
allegedly shared by Jewish and Palestinian residents.  
The Mixed-City is antithetical to the foundational Zionist methodologies that underscore the 
colonial map in Israel, which cuts away, segregates, and fragments, in the physical expression 
of a separate ‘other’ that is included yet excluded from the hegemonic centre. The rest of the 
country’s localities are demarcated by clear ethnic and national lines, cross-cut with class and 
religious beliefs. Only 8% of Israel’s Palestinian population live in the “Mixed Cities”, all of 
which have a clear Jewish majority. In most cases, this ‘majority’ was transposed onto 
previously all-Arab, or majority Arab localities that were divested of their non-Jewish 
residents during and in the aftermath of the 1948 war
68
. A critical phenomenon of this process 
has been the use of Jewish bodies, symbols and signs to construct a new Jewish history to 
efface evidence of an Arab presence that existed before or since the birth of the state.  
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 There are some exceptions to this: For example, Nazereth Elit and Karmiel, which were planned as all-Jewish 
settlements on Palestinian lands in the Central Galilee, have become new Mixed Cities due to an influx of 
Palestinian migration over the past 10 years. See Rajagopalan (2002) and Yacobi & Yiftachel (2003) for further 
elaboration on the different histories of Israeli Mixed-Cities details. 
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The experience of Jewish and Arab neighbours, in space that is supposedly shared, is not of 
co-existence and equal rights of place, despite the rhetoric implied in the term ‘Mixed’69. 
Rather, the “Mixed City” tells the story of marginalised neighbourhoods, their uneven 
development and neglect reinforced with high walls and racial divisions
70
. While some 
neighbourhoods, streets and even buildings do host a mixed-constituency of Arabs and Jews, 
the majority of space is segregated; and Arab residents are contained and disconnected from 
the structures of power and policy that design and determine life in the city (Yiftachel & 
Yacobi, 2003; Goldhaber, 2010). However this conceptualisation of a completely excluded, 
subaltern Palestinian space is not sufficient to capture the ongoing mediations, contradictions 
and intersecting matrix of power relations in Jaffa (Monterescu, 2011; Belkind, 2013). 
Jaffa’s own story conflates the Zionist processes of settler-colonialism, ethno-nationalism and 
modernisation (which, in the present day, this takes the form of neoliberalism). Each is a core 
project of dispossession, geared toward the removal and replacement of its other: the native, 
the non-Jew and the pre-modern/pre-capitalist figure, all of which, from the perspective of 
the state and hegemonic order, is embodied in the ‘Palestinian citizen’. Haim Yacobi and 
Oren Yiftachel (2003) have conceived this particular spatialisation of the Zionist project, as 
urban ethnocracy; the expression of which can be captured in the logic of an inherent, 
ongoing, and unending internal frontierism – or internal colonialism (Yacobi, 2012). 
Palestinian space within this frame is not merely truncated, ‘othered’ or unseen. It is also 
confronted as a threat and thus constantly targeted and bombarded (Yacobi, 2009). In many 
ways, this can be understood as a colonial reaction to the difficulty of containing the 
encounter with the Palestinian neighbourhood, which persists, permeates and engages with 
Jewish space; unlike in other parts of the country, where demographics and geography help 
ensure the segregation of communities. This translates into a programme of de-legitimisation 
of Palestinian presence within the Mixed City, and, in light of the cracks and chasms endemic 
to the hegemony of an ethnocracy (Peled, 2007; Yiftachel, 1999), further transforms it into a 
contested city, where struggle is innate to the culture of this space.   
                                                          
69
 The term and ideology behind it have been challenged extensively in the works of critical urban theorists, 
such as Yiftachel & Yacobi (2003), Rajagopalan (2002), Yacobi (2009), Monterescu (2009) and Hamdan-Saliba 
(2014). 
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 As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, Israel’s obsession with borders takes on multiple forms 
throughout Israeli-controlled territory. In some Mixed Cities, these take on material form as brick walls between 
communities: in the “Mixed City” of Lydda (15 km southeast of Tel Aviv), Jewish residents of Moshav Nir 
Zvi built a 4 metre high wall to separate their homes from the neighbouring Palestinian-citizen community of 
Pardes Snir. A similar wall was built in Ramle (22 km southeast of Tel Aviv) to separate the Jewish compound 
of Gannei Dan and the Palestinian community in the Jawarish neighbourhood.  
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The siege begins with the construction of a border, of sorts. Jaffa’s particular political, 
economic and geographic position on the margins of Tel Aviv, the epicentre of Jewish Israel, 
was an effective container for Palestinian life in the city. Jaffa – or rather, the truncated 
Palestinian neighbourhood of Ajami – is completely surrounded, bounded on its Western 
frontier by the Mediterranean Sea, and by Jewish neighbourhoods on its northern, southern 
and eastern limits
71
. The lines were determined in the violence that helped force Jaffa’s 
surrender in May, 1948
72. Jaffa’s Northern-most neighbourhood, Manshiyya, was bombed to 
the ground to create a clear definition between Jewish and Arab space (Aleksandrowicz, 
2013); an urban scar – and open wound – that persists in the border that continues to stretch 
between Ajami and present-day south Tel Aviv, which now includes a remodelled promenade 
of five star hotels that ultimately replaced Manshiyya. The aesthetics of this border are what 
Wallah (2010) coins ‘the in-between places’, visualised in the stark differences one 
experiences when crossing into Jaffa, of graffittied walls, empty plots of land, and crumbling 
buildings scattered along the edges of towering skyscrapers, well-kept streets and bustling 
shopping areas. Salome Street, the thoroughfare that connects these two worlds, was 
produced as a clear line that divides modern from traditional, new from old, rich from poor, 
strong from weak, Jewish from Arab (ibid). But these gaps are neither permanent, nor 
protected. Ajami, as a ghetto-space, was produced to keep Palestinians out of Tel Aviv, but 
not the other way around. The Palestinian community was sequestered, and then besieged by 
acts of ongoing destruction, ghettoisation and debilitation; the legacy of which is inherent in 
the framework for Ester Saba’s story.    
Within the bounded space, the siege was and is articulated in erasures. These took shape in 
the absorption of Palestinian properties and the effacement of Jaffa’s separate history, 
identity and character. Jaffa’s incorporation into the Mixed City became a conundrum to the 
Judaisation project, and an immediate target of the mission to infiltrate and overwhelm non-
Jewish spaces left after the Nakba. This ‘infiltration’ mission is known as one of the 
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 Ajami is contained on the eastern, western and northern fronts by Jaffa neighbourhoods that have already 
been gentrified and filled with Jewish residents, businesses and architecture; of special note is Jaffa’s old city, 
which sits on the north-eastern edge of Ajami, overlooking the beach. Its beautiful cobblestoned streets and 
ancient buildings were targeted for ‘renewal’ in the 1980s, and became home to a Jewish artists’ colony (Abu 
Shehadeh & Shbayta, 2009). Ajami’s northern border has been swallowed by the re-developed Jaffa Port, the 
shopping promenade that surrounds Jaffa’s ‘clock-tower’, one of Jaffa’s most recognisable landmarks, and an 
area the municipality refers to as ‘Northern Jaffa’. Its southern border is with Bat Yam, a Jewish city that was 
founded before the establishment of the state. The Manshiyya neighbourhood, when it existed, was situated 
north of the Clock-Tower and Salome Street. A map of Ajami appears in the Appendices to this thesis as 
Appendix 3.9. 
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 For a map of Jaffa in 1948, just before the bombing of Manshiyya, see Appendix 3.10. 
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‘successes’ of the Mixed Cities (Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003)73. It sets out to contain ‘the other’ 
through the imposition of Jewish ownership, legitimacy and power, with the expansion of 
Jewish presence, physically and symbolically in these frontier neighbourhoods.  
There are endless examples of the state’s infiltrations into Jaffa: The first targets were the 
street signs and public symbols that spoke to a Palestinian past. These were re-mapped to 
connote Jewish presence and historical stakes on Jaffa (Abu Shehadeh, 2011; The Jaffa 
Project, accessed 2013; Palestine Remembered, accessed 2013). Today there are no street 
signs named for Arab-heroes or state-sponsored monuments to Arab history. The subsequent 
‘attack’ can be construed in the settling of Jewish refugees in Ajami, a fact that diminished 
any lingering Palestinian hold on the space
74
. More than 50,000 Jewish immigrants infiltrated 
Jaffa in the 1950s. Most were then removed southward in the wave of demolitions that 
allegedly sought to ‘modernise’ Jaffa’s architecture, all the while destroying evidence of its 
pre-state history (Levine, 2005). In the wake of the Jaffa Slopes project, 3127 building-units 
were destroyed. A mountain of garbage replaced them and constructed the foundation for 
today’s housing crisis. With the failure of the first Jaffa-Slopes project, new development 
plans – approved from 1992 onwards – were created. These shifted tact, seeking new ways to 
attract a ‘stronger’ demographic, through increased infrastructure investment, protection of 
historical and architectural sites, and restricting population densities (Wallerstein and 
Silverman, 2009)
75
. These have evolved with the new neoliberal programme to privatise 
public property and divest direct responsibility for the neighborhood from the state and 
Amidar. Today, these processes have been intensified as real estate booms in Tel Aviv and 
Jaffa is slated to house those who can no longer afford to live in the northern parts of the city.  
Thus, while the ghetto still contains the Palestinian minority and creates a protective border 
around Tel Aviv (Wallah, 2010)
76
; the internal aesthetic of Jaffa is constantly being attacked 
and re-written. Tel Aviv has encroached directly into the ghetto, with an evolving 
methodology for transforming – and ‘transferring’ – the neighbourhood. Today, this takes 
form in complex intersections of ethnic gentrification, the targeting of Amidar’s residents, 
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Mosque, on the edge of Bat Yam, the community has remained contained within the ghetto-borders 
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and new infiltrations of elite (as opposed to refugee) Jews to the neighbourhood. On top of 
this, new settler-communities are arriving from the West Bank, with full state support, to 
build Jewish community-centres, yeshivas and public schools in the midst of Arab streets; 
strengthening the Jewish demographic, while unveiling the clear discrimination in plans, 
budgets and infrastructure development for the Palestinians still living in the neighbourhood 
(Abu Shehadeh, 2011; Saba, 2012). Accordingly, the geographic gaps between these worlds 
are disappearing.  
Throughout its history as part of the Israeli state, the intention has been to intervene and 
transform Jaffa. Yet, different waves of Palestinian resistance have pushed back the state, 
clashing with the totalising and unforgiving project to Judaise Palestinian space. The fact that 
the neighbourhood still exists despite an endless line of policies to destroy it requires a multi-
layered understanding of the impact of both subaltern and hegemonic city-residents, on the 
production of the city-scape. Through this lens, struggle is an interlocutor in the matrix of 
social relations, and an integral part of the lived spatial experience. Thus, the ordering of 
space around and inside the neighbourhood, can be understood as an outcome of the 
encounter between powerful state structures and the subaltern community, embedded within 
them. 
Ester Saba’s experience depicts Jaffa’s current resistance culture, one that is expressed as an 
evolving spatial praxis, whose agents, actions, politics and perspectives develop through their 
entanglement with urban ethnocracies, as discussed above. That entanglement has informed 
a constant, ongoing struggle that is endemic to being a Palestinian resident here, in the urban 
frontier of the “Mixed City”. Underlying its modes and modalities is the question of what 
happens to struggle and resistance in such a volatile space; a struggle informed  by close 
engagement with the Jewish majority, without borders, without autonomy to define the space 
as Palestinian, as different or separate from the centre. As so many of Jaffa’s activists and 
residents repeated to me in our interviews: “Struggle in Jaffa is existential”; a fact clearly 
expressed in the battle to retain Palestinian presence at almost any cost, against the state’s 
powerful impetus to efface the community from the Mixed City. Every element of this 
movement ripples with the fact that it is a movement for survival, and this has immense 
ramifications for the practice of resistance – its politics, its strategies, its tactics, its targets, 
and even its collaborators.    
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Evolving Encounters – The Changing Struggle for Jaffa  
As discussed above, the frontier ethos of the hegemonic project in Tel Aviv evolves, permeates and 
clashes with its other: the struggle for survival, for Palestinian presence, for collective and historical 
rights to and in Jaffa. The following sections explore  the resistance (non)movements that intersect 
with the waves of cleansing, enclosure, infiltration and removal. This includes some of the essential 
stories of resistance, battles won and lost; the development of the culture of struggle in Jaffa, and its 
changing relationship with the state. These sections are organised as a series of debates, tensions and 
dialogues between the different actions and actors, their ghosts and current heroes, their successes and 
their failures. Together these make up the struggle for Jaffa, and offer a clear window into the debates 
and tensions that are inherent to carving out a Palestinian space in the Mixed City. 
The First Struggles – The Tension Between Exclusion and Engagement 
The Popular Committee and the current wave of struggle in Jaffa is entangled in the legacy of 
Jaffa’s resistance culture. While Ester’s case sparked a new trajectory for action, the current 
discourse, many of its methods, and the logics of this work cannot be separated from the 
networks that came before them. This section looks at the first struggles, how they functioned 
in relation to the hegemonic order, and how they continue to resonate what is conceived here 
as an ongoing debate between exclusion from and engagement with the structures of power in 
Jaffa-Tel Aviv. 
Until 1979 with the founding of al-Rabita, there was a vacuum of collective challenges to the 
state and its treatment of the Palestinian residents of the city. This is attributed to the 
particular Nakba that befell Jaffa and the complete reorganisation of the space, as a result. 
The chain link fence  signified the severed ties between residents and their city, as well as to 
their families and kinship lines splintered across new nation-states, and even the Palestinians 
congregating in the north around Nazareth. The great city was demoted to a neighbourhood in 
the Tel Aviv municipality, establishing its future as part of one of the new Mixed Cities, 
where Jews and Palestinians would supposedly share the same urban jurisdictions. Poor 
Jewish immigrants, part of the demographic frontier lending facts on the ground to the 
Judaisation of Israeli space, were moved in. First to the surrounding neighbourhoods, then 
into Ajami, and then into the homes of Palestinian families. At the same time, Jaffa also 
became a holding space for other groups of Palestinians, some internal refugees, some 
transferred from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, after 1967
77
. Divisions and entrenchments 
along religious, class, ethnic, national and family-lines were part of the tensions of the 
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Palestinian enclosure, as they were jumbled together, one on top of the other. Jaffa became an 
Israeli ‘project’ neighbourhood and Ajami was a slum with a beautiful view of the sea 
(Shaker, 1996, interview from The Jaffa Project archive; Goldhaber, 2010).  
Echoing discussions in Rabinowitz & Abu-Baker (2005) and Cohen (2010), interlocutors 
from Jaffa qualify the struggle of these first and second post-Nakba generations  in terms of 
their tactics for survival. They rebuilt their networks, developed relationships with their 
Jewish and Palestinian neighbours, and found new employment in the ‘Jewish’ sector, as 
wage labourers. Most importantly, Ajami residencts created a necessary gap between 
themselves and the state, entrenching themselves within the truncated space allotted to them. 
Within it they built their homes and occupied space without permits, much of it in direct 
defiance of laws that would inevitably and rhetroactively criminalise these actions
78
. 
Yiftachel (2009) conceived a language for understanding the phenomenon of such 
neighbourhoods in Israel and elsewhere, in which a community’s resilience is dependent on 
its precarious vulnerability. He calls this ‘grey space’, as a way to conceptualise space that 
exists outside the boundaries or protections of law (the white space), but which continue to 
resist the ‘blackness’ that is “criminal”, “destruction”, “death” (Yiftachel, 2009a). Grey space 
is an essential feature of Palestinian space within Israel, although it has evolved in multiple 
manifestations, dependent on its permeations and positions within the state and vice versa.   
The neighbourhood’s survival should be understood as part of the etymology of Jaffa’s 
resistance culture; borne out of a debilitated community, whose capacity for direct resistance 
and political contention had been destroyed, just as Palestinian Jaffa had been destroyed and 
swallowed by Tel Aviv. In contravention to Lustick’s (1980) assertions79, survival in the 
Mixed City does not imply acquiescence to the state, nor consent to its Judaising project. This 
was where the ground was laid for carving out a different, Palestinian space inside Jewish 
Israel. It took them (the residents of Jaffa) another 30 years to build it up, to repair the 
fragmentation of the communities, and resist the encroachment of the state and the shrinking 
of their political space.  
Unlike the current wave of activists in Jaffa – many of whom come from the Galilee and the 
Triangle region – al-Rabita’s founders were born into the world described above: Jaffa’s 
poor, fractured, and increasingly isolated and self-isolating community. Ajami lived off the 
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grid of both Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, both of which were focused on the north, as 
the main arena of contention. The cultivation of a subaltern, othered sphere, as grey and 
marginal to the new Israeli-urban infrastructure, was inherent to surviving the Zionist siege 
on Palestinian space, post 1948.  Within the grey space, a repertoire of resistance is 
performed as a response to the absent and disengaged state; despite the fact that, as Yacobi 
(2009) argues, the state  is always present. Alternate rules, laws and affiliations were 
developed in response to the community’s status as unseen and disconnected. There are 
echoes here of what was discussed in the previous chapter as Lefebvre’s (1991) theorisation 
of a ‘different space’ and Holston’s (2010) insurgent citizenships, in light of the resilience of 
Jaffans in carving out their survival against the impositions of Judaisation and de-
development. 
The illegal construction rampant in Jaffa and its circumvention of the state’s legal 
infrastructure is a perfect example of this ‘grey-spaced agency’. The development of 
alternative leaderships, religious arenas, and cultural and linguistic space, likewise come 
together to participate in their evolving resistance. It is on this basis that al-Rabita came to be, 
and their first struggles exemplify the impact of grey-space on their strategies and tactics in 
those early years. Al-Rabita’s founding activists sought to strengthen the resilience of the 
community, to ensure its survival and development against the impetus of enclosure and 
encroachment by the state, by enhancing the autonomy pressed upon Jaffa, as the 
disconnected poor Arab neighbourhood of Tel Aviv. However, as becomes clear in Jaffa’s 
case, the grey space could only survive so long as the state treated it as such, unseen and 
unchallenged as a sequestered, marginalised entity. As has been argued above, the key 
impetus in the Mixed City not to sequester and forget Palestinian space, but to bombard, 
infiltrate and conquer it; and this has had deep ramifications for collective struggle in Jaffa. 
Al-Rabita’s founders were among the first university graduates to come out of the Ajami 
Ghetto. They were part of a changing  economic and educational platform evolving in Jaffa, 
in the 1960s and 1970s (Abed, 2012; Payes, 2005). Inspired by the political movements that 
erupted around Land Day, al-Rabita’s initiators sought an alternative political forum, through 
which to support and advocate for the needs of the local residents
80
.  Their key objective was 
to treat Ajami as a singular collective, through which lines between families, religious 
groups, class and even nationality could be erased. Accordingly, they chose issues they felt 
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cut across Jaffa’s divisions and impacted everyone: the crises in housing, in education and 
among Jaffa’s youth. Al-Rabita became a de-facto local council, with regular elections open 
to all residents of Jaffa, regardless of denomination, in lieu of a representative at the 
municipality
81. It is still considered the centre of Jaffa’s politics today, as it houses the 
Popular Committee and was behind the 1993 campaign to create a seat for Jaffa at the city 
council (called the Jaffa List) (ibid; Abu Shehadeh, 2011).  
The first activities – bent on “strengthening the Palestinian population of Jaffa (Abed, 2012; 
Siqsiq, 2012)” – were described as follows by Omar Siqsiq (2012), one of al-Rabita’s 
founding members: 
“We started by cleaning the streets of Jaffa. After the total neglect of Jaffa by the 
municipality; after the municipality decided to completely ignore the area, after it existed 
with no plans, no development, and no legal construction, we had no water, no electricity, no 
roads, no services or infrastructure. After we established the organisation, we realised that 
the first focus needed to be on how to create a more normal existence for Jaffa. We started 
with issues of welfare, and focused in on cleaning the streets, building roads, creating 
infrastructure – this was the best work we ever did at al-Rabita. Only after this did we start to 
work on issues of the place, seeking from the state, from the municipality, the needs, services 
and rights for the population.”  
Al-Rabita’s role within the community starts from these direct actions. They had minimal 
engagement with the state. As the state consistently ignored their calls for services – and their 
responding curses – al-Rabita began to entrench the population further inside Ajami’s 
figurative borders, utilising the subversive networks and repertoires already at their disposal 
(Abed, 2012). They helped the community defy the restrictions on construction and to expand 
the space available for the growing population.  
These were the first ‘weapons’ in the struggle to maintain Palestinian presence in Jaffa. Al-
Rabita focused on the buildings themselves, reinforcing them, renovating them; they worked 
on the community, providing services and establishing some normalcy within the lives of the 
residents. They worked against – but also with – a policy of intentional neglect; a policy 
reproduced in the practice of surviving without the state. According to Siqsiq (2012), “they 
made it possible for the Arab population to stay in Jaffa; not to run away or disappear to other 
areas, because the plan was always to get rid of Jaffa’s Arab population.”  That is, until a 
trickle and then a deluge of demolitions invaded Ajami, and changed the game. After this, the 
space was no longer grey and hidden, and the state was no longer distant and unseen.    
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Jaffa-Slopes and Garbage Mountain - The Direct Entanglements 
The ‘Jaffa Slopes Project’ was developed to turn southern Jaffa’s ‘slum zone’ into a riviera, 
similar to what befell Manshiyya in the north. The plan aimed to “reclaim land from the sea” 
and re-designate the area for the millionaires of Tel Aviv and Jewish-Israel (Rajagopalan, 
2002; Goldhaber, 2010). According to Ilani (2009), it would “uplift the local population” in 
the process, transformating the spatial, social and demographic fabric of the neighbourhood. 
The ‘plan’ – a joint brain-child of Tel Aviv’s then mayor, Maj. Gen. Shlomo Lahat, and then 
Housing Minister, David Levy – required an extensive amount of rubble to create the 
artificial land upon which the new luxury homes would be constructed. That rubble was 
sourced from Ajami; or rather, from the more than 3000 homes demolished for the sake of 
the project.  
The story is famous among Jaffa’s activists, not simply because of the physical legacy it left 
behind, but because the razing of Ajami and the direct act of Judaisation, embodied in the 
invasion of the bulldozers, signified a new kind of violence in Ajami; and because it 
catalysed the first collective response to the state’s siege on the neighbourhood. According to 
Siqsiq (2012) and Abed (2012), it took the al-Rabita activists time to understand what was 
happening. At first they responded as they had always done, working to defend the 
neighbourhood’s infrastructure and the capacity of the community to survive within it. 
However, as the depth of the plan became clearer, al-Rabita was forced to contend with and 
engage directly with the state, using whatever tools they could access. With the help of the 
Association for Civil Rights in Israel, a Jewish human rights organisation, they began by 
recruiting the community into a collective legal appeal, through which to articulate their 
rights within the main structures of the state. Concurrently, they worked directly with Jewish 
residents and local Jewish organisations to help support and develop a public campaign that 
would reach mainstream, Tel Aviv audiences and the Knesset leadership. Their main 
repertoire worked with/within the liberal, hegemonic language and arenas in which such 
politics are practiced, i.e. law, jurisprudence and media. Al-Rabita hid behind the 
‘democracy’ veil (at least in public), and demanded an end to the plan on the basis that it 
‘harmed the local community’, and had been implemented without formal approval. It is on 
this technicality that the case was won at the Supreme Court, in 1985; after most of the 
neighbourhood was already devastated, and without concretely changing the hegemonic logic 
with which the plan was devised in the first place (Goldhaber, 2010).  
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Al-Rabita won the battle, but not the war. The plan was delayed and reframed, but not 
discarded. The municipality was admonished for its radical and brutal rehabilitation 
programme, but the underlying ethos to alter the demographic makeup of the community was 
retained (Goldhaber, 2010). This is evident in the gentrification and renewal programmes that 
have been discussed above, as part of the new erasures in Ajami; and which are no longer 
implemented with direct acts of violence, but, rather, with slow, incremental evictions, the 
auctioning off of properties, the privatisation of Jaffa’s housing market and the influx of the 
new Jewish residents. Moreover, the razed homes were not replaced with new construction 
for the local residents. Instead, the debris was left to rot, attracting additional garbage from 
the neighbourhood until it became a ‘mountain’. Twenty years later, without the consent of 
the community, the municipality spent a million shekels to turn Ajami’s beachfront/garbage 
mountain into a park
82
; while the housing crisis continues unabated.  
At the same time, Al-Rabita’s first major Supreme Court success became a watershed 
moment that shifted the arena, landscape, tactics and strategies of Jaffa politics. The 
organisation increasingly worked within the Mixed City infrastructure, engaging the state 
through its own institutions – using the courts, targeting the municipality, changing tactics 
from outside to inside
83
.  Al-Rabita, in these methodological shifts, cultivated a more direct 
challenge to the process of Judaisation, but at the same time, increasingly relied on strategic 
engagement with/within the hegemonic arenas of the state, particularly through connections 
with Jewish organisations and political representatives. This evolved as a necessary reality, as 
the othered, rooted space of Palestinian-Jaffa is ever in contact, ever under siege. Survival, 
thus, became integrated and dependent on state structures, which at the same time continued 
to encounter the community through the Mixed City contradictions that seek to enclose, 
exclude and remove. Which, as it turned out, was not so easy to do. 
Al-Rabita, regardless of its new resistance arsenal, remained anchored in the Sumud and 
grey-spaced exclusions of the neighbourhood. As many of my interlocutors explained, there 
is still a Palestinian community in Jaffa because, after the dust settled from the bulldozers, the 
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residents had nowhere else to go. This was their space, surrounded by their language, their 
community, their memories and ghosts (Abu Shehadeh, 2011; Amouri, 2011; Saba, 2012; 
Goldhaber, 2010). For its part, al-Rabita continued to support this entrenchment, by “doing 
what it does best”, by making life normal again, servicing the community and cleaning the 
rubble (Siqsiq, 2012; Payes, 2005).       
The Housing Intifada 
In Jaffa, transgressive and unruly politics are geared to disarticulate the everyday, the 
habitus
84
 of the urban ethnocracy and the neoliberal project encroaching upon the 
neighbourhood. Present-day actions of this kind – creative, innovative, disruptive and 
difficult to contain – are said to have been inspired by a particular moment, found in the al-
Rabita archives, reminding us that community struggle depends on a repertoire of tactics, 
previously performed and tested, as much as its own new ideas about how to change the 
status quo. Called the Housing Intifada, it is the story of a radical act that resulted in the 
capitulation of all the powers-that-be in Jaffa. It stands out after more than a decade of 
reacting to incessant practices of exclusion and the threat of direct and indirect ‘transfer’ 
policies; in this case, al-Rabita initiated and defined its own trajectory for action. In 
Monterescu’s (2008) analysis, the Housing Intifada was a catalytic moment, informing 
Jaffa’s essential shift from “a liberal discourse of coexistence to an assertive claim for 
political entitlement and collective existence.” (p. 21) 
According to Omar Siqsiq (2012) and Gabi Abed (2012), both key organisers of this action, 
an acute expression of the housing and development crisis, as well as some of its potential 
solutions, were the dozens of sealed buildings that exist in Jaffa
85
. Some had been sealed 
since 1948, some since the Jewish families that once occupied them were chased out by the 
demolitions.  All were Absentee Properties and by the 1990s, many had been sold off at 
public auctions, as part of the privatisation project evolving out of the increasingly neoliberal 
political scape (Levine, 2005). For years, al-Rabita promoted a concerted campaign (mostly 
in the form of letter-writing), asking the state for help in resolving the crisis, primarily 
through unsealing the houses and making them liveable. The campaign made no dent in the 
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state’s policy, until, as Siqsiq (2012) explained, they “broke down the walls of the sealed 
buildings and moved in.”  
This ‘Night of the Squatters’, as it is also known, is the stuff of legends in Jaffa, much like 
the obstacle al-Rabita created to the success of the Jaffa Slopes project (Ilani, 2011). It was 
well-organised, beginning with the collation of a list of young couples and female-headed 
households, who would normally be considered for affordable and public housing schemes, 
but had nowhere to live in Jaffa
86
. Next, they collected the necessary support networks they 
would need to see the action through, including permission from neighbours to link these 
homes to the electricity and water grids; legal, public, and media support, ready at a 
moment’s notice to step in; Jewish NGOs who could intervene with the state; and a collective 
of activists prepared to act as human shields to protect these young families against violent 
interventions by the police. Then, one Friday night in March, 1995, al-Rabita un-sealed 20 
previously prepared apartments, and moved in the families. However, by the end of the 
following day, the word spreading through Jaffa was that al-Rabita had given the green light 
to take over all the empty buildings, and so, within 24 hours, over 120 units had been 
occupied. 
The stunt was something new for Jaffa – disruptive, collective, direct – and it wrestled a near 
immediate response and negotiated solution from the authorities. By Sunday, the police were 
mobilised to deal with the squatters. However, when the police arrived to evict the families, 
al-Rabita intervened, explaining that for every family the state removed, they would replace 
them with ten; that they were prepared to fight, and hold the space indefinitely. The police 
backed down, and then the Housing Ministry, the Mayor, the Municipal Council and Amidar 
came to negotiate. According to Siqsiq’s (2012) recollections87:  
“They all came to sit with us, and we came to a very good agreement, that they (the Tel Aviv 
Municipality) would build 400 new units within a year, and that they would institute new 
policies to help support the Arab community to buy their homes.  There was one condition, 
that we needed to remove all the people from these sealed buildings, and then they would 
start fulfilling their end of the agreement. And it was really hard on us, to go and take people 
out of the buildings, but this is what we agreed to, so we did it. But even though we kept our 
end of the agreement, the government didn’t keep theirs. They gave us 100 apartments from 
among those that already existed in the sealed buildings, and until now, we are still waiting 
for the other 300. And so we have no one we can believe anymore.”  
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In fact, several schemes were begun in the aftermath of this event, including a ‘build-your-
own home’ programme, that proved too expensive, and a neighbourhood development 
project, that was inevitably dropped by the municipality (Goldhaber, 2010; Ibrahim, 2008). 
At the end, the state failed to deliver on its promise, an issue every interlocutor to this case 
continues to lament. This brings a series of questions to the surface, as to how struggle can 
sustain its impact; as to its capacity to maintain the disarticulation of the Judaising project in 
the Mixed Space. These were also at the core of al-Rabita’s self-analysis, provoking the 
organisation to shift their methods again and become more integrated in the hegemonic 
sphere (Payes, 2005; Abed, 2012). Within months of the Housing Intifada, Al-Rabita 
launched its Arab-List, signifying their belief that in order to reverse the status quo for 
Palestinians, they needed to be in a position to make decisions on their behalf (Payes, 2005). 
It also signifies a deeper understanding of their position within the Mixed City’s peculiar 
colonial project, excluded and yet included, and dependant on the state’s own political and 
legal machinery to challenge the hegemonic logic that controls their lives.  
The new border for transgression became the state institutions themselves, even as Jaffa’s 
culture of resistance is ever-grounded in its everyday occupation (and survival) in Palestinian 
spaces. The new wave of resistance, housed within the Popular Committee, still battles with 
this tension in its own tactics and strategies. In many ways, the Popular Committee 
exemplifies the way the struggle has changed in the last 2 decades. It oscillates between 
dependency on and integration within the state, on one hand; and on the other, using direct 
actions that protect the residents, and innovative practices that engage and provoke the 
internalised frontier, while carving out new Palestinian space within the neighbourhood.   
The Fine Line between Hegemonic and Non-Hegemonic Tools 
“There are many failures… Because all the laws of the state of Israel, Amidar, the 
development and housing authorities; the war with the laws and the authorities, we are 
outside it. It doesn't give us strength, it – the laws and policies and state – weaken us. We 
reject it at the end, but we are in the position where it weakens us…”  
Busayna Dabit, Jaffa and Mixed Cities political activist, Personal Interview, 2012 
Hegemonic tools are those in the resistance arsenal that use the logic, language and ethos of 
the hegemonic order, as a way to challenge its own practices and impacts. For example, the 
legislature, the court system, the planning institutions, civil society organisations, and the 
state bureaucracy, among others; all of which are entrenched in and contribute to the 
legitimacy of Judaisation  and the ethnocratic settler-colonial regime. The main tension 
inherent in their use, as part of the resistance arsenal of Palestinian subaltern classes, is 
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expressed in a pointed comment from Sami Abu Shehadeh (2011) – who was Jaffa’s council 
representative to the municipality and a founding member of the Popular Committee
88
 – and 
which has been repeated in a repertoire of academic and advocacy materials on the topic
89
: 
“When the judge is your enemy, who can you complain to?” The crux of the dilemma is both 
practical and theoretical. The legal-democratic space, while contained by and within the state, 
offers the Palestinian community the opportunity to claim rights and services, as citizens. 
However, the regime has ordered the ‘liberal democratic’ system to create the conditions that 
privilege Jews over Palestinians, and colours Palestinian space grey and unseen, or other and 
threatening.  
In the previous chapter, the role of hegemonic tools has already been debated and discussed, 
as it is a foundational and divisive issue among the Palestinian activist community, inside and 
outside of Israel
90
. Within the Jaffa case, hegemonic tools have been deeply engrained in the 
community’s struggle for survival. They are inherent to the paradox of Palestinian 
ghettoization within the Mixed City, and are fundamentally tied to the dialectic encounter 
between this subaltern community and the hegemonic order, with which it shares a language, 
framework and space for action. From a theoretical perspective, there is no abstraction from 
the field of force. Thus, the tension that stems from the shared space has immense potential to 
transform the hegemonic sphere, although there is always a danger of reproducing and 
strengthening it. From a pragmatic perspective – a perspective that informs the majority of 
actions coming from the Popular Committee – it makes sense to use every tactic and strategy 
from within the shared social, civil, political and economic terrain to entrench the community 
within Ajami, against their removal.  
With this context in mind, the question becomes how to use hegemonic tools without 
reproducing the order they represent; and if it is even possible to do so. In Tripp’s (2013) 
work on the topic – contextualised in the Middle East – resistance is discussed in light of a 
spectrum of time and space. Rather than see struggle in terms of its individual manifestations, 
he sees it as a collective of actions, evolving over time as part of a process, as opposed to a 
singular moment of social change. This thinking is similar to that expressed in the works of 
De Sousa Santos (2002) and O’Brian (1996), each of whom claims that hegemonic tools can 
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Shehadeh was the fourth representative from the list to take a position on the Jaffa-Tel Aviv municipal council, 
but lost his seat in the 2013 October elections.  
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 See for example: Sultany (2012), Sabbagh-Khoury (2013), Yacobi (2007); Sfard (2009). 
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 See Chapter One for more extensive dealings with this debate, in academic and practitioner circles. 
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be used unhegemonically, in so far as they are linked to other political spaces and/or integrate 
the use of radical language and ideas into the hegemonic arena. Elian Weizman (2013), based 
on her own analysis of the hegemonic functionality of Israeli Law, has a similar, if slightly 
more critical and wary conclusion. She argues that a hegemonic tool – in her case, litigation – 
should and can be used cautiously, as part of a larger ensemble of resistance. 
At the same time, even if practically or theoretically sound, hegemonic tools can be 
debilitating to Palestinian struggle, informing a clear moral and political need of the 
Palestinian communities to situate their activism outside the language, structures and frames 
of the settler-colonial state. Interlocutors to this study spoke extensively of their long history 
with disempowerment, subject-hood and patronism, particularly when working with state 
institutions, as well as with activists and organisations from the Jewish left in Israel. It is this 
experience to which Busayna Dabit refers, in the quote, above. This is particularly poignant 
in the Mixed City, where there is so little opportunity or possibility for Palestinian struggle to 
orchestrate this kind of separate resistance, determined as it is by demographic and spatial 
realities. These debates will be explored further below in the discussion surrounding the 
Popular Committee and the current wave of struggle in Jaffa, as well as throughout this 
thesis.  
The Popular Committee 
The Popular Committee is a focal point for these tensions, and the debates that evolve out of 
them, as it functions both inside and outside; with tools that are ‘pragmatic and political’; 
‘popular and professional’; ‘transgressive and contained’; ‘hegemonic and non-hegemonic’91. 
The Committee, formed through the call to arms by Ester Saba, started with an uncoordinated 
network of Jewish and Palestinian activists, professionals and residents; all currently call 
Jaffa home, but many of its founders and leaders do not have their roots there
92
.  
According to interviews with several interlocutors from the case
93
, when they started, the 
Committee’s members knew very little about how to combat the problem. They were still 
unaware of the length and breadth of what they were dealing with. They inherited their 
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 Refer to the discussion of these terms in Chapter One, for a more comprehensive understanding for how they 
fit into the debate on hegemonic tools; in particular, how subaltern struggles intersect with and challenge 
hegemonic structures of power.  
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 For example, Hana Amouri, who is from the Galilee and Fadi Shbayta, who is from the Little Triangle (in the 
centre of the country); even Ester Saba is originally from the Triangle region, while her husband is a ‘true’ 
Jaffan. 
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 See in particular the interviews with Hana Amouri (2011), Ester Saba (2012), Fadi Shbayta (2011), Yudit 
Ilana (2011), and Sami Abu Shehadeh (2011); all of whom were integral to the founding of the Popular 
Committee.  
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discourse, some expertise and a ready-made activist network from al-Rabita, but their 
methods, their creativity, and their impact, developed through the praxis of struggle, through 
the act of challenging the state and reflecting on that action (Schugurensky, 2002).  
Ester Saba (2012) describes their beginning in this way: 
“When we talk about it now, we know what to do, it’s obvious, but then, we didn’t know 
anything. When I found out about the eviction notice, many activists came to be with me. And 
there were people with all kinds of expertise willing to add to the collective tools we had. 
There were people who knew how to do campaigns and publicity, some who were lawyers, 
others who were journalists. And then we divided into working-groups, and everyone focused 
on their own group. When someone found out about an eviction, we would get the number 
and the address, and start working. Team One – the lawyer and case worker – would do their 
work with the bailiff and the court. Team Two would collect the activists and barricade 
themselves in the house, until things were fixed with the court… And we did amazing work.”  
In their first year, the Popular Committee was in motion almost daily, with public meetings, 
demonstrations in the street, mapping the crisis, collecting information on potential different 
legal, political and public avenues for action, and raising awareness of the collective and 
systemic nature of the mass evictions among the community. However, their primary targets 
were the various arms of the Israeli authorities with the capacity – and responsibility – for 
orchestrating solutions to the crisis.  
According to Yudit Ilani (2011), another key interlocutor and a case worker for the Popular 
Committee, their demands were two-fold: First, a solution to the immediate issue of the 
evictions, including a freeze on all eviction orders and associated legal actions; second, a 
systemic solution to the crisis. This solution, as Ilani (2011) explained, needed to include: 
“an end to any and all sale and auction of allegedly publicly owned land – meaning refugee 
and absentee properties – and entering a dialogue with the Popular Committee to implement 
a system that guarantees a long-term Palestinian presence in the city; and that enables youth 
and young couples to find affordable housing in the city, particularly in the Jabaliya and 
Ajami neighborhoods.”  
The core motivating spirit of the campaign was the survival of Palestinian Jaffa, expressed 
through their slogan, ‘Jaffa for Jaffans’.  The underlying focus of their work was “the need to 
wrest recognition of Jaffa’s Arab-Palestinians as a group with historic rights to the land and 
properties of the city.” (ibid) The recognition, according to Amouri (2011) and Ilani (2011), 
would come from the state; and the solutions – which would be implemented by the state – 
would be devised through consultation, negotiation, and consent of the community. The key 
targets, and the Committee’s key tools, were the state’s institutions, legal lexicon, planning 
authorities, city council and housing ministries, all of which were infused with the urban 
ethnocracy that caused the crisis in the first place. 
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However, this is not all the Popular Committee did and does. An array of transgressive 
actions were piled one on top of the other, particularly in the first year, when the threat of 
evictions were most acute. They barricaded homes against bailiffs. They picketed Amidar and 
the buildings up for auction, often inviting themselves on tours with the tycoons expected to 
bid for the properties, and frightening them away through threats of prolonged planning and 
bureaucratic interventions
94
. They developed coalitions with Jewish organisations – and 
eventually whole neighbourhoods
95
 – and worked to spotlight the increasing vulnerability of 
the neighbourhood in Jaffa’s streets and public spaces.  
One telling anecdote from this period is from the rush up to Land Day in 2007, a mere few 
weeks after the Committee was formed. According to Amouri (2011), the activists felt it was 
important to have the focal event in Jaffa that year, where things had been ‘quiet’ for more 
than a decade, while gentrification, under the guise of business as usual, developed all around 
them
96
. The decision expressed more than just the need to spotlight what was happening in 
Jaffa. It re-opened the internal Palestinian discourse around land, and shifted its frame to 
include the urban space, in the centre away from the Palestinian politicised zones of the 
northern enclave. The Mixed Cities had been excluded from the radar of Palestinian politics 
for a number of years
97
 and the Popular Committee reintegrated them into the larger 
Palestinian struggle, pushing open the internalised boundaries on what constitutes contested 
space and contested communities. Besides the street protest planned to commemorate Land 
Day, a series of events and awareness-raising campaigns were planned, targeting the 
community and the wider Jewish public of Tel Aviv. One significant action, which Shbayta 
(2011) considers one of their most creative instalments of public political theatre, was a map 
the Committee created of the demolitions and evictions. The ‘rub’ was the fact that the map 
was overlaid on top of a food-festival map produced by the municipality. Next to restaurant 
icons (like a fork and spoon), they added a bulldozer and a key that explained who was under 
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, 2012. I witnessed 
him exploit his status as a councilman to explain to the property’s potential buyers his many technical avenues 
for making the project of development as close to impossible as he could 
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 For example, the Kfar Shalem and Tikva neighbourhoods of the Tel Aviv/central district; both targets for 
gentrification and the displacement of current (weak) populations by richer migrants from other parts of the 
centre. Both neighbourhoods are Likud (right-wing) strongholds.   
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 In October 2000, every Arab locality organised their own solidarity protests in support of the Palestinians in 
the occupied territories, engaged in the Second Intifada. In Jaffa, there had been riots in the streets, brutal 
treatment by police and a long period afterwards of Jews boycotting Jaffa businesses. This period of ‘quiet’, 
referenced above, was a response to both the events of 2000 and its aftermath. 
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 As is clear from a reading of the ‘Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs of Israel’, which only mentions Jaffa 
once, in a section about rediscovering Palestinian culture in the 1970s (The National Committee for the Heads 
of the Arab Local Authorities in Israel, 2006). 
89 
 
threat of eviction.  They made it uncomfortable for a community of rich foodies from Jewish-
Israel to sit in Jaffa behind the veil of reconstructed and rehabilitated space. They used the 
public space and events that celebrate it, engaging directly with the ‘map’ of the modern, 
developed city, and laid bare the hidden casualties of its gentrification project.  
Institutionalising the Movement – From Popular to Professional, Political to Pragmatic 
A division exists between the first year and later years of the movement. In the beginning, 
there was no organised system or address for dealing with the evictions. The Committee was 
innovative and mobile, situated outside particular ‘containers’ for transgressive actions. It 
worked in teams, with space for residents, activists and professionals to develop the 
campaign together and in parallel tracks. Without the limits of parties and organisations, they 
could be flexible, responsive and inclusive; in other words, a popular, grassroots struggle
98
. 
However, after about a year of constant acts of protest and court-based engagement, new 
thinking around how to evolve a more ‘systematic’ line of action, came to the fore, and 
became routinised. As the Popular Committee continued to collect names and map the 
problems, they devised a more organised way of dealing with them, and with addressing the 
state. As a result, Darna, the organisational/professional arm of the Popular Committee, was 
established, and became an avenue for further institutionalisation and engagement with the 
hegemonic order. Moreover, while members of the Popular Committee continue to 
differentiate between the two, in practice, their resources, activities and focus are entirely 
integrated, with Darna’s employees also key founders and leaders of the Popular Committee. 
Darna took over the task of collating, tracking and organising the case work around the 
evictions. They link residents to available lawyers – through the state’s public legal aid 
system – and coordinate the type of litigation, mediation and direct interventions to be used in 
the cases. It took several years, but Darna has developed an organised system of working 
with the community, the lawyers and the officials from the state and Amidar, to generate a 
protective haven around the neighbourhood. So long as they have sufficient notice from the 
family at-risk of eviction, Darna is nearly always successful in preventing their removal 
(Ilani, 2011; Abu Shehadeh, 2011).  
Over the past eight years, Darna/the Popular Committee have continued to deepen their 
engagement with the state in order to resolve the individual cases. They developed short-cuts 
through the bureaucracy, and organised bi-monthly visits from a public housing case worker, 
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to check on the status of the residents. They found human voices within the planning spheres 
and worked through them to map out better technical solutions for the community. They 
worked directly with Amidar to institute systematic support-networks against the removal of 
their most vulnerable tenants. They also found conspiratorial partners across the national 
divide, in poor Jewish communities (many of whom were part of the Mizrahi refugee 
communities instated in Palestinian homes in Israel’s urban centres the 1950s), who had 
better, more coordinated campaigns against the evictions. In 2010, the Popular Committee 
organised a year-long programme of roundtables, at which they sat with all stakeholders from 
the state, the municipality and Amidar, to develop joint solutions to the housing crisis. 
Finally, in 2013, they orchestrated a class-action suit against plans to turn Kedem street, the 
street that travels along the beachfront, into a highway; the action included transmitting 700 
individual appeals to the courts on behalf of the affected families.  
The Committee gained some genuine victories through this process, with the evictions almost 
down to a trickle in 2011 and 2012, when the primary interviews for this study were 
conducted (although new evictions have popped out of the woodwork in 2013 and 2014). 
Moreover, the state was forced to acknowledge that the housing crisis in Jaffa was collective 
and had particular implications for a specific, ethnic community (Amouri, 2011). However, 
as a result, the initial politicised discourse was, if not dropped, then dulled (at least in public) 
(Amouri, 2011; Abu Shehadeh, 2011). The more this process evolved, the more room there 
was to manoeuvre within the state’s institutions, which in turn galvanised more results for the 
community. This moved much of the action out of the street, and into hegemonic corners, and 
changed the circumstances through which Sumud is practiced and protected.  
There are clear tensions in the dependence – and, thus, often silencing methodologies – of 
working with and through the state. In order to protect the community against eviction, the 
Committee/Darna often encounters the system without necessarily provoking it, without 
challenging it. Their goal is to keep the residents in their homes, using whatever tools are at it 
their disposal; politicised or pragmatic, direct or subversive, inside the system or outside. As 
a result, the individual cases are often fetishized, enabling the bureaucracy to articulate the 
shape and breadth of these actions and further distance the cases from the systemic, political 
issues they embody. Yudit Ilani’s (2011) description of one particular intervention offers a 
window into the conundrum Darna/the Popular Committee faces in their work, and the 
distance they need to go from political to pragmatic politics, in the process:  
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“In one case I am working on – and truthfully I don’t know which direction it’s going; I mean 
in some cases, we just win. We manage to prove that the family actually lived in this house, 
that it has rights. If there are debts, we get a deal in which they pay the debt in monthly 
instalments, it’s finished. But this one is not so clear cut. It is an interesting case, where the 
family started out in a one-room apartment and over time, the family actually constructed 7 
other rooms. And they were facing eviction, because, of course, these rooms were constructed 
illegally; but they needed it, because this was a very large family at the time. But in the 
meantime, the children have grown up, and now there is only the mother and one son, who 
suffers from mental retardation. Anyway, we managed to get a deal with the housing 
company that she has to demolish two rooms, but then she will become the legal tenant of all 
the other rooms. So instead of 1 room, she is left with 6 rooms – but this is a good deal, she 
stays in her house. It’s a pity she has to lose 2 rooms, but this is a good deal.  It’s fair, she 
gets to stay and be a legal tenant of the house.”    
This is not to say that this isn’t an effective method with which to place facts on the ground, 
to keep Palestinians in Jaffa and stay the flow of Judaisation. However, as Gadi Algazi 
(2011a), another key activist from the movement, explains, “the evictions have stopped, but 
the process of gentrification continues.” That said, in a second interview with Algazi (2011b), 
he further argues that “when we are dealing with real people and real problems, this is the 
only choice you can make.”   
Overall, in the work of Darna/the Popular Committee, direct actions weave into hegemonic 
actions, and vice versa, continuing the legacy of al-Rabita before them. With the core focus 
on the state and Jewish-Israel, as key addressees, there is an inherent link being constructed 
between survival and the larger hegemonic arena in which they function; and one to which 
the state has begun responding, at least in terms of the individual cases. The system and its 
boundaries need to be engaged and encountered to evoke an unruly response; even if the 
political discourse is disguised within something more hegemonically digestible in the 
process (Yacobi, 2012). This is not to say that a multitude of actions and actors working from 
their space outside the hegemonic order, without utilising its institutions and networks, 
couldn’t inform a new boundary, nor inform systemic transformations. However, this is not 
the story of the Palestinian citizens, and particularly the vulnerable community in Jaffa. As 
Abu Shehadeh (2011) often reminded me, they, the Palestinian contenders for space, are not a 
multitude. They are a few hundred activists and in this context, demographics mean 
everything. Being so few, Jaffa’s constituents are dependent on the state and its institutions; 
they cannot divorce their actions from the system and the communities upon which they are 
dependent and to which they are so vulnerable.     
The Popular Committee – and their cohorts in the struggle – express a strategic understanding 
of this dilemma. The majority embrace the need for a spectrum of actions – direct, 
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contentious, transgressive and hegemonic – and that these must be mobilised simultaneously 
for them to have an effect. What unfolds through this process is that it is not necessarily the 
arena for action but the boundaries transgressed through them, as part of a resistance 
repertoire that informs the disarticulating capacity of the struggle. This does not mean that the 
Popular Committee is not overwhelmed at times by the hegemonic/ethnocratic project, and its 
ability to reshape itself around the community’s struggle, often disempowering its modes and 
methods in the process. This is always a challenge, as the community seeks to carve out and 
embed a Palestinian space in Jaffa.  
The Impact of the Mixed City – Carving out a Palestinian Struggle 
“When I was a student, the language of responsibility and making present the Palestinian 
voice in an egalitarian political partnership was as foreign as Chinese to me, and I can 
imagine that for many Palestinian university students it still is. The words “move on” 
sounded to me at the time like a declared forfeit of memory, of the right to remember, of the 
voice that has been silenced by the aggressive naturalization process of Palestinian citizens 
of Israel, and for what? For nothing! It meant giving up what I am – because the Palestinian 
historic narrative is a part of me. How can we be separated? How can one possibly think we 
could be separated, and what would I be without it? What would I be outside it? The 
excruciating, catastrophic, bloodied memory is still the only way in which we perceive you, 
communicate and dialogue with you, the only way we perceive not only you but ourselves in 
order not to get lost amongst you. It is the only way to buffer ourselves from you. And we 
need this buffer in order to remind ourselves that we are we and you are you, that this we will 
never be you. Identity is the pre-condition for true dialogue – and develops from within it.” 
Rajaa Natour, Dialogue Facilitator & Gemini Project Coordinator, Sadaka-Reut;  
From Tarabut-Hithabrut’s Website, 2013 
As discussed above, the specificity of the Mixed City and the particular agents who have 
mediated its development give rise to a particular tension within the field of struggle in Jaffa. 
On one side, there exists the need for and development of a Palestinian-only space for 
resistance, and through it, a set of necessary barriers and protections from the Jewish space. 
On the other, there persists the ‘Joint’ resistance of Palestinian and Jewish activists, and the 
baggage of ‘co-existence’, dialogue and accusations of ‘Israelisation’ that come with it99. 
This tension is tied to the socio-political history of this place, and the experience of struggling 
for a particular Palestinian identity within it, in relation to the hegemonic order seeking to 
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erase it. That identity is tied to the physical presence of a Palestinian population, rooted in 
Jaffa’s last Palestinian neighbourhood. Survival and Sumud are pitted against Judaisation, 
and its evolving cycles of infiltration and containment, removal and replacement. However, 
the tools for this struggle take form in these two intersecting, sometimes clashing, sometimes 
mutually penetrating circles, as the need for a Palestinian space cannot separate itself from its 
proximity to Tel Aviv, to the “centre of the centre” and all it means for the hegemonic veil of 
a “Jewish-democracy”; nor from the significant fact that there are just too few Palestinians to 
hold the state at bay on their own (Karkabi, 2014). Housed within Jaffa is the tension between 
how to provoke change, to engage the system and to find subversive collaborators wherever 
they exist, and yet to retain the politics of being Palestinian in the Jewish settler-colony.  
While this is a core conflict for Palestinian struggle throughout the Mixed Cities – and to a 
lesser degree, the Palestinian peripheries of the country – it is especially poignant in Jaffa. As 
many interlocutors from the Popular Committee contend, the nature of the struggle cannot be 
isolated from the fact that Jaffa was once the great city of Palestine and is now a mere 
neighbourhood of the largest Jewish municipality; nor from the fact that Jaffa has been so 
overtly Judaised, with the bulldozing of its history and ongoing attempts to quietly ‘transfer’ 
its communities; nor from the fact that a Palestinian identity has been de-emphasized and de-
legitimized as Jewish presence, Jewish narratives, Hebrew language and Hebrew culture have 
settled in Jaffa. The boundaries have been dissolved, and there is no distance or gap left 
within which to carve out a different space, preserved for Palestinian identities, symbols, 
language and culture. Thus, there is a craving for a purely Palestinian space and resistance.  
At the same time, the reality of where they are, of their audience, of the borders that now 
cross right through and over them, has informed and articulated the strategy of joint protest. 
The tension this evokes is similar to the debate presented above, as to when and how to use 
the hegemonic arenas of the state – and replayed in multiple online Arabic blogs, articles, 
facebook messages and community meetings
100
. According to several interlocutors to this 
thesis as well as additional Palestinian activists writing on the topic
101
, there is an inherent 
ambiguity in working within Jewish space and with Jewish activists (even those who label 
themselves anti-Zionists and call for the de-colonisation of Israeli-Jewish privilege). This 
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ambiguity relates to the long history of Jewish activists speaking for and directing Palestinian 
struggle (Farah, 2011) and the dangers of reproducing the same power dynamics as those 
subsuming Palestinian Jaffa. As Natour mentiones above, there is a fear of that which is 
gained being overshadowed by what is lost – the right to (and struggle for) a Palestinian 
space. However, engagement with this sphere has become a necessity of the housing protest. 
Moreover, Palestinian-only and joint-activism in Jaffa do not happen in diametric opposition. 
Rather, they share a spectrum of actions and spheres that come together to make up the 
community’s culture of resistance, and through these encounters, some of the most radical 
engagements with the spatial ordering of the Mixed City are cultivated. 
The Palestinian-Only Struggle 
The ‘Palestinian-only’ struggle is not exclusively related to the housing crisis, despite the fact 
that it is very much anchored in it. Much of its discourse and activities relate back to the 
essential goals of the Popular Committee, and many of its advocates are key leaders within 
the Committee. However, there is a new articulation for action, where the question is no 
longer about survival in itself, but the kind of community that would survive here. The 
carving out of a different, Palestinian space is not about the mere existence of Arabs in Jaffa, 
but the right to be Arabs inside Israel and keep their identity (Abu-Shehadeh, 2011)
102
. The 
space is reclaimed from the erasures of the Mixed City, in multiple articulations and 
configurations, and with a plethora of audiences. It is then about embedding this story in the 
public space, as an evolving, radical and intentionally provocative programme of ‘re-
Palestinianisation’. 
Insurgent Mapping 
A key embodiment of this process of re-Palestinianisation can be found in what Sami Abu 
Shehadeh calls his ‘political-historical tour of Jaffa’; in essence, a walk through the still raw 
urban scars of the different neighbourhoods. My own experience of taking this tour with Abu 
Shehadeh (in November, 2011), helped shape my understanding of the community’s struggle, 
the space within which it is housed, and the order against which it clashes
103. This ‘walk’ has 
evolved as a political exercise, an insurgent mapping process that challenges the Judaisation 
practices shaping Jaffa, since the establishment of the state
104
. In Abu Shehadeh’s 
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engagement with Jaffa’s map, he names the hegemonic order, unveiling its colonial language 
and its reproduction of ethno-national power dynamics. He then re-Palestinises its signs, its 
symbols, its neighbourhoods, and re-invests it with Palestinian narratives and memories. In 
Abu Shehadeh’s hands, each landmark, each mark on the map, each street sign becomes 
contested space; as he walks you through the history of how Jamal Basha Street became 
Jerusalem Boulevard (one of Jaffa’s main streets), or how ‘Clock Tower Square’ became 
‘Hagana Square’, at the entrance to Jaffa (named for the pre-state Jewish militia that helped 
conquer Palestine in 1948), or how Palestinian-Jaffa was contained within the Ajami ghetto 
and the space was infiltrated by Tel Aviv’s development programme. He repeats the story to 
the multiple visitors and stakeholders who join his walk, and in so doing, Abu Shehadeh 
carves out Palestinian space from the Judaised version of it, in physical and material terms.  
Abu Shehadeh’s mapping practice leads through the present and historical terrain of Ajami’s 
struggle; sites of essential conflict that have already been emphasized, above. These include 
endless construction projects signifying the march of gentrification; the buildings that have 
been bought to house the settlers from the West Bank and their institutions; Park Ha 
Midron/Garbage Mountain; the neighbourhoods (like the Old City) that were emptied and 
replaced; and the monuments and public places that have been completely divested of any 
links to their Palestinian origins. However, there are also spaces of hope, interwoven into the 
walk as key sites of Jaffa’s political theatre: the grafittied walls of Amidar-managed buildings 
that claim Jaffa for its residents; several homes, whose families had been saved from 
eviction; several others that are up for auction and have become sites of contestation; the 
cafes and restaurants that act as havens for Jaffa’s political activists, as well as public spaces 
for staging political events and meetings; and the Clock Tower that stands at the entrance to 
Ajami, which itself has become the central site of Jaffa’s many protests and public 
demonstrations.   
The tours have proliferated in the last decade or so since Abu Shehadeh began leading them. 
In 2014, there are not only multiple versions led by the local activist community, but versions 
that appear online, and in multimedia formats. In one example called “the Jaffa Project: 
Autobiography of the City” – a project directed by Muhammad Jabali, an activist, DJ and 
blogger – a virtual tour made up of interviews, images, maps and personal histories, take 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Brazilia; and Avinoam Meir (2003, 2005, 2009), who conceives of the term ‘Insurgent Planning’ as a label for 
the Bedouins’ use of planning mechanisms to attempt to reshape the state’s imposed vision of the Naqab. For 
more details of Holston’s work, see further discussion in Chapter One; for more on Meir’s work, see Chapters 
Three and Four. 
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visitors through the city’s lost Palestinian memories, as a way to reclaim them. The insurgent 
map has become an integral component of building a Palestinian identity and transmitting it 
into the public sphere, where the main battlefield is still evolving.   
Reframing the Public Space  
Jaffa’s public space has been stolen by the state – at first it was the street signs and public 
monuments, but with the new ‘development’ and neoliberal renewal programme, the state is 
everywhere. It is in the new shopping arcades, the gentrified flea market, Park HaMidron, the 
new Jewish neighbourhoods and Jaffa’s Port; while Jaffa’s historical and Palestinian 
character are consistently erased from the streets. These spaces have thus become essential 
targets for reclaiming Palestinian-identity, and projecting a Palestinian claim on the 
neighbourhood.  
According to Abed Abou Shhadeh (2011)
105, a key activist from Jaffa’s Palestinian youth 
movement, this is the place to assert a Palestinian-voice. As opposed to the courts, the 
roundtables and the municipality, where he feels their politics are silenced, Palestinian 
political protest needs to be in the street. The main site is the ‘Clock Tower’, where the 
majority of Jaffa’s Palestinians live, and yet have been surrounded by a newly gentrified 
promenade. It is also where the local residents most often encounter the other, and the point 
at which Tel Aviv physically and symbolically meets Jaffa
106
. The significance of the protest 
space activates the border between two worlds.  
The main and most antagonistic expression of this Palestinian presence is the public protest. 
Dozens of mass demonstrations are organised by the city’s Palestinian activists every year. 
These tend to be linked to an anti-Zionist, pro-Palestinian theme, e.g. Nakba Day, the Siege 
and ongoing bombardments of Gaza, the Political Prisoners, and the Housing Crisis; and 
from July through November, 2013, several ‘Days of Rage’ protests were organised, in which 
the Bedouins’ struggle in the Naqab was intersected with Ajami’s own struggle for 
recognition and right of place. The demonstration is the arena through which the Palestinians 
of Jaffa challenge the norms of ‘transfer’ and ‘transformation’, in public outcries that force 
the state to acknowledge their presence and their rootedness in the neighbourhood. For 
example, during the Land Day demonstration in March, 2012, one elderly woman explained, 
as she walked hand in hand with her daughter and grandchildren, that “this is not about 
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edge of the Modern Jewish city.  
97 
 
winning. We probably won’t win here. But we will not leave without screaming as loud as 
possible, and forcing them to hear us; that this is our home and they can’t just take us out of 
it.” (Land Day March Participant, 2012) 
This does not mean that Jews do not participate in the Jaffa demonstrations – there are many, 
and signs and slogans are more often in Hebrew than in Arabic; although this is also because 
their audience is not primarily in Jaffa, but in Tel Aviv, and includes the mainstream press 
and Jewish general public. However, it is clear that in many cases, the collective ‘voice’ is 
that of a Palestinian identity. The space itself is covered with Palestinian flags, the rhetoric is 
politicised and provocative, the themes are about Palestinian liberation, and the heroes are all 
Palestinian.   
The demonstrations are the most overt example of a call for a Palestinian public space. 
However, it is the non-institutional, indirect but conscious and subversive activities that have 
become critical to the spectrum of actions that embed a Palestinian identity in Jaffa. These 
form a new kind of Sumud in the neighbourhood. One example is the bi-weekly youth group 
meetings (led by Abu Shehadeh), where many of the demonstrations and community 
activities are organised. These have become the space to discuss what it means to be 
Palestinian youth in Jaffa; where stories and ideas are shared and turn into plans (Jaffa Youth 
Group, 2012). The Youth Group focuses on finding and expressing a common identity among 
the fractured Palestinian communities of Jaffa. For example, the group hosted an Eid al-Fitr 
feast in 2012 in a Christian churchyard, to highlight the common loss of land by both Muslim 
and Christian local religious communities. They also formed a Dabke Dancing troupe (a 
Palestinian folk dance group), again in light of a lack of Palestinian cultural space in the 
‘Mixed City’. It performs regularly at public events, and as much as possible on the streets of 
Jaffa; but it also performs in the Arab-Hebrew Theatre of Jaffa, and to mixed audiences. The 
troupe fits right into the nationalist music scene that is also beginning to take hold, as with the 
weekly electronic Arab music nights at Anna Lou Lou Bar, on Yefet Street
107
. There are also 
Palestinian theatre and poetry nights, public art and graffiti, online journals, blogs and 
newsites
108
. In this burgeoning space, the syntax and symbolism, discourse and movement is 
very much Palestinian, despite the fact that there are many Jews who take part.  
On one hand, the ‘Palestinian-only’ struggle depicts the separate space of difference, inside 
which it seems possible to reclaim the Palestinian city. It enables the community’s push 
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against the fixed borders of the state and reimagines them as processes that evolve in their 
contact with transgressive and radical acts of resistance; through alternative, untold and 
unseen Palestinian narratives, histories, symbols, art, architecture and most of all, people. On 
the other hand, this is not a ‘disengaged’, spatial haven for Palestinian identity or struggle, 
enclosed and distinct from the Jewish sector
109
. As Natour (2012), quoted above, argues, 
these acts of radical Palestinian identity – the extreme other in the hegemonic order – offer a 
way for the victims of this history to engage with the Jewish space, through a necessary 
buffer. It makes it possible for them to encounter fellow activists in the joint space, without 
losing themselves; an experience opposite to the norms of their experience with Jewish 
society, of the market, of the bureaucracy, and of a powerful hegemony that has no room for 
indigenous Palestinians. As mentioned above, the nature of the Mixed City, and the 
bombarded, contained and tiny community of Palestinian-Jaffa, has made the ‘Palestinian-
only’ arena unsustainable without the Joint Struggle. This culminates in the fact that there is 
no separate Palestinian space. However, it has cultivated a third space, where Palestinian 
politics, particularly those that engage the state – in the street as well as within the institutions 
– are promoted by both Jews and Palestinians.  
The Joint Struggle  
The ‘joint struggle’ and deep involvement of Jewish activists in the Popular Committee, is an 
essential and oft-touted strategy of the struggle for Palestinian space in Jaffa. Those involved, 
in addition to the Palestinian activists, are local residents, some of whom are descendents of 
those who were originally transferred into the neighbourhood in 1948 and who are also 
vulnerable to gentrification; and others who have moved to Jaffa in light of their political and 
social affiliations (several of whom are interlocutors to this study), which include living and 
struggling with Palestinian citizens of Israel
110
. In addition, there is a spectrum of Jewish, 
non-residents who take part, including activists, human rights NGOS, community 
organisations and politicians. Actions play out in front of a Jewish, mainstream audience, 
before the national media, and increasingly, in partnership with other ‘peripheral’ 
communities. This is not new, as Al-Rabita constructed its campaigns from the 1980s 
onwards, in collaboration with Jewish NGOs and activists (Abed, 2012). However, many of 
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the newest actions include a politicised message that intersects the social with the political, 
arguing that what is happening in Jaffa, and thus in the Arab-Jewish neighbourhoods of Kfar 
Shalem (south Tel Aviv), Givat Shmuel (north Tel Aviv), and Old Katamon (West 
Jerusalem), and elsewhere, is systemic and ethnically motivated
111
. The politicized, ethno-
national discourse has also begun to appear in joint public events. For example, at a joint 
panel organised by a Jewish Human Rights NGO in Bat Yam (2012) – Jaffa’s almost 
exclusively Jewish neighbour to the south – Hana Amouri spoke about ‘the ethnic 
gentrification of Jaffa’ at a table she shared with Bat Yam’s Jewish mayor.  
As can be imagined, there isn’t an overtly mainstream (Jewish) audience for articulation of 
the colonial hierarchies that have driven the exclusion and seclusion of various minorities 
within Israel. However, it is a discourse that is starting to appear in different public arenas, 
developed by and meant for joint consumption. Other predominantly Jewish activist-circles 
have also begun to reproduce the discourse of colonial and ethnic-privilege, as it applies to 
their own communities. One group embodying this rhetoric is Ha Maabara (‘The Transit 
Camp’), an activist group trying to protect the housing rights of poor North-African Jewish 
residents of West Jerusalem through Sumud-inspired actions
112
. As well, The Committee for 
Public Housing, which is led by Jewish activists, appears at homes in Ajami to defend the 
community against Amidar’s henchmen, as often as they do in Jewish neighbourhoods. 
Darna even takes on cases of poor Jewish residents, who have also been targeted for eviction. 
There is also a joint youth movement in Jaffa, housed within a grassroots organisation called 
Sadaka-Reut. The group organises joint community-based actions that attempt to rattle 
dynamics of power, through a variety of forms and in multiple Jewish and Palestinian arenas. 
For example, every summer, the movement comes together, after a year of pedagogical and 
grassroots actions, for an intensive summer camp on the production of shared Jewish-
Palestinian activism in Jaffa. In another example, members of the movement spent their New 
Years Eve (Dec. 31
st
, 2012), going from bus stop to bus stop in Jaffa, adding Arabic to signs 
which previously only had Hebrew on them. In September (2013), the group took over the 
Arab-Hebrew Theatre, for a night of shared learning and public performance, in which the 
entire Jaffa community – residents, artists and activists – took part. 
                                                          
111
 This assessment also appears in articles by Allweil (2013) and Belkind (2013) in their studies of the Popular 
Committee’s reshaping of J14 discourses within Jaffa’s own tent encampment and public protest activities. 
112
 One of Ha Maabara’s key activities is enabling homeless families to squat in empty buildings, mirroring al-
Rabita’s Housing Intifada of 20 years earlier.  
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At the same time, there is always the potential for problems in joint struggle and the rhetoric 
that goes along with it. When Palestinians and Jews share public, mainstream protest, the 
‘Palestinian space’ is tempered by the need to articulate a joint movement, rhetoric or goal; 
which in turn reiterates the asymmetry of power relations, within the shared space. An 
explicit example of this can be found in the way Palestinian space had to be manoeuvred 
during the J14 Social Movement Protests (Allweil, 2013; Abou Shhadeh, 2012).  
The J14 Movement is a campaign that ran from July to September in Israel, in 2011. It started 
with a few tents in Tel Aviv’s main boulevard (Rothchild), and evolved into a mass protest, 
that created tent cities in every major urban centre of the country, including Jaffa, and 
brought half a million mostly, but not only, Jewish citizens into the streets, to spotlight the 
problem of affordable housing for Israelis across the country. However, the Movement 
succeeded in its mass mobilisations by endeavouring to cut out politics – meaning the ethnic 
and Palestinian issues – from the arena of protest. As Belkind argues, they tried “to reshuffle 
the cards without challenging Zionist/Jewish hegemony (Belkind, 2013, p.333)”.   
While many of Jaffa’s activists felt that what was happening in Rothchild had nothing to do 
with them – and were in fact offended at its intentional divorce from ‘conflict politics’ – the 
Popular Committee chose not to ignore the opportunity, and many followed their direction. A 
tent encampment was established in Gan Hashnaim Park, in the centre of Ajami
113
; and a 
mixed Jewish-Palestinian Jaffa tent was set up on Rothchild Boulevard. Through daily events 
and assemblies in the park, as well as joining in the conversations and rallies held in Tel 
Aviv, the Jaffa Camp attempted to reshape J14’s mainstream discourses, to highlight the 
inherently structural nature of the housing crisis. However, the Jaffa activists were limited in 
terms of their impact on the larger movement, and even found their own politicised space 
constrained by its participation in J14.  
Jaffa’s own tent encampment became the axis and microcosm of many of the tensions 
inherent in the Mixed City struggle: Between a nationalist/Palestinian space and a ‘joint 
space’; between engaging and disengaging from the mainstream; between the Sumud of local 
residents, the popular struggle in the Street, and the pragmatic/professionalism of the Popular 
Committee. For example, according to Abou Shhadeh (2011) and Amouri (2011), a debate 
was held concerning the desire of some activists, primarily from the Palestinian youth 
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movement, to have a Palestinian flag in the camp
114
. This raised the dilemma of the 
compromises to be made in the development of a shared and inclusive space, wherein the 
Zionist order is always present. It brought to the surface the question of how to balance 
pragmatism with the need for political articulation; how to balance the strategy of a common 
discourse of social justice, with the need to unveil and disarticulate the clearly ethnic and 
racial lines of poverty, to which the housing protest truly speaks. The Palestinian flag lost out 
in this argument, and it along with other Palestinian symbols were banned from the camp and 
during public demonstrations, for fear of alienating Jewish comrades in struggle (Amouri, 
2011; Abou-Shhadeh, 2011; Allweil, 2013). However, at those same events, Hana Amouri 
spoke about ethnic gentrification; Sami Abu Shehadeh spoke about the Palestinian 
community’s right to remain in Jaffa; and System-Ali, a joint Jewish-Palestinian hip-hop 
group, performed songs about liberating Palestine. As Natour argues above, not everything is 
simultaneously lost or gained in the shared space. 
Inverting the Mixed City – Concluding Thoughts 
While the J14 example points to what may be lost when engaging in the mainstream, and in 
joint activities, it also underestimates much of what is gained in the new grassroots emerging 
within Jaffa. This joint grassroots space is intentionally and often overtly Palestinianised. It 
is always permeated by the politicised narrative and lived experience of Palestinian Jaffa; its 
memories, its symbols, its voice. Its messages and methods are increasingly innovative, and 
unruly; finding new ways of reclaiming the past, present and future Jaffa, as Palestinian, and 
as shared space. For example, a recent piece of online and public theatre was produced by 
members of Jaffa’s Jewish and Palestinian activist community. They created an “audio-walk” 
for the northern Manshiyya neighbourhood, which was swallowed by Jewish Tel Aviv, and is 
now home to endless lines of Jewish-owned hotels, restaurants and the tourists and 
millionaires who appropriated this space. The activist-musicians and actors re-enacted the 
stories of the old Jaffa neighbourhood, and publically launched them online, so anyone who 
walks here, can take the echoes of Palestine with them. In some ways, these actions, which 
target and attempt to dislocate the borders of the Jewish space, through a uniquely joint 
discourse about Palestinian space, are hyper-radical (Karkabi, 2014). They have to be, in 
order for Palestinian activists to maintain their legitimacy among their own communities 
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elsewhere in the country; and in order to protect themselves from being overtaken by the 
hegemonic veil (ibid).       
There is a necessary critique here of the joint arena as an imposition of the Mixed City, where 
Judaisation takes form through imbibing a physical, Jewish presence in Arab communities, 
encroaching upon their growth and development, and seeking to erase the echoes of their 
footprints (Echoing Yaffa, accessed 2014). In light of this, the joint actions may seem to be a 
mere reproduction of the hegemonic order in Jaffa, where Palestinians are bombarded by the 
Jewish space, as well as patronised and ‘protected’ by it. However, there is also room to 
consider Charles Tilly’s (1977) argument, in which the system of repression cannot 
necessarily control how that system evolves and is reproduced by its subjects (p.4-27). This is 
reiterated through Holston’s (2010) assertion that even that which is imposed clashes with 
and is penetrated by the ‘user’ in/of the space. In this reading, the space is re-constituted in a 
process of social relations, and is re-experienced and re-articulated in its spatial practice. This 
lens exists in contravention to the more orthodox assumptions that see Jaffa exclusively 
informed by the Zionist aesthetic, and the hegemonic grid being imposed on it, from inside 
and outside
 115
. Thus, while the Mixed City has been forced upon Jaffa’s remaining 
Palestinian residents, the community has reinterpreted it in the practice of their current joint 
struggle. The struggle for Palestinian identity in Jaffa, particularly expressed in the actions of 
the youth movement, the public demonstrations, the clock-tower protests and public displays 
of Palestinian symbols, and their ongoing celebration of their identity, are their buffer against 
the need to encounter the majority, even those in the radical-left, as the victim of their shared-
history. They can work together because they do not lose their Palestinian space, even though 
that space does not survive on its own, there.  
This is not to say that this is always the case. As Dabit (2012), quoted above, explains, there 
are still many moments where the community is disempowered through their engagements 
with the state, particularly with Amidar; where the Palestinian space is encroached upon by 
the need to succeed in the court, in the clerk’s office, and in the public encounters between 
Jews and Palestinians. However, there are moments that bring hope: the Palestinian and 
Jewish youth who develop slogans and signs that challenge Judaisation in Jaffa, at Sadaka-
Reut’s activist camp; a jointly led protest in front of a building being toured during an 
Amidar auction; a Jewish-group taking part in Abu Shehadeh’s political tour; or even a 
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Palestinian-Jewish hip hop group, singing in Arabic, Hebrew, Russian and English, of 
Palestinian rights to this place; and especially a joint political movement of both Jewish and 
Palestinian activists, that embraces the idea of a state for all its citizens. There is evidence in 
this case that the agents of these movements have managed to invert the trajectories of the 
‘Mixed City’, and determine a shared-space in Jaffa. Although it is small, Jaffa’s culture of 
resistance is truly ‘other’, an anomaly within the colonial practice of segregation, de-
legitimisation and erasure.  
Epilogue 
I was told a story in the process of writing this chapter, about a growing community of Jewish 
and Palestinian residents/activists in Jaffa, who, for the first time, not only struggle together, 
but actually share a lifestyle (Hakim, 2013). This group of about 40 young people go out 
together, they live together; their political and social engagements have become completely 
intertwined, as one glance at their facebook page clearly elucidates
116
. Jewish members are 
learning Arabic, not for their activism, but for their friendships. And when they stop and 
notice it, and then discuss it, often at the end of a night at the local bar where they just spent 
the last few hours dancing and drinking, they recognize “it’s unusual”; potentially, a radical 
practice of anti-normalisation that seems to transcend the lines drawn by a colonial and ethnic 
ethos of separation and inter-dependence. In a 972 magazine interview with ‘System Ali’, 
Muhammad Aguani, the band’s front-man, perfectly captures this sentiment:   
“The situation in System Ali is the complete opposite from the misconception that everything 
is good and normal. The fact that Jews and Arabs sing together does not mean there is peace. 
Personally, I don’t believe in the peace process. The people in this band are partners. The 
band got together, first and foremost, due to its members, and it got together to say in all four 
languages
117
 spoken among us that there are problems here, there are things that we must not 
be silent about, no matter what language.” (quoted in Shezaf, 2013) 
As my interlocutor and I agreed, it is unclear how we can understand this in light of the 
struggle for Palestinian presence in Jaffa; but there is something innately and powerfully 
radical in shifting the borders and lines between communities. Moreover, there is an 
interesting moment here, wherein the imposed merging of Jewish and Palestinian space is 
turned on its head into something new. At the same time, to quote Abou Shhadeh (2011), “I 
am not naïve enough to believe this changes anything.” While on one hand, there are integral 
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and unruly transformations ongoing in this space, the state continues to assert itself, 
swallowing Ajami and attempting to efface any Palestinian claims to the neighbourhood.  
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Chapter 3: The Galilee – Struggle Within The All-Arab Enclave 
There is a point in the struggle when citizenship, integration and equality are no longer the 
dominant goals, but are intertwined with efforts to create autonomous ethnic spaces of 
development and identity 
Oren Yiftachel, ‘Critical Theory and Grey Space: Mobilisation of the Colonised’, 2009, p.242 
 
Map of Main Arab Localities of the Galilee 
  
The Galilee as Arab Space 
 This map depicts the main Arab localities of the Central and Upper Galilee, many of which are featured 
as part of the discussion of Palestinian struggle in this chapter. 
Source: The Arab Association for Human Rights, accessed 2014   
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The Legend of Yom al-Ard (Land Day) 
Through the Lens of Muhammad Miari, a Land Day Founder
118
 
“For the first time, there was a struggle by the Arabs, not about a specific and limited point 
or spot, but opposing the confiscation of land as land. Not only the owners opposing 
confiscation of their own land, but the entire people; and the land here was not held as an 
economic value, but a national value. I think this is the development which happened.” 
Muhammad Miari, Founding Member, Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands, 
Personal Interview, 2012  
Land Day, March 30
th
, 1976, tells the story of a violent and oft-mythologised confrontation 
between Israel’s Palestinian citizens and the state’s military forces, in the Central Galilee. As 
mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the day had been called as a general strike, in 
response to the ongoing appropriation of Palestinian lands and encroachment on the ever-
shrinking Palestinian space. The conflict-site was a triangle of Arab localities in the Central 
Galilee, known as the Sakhnin, Deyr Hanna, Arrabeh corridor. These villages, targeted for 
mass land confiscations in 1976, became the focal point for a stand against the state that 
reverberated across the entire country. The government reacted by sending tanks and soldiers 
to the Palestinian street (Kanaaneh, 2010). By the time the dust settled, 6 young people from 
these villages were dead and Palestinian-citizen struggle within Israel reached a point of no 
return (Miari, 2012; Amouri, 2011; Satel, 2012; Shbeita, 2012; Zayyad, 1976).  
The strike’s catalyst was the Prime Minister Office’s (PMO) announcement of its new 
development plans for the Galilee
119
, part of which included the expropriation of 21,000 
dunams of land and the re-spatialisation of the Galilee for the needs of the Jewish sector. The 
focus of these plans – approved in February, 1976 – were a conflation of settlement actions, 
with the intention of altering the demographic and spatial ordering of the Galilee, and using 
Jewish presence to interrupt the contiguity of the densely Palestinian space. These included 
the expropriation of land to existing Jewish townships in the larger Galilee region; the 
development of 15 rural-industrial villages ‘to create wedges between clusters of Arab 
settlements’ (PMO, 1975, p.6; quoted in Yiftachel, 1992); and the creation of a closed 
military zone near Sakhnin, known as Area 9, where the bulk of the confiscations would take 
place. 
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The intricacies of these planning mechanisms described a new frontier-development 
landscape, aimed at dispersing the demographic status quo, and the threat such a concentrated 
Palestinian space represented – and still represents today. In effect, it encouraged Jewish 
penetration into the Arab heart of darkness with an array of economic, demographic and 
geographic planning incentives, including tax-free zones, land and business grants, and other 
forms of support to the new communities (Hawatmeh, 2005; Zayyad, 1976; Holzman-Gazit, 
2007). According to Yiftachel (1992), despite previous attempts to infiltrate the area, as with 
the confiscation of Arab lands that established the Jewish settlement towns of Migdal 
HaEmek (1953), Upper Nazareth (1954), Maalot (1957) and Karmiel (1964), these plans 
marked the “genuine beginning of the concentrated Israeli push for Judaisation of the 
Galilee.” (p.139)  
Like any social movement spark, the story of Land Day has its antecedents in a network of 
pre-existing actions and activists. The burgeoning political terrain had been building since 
1948 in the Galilee, and had been gaining in strength since the lifting of the Military 
Administration (in 1966). The new radical politics were housed primarily, but not 
exclusively, in the Communist Party and its local expression in municipal politics. Discussion 
of the range of political support systems that went into Land Day are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but it is important to note the increasingly politicised and educated community that 
gave critical voice to the new movements. Miari (2012) specifically points to a build-up of 
community mobilisation throughout 1975 and 1976, beginning with a conference that 
inaugurated the Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands in October, 1975, and the 
promulgation of popular committees throughout the northern villages, soon after. 
Additionally, both Tawfiq Zayyad (1976), who became the mayor of Nazareth, in December, 
1975; and Yisrael Koenig (1976), the Northern District Commissioner at the time, reference 
the Communist Party’s sweeping of local municipal elections, as having propelled the state’s 
planning apparatuses into action
120
. In fact, in a memorandum Koenig (1976) wrote on the 
potential reverberations of the political actions leading to and from Land Day for Israeli state 
policy, he references the Nazareth elections as a wake-up call to the ‘ticking time bomb’ he 
saw brewing in the Galilee. 
Thus Land Day includes much more than the particular events that followed the 
announcement of new expropriations. It represents the culmination of long years of survival, 
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of personal and community development, of Sumud and resilience, and the evolving 
politicisation of Palestinian citizens of Israel. However, as Miari points out in the quote 
above, it is also a moment that marks a qualitative change in Palestinian struggle for land in 
the Galilee, and in the spatial relationship in which it has been housed. According to Zayyad 
(1976), “the strike caused an earthquake that shook the state from end to end, and overturned 
its policies and expectations.” (p.101)  
The Lead-up to Land-Day 
The “Day of the Land Strike” was called on March 6th, at a convention in Nazareth hosted by 
the Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands (Koenig, 1976). It sparked a flurry of 
mobilising actions focused around the national strike and the organising of mass 
demonstrations across the country, including one in front of the Knesset. The Committee for 
the Defence of Arab Lands went to work in the Arab localities in the north and south, 
inspiring the establishment of popular committees tasked with mobilizing grassroots support. 
With the land confiscations directly encroaching Sakhnin, Dayr Hanna and Arrabeh, their 
local councils became the central headquarters for Committee actions and discussions. 
However, additional pockets of protest appeared across the Galilee and the Naqab, wherever 
a committee had been established. An activist currently among those at the helm of al-
Araqib’s land struggles, Nuri el-Uqbi, headed one such committee in Beersheba, and led the 
Bedouin community in its first acts of solidarity with the rest of the Palestinian citizens of the 
state
121
. Demonstrations were also organised at all universities with an Arab-student 
population, including Haifa University and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. According to 
Miari, Committee members went from village to village, building support and consensus for 
use of the one tool they still had, although had yet to utilise, in the defence of their lands and 
their rights: public, collective protest.  
As strike-day neared, the state became increasingly aggressive, building an arsenal of 
pressure tactics. First, it worked to contain those already entrenched within the institutional 
matrix of the state. Just days ahead of the strike, on March 25
th
, the state called a meeting of 
the Committee for the Heads of the Arab Localities in Israel (the ‘Arab Mayors’) in Shefa 
Amr (Koenig, 1976; Miari, 2012; Shoughry, 2012). The Arab Mayors were jointly 
coordinating the strike with Miari’s Committee, and several of its members were key 
interlocutors of the action, particularly the Mayor of Arrabeh; and many of their networks 
were integral to mobilising community participation (Miari, 2012). Using the Arab Mayors’ 
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more vulnerable position against them, threatening their municipal budgets, leadership 
positions and the safety of the communities, the state demanded they call off the strike. 
According to Miari (2012)
122
, the larger group of Arab Mayors acquiesced, although the 
mayors of the towns directly affected by the confiscations continued to promote the action, 
alongside the Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands and the Communist Party.  
The state then moved from pressure on Palestinian leadership, to government employees, 
including teachers, whom they threatened with the label ‘agitators’ and the loss of their jobs 
for joining the strike. The authorities then directed their pressure to the communities, 
themselves, to whom they framed the organisers as a threat to the state, and thus to the safety 
and security of the villages. However, the plan continued to move forward. As the hours grew 
closer, at 6:00 pm on the 29
th
 of March, the larger villages of the Galilee were placed under a 
blanket curfew; and Sakhnin, Arrabeh and Dayr Hanna were directly targeted and surrounded 
by the Israeli military. More than 4000 officers, tactical units, and even a helicopter brigade 
were called to break the strike, and the struggle along with it. Clashes broke out between the 
activists and the military forces and before 9:00 pm on the evening of the 29
th
, Arrabeh saw 
its first Palestinian casualty; and by the end of the strike-day, six others had died (3 girls and 
3 boys). 300 more were gravely injured, and thousands arrested. March 30
th
 has been 
commemorated as ‘Yom al-Ard’ (‘Land Day’) ever since, and the political ramifications of 
the first national Palestinian-citizen action against the state still reverberate, today.  
As Miari (2012) explains: 
“This was a new stage in the relationship between the Arabs and the state, one we paid for in 
victims and in blood. The situation of the Arabs before and after Land Day was different. 
Yom Al-Ard became a national day of struggle for Palestinian people and Arabs inside 
Israel; and I even heard of some people who are not Arabs or Palestinians who celebrate it. 
It became a symbol, one that we accepted. But how to celebrate it and how to maintain its 
meaning is something we couldn’t resolve…” 
Miari points to Land Day as a watershed in time, in consciousness, and in national 
imaginations. However, it also marks a physical encounter between state and citizens and a 
line drawn in the sand between Jewish and Arab space, as much as Jewish and Arab relations. 
Land-Day became a crossroads in the Palestinian experience of the state, as well as the state’s 
experience of its citizens, particularly in the way struggle and hegemonic structures of power 
have been shaped by spatial relations in the Galilee. This is most evident in the explosion of 
protests after Land Day, and the decades that followed in which the community refused to 
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acquiesce to state interventions on land jurisdiction and appropriation (Yiftachel, 1992; 
1997). However, it is also evident in the way the story of Land-Day is told and re-told, as a 
moment bound-up in what came before and what came after. For 30 years, land, dignity and 
blood had been expropriated by the state, in direct actions against the Galilee’s Palestinian 
inhabitants. Land Day marks the first major collective drive against this process; a moment of 
direct struggle, evolving from decades of the community building its capacity to resist the 
state’s plans for the north.  
Yisrael Koenig and the New Judaisation Trajectory 
Prior to the 1976 plans, discussed above, the settlement focus had been on segmenting the 
internal Palestinian space, and severing its physical ties with the still volatile border areas, as 
well as establishing a territorial hold on those properties ‘emptied’ of their Palestinian 
inhabitants in 1948. The majority of these ‘human frontiers’ were established either on the 
borders, or inside areas already heavily populated by Jews, and previously outlined as part of 
the ‘Jewish state’ in the 1947 UN Partition Plan (Falah, 1989)123. Although, as discussed 
above, some Jewish development towns appeared within the core areas of Palestinian 
settlement in the 1950s and 1960s, the state’s primary focus was on segregation and 
containment; as well as entrenching the Galilee Palestinians’ political, social and economic 
dependence on the Israeli state (Sadi, 2003; Zureik, 1976; Raja Khalidi, 1988; among others).  
However, the same dense Arab demographic that had primarily kept the state at the ‘borders’ 
of the Galilee, had begun to promote a growing fear in Jerusalem. The increasingly confident 
northern leadership and their claims to Palestinian nationality and liberation was seen as an 
internal threat, with the space they inhabited a geopolitical link to the belligerent Arab states 
that surrounded a vulnerable Jewish territory (Kipnis, 1984; Koenig, 1976). The planning 
documents pay tribute to this fear – as does Koenig’s Memorandum – as the state attempted 
to reproduce the siege-methodology of bombardment, infiltration and erasures that had been 
imposed on the coast and the ‘Mixed Cities’.  
‘Land Day’ forced the state to contend with a direct challenge coming from the Palestinian 
space; a challenge that for the first time seemed it would not be restrainable with pure 
coercion. As a result, the state temporarily withdrew, cancelling the planned expropriations 
and returning the lands intended for the new military zone, to their owners. In Koenig’s 
document (which was written in two parts, before and after the events of March 30
th
), Land 
Day brought the ‘ticking demographic time bomb’ into sharp relief. In the second part, he 
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begins to outline a new approach in the quest for Jewish penetration and dispersion within the 
Palestinian landscape. In his view, the state could no longer contain the political threat, just as 
it could not allow the demographic threat to grow, unchecked: 
“The absolute unity of the Arab population that was attained on the ‘Day of the Land’ and 
the deep rift created between the Arab and Jewish sectors was a historic achievement for the 
organizers. This rift had and will have in the future grave expressions in the Arab and Jewish 
populations alike. Needless to say, it will be well exploited by a hostile factor.” (Koenig, 
1976, p.199)  
This document is striking as a first sign-post for how Judaisation would inevitably be shaped 
in the Galilee; and how the direct encounter with Palestinian dissidence directed this path. 
Koenig’s pre-Land Day sections continue to reproduce the thinking that created Karmiel and 
Upper Nazareth (where Koenig lived), wherein ‘infiltration’ was seen to be key to subduing 
“the agitators”. Post-Land Day, he promotes a policy to de-link the Jewish community from 
the Arab ‘sectors’, particularly Arab-labour, which he believes has made the state and Jewish 
society vulnerable to such actions. He says:  
“a significant impression was felt in plants and services as a result of the strike by proving the 
dependence of the smooth operation of the economy on Arab hands. Parallel to that, 
dependency of the Jewish-run economy on them has been proven to the Arab population. 
Even this is exploited, and will be in the future, for the sake of feeding the "Arab back-
straightening", which the Arabs of Israel must exploit.” (ibid, p. 199) 
Koenig’s focus shifts from altering the Northern demographic order to marginalisation of the 
Palestinian political threat to the Zionist project.   His ethos of segregation offers the first 
glimmer of what has become status quo, in a current reading of the Galilee map; he 
articulates what connotes a realisation that the Zionist hegemony would not be able to re-
shape and re-articulate itself around or on top of the Palestinian space. Despite an ongoing 
rhetoric to transform the Arab space
124
, Land Day evoked a very different encounter between 
‘the Galilee’ and the state’s Judaising logic: the state no longer sought to outright conquer the 
frontier, but to cut it out from the hegemonic centre; to create a physical and political enclave 
that is separate from and yet completely surrounded by the Jewish core. Thereafter, the 
evolving Palestinian struggle for land and space in the Galilee clashes against the constriction 
of space, physically and politically, shaped more by an ever-increasing marginalisation of the 
Arab-Galilee than by the actual practice of Jewish infiltration into Palestinian space.  
This argument is flushed out in the present chapter, despite the difficulty in peeling back the 
layers of rhetoric inherent in the land politics of both the state and the Galilee’s politicised 
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residents. Despite the state’s public charges of a demographic threat in the Galilee, and 
despite a Palestinian leadership pointing to life under siege, in practice, the Galilee tells a 
different story. Land Day changed the game, re-shaping the dialectic between struggle and 
power, in which resistance – even if more radical – is not in the street, and no longer acute, 
direct, jubilant and urgent; and wherein, state interventions, violence and force are limited to 
the borders and to an everyday domination that is remote, even if always present. The 
existential, popular struggle embodied in Land Day has been re-directed to other arenas and 
other discourses.  
Today, Land Day is remembered in a series of annual events that include lectures, 
performances, art shows and public discussions in the days and weeks leading up to March 
30
th
. Its focal event is a march along the highway that stretches from Dayr Hanna to Sakhnin. 
The walk takes you past the cemetery that houses the youths killed in 1976, as well as those 
murdered in October, 2000 at an all-too-similar protest action
125
. On March 30
th
, 2012 (and 
again in 2013), I joined the march to Sakhnin. A simultaneous demonstration was set in the 
Naqab to link Land Day with the Bedouins’ struggle against the Prawer Plan; and another 
took place in Jaffa, the next day, to spotlight the expanding siege against the Mixed Cities 
(which I also attended).  
As I walked the long stretch of highway between Dayr Hanna and Sakhnin, on Land Day in 
2012, some of these thoughts about the ambivalent nature of the struggle had already begun 
to reverberate in my mind. Crossing from one village to the next with two activist friends of 
mine, through the lands that should have been expropriated in 1976, we walked alongside 
hundreds of others. The language of the road was Arabic; signs, banners, slogans and songs 
devoted to a Palestinian identity and place. The Palestinian flag was everywhere, even in the 
colours of faces and clothing, all red, green, black and white. However, we were silent, 
downtrodden as we walked. The energy, in general, was not electric, not celebratory, unlike 
what I was expecting. It wasn’t even sufficiently angry or righteous. Most people walked in 
silence, like my friends and I, and there was a general air of disillusionment (unlike the 
demonstration I would attend the next day in Jaffa). Perhaps this was because of the tensions 
that had been aroused that morning: A moratorium on partisan party symbols – an order that 
had been agreed on by the High Follow Up Committee, through the consensus of its members 
– had been broken as the Communist, Nationalist and Islamic parties turned up with flags and 
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banners. The result was a schism, in which the Nationalists headed to Arrabeh, for the 
culmination of their march, and the rest were headed to Sakhnin. Or, perhaps it was because 
of the disappointment of the crowd in the increasingly low turn-out that these events inspired 
in the Galilee. Or even more likely, in line with the depiction given by one of my 
interlocutors, Suhad Bishara (2012)
126
, a legal advocate and expert on the land and planning 
regimes in Israel, Land Day has become a symbol of what was lost; not the land, or the right 
to self-determination, but the direct act of struggle itself. As she put it, “I feel bad when I go 
to Land Day and sometimes I decide not to go because this is what we do; and the rest of the 
year we do nothing. And to me, this is not how you run the struggle, over your rights, your 
lands, even your memory.” (Bishara, 2012)   
The Galilee – ‘Painting By The Numbers’ 
As is the case with all of Israel’s physical and political boundaries, the Galilee’s ‘borders’ are 
both elastic and fixed. They morph through the imaginations of the Palestinians who live 
inside, and the state, which sits primarily outside; but are also officially marked and 
organised according to master plans and jurisdictional lines. These evolving demarcations 
have made it difficult to determine which map constitutes ‘the Galilee’ for this research. This 
paradox has not been entirely resolved in this chapter, even as it offers important insight into 
the Judaisation logic at work here and to the relevance of ‘demographics’ to the trajectories 
of power and resistance in this space (and throughout Israeli-controlled territories). 
The first clue can be found in Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), where there is a 
lack of disaggregated statistical data for the ‘Galilee’. Whereas the Galilee is considered one 
of 5 distinct natural regions, jurisdictions are drawn to conflate the multiple subdivisions of 
the Northern Region, making it difficult to analyse the area on its own. Israel’s Northern 
jurisdiction winds its way north from Acre to the Jordan Valley, and includes parts of the 
Upper, Western and Eastern Galilee, as well as the Golan Heights, the Hula Valley and the 
Western Coastal Area. Haifa, which sits on the western edge of the Galilee Mountains, is 
excluded from this configuration, although it is the regional urban and economic centre, in so 
far as the major industries and services of the region are located in Haifa
127
. The region’s sub-
districts – by which budgets, councils and plans are determined – diverge and converge the 
geographic zones and border-lines of the Galilee. Simply put, areas that are primarily 
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‘Palestinian’ are carved up, integrated with primarily Jewish districts to skew the 
demographic fact-sheet (Wesley, 2013; see also Falah, 1989 and Newman, 1984)
128
.  
The mapping and re-mapping of the Galilee, in conjunction with the land regime that has 
legalised this process, is orchestrated according to the fundamental Zionist colonial logic that 
anchors its legitimacy in territorial control. Thus, the establishment of settlements, municipal 
and regional councils, the outlines of towns and the infrastructure to connect and develop 
them, are ever-concerned with the need to establish Jewish sovereignty over space and over 
land; the traditional tools of which integrate the use of law and planning, with physical, 
territorial presence (Newman, 1984; Rinat, 2013; Ben Simon, 2013). However, the Galilee, 
particularly its centre-core, is a conundrum to Zionist geographers, planners and bureaucrats 
who must contend with the large concentration of Arabs inhabiting the region (43% of 
Israel’s Palestinian population live in the Northern District (CBS, 2014)129). This has made it 
difficult to recruit and sustain Jewish presence and the fait accompli associated with 
permanent settlement; although not for a lack of trying (Falah, 1989; Kipnis, 1984). Such a 
concentration has been understood and treated as the essential demographic and territorial 
threat to the integrity of the Jewish state since Israel’s establishment (Pappé, 2011; Falah, 
1989). With the failure to consolidate Jewish physical settlement in this space, other 
discursive and planning practices have been implemented to give off the illusion of the 
politically desired ‘demographic balance’, a ratio of Jews to Arabs that currently stands at 43 
to 57 (CBS, 2014).  
When we begin to unravel the statistical veil, a different – and confusing – truth is revealed. 
As Falah points out, in “taking only the natural areas associated directly with Galilee proper, 
one finds an Arab population of 270,300 in 1986, or 73 percent of the total population.” 
(Falah, 1989, p.70) Current statistics for the Central Galilee region to which Falah is 
referring, still incorporates a 75% Arab majority (Wesley, 2013). The area, which stretches 
from the border with Lebanon in the north, to the edge of the Jisreel Valley in the south 
(where the Little Triangle/Wadi Ara Region begins), and flanked to the West by Haifa and to 
the East by the Jordan River Valley, and includes the cities of Nazareth, Sakhnin, Tamra and 
Kafr Kanna, has no distinct jurisdiction attached to it. Instead it spans multiple sub-divisions 
of Israel’s northern territory, thereby giving much credence to assertions that a statistical 
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illusion has been developed to skew the demographic reality (Falah, 1989; Newman, 1984; 
Kipnis, 1984; and Wesley, 2013). The state’s reasoning behind the misrepresentation can be 
further understood through the planning policies and changing Judaisation approaches to the 
area. The point of this seems to be to embed the immediacy of the Arab-demographic threat 
within the Jewish-national discourse; yet one that is containable through the mobilisation of 
Jewish settlement to the north (Falah, 1989). 
This picture of the Galilee is inherent to the mapping of struggle in this chapter. The spatial 
matrix of this frontier is both fluid and fixed. Resistance to the Judaisation of land and space, 
likewise, exists in multiple places, and challenges multiple fixed and fluid lines. Unlike in the 
Jaffa case, there is no singular, cohesive story of struggle in the Galilee, making it difficult to 
decide what to include and what to exclude. However, collectively, these multiple resistances 
point to their battle with the boundaries drawn around life in the Galilee. These are best 
understood through the physical expression of the colonial geography of the northern region: 
There is a dense centre-core of Palestinian ‘rural-urban space’, dotted and primarily 
surrounded by Jewish settlements. The further out you go, the more Jewish the space, with 
the Western coast and Eastern regions of the Galilee inhabited by a near-total Jewish 
population, as with the towns of Safed, Nahariya, and Tiberias (CBS, 2014). Historical and 
present-day maps and plans for the area depict the reality of constriction and containment
130
. 
This is not an abstract policy and practice, exclusively devised and enforced from top-down. 
Instead, it has evolved as a particularised and localised response to Palestinian citizens of the 
Galilee and resistance against the community’s disbursal and enclosure. The case is therefore 
explored through an analysis of resistance within this core, as it comes into contact with the 
colonial map, in physical, virtual and imagined spaces. It is in these encounters, on the shared 
borders of Jewish and Palestinian space, where Palestinian resistance clashes with the 
structures of power; where hegemony may be unveiled and disarticulated, and struggle 
potentially becomes unruly, transgressive, and even transformative.    
The Galilee Ghosts 
The current story of Palestinian resistance in the Galilee is embedded in the legacy of the last 
65 years, in a series of ghostly imprints that have inscribed the Palestinian enclave, as 
contained and excluded, dependent and subaltern, separate and surrounded. The first ghost, 
the Palestinian Nakba, was launched with a series of Zionist military campaigns between 
December 1947 and October 28
th
, 1948. These campaigns were implemented, primarily, 
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under the frame of Plan Dalet, an overarching military programme of conquest and 
destruction aimed at consolidating Jewish-Zionist control of the Northern coastal territory. 
The Plan, which was finalised by the Haganah in March, 1948, is considered a blueprint of 
the Zionist expulsion programme (Robinson, 2013; Pappé, 2006; Khalidi, 1988). Like many 
ambiguous components of Zionist hegemony, the plan did not give express instructions to 
ethnically cleanse the landscape. However, it directly instructed field officers to de-populate 
any villages that ‘resisted’ the invading armies, leaving it up to individual soldiers to 
determine what constituted resistance (Robinson, 2013, p.26). Implementation of the Plan 
ended with the capture of the Northern District and the abrupt emptying of 56% of the 
Palestinian population of the area, although still claiming the highest concentration of 
Palestinians, after the 1948 war (Falah, 1989, 2003; S. Jiryis, 1976).  
The major urban centres of Haifa, Acre, Nazareth, Tiberias, and Safed, saw the largest 
exodus of their Palestinian residents (Falah, 1989). However, the focus of the state’s de-
Arabization programme in the north was on the western, eastern and southern parts of the 
map. Of the 158 Arab towns and villages destroyed in the Galilee in 1948, only 9 were from 
the Central Galilee Mountain range (Morris, 1987; Wesley, 2013); and of the 70 Arab 
localities left intact after the war, 51 were from the Acre-Nazareth corridor in the Central 
Galilee (Kamen, 1987). On top of these destroyed and empty places, the state set about filling 
the vacuum of Arab-space with new, mainly agricultural, Jewish settlements. According to 
Falah (1989), 117 development towns and villages were created, “both to absorb as quickly 
as possible the influx of Jewish immigrants and to create a fait accompli that would prevent 
the return of the former inhabitants who had either been expelled from the new state 
altogether or were ‘homeland refugees’ inside the armistice lines.” (p.73) Thus, when the still 
‘open wound’ of land confiscations are discussed in the Galilee131, this is, in practice, a 
reference to the way Judaisation played out along this internal frontier.  
The second ghost takes form in the military administration that lasted from 1949 to 1966, and 
its integration with the first physical markers of the Judaisation project in the Galilee. In the 
first decade, policy-actions were aimed at consolidating Zionist-land gains on the coast and 
the planting of Jewish settlements along the northern and eastern borders. Additional 
Palestinian villages were declared closed military zones, their populations emptied and 
transferred to other villages and urban centres. This explains how Nazareth, which lost 20% 
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of its population in 1948, mushroomed from 14,000 in 1945 to more than 20,000 residents in 
1951 (Palestine Remembered, accessed 2013). Each village was segregated and contained, 
with movement, development, and expansion expressly limited. As a result of the new land 
regime, any agricultural resources outside the newly segregated space were no longer 
accessible, and no longer belonged to them. The majority of the village residents were forced 
into wage-earning labour, encouraging the inevitable shift from peasant to proletariat-based 
economies in the north (Zureik, 1976). At the same time, the state constructed a planning 
‘wall’ around the villages, similar to the ‘slum clearing’ label attached to Ajami. No new 
buildings, infrastructure or industries received permits, budgets or support from the state. 
While the population tripled in size, the boundaries remained unchanged.   
The binding of Palestinian space remained intact, long after the lifting of the military regime, 
through increasingly sophisticated legal and planning policies, and through the internalisation 
and reproduction of those limits by the users of the space, themselves.  As Zureik (1976) 
explains, the legacy of this period is both the colonial creation of village-ghettos, and the 
close-knit, self-reliant communities that survived the military regime. After the lifting of the 
military cordon, residents relied on these networks, retaining their homes and relations in the 
villages, despite finding work in Jewish and other Arab townships (Falah, 1989). While this 
can also be understood as part of the local practice of Sumud against the siege of Arab space, 
the retrenchment of internal refugees offers some different insights. Those who had resettled 
in other Arab localities in the region “were even less inclined to uproot themselves once 
again and migrate to urban centres.” (ibid, p.75)  
These are the kinds of bonds that create dense, impenetrable living spaces, cultivating real 
networks of resilience, survival, and inevitably, resistance. These are the networks that 
bloomed in 1975 and 1976, leading to the first municipal election win by a non-Zionist party 
in Nazareth, and the capacity to organise a nation-wide strike on Land Day. Cut away from 
the outside world, these communities developed their own internal systems of survival. After 
18 years, even the movement of Jews into this territory could not intervene in the creation of 
new geographic and political orbits, around which to direct their claims and alliances. 
The third ghost is the shifting planning regime, and the cultivation of a new container for 
Palestinian growth and development to replace the military administration (Robinson, 2014). 
If the first decades after the establishment of the state were the years of “judicial land 
redemption”, in which the Zionist hegemony of land use and ownership were ordered and 
effected through the creation of new laws, then the years following the military regime could 
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be seen as a “first phase of planning and bureaucratic land redemption (Yiftachel and Kedar, 
2006, p.14)”. The state’s intention was to construct a separate Jewish space within Arab-
controlled territories; the seeds of which were sown with the establishment of the Galilee’s 
Jewish townships during the military administration. However, the Land Day backlash led 
both the state and the Galilee Palestinians to understand that large-scale expropriations and 
colonial transformations of the Arab space would no longer be acquiesced to; and would 
provoke direct, contentious responses from the community. Therefore, in the second wave of 
planning – post-Koenig – a new methodology for controlling the space came into being. The 
new plans focused on rapid settlement, in strategic and sensitive frontier areas. These were 
anchored in a new type of settlement programme based on the Mitzpe (Hilltop or Watch 
Tower) settlements, conceived on the basis of a plan devised by the Jewish Agency in 1978 
(Yiftachel, 1992; Newman, 1984; Hussein and McKay, 2003)
132
. These small, partially 
developed and serviced settlements depended on anywhere from six to 20 family groups to 
claim physical control of large swathes of territory, in order to prevent and report on their 
‘illegal usage’ by Palestinian citizens in the area. In the decade after Land Day, 28 Mitzpe 
settlements were planned and settled in the Central Galilee (Falah, 1989; Newman, 1984; 
Kipnis, 1984; Yiftachel, 1992; Abu Hussein & McKay, 2003).  
These new settlements had settlers before they had infrastructure. They were created as 
temporary solutions, without the capacity for sustaining a demographic shift; but it appears as 
if ‘demography’ was no longer the target. As Newman (1984) explains:  
“the planning region for this project was also limited to the central mountains, where the 
demographic and territorial conflict is sharpest. The outposts are all located on mountain 
tops, usually overlooking Arab villages and lands. Thus, physical control is exercised over 
the surrounding region, despite the small number of people involved.” (p.8)  
Newman is here reinforcing the argument made above. Judaisation in the Galilee does not 
manifest in a colonial re-imagination of the internal space, because the state never physically 
managed to penetrate the space. As a result of this, it needed to develop a methodology for 
how to control the Galilee from the outside.   
A fourth ghost took its shape alongside the Jewish infiltration projects, a complementary 
planning methodology intent on rigid control of Arab growth and development. The first 
phase, informed by the Planning and Building Law (1965)
133
, determined which space 
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‘existed’ and which didn’t. The first National Master Plans, borne out of the new law, 
mapped and recognised the existence of 123 Arab villages and townships. However, it has 
been estimated that more than 100 others were left off the map (Payes, 2005)
134
. Planning 
zones were specifically determined and borders entrenched, thereafter, in order to curb any 
Arab expansion. No Master Plans were developed for these districts, and hence no 
infrastructure, no green space, no new industries or even new housing. The legacy of these 
‘unplanning’ policies is articulated in the massive gap that exists between Jewish and 
Palestinian local authorities in Israel. For example, there are extensive asymmetries in 
municipal incomes (in 2006, these were 25% lower than their Jewish counterparts); spatial 
jurisdictions, wherein less than 2.5% of Israel’s land falls under the control of Palestinian 
local councils
135
; the level of socio-economic strata, wherein all Arab localities in the Galilee 
sit in the lowest rung, whereas the majority of the Mitzpe settlements are situated on the 1
st
 
and 2
nd
 levels; and in ‘urban’ services like post offices, national insurance offices, emergency 
services, leisure centres or maintenance of green spaces (Galilee Society, 2006; Banna et al, 
2012). The list goes on, but the point is clear: de-development has been a focused programme 
of the state towards its Arab-spaces, particularly the Galilee. What could not be controlled 
through direct erasure and replacement was controlled through planning, through intervening 
in the natural growth of citizens, and through the creation of an urban marginality (Newman, 
1984).  
This lack of development is then layered into the uncontrolled and illegal construction 
patterns of the Palestinian inhabitants of the unplanned, unzoned townships. As in Jaffa, this 
grey-spacing was encouraged. It became yet another method for controlling the space from 
the distant political centre. As Yacobi (2009) explains, "policy-makers allow urban illegality 
because it provides an indirect and inexpensive rule of the ‘ungovernable’. The tactic is 
avoidance and containment from a distance, but the result is the condemnation of large 
communities to unserviced, deprived and stigmatized urban fringes.” (p.113) As an example, 
we should consider that there are currently upwards of 40,000 structures in the Northern 
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 According to the CBS survey of Arab citizens in 2008, there are currently 129 Arab localities in Israel; but 
this number does not include any of the Unrecognised Bedouin villages from the Naqab (CBS, 2009). It should 
also be noted that since 1948, the state has invested in the creation of over 700 Jewish settlements, whereas, 
except for the 7 Bedouin townships built to concentrate and remove Bedouin communities from their traditional 
lands, no new Palestinian settlements have been built since the establishment of the state (Yiftachel & Kedar, 
2006).  
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 This number refers to the percentage of lands controlled by Palestinian citizens throughout the state; it is not 
disaggregated for the central Galilee. See discussion below for detailed breakdowns of the Galilee. 
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District with demolition orders against them. On this basis, their owners receive and pay 
yearly fines without the possibility of legalising their situation.  
By the mid-1980s, the ‘policy moment’ was fully inscribed with what Falah (2003) theorised 
as the push and pull of the state’s “enclaving and exclaving” project; a spatial apartheid that 
is maintained through tightening the bounds of Palestinian enclosures (“enclaving”), and 
segregating them further from their lands by increasing exclusive Jewish hold of their 
resources (“exclaving”). Two explicit examples speak to this phase in state policy: the 
creation of the Misgav Regional Council in the centre of the Arab-Galilee in 1982
136
; and the 
invention of the Interministerial Commission on Illegal Construction in the Arab Sector in 
1985, also known as the Markovitz Committee, after its chairman.  
The Misgav Regional Council was proclaimed on October 7
th
, 1982
137
. It covered 
approximately 150,000 dunams of land that had previously been without municipal status, 
about two-thirds of which was privately owned Palestinian land belonging to residents of 17 
Arab villages that sit inside and on its borders (Yiftachel, 1992). The new administrative 
boundaries were supposedly set in order to create “some territorial contiguity” in the 
administration of land and services in the area (ibid); although on the Misgav Council’s 
Homepage, there is also mention of the council’s purpose to protect the land and region from 
over-urbanisation, a well-known euphemism for maintaining the Judaised frontier against 
encroachment by the surrounding Arab communities (Misgav Regional Council, 2007). 
However, despite the fact that its jurisdiction covers lands that reach across dozens of 
Palestinian communities, including Sakhnin, Majd el Krum and Tamra
138
, these are not 
included in the 37 settlements that make up the council, nor do they have any share in its 
decision-making powers, budgets, or income-accumulation. The result of this was that an all-
Jewish authoritative council gained jurisdiction over everyday and future usage of Arab-
lands, and the local Arab owners have no say or representative status within its institutions.  
The other side of this policy moment, the Ministerial Commission headed by Yaacov 
Markovitz, is infamous today for coining the term ‘Unrecognized’ villages. His report also 
created a new language for those structures built outside the planned zones, and sitting on the 
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 A regional council is a unique aspect of Israel’s local governing scheme. They unite geographically dispersed 
small rural settlements and have jurisdiction over the entire territorial expanse that surrounds and includes those 
settlements (although the presence of other local authorities sometimes results in the regional council having 
expanses of territory that are not contiguous); but they function as local authorities, in light of the fact that 
settlements included within their boundaries do not have their own separate councils (Wesley, 2013). 
137
 For a map of the Misgav Regional Council, see Appendix 3.8 of this thesis. 
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 Each of these localities are discussed as integral sites for the struggle over land and space in the Galilee, in 
this chapter. 
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margins of the legal, built space, which he called ‘grey buildings’. The Markovitz Report 
became a call to arms, geared towards controlling the unauthorized expansion of Palestinian 
villages. Moreover, in the case of Bedouin villages and neighbourhoods – of which there 
were dozens in the Northern District– it called for removing them altogether139. The 
concerted efforts of the state in following the report’s recommendations (the demolition of all 
grey buildings in the Galilee), literally shook the Galilee from the late 1980s into the mid-
1990s, with more than 1440 demolitions taking place between 1993 and 1996 (Payes, 
2005)
140
.  
These policies, combined with the government programmes, discussed above, begin to 
outline a clear picture of the legacy of the state in its contact with the dense Palestinian space: 
to control, contain and weaken Palestinian economic and political development, as much as 
possible, while bolstering Jewish infrastructure, jurisdiction and economic bases. Moreover, 
the trajectories of these policies continue to resonate in today’s Galilee. There are still 
massive gaps between Jewish and Arab localities in this region; there is deep retrenchment 
within the walls of the Misgav, to protect the land from Palestinian invaders; there are no 
Master Plans, minimal investment and almost no growth in the Arab sector, but Industrial 
Zones in the Jewish sector are flourishing. This is the essence of regional relations today, and 
the world in which and against which the current struggle is cultivated.  
The fifth and final ghost is the particular internalisation of the October 2000 events - the 
community’s most violent confrontation with the state since Land Day – among the 
Palestinian public in the Galilee. The significance of October 2000 was not merely the death 
of 13 Palestinian citizens at the hands of the police, who fired live ammunition into 
demonstrations; or the violence of the attacks on them by their Jewish neighbours; or even 
their own community’s eruption as angst and anger drove them to riot in the streets. It was, 
ultimately, the system’s lack of justice that promulgated the community’s still unresolved 
anger and responding retrenchment, away from ‘state infused spaces’ (Naamnih, 2011; Cook, 
2012a). The state’s investigation into the October events – outlined in an 831 page report by 
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 The story of the Northern Bedouin villages is outside the scope of this thesis, as they have a very different 
trajectory to those of the Naqab. Their struggle became a cohesive campaign with the establishment of the 
Association of 40 in 1978. Their primary activities took place during the 1980s and their main goals were 
achieved by 1992: eight unrecognised villages in the North were recognised and many neighbourhoods and 
small localities were incorporated into Palestinian jurisdictions. For more details, see Yiftachel (1992) and 
Payes (2005).  
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 This should be compared to the Naqab case, in which more than 1000 demolitions per annum have been 
reported since the Prawer Plan was announced in 2010; additional discussion of these demolitions is spotlighted 
in Chapter Four. 
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the Or Commission of Inquiry
141
 – led to almost no conclusive recommendations regarding 
the killings, and those seen as its main instigators – i.e. then Prime Minister Ehud Barak, then 
Minister of Internal Security, Shlomo Ben Ami, Commander of the Northern District, Alik 
Ron, and then Commander of the Border Police, Benzi Sau; as well as nine named police 
officers (out of a possible thousand) – were treated with relative impunity142 (Adalah, 2003). 
While the Commission notes in the report that the police used excessive violence, 
acknowledging a long history of hostile actions by police against Palestinian citizens (Or 
Commission Summary Report, 2003), it also concludes that the police’s actions were “an 
inappropriate reaction to unprecedented riots” (Or Commission Report, quoted in Adalah, 
2003), of being unprepared for a situation of extreme pressure and danger (Or Commission 
Summary Report, 2003); rather than seeing the riots as a response to the violence and 
pressuring presence of the police. stateMoreover, although the investigators saw a direct link 
between the ongoing marginalisation and discrimination experienced by the ‘Arab sector’ by 
the Israeli state and Jewish society, and the violent eruptions of the Arab communities in 
October 2000, blame for the event was placed on the shoulders of members of the Arab 
leadership. Specifically, Azmi Bishara (founder and then head of the National Democratic 
Assembly) and Raed Salad (head of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement
143
) were 
accused of catalysing and propagating violence among their constituencies, while instigating 
anti-Zionist political messages, “constituting a threat to Jewish citizens… and blurring the 
line more than once, between the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria and the Arab citizens of 
the state.” (ibid, p.2) 
In this statement, the state articulates the schism it had constructed with its Arab citizens 
since 1948. The line they draw is between state and citizens, with Palestinians, inside and 
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 The State Commission of Inquiry into the Clashes Between Security Forces and Israeli Civilians (and the 
report it produced), which was appointed by then Supreme Court President Aharon Barak in November, 2000, 
was dubbed ‘the Or Commission’, after its lead investigater, Supreme Court Justice Theodor Or (Adalah, 2003). 
The Commission’s conclusions and recommendations were based on 92 public hearings, through which 435 
testimonies were heard from 377 witnesses (some of whom were called to the stand more than once); 4,289 
exhibits were brought before the court, and the protocol of the hearings is over 16,000 pages long (Ettinger, 
2003).    
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 Even those whom the Or Commission held responsible for the October events, and whom it recommended 
against their being able to hold future positions of command or attaining promotions still did so; for example 
Alik Ron, who the Commission said was responsible for live fire by sharpshooters in Umm al-Fahm and should 
be barred from holding any top administrative position (Or Commission Report Summary, 2003) joined the 
political ranks of the Centrist Kadima Party in 2010 (Hoffman, 2010).   
143
 The NDA (Tajamo, in Arabic; Balad, in Hebrew) was founded by A. Bishara in 1995 and attained its first 
Knesset seat in 1996 (as part of a combined list with other Arab parties). Its platform – to create a ‘State for all 
its Citizens’ - and political significance are discussed more comprehensively, below. The Northern Branch of 
the Islamic Movement, one of two branches of the Islamic political stream in Israel, is also discussed 
extensively below.   
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outside, an endemic physical and political threat to ‘Jewish citizens’ and to ‘the Jewish state’. 
As many interlocutors to this thesis explained, this moment informed the final shift, in which 
a new politics of disengagement fully takes hold
144
. That said, it is clear from the imprints of 
the previous ghosts that this moment merely articulated a process that had been evolving for 
nearly six decades.  
A.Bishara (2001), writes similarly, that the violence of the police, and the clashes between 
Jews and Palestinians, merely accentuated and highlighted the truth of the enclave. Not just in 
terms of the racism that was unmasked in the orders to kill Arab demonstrators, but in the 
experience and practice of a separate, alienated and territorialised entity. At the same time, 
while it may not have been sudden, like Land Day before it, October 2000 shifted the 
trajectory of struggle in the region. The tools, the language, the claims and even the political 
targets shift as the ghosts of 2000 cemented the gap between the Galilee – the all-Arab-space 
– and the Jewish-Zionist hegemonic order.  
The Matrix of Power and Struggle in the Galilee 
As discussed in previous chapters, the Zionist production of space is inherently violent. Its 
core ethos is the colonisation of indigenous space, through its de-legitimisation, erasure and 
replacement. Moreover, a particular history of persecution and migration has internalised 
what Yiftachel (2008) calls an “ethnic colonialism of survival”, a totalising mission in which 
all land, all territory, all space must be articulated as Jewish. Jewish monuments, maps, 
symbols, and bodies – legitimised through law, planning and its own hegemonic narratives – 
are used to ethnicize and establish complete sovereignty of the territory, without the presence 
of or disruptions by the native population. Palestinian space is, thus, a constant target, a 
frontier zone, ever under siege (Rabinowitz, 2001); to be penetrated, disbursed, transformed.  
However, looking at the Palestinian world within the Galilee today, the weakened, 
disempowered, de-legitimised subaltern is missing. Instead, we find a densely inhabited and, 
in demographic terms, nearly homogenous territory, with its own internal systems of 
governance and leadership. There is a strong civil society, driving a highly politicized and 
professional challenge to Jewish hegemony within the space. There is a growing economic 
sector and a middle class of intellectual and political elites. These elite are at the helm of calls 
for separation from and boycott of the Zionist state institutions, and of an aggressive 
campaign for international intervention in the system of occupation and oppression within the 
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 This argument is also supported in an array of secondary sources, for example in Bishara (2001), Jamal 
(2011), Ghanem (2010) and Pappé (2011).  
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state. Moreover, on the surface, at least in the central Galilee, we don’t see Jews. We don’t 
see their flags, their symbols, their heroes. We barely even see their language except on 
public-buildings and street signs, which are often graffitied over and replaced by hand-
painted signs in Arabic. Judaisation, in its attempted siege of Palestinian space, seems to have 
receded, here. The goals of Judaisation – to establish a demographic majority, to appropriate 
all Palestinian land, to fragment Palestinian identity, to sever Palestinian ties and claims to 
the area, and even the isolation and control of Palestinian growth and development – have, in 
large part, failed in the Galilee (Falah, 1989).  
At the same time, a deeper analysis reveals a planning regime that tightly controls the spatial 
and economic development of Arab villages and urban neighbourhoods (Falah, 1989; 
Yiftachel, 1992; Banna et al, 2012; Wesley, 2013). For example, the Nazareth municipality is 
engaged in an endless number of planning requests to expand beyond its current jurisdictions. 
Until 2012, every one of them had been refused, as buildings get taller and the congested 
space feels increasingly ghettoised and dense with human bodies (Jaraysi, 2012; Human 
Rights Lawyer, 2011)
145
. There is also an abundant amount of illegal structures marking the 
greyed space of the northern localities; their ‘legality’ is unresolved and yet the state 
continues to collect fines that de facto accept their (non)existence. As mentioned above, there 
are few green spaces, almost no service-based infrastructure, and few leisure compounds - 
although the latter is changing, but not due to any increase in investment by the state or 
majority sector. Most main arteries, public transport infrastructure (trains) and public utilities 
(pipe lines) cross directly through Arab towns and agricultural lands; the contiguity of the 
space clearly and intentionally broken through the blatant misuse of the Acquisition for 
Public Purposes Law (1964)
146
, which allows the state to confiscate land for ‘the sake of the 
public good’. By an apparent coincidence, Palestinian lands are most often targeted for this 
purpose, whereas such public features physically circumvent, but still service, Jewish towns, 
regional councils and gated communities (Shbeta, 2012; Y. Jabareen, 2011; Manna, 2012).  
While land ownership is no longer contested, and the majority of property is in fact owned by 
the Palestinians that live there, land is almost entirely controlled by the state. The significance 
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 Yosef Jabareen (2011), a Palestinian academic, geographer and planner, discusses the problem of space in 
Nazareth, through a comparison with Upper Nazareth: In Nazareth, 80,000 people share 15,000 dunam of land 
(or less than a ¼ dunam per person); in Upper Nazareth, a population of about 40,000 share 40,000 dunam of 
land (or 1 dunam per person).  
146
 The Law referenced here is an amendment to the Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance, outlined 
in the appendices to this thesis, as a major contributor to the transfer of Palestinian-owned private lands to the 
state. 
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of this is discussed by Shadi Shbeta
147
, in his explanation of what has happened to his own 
land, in Yafa an-Naseriyye, which was confiscated in the establishment of the Jewish 
Development Town of Migdal HaEmek, in 1953
148
:  
“I still have land here, on the Migdal HaEmek side. What does this mean? It means that if I 
want to build a house on the land, I can’t. I need permission from Migdal HaEmek. I can only 
use it for agriculture. But if Migdal HaEmek manages to take the land from me, they will 
probably turn it into an industrial zone. Anyway that I could put the land to use, to make 
money, is not allowed.”  
In the Galilee, there is a large gap between possessing and controlling land. To own land is 
not enough, if you do not have the autonomy to develop or build on it. As Shbeta contends, 
the planning and land regime have been orchestrated specifically to prevent this. This is 
further highlighted in the jurisdictions of the Misgav Council; in the fact that 70% of land in 
the Galilee belong to the Mitzpe communities; and in the fact that Upper Nazareth’s 
Industrial Zone (Zipporit) was built on Arab lands expropriated for public use, and yet pays 
its taxes to the Upper Nazareth municipality (Wesley, 2013; Shbeta, 2012).  
Adding to the control mechanisms, there are constant physical reminders of state-
surveillance, albeit on the frontiers of local authorities and jurisdictions. The message is that 
of external control, on the periphery of Arab-space. This practice is highlighted in the fact 
that inter and intra village-violence, including ‘Price Tag’149 actions in the area, rarely see 
police intervention or protection. However, this doesn’t prevent immense police presence – 
and often brutality – at political rallies and demonstrations, as these are perceived as threats 
against the state and its Jewish citizens
150; an act of violence that transgresses the ‘borders’ of 
Palestinian space. Moreover, while there is a dearth of Jewish numbers, there is no lack of 
Jews leading the planning councils, the regional and district authorities, state-level ministries, 
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 As mentioned in the introduction, in addition to guiding me through the Central Galilee, Shbeta is the 
personal assistant of MK Hanna Swaid, a representative from the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality 
(DFPE). The DFPE (Hadash in Hebrew) is an Arab-Jewish political party that was formed in 1977, out of a 
consolidation of the Communist Party and other, non-partisan groups. 
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 Yafa an-Naseriyye is a small village situated on the periphery of Nazareth City.  
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 The term ‘Price Tag’ (Tag Mechir in Hebrew) generally refers to acts of vandalism directed against 
Palestinian citizens and residents of Israeli controlled territories by Jewish extremists seeking retribution for 
state policies seen to be instigated against the settlement infrastructure in the West Bank and inside Israel. 
Examples include burning and cutting down olive trees, spraypainting Palestinian property with racist slogans, 
desecrating mosques and cemetaries, slashing tires, etc... For additional details, any number of media sources 
can be consulted, including Corbin (2012), Booth & Eglash (2013) and Hasson (2015). For more direct 
discussion of Price Tag attacks inside Israel (including the arson of a bilingual school in Jerusalem in 2014), see 
for example Prusher (2014), Hasson (2012) and Ashkenazi (2014).    
150
 This was the case with the November, July and August 2013 ‘Days of Rage’ against the Prawer Plan, 
throughout the Arab ‘enclaves’ of the country.   
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and the local councils that sit on the highest strata of Israel’s socio-economic ladder, behind 
walls that are institutionally protected against Arab encroachments.  
The colonial geography of the Galilee seems to stop at the edges of Palestinian space, 
supporting Falah’s (2003) theorisation of ‘enclaving/exclaving’, mentioned above. His 
metaphor brings to mind the active and on-going practice of creating segregated, closed and 
confined spaces – a ghettoization of Palestinian communities within the territory of the 
Zionist-state. These enclaves are neither autonomous, nor are they part of the state. Wacquant 
(2007) describes the same process as the cultivation of an advanced marginality, 
concentrating the ‘unwanted other’ into isolated and bounded territories, the purgatories of 
the state. Far from acting as a protective shield, the Galilee is constructed as an alienated 
space, whose perimeter is paroled and maintained as a way to contain its violence. This is 
akin to what Zayyad (1976) called the state’s “Chinese Shoes Policy”; a policy whose central 
goal “is to impose retardation on Arab villages and towns, freezing their development, 
embittering and impoverishing their life, to weaken any influence they may have on the 
political or economic life of Israel.” (p.99)  
In both Falah’s (2003) and Zayyad’s (1976) depictions of the enclaving process, the impact 
of the clash between the Judaisation project and the dense Arab space is underestimated; in 
this thesis, a different lens is incorporated. The process by which the enclave has been 
entrenched is inherently tied to the community’s struggle to retain and retrench a Palestinian 
place in the Galilee. As a natural paradox of the ethnicized hegemonic paradigm, in which the 
‘other’ is always outside, always subaltern and always a threat, the community mobilised its 
own collective discourse, its own civil leadership and territorial grid. Despite efforts to 
subsume and reshape the Galilee as part of or at least subordinate to the Zionist project, an 
increasingly self-confident and politically organised Palestinian community has kept the state 
at bay (Falah, 1989, 2003; Swaid, 2012). Its resilience dislodged and dislocated the basic 
tenets of Judaisation: that the land, through settlement, is redeemed as part of the Zionist 
project; that the democratic infrastructure of the state enshrines the control of its institutions 
by a Jewish majority; that the Palestinian-minority can be ‘Israelised’ and the indigenous-
identity erased from the space. Within this space, a new ‘geography of resistance’ (Y. 
Jabareen, 2011) is produced, away from the daily siege on Arab lives and symbols that occurs 
in other parts of the country. In this space, according to Jonathan Cook (2012a), a journalist 
living in Nazareth for the last 10 years, a new centre can be imagined, without the state, its 
institutions, its language and narratives.  
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At the same time, as Areej Sabbagh-Khoury (2011), a researcher at Mada al Carmel
151
, 
explains, the construction of the enclave, whether from inside or outside, has suited the 
colonial outline, as it seeks to segregate Jewish and Arab spaces: 
“If I write about space in Palestine, I would write about an apartheid system, because the 
space, when you go from a Jewish town to a Jewish town, without having to pass through an 
Arab town; this is part of the apartheid system. They are building more roads to connect the 
Jewish places, with no need to enter the Arab villages. In this way, the state can also split the 
Jewish consciousness, so the Jewish people don’t know what’s going on here. If you don’t see 
the Arabs, you conceal them. You ‘disappear’ them from the space.” 
In Scott’s (2009) discussion of ‘ungovernable’ spaces, he argues that there are no naturally 
determined spatial-havens left in this world. Thus, the development of seemingly self-reliant 
spaces necessarily services the logic and governing needs of the state. In enclaving the all-
Arab space, the state, and its hegemonic project, is protected from the link to a Palestinian 
threat, to its nationalist ideology, its claims, its narratives and its indigeneity. So long as this 
space is enclosed, separate, and segregated, it can be made redundant to the Zionist project. 
As discussed above, it can be (and is) cut away from the centre (Cook, 2012a). However, as 
Ramiz Jaraisy
152
 (2012) explained to me, through his lens as (then) mayor of Nazareth, life in 
the Arab space is never autonomous. It is dependent on the state for its budgets, its plans, its 
permits. It is also vulnerable to the state’s laws and limits. However, this also implies that the 
hegemonic order is likewise connected, and thus penetrable. Hegemony is never safe from 
the threat of the other, which can engage and challenge its internal frontiers, of which ‘the 
other’ is always a part.    
Thus, the struggle investigated in this chapter contends with both the problems of maintaining 
the space against Zionist intervention, and with how to challenge the hegemonic control of it. 
The cleavage and spatial alienation that each side has constructed becomes integral to a 
production of the colonial ethos in this space, but is also part of the paradox of survival and 
struggle in the grey periphery.  
Struggle in the Galilee – Reimagining the Hegemonic (b)order 
In the sections above, the all-Arab space has begun to take shape – through its ghosts, its 
bonds, its limits, and its resilience. The distance between the Galilee and the Zionist centre 
has become both a tool of the struggle – constituting the survival of Palestinian identity and 
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 Mada al Carmel was founded by Nadeem Rouhana, one of the first and most influential Palestinian-citizen 
social scientists. The NGO he founded is a research institute that studies Palestinian society and politics, and 
provides a counter-space for Palestinian citizens to engage in non-Zionist research of the state and its citizens.   
152
 Ramiz Jaraysi (of the DFPE party) was the mayor of Nazareth from 1994 – 2013, when he lost his seat to his 
Deputy Mayor, Ali Sallam, who left the DFPE to establish his own non-party list, My Nazareth.  
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space, separate from the Zionist imagination– and a product of the colonial-regime. 
Resistance within the Galilee feels empowered, as well as trapped, by the frontier borders, by 
their peripheralisation, their growing disengagement from the state, and, ultimately, by 
attempts to become autonomous within the Zionist field of force. This ambivalence of the 
northern Palestinian enclave has evolved a unique trajectory for the struggle over land and 
space, and for how the hegemonic grid is interpreted, experienced and lived, and accordingly, 
challenged and re-articulated.  
The paradox is acutely expressed in the changing essence of the struggle; its tools and targets, 
needs and experiences. As many interlocutors of this case explained, the culture of protest in 
the Galilee is no longer a direct struggle for land, although land is still the open wound of 
every tale of resistance. In the Galilee, the majority have resigned themselves to the land 
issue being “settled, with the state taking what it took, the people owning what they own (S. 
Bishara, 2012)”. As a result, the political urgency and critical masses of the 1970s have 
dissipated. The ‘frontline’ has moved, into the more directly contested territories of the 
Naqab and the ‘Mixed Cities’ (as well as into the Occupied Territories), so the struggle is less 
tangible, less existential for most interlocutors of this case. There are still those who fight for 
the tangible return of land, but for the majority, it is more about ‘living space’, ‘equal or civil 
rights’, ‘community and economic development’ and ‘control of the space and the institutions 
housed within it’ (depending on who is speaking).  Hanna Swaid (2012), who is an urban 
planner in addition to a member of Knesset, describes the changing struggle as follows:  
“The soul of the struggle has shifted, has changed from direct confiscation of lands, direct 
Judaization, implemented by establishing settlements, to more a struggle regarding planning 
rights, as if the outcomes have been accepted. The existence of these settlements does not 
disturb me as long as I have equality, as long as I feel I have equal access to resources. It's 
not a problem of establishing the Misgav, but a problem of how much resources you give 
Misgav at my expense. This is the epicentre, the major idea of the struggle now.” 
The tools of the struggle have also been transposed. This is no longer a resistance culture 
under siege, but, as Sabbagh-Khoury (2011) explains, a slow, incremental and on-going 
“struggle over life; for how to live a better life in the squeezed places.” These tools are 
primarily housed in civil society institutions and led by professional resisters in law, 
planning, media, economics, and social science research; although there are still popular 
committees for the defence of land and space in every Palestinian locality of the north
153
. The 
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 As shall be discussed further below, these have primarily been organised to fight off a new series of Master 
Plans being imposed on the individual localities of the Galilee (see S. Bishara, 2012; Y. Jabareen, 2011; Banna 
et al, 2012, for details). 
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political parties have their own methodology and agenda, often divorced from the daily 
struggle for space and survival in the periphery, which is often left to the local committees 
and local authorities. There are extra-parliamentary movements that function to de-legitimise 
the state by refusing to participate in its institutions, but many are likewise removed from the 
daily struggle for space. As discussed more comprehensively, below, the Islamic Movements 
are exceptions to this, but their focus has primarily drifted south and away from the 
Galilee
154
.  
That said, a protest culture of demonstrations and public actions still exists in the north. It is 
hyper-political and keenly articulate of the colonial project. It is aggressive in its demands 
and its mandate to live as equal citizens in the state, as a national and indigenous Palestinian 
minority (Bishara, 2012; Zahalka, 2012; Ghantous, 2012). Its most active participants are 
generally young, well-educated and part of the growing elite and middle classes. Much of it 
takes place on Haifa’s ‘shared’ university campuses, as opposed to the streets of Sakhnin, 
Shefa Amr or even Nazareth
155
. In fact, the streets of the Galilee localities are generally quiet, 
except of course on Land Day (and sometimes Nakba Day
156
). This is because the target – the 
state and its policies – has been displaced from the villages, even if the colonial geography is 
ever-present in the landscape, through hegemonic maps, plans and laws. Thus, the ‘politics’ 
of the street have receded as well, looking to entangle the structures of power, elsewhere.  
These changes can only be understood in light of the ‘enclaving’ process and the cultivation 
of increasingly entrenched borders. The tight boxes that seek to surround and segment the 
Palestinian Galilee, marginalising it from the centre and from the rest of the Palestinian-
citizen space, cultivate a struggle within and against the frontier. It is a struggle ever in 
tension with a border that is both imposed from without and protected from within. The 
stories and movements of this case are therefore a window into the dynamic encounters with, 
against and beyond the hegemonic lines that order Palestinian space.  
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 There are two Islamic Movements in Israel, a Northern and Southern branch, each with distinct politics vis à 
vis their relations with the state. They shall be discussed more comprehensively, below. 
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 There has been one exception to this rule, during the progress of this research. Nazareth became a site of 
action in July 2014, during ‘Operation Protective Shield’, in which Israel bombarded the Gaza Strip and killed 
over 2000 people. After violent clashes a few days earlier during a demonstration in Haifa, between anti-war 
activists – many of whom were Palestinian citizens – and police, as well as pro-war Israeli-Jewish protesters 
(Hovel, 2014; Hasson & Kubovich, 2014), the Palestinian communities held a separate anti-war protest in the 
relatively safer, separate space of Nazareth, with 20,000 participants (Sherman, 2014).   
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 Nakba Day is an annual commemoration of the Nakba, and its ongoing impact on Palestinian lives.  
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Struggle for Living Space – Challenging the Internal Borders 
“The state is controlling people’s lives, controlling the space. I don’t know what the 
Palestinians can/should do, because the patterns of control are overcoming every site of their 
lives…The link is that people are struggling over the space, they want space to live in.”  
Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, Personal Interview, 2011 
The first ‘borders’ are the internal frontier, implemented through a matrix of laws initiated 
since 1948 to segment the inner threat and define its physical limits. The failures of the 
regime to ‘Judaise’ the space shifted the focus to control, as discussed above: control over 
resources, development, and income; control over the right to expand and the space within 
which to do it. At the same time, the communities continue to build, grow, and develop. As 
Shbeta (2012) explained, you cannot contain an explosive force forever. Both innately and 
intentionally, the communities challenge the limits imposed on the space. Some directly 
engage the institutions of the state, demanding access to space and resources, including new 
plans, new budgets, new industrial zones and new neighbourhoods. Others circumvent and 
encroach the lines, in direct actions that attempt to ‘move’ the borders without formal 
permits, or, more often, naturally moving beyond them, to alter the demographic geography 
of the remaining Judaised spaces in the Galilee. In all cases, the process of ‘enclaving’, from 
top down and bottom-up, is inherent in how struggle is performed, and the lines that are 
targeted and, at times, transformed.   
Struggle Against the Outlines 
The first layer of actions can be described as direct challenges against the Planning Regime. 
These have taken shape as professional (primarily NGO-led) and community struggles in 
three main arenas of action: The first group reject and resist the newly imposed 
Master/Outline Plans for the Galilee villages and districts, none of which have been 
developed with the communities, and none of which sufficiently resolve their planning 
problems (Galilee Society, 2006; Banna et al, 2012). The second group is made up of 
collective, community-based actions negotiating against the implementation of national 
projects ‘for the public good’, and yet which do not serve the Arab public. The third group 
constitutes activities that seek to circumvent the long-standing policy to prevent development 
within or expansion beyond the enclosed space. These actions, which are often fragmented, 
bureaucratic and sadly unsuccessful, directly clash with the imagined and yet very real wall 
enclaving the villages. As soon as there is a request to be made of the regime – a permit, a 
plan, a service – the distance between the periphery and the core dissolves. The control 
mechanisms are brought into the light, and unveil where the structures of power are sitting.  
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According to Swaid (2012), the struggle within the planning regime is innately political. 
There is potential to criticise his statement, given the discussions in previous chapters, as to 
the use of the ‘Masters’ Tools’ to challenge the ‘Master’s Regime’ – and there is no more 
‘colonial’ a tool, than the planning mechanisms of the colonising state. This is particularly 
evident in the similarities that exist between the individual legal cases that proliferate in the 
Ajami case, and the planning actions in the Galilee. The majority of wins are small, the 
language used is depoliticised and the arena of action is hyper-professional and contained 
within hegemonic institutions of the state. At the same time, planning advocacy directly 
spotlights the hegemonic and colonial containers that target the encroachment and enclosure 
of Palestinian space by challenging the way space is re-ordered and controlled through the 
planning arena. S. Bishara (2012) comes to a similar conclusion: 
“You know what planning is, right? Planning is the way I want to live. It’s everything, it’s my 
house, it’s how I want my public space, it’s economic infrastructure, it’s services. I tell you 
why. In Israel, planning runs everything. It controls private land, it controls public land. It 
decides where you can cultivate, where you can build; everything. And people are restricted; 
they cannot put two stones on top of the other. And since we‘re talking about one type of 
community, planning is considered one of the main tools to control them. It’s why people feel 
so threatened by it, all the time. And people feel they need to struggle against it, all the 
time...” 
According to Yosef Jabareen (2011), an urban planner and academic at the Technion 
University in Haifa, the repertoire of activities in a ‘planning struggle’ follows a particular 
trajectory in the northern all-Arab peripheries that is repeated across cases. As a window into 
the shape and scope of such actions, Y. Jabareen shared an example from his own experience, 
challenging the National Railway’s attempt to appropriate village lands for a storage facility 
in Jaljulye, in the Little Triangle, just south of the Central Galilee
157
. First, an ad hoc 
committee is formed and a protest tent set up. It becomes a shared, public space where the 
community can discuss their needs and expectations, their strategies and plans for protecting 
their lands. Experts come to the tent to give lectures, and other residents of the area come to 
sit in solidarity with the village, along with members of the local and national political 
leadership. Y. Jabareen’s description of the protest tent is reminiscent of the analysis of street 
and community ownership described in the works of Bayat (2010) and Harvey (2012). He 
describes the tent-space and popular committee as belonging ‘to the people’, and as filling a 
gap that should but doesn’t come from the local authorities, in their capacity to engage and 
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 While Y. Jabareen is referencing his experience with a village in the Triangle, according to him, as well as R. 
Khouri (2011) and S. Bishara (2012), this pattern is replicated throughout the Galilee. 
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negotiate with the state. Representatives from the High Follow-Up Committee join the tent 
space as well, bridging the local with the national, although participation is primarily limited 
to the local space in which the case is happening. In parallel time, the planning professionals 
– lawyers, urban planners and critical geographers – are brought in to negotiate directly with 
the planning authorities. Their discourse focuses directly on the plan, its detrimental impact 
on the community, and potential alternatives. In the example Y. Jabareen described, the case 
was won at the Planning Authority. The Planning Committee sided with his assessment that 
there was no need to appropriate village land for the project. The National Railway was 
forced to seek a different home for its trains, the protest ended and the tent that housed the 
struggle, came down.  
Despite Swaid’s and S. Bishara’s assertions to the contrary, the limited, local and contained 
nature of such struggles need to be acknowledged. As Y. Jabareen’s example implies, in most 
cases of planning activism, the focus of activity is not the protest tent. Instead, the localities, 
their committees, and the local and national NGOs that support them, protest on bureaucratic 
paper at the different Planning Committees and Ministries, and, as needed, in district courts. 
Moreover, they each develop their campaigns, alone (R. Khouri, 2011
158
). The state has 
constructed a planning discipline and language that situates each village inside a particular 
outline, its jurisdiction fetishized and atomised within the new (and old) Master Plans 
(Shneydor, 2012; R. Khouri, 2011)
159
. When the national institutions come as delegates of the 
colonial programme, their focus is on a particular piece of the grid and their language is 
professional and neutral. This neutrality is often challenged among planning activists, who do 
make links between the Judaising project and the practice of planning and controlling 
Palestinian space. However, these are often couched when these same activists are directly 
negotiating with the Planning Authorities; which means they never officially disarticulate the 
legal and planning discourses, even if they change the facts on the ground.    
While there are some limited attempts at collective organising across the Popular 
Committees, the main defences and negotiations of the communities tend to be segregated 
and atomised (S. Bishara, 2012). Needs are defined, determined and mediated within the 
individual villages. Majd al-Krum, a village 5 km west of Karmiel, and one of those whose 
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 This is another example of differential spellings of surnames: Raja Khouri is the director of the Arab Center 
for Alternative Planning (ACAP), and should not be confused with Areej Sabbagh-Khoury, who is a researcher 
at Mada al Carmel, or Jack Khoury, a journalist with Haaretz, whose name appears below, and throughout the 
remainder of this manuscript.  
159
 For more details on Israel’s planning mechanisms and how they function, both as mechanisms of control and 
neglect, see Yiftachel (1994, 2006), Yacobi (2009), and Banna et al, 2012. 
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lands were confiscated to establish the Jewish settlement there, acts as a case in point. Over 
the past year, the lands of Majd al-Krum have been targeted for yet another Israel National 
Railways project. A tunnel will be blasted through their mountains to make room for the new 
express line between Acre and Safed. With the exception of Karmiel, the line has been 
planned without the infrastructure to service the dozens of villages that stretch between them; 
supporting Sabbagh-Khoury’s conclusion that the line is part of the expanding project to 
bypass Arab space. Majd al-Krum’s residents orchestrated their own negotiations with the 
Railway, some choosing to agree to compensation, others refusing and forcing changes to the 
route of the track. However, based on past experiences with such projects, the villagers came 
to the consensus that if they try to stop the line, they would lose. In light of this, they shifted 
their battle, not against confiscation of land, but against the lack of services to the local 
communities. They are fighting to build a station in Majd al-Krum, a struggle that is still 
ongoing, although there is no public fanfare, campaign or protest tent to spotlight the new 
line cutting through and circumventing the Palestinian enclave.  
This ‘battlefield’ is integrally tied to the Structural Master Plans that organise Palestinian 
space, and Palestinian life; and through which “the powers that be” can demolish a home, or 
invest in the building of an industrial park. Even Nazareth isn’t immune, and is in constant 
battles with the state over the expansion of a neighbourhood, the right to build beyond the 
city limits, even the decision to construct a new building. The discrimination in policy and 
practice was deeply apparent in my tour of the area, with Shbeta (2012) pointing out multiple 
new construction projects in Jewish gated communities and the ever-expanding 
neighbourhoods of Upper Nazareth. There are moments where a town succeeds in extending 
its jurisdiction, defeating a demolition-order, or protecting its space against encroachment. 
However, when the state seeks to flex its muscles, to remind the northern residents of its 
leering presence and power, it succeeds. This was the case in July 2009, when the Transport 
Ministry reassigned Hebrew names to every road, village and landmark in Israel. Even the 
Arabic on road signs became a transliteration of the Hebrew name for a place.  
In another example, in 2008, the state completed construction of a new tunnel to connect the 
Lower Galilee and the centre of the country. The point of the tale is not the familiar trope of 
the appropriated Arab lands, but rather the name chosen by Ministry officials behind closed 
doors. The place is called the Rafael Eitan Bridge, after an ultra-right, ultra-nationalist 
political and military figure, well-known for his policies on transfer as solutions to the 
Palestinian-citizen ‘problem’ (Cook, 2012c). Both examples act as semiotic reminders that 
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while there are diminishing attempts to commandeer Palestinian space from the Central 
Galilee, the state is not simply ‘gone’. It lives on in the borders, which it paroles and 
maintains against encroachment; and in the stifling of Palestinian voices and identity, growth 
and development. The more nebulous and distant the state seems, the less the struggle seems 
to find those lines.  
At the same time, the majority of the new signs were spray-painted over with the original 
Arabic name; and no one within the Arab localities calls the bridge by its official name 
(Cook, 2012c). On the ground, in the everyday experience of the local space, the residents 
refused to accept the re-mapping of their homes as Jewish space; and reclaimed it, if not 
officially, at least symbolically.  
Crossing the Internal Borders 
A new phenomenon is evolving and outpacing the direct struggle for living space, 
demonstrating that the rigidity of jurisdiction lines cannot root people in place. As discussed, 
village space is becoming increasingly congested and expensive, and a growing middle class 
is seeking new economic opportunities and breathing room. As a result, there is a growing 
trend of migration into those few places in the Galilee that do not have limits to their 
expansion, their green spaces, their services and economic opportunities: the Jewish 
agricultural communities, the Mixed Cities of Haifa and Acre, and the Jewish settlement 
towns of Karmiel and Upper Nazareth. For a variety of reasons, there are no accurate 
statistics available for these movements. The residents themselves often move without 
changing their addresses, in order to maintain their right to vote in their own localities, or in 
order to continue to send their children to schools within their villages, because there are no 
Arab schools in the Jewish towns (Yacobi, 2012; Chomsky-Porat, 2011). On the side of the 
Jewish municipalities, there is resistance to reporting accurate statistics that might change 
their status to ‘Mixed’, and force them to take responsibility for ingesting the space with Arab 
language signs, Arab schools and Arab cultural and religious centres, as required by national 
law (Chomsky-Porat, 2011)
 160
. Even without full statistical evidence, anecdotes and 
newspaper articles tell us more about the influx of Arabs and the surge to protect Jewish 
space against this invasion
161
.  
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 A City becomes ‘Mixed’ when its Palestinian population is higher than 10%. Both Karmiel and Upper 
Nazareth have far-exceeded the demographic limits for ‘Mixed’ status, but neither space reflects this change, in 
terms of services and infrastructure.  
161
 See for example Ashkenazi (2013b), Caller & Traister (2013) and Gapso (2013) as part of a range of articles 
appearing in Israeli media in the run-up to municipal elections in October 2013. This shall be discussed further 
below. 
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According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, 19% of Upper Nazareth’s population is 
Palestinian (CBS, 2014); although MK Jamal Zahalka, the current head of Tajamo, quoted a 
figure of 30% during our interview. Four years ago, it was 15.2% (Ashkenazi, 2013a), 
indicating that the phenomenon is increasing. Lands that once belonged to the local villages 
are being re-inhabited by Palestinians. Shbeta (2012), during my tour with him, described 
multiple neighbourhoods in which the majority of space is newly de-Judaised; and according 
to Jafar Farah (2011), the head of the Palesitnian-citizen media advocacy organisation 
Mossawa, there is a case to be made that these actions, which alter the borders of Arab and 
Jewish spaces, are redefining shared and segregated space in the Galilee. However, Ayema 
Manna (2012), an activist and resident of Majd al-Krum, who also works at Mossawa, sees 
this ‘encroachment’ as a failure of the struggle, and as part of the new geography of the 
enclave: 
“And what happened on Land Day, 1976? People at the end, they struggled, they went to the 
streets, and they didn't have any problem to die for their lands. Now you feel that people, 
when they have nowhere to stay, nowhere to go, they just leave. They are going and renting 
houses in Karmiel; or they are buying the land, demolishing old houses, and building their 
own villas. Some of the people I meet from Karmiel say that they are ‘returning to our lands’. 
But that's a privilege that not many people can afford.” 
In other words, segregation of space is still enforced for those who make up the lower strata 
of the economy, as is the case for the majority of Palestinians living in exclusively Arab 
localities in the Galilee (Galilee Society, 2006). Moreover, when people do move, the 
representative space does not in fact reflect the changing demographic; a reminder of which 
system and which sector is still in control of it (Lefebvre, 1991). This seems to reiterate the 
semantic messages mentioned above, indicating who designs the signs and landmarks, 
regardless of who lives in the space. In Upper Nazareth, not a single Arab kindergarten can 
be found within the city limits. There are no Arab representatives on the Karmiel council, and 
only 2 on the Upper Nazareth council. It took a national campaign, led by high-profile NGOs 
and a court decision by the Supreme Court to force Upper Nazareth to open its first Arab 
school; a decision publicly challenged by the Jewish mayor (J. Khoury, 2013). In fact, this 
same mayor – Shimon Gapso – won the 2013 municipal elections on a campaign he ran on 
the basis of the following statement:  
"Upper Nazareth will be Jewish forever; no more shutting our eyes, no more grabbing on to the law 
allowing every citizen to live where they want. This is the time to defend our home.” (quoted in 
Ashkenazi, 2013a) 
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If Gramsci, is correct in arguing that in politics, the siege is always reciprocal and the ruler 
musters all its power to respond to its greatest threats (as implied in the quote that begins 
Chapter One to this thesis), then we should take a closer look at the meaning of such overt 
reactions to the migration phenomenon. It would seem that the Zionist project musters all its 
resources to defend itself from these encounters with ‘Palestine’; and with the prospect of 
ripples in the hegemonic order that seeks to contain the Jewish ghetto against shared, 
permeated space. In the next section, the reciprocal siege is analysed more concretely in a 
case that exemplifies the threat the Zionist project – or at least some of its agents – sees in the 
transgression from Arab space to shared space in the Galilee, even though some of it has 
already been ‘reclaimed’.  
The Rakefet Case 
The Rakefet Case has come to embody the current struggle against spatial apartheids in the 
Galilee. The case is captured and nearly always told in two parts: through an individual 
family’s clash with the land regime and through the principal issues this individual story 
encapsulates. As a first layer, Rakefet tells the personal story of a young, middle class 
Palestinian couple from Sakhnin who, like those migrating to Karmiel and Upper Nazareth, 
were seeking a way out of the ever-shrinking space of their tightly contained Arab village and 
had the means to do so. The story has been retold in the same way, in dozens of sources 
(newspaper articles, court depositions, press releases and interviews). The couple, Fatima and 
Ahmed Zbeidat, both architects and graduates of the highly respected College of Architecture 
at Bezalel Academy of Arts and Design in Jerusalem, filed an application to live in the 
community town of Rakefet, one of the 35 villages that fall under the jurisdiction of the 
Misgav Regional Council, and sits less than 2 miles from their home. Regulations applicable 
to small community associations, such as Rakefet, required that the couple pass an 
‘acceptance test’ orchestrated by the regional selection committee, and administered under 
the jurisdiction of the Israel Lands Authority. The committee, composed of the deputy head 
of the Misgav Regional Council, a representative from the Jewish Agency and a 
representative of the Rakefet Absorption Committee, rejected the Zbeidats’ application on the 
grounds that they were not “socially suited” to the fabric of life in Rakefet. This test took 
place in 2006; the legal battle – which they won – played out over the next five years. 
This first layer is told and repeated in clichés, because the plaintiffs in the case – which 
include five high-profile human rights organisations, led by Adalah – want to make it clear to 
their audiences the meaning behind ‘social unsuitability’, and what it is that the Zbeidats 
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threaten by trying to become part of the Rakefet social fabric. That is, they are Arabs, and 
therefore unfitting to the Zionist colonial logic the settlement represents. Rakefet, founded in 
1980, was part of the Mitzpe settlement programme. As discussed above, the small 
settlements were strategically deployed to control the space, until a Jewish majority could 
take hold in the Arab peripheries (Cook, 2012b). While the numbers were never forthcoming, 
the statistics of land holdings tell a very different story. According to Adalah (2007b), 
selection committees operate in 700 agricultural communities in Israel. These localities are 
home to about 5.2% of the state’s population, and yet they exercise control over 
approximately 81% of the country’s land.162 The communities include less than 400 
households and, as mentioned previously, comprise much of Israel’s highest economic strata. 
The streets are wide and tree-lined, houses are beautiful, space is plentiful; and the faces are 
primarily white (Cook, 2012b). Other than this, they have few community values or 
communal practices to ‘protect’ from outside incursion (Manna, 2012). Rather, it is land, and 
the laws used to redeem Jewish space, that fall under the jurisdiction of these committees. 
Thus, the couple’s clash with the racist demographic of Rakefet was in fact a clash against a 
deep-seated practice of colonial segregation that brought the hegemonic boundaries into the 
light. It also became a vehicle through which to challenge the larger problem of ‘Admissions 
Committees’ and the exclusionary process they protect.  
While the extensive level of interest the case provoked among its different stakeholders 
suggests otherwise, this isn’t the first case of its kind. The first such ‘transgression’ into 
protected Jewish space was the Kaadan family’s attempt to attain land in Katzir, a Kibbutz 
established in 1982 by the JNF in the Wadi Ara region of the Little Triangle. The Kaadan 
case seemingly made Israeli legal history in 2000 (Cook, 2012b), when then Supreme Court 
president, Aharon Barak, pronounced in his decision on the case that it is “impermissible to 
discriminate against an individual and prevent him from living in a communal village on the 
basis of his not being Jewish (ACRI, 2010)”. The case is often problematized in critical legal 
circles in Israel. For example, Barzilai (2000), Shamir (2000) and Dalal (2000) argue that 
while the Court did rule against the Selection Committee’s decision to reject the family’s 
application, it did not directly articulate what actions the state must take on behalf of the 
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 Yacobi & Tzfadia (2010) paint a more ethnically coloured picture of the same statistics, applied explicitly to 
the central Galilee: 60% of land in this region belongs to Ashkenazi (Jews of European descent) controlled 
regional councils, although only 6% of the population is Ashkenazi. 20 % is controlled by jurisdictions 
primarily housing Mizrahi-Jewish communities, who make up 24% of the population, although the majority of 
these do not live in the small agricultural communities; 16.1% of the area is under Palestinian controlled local 
councils, despite making up 72% of the total population.  
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Kaadan family, nor acknowledge the historical circumstances that led to the situation of 
unequal land distribution and access in the first place
163
. The colonial history that confiscated 
Palestinian lands, the containment of Palestinian space and the segregation of Jewish and 
Palestinian communities, is sidestepped in the judgement, as it focuses in on the individual 
rights of the Kaadan family. The court’s lack of direct relief for the Kaadans enabled Katzir 
more than a decade of manoeuvring, in its attempts to circumvent the judgement; it took 
another seven years to force Katzir to accept the Kaadan application and an additional four 
years before the house was built and the Kaadan family could move in (Cook, 2012b). 
Moreover, the decision left open a loophole, as multiple authors have pointed out
164
. It calls 
on the state to consider the petitioners' request to purchase land in Katzir while “taking into 
consideration factors relevant to the matter-- including the factors which relate to the Agency 
and the current residents of Katzir -and including the legal difficulties entailed in this matter.” 
(H.C.J, Decision 6698/95, 2000, p. 16). It is this open space that the new criterion on ‘social 
suitability’ was created to fill.  
By the end of 2007, the District Court had already ordered the ILA, the Misgav Regional 
Council and Rakefet Committee to ‘rethink’ its decision regarding the Zbeidats; the case was 
then bounced back and forth in appeals, before reaching the Supreme Court in 2011. Based 
on a reading of the legal documents, the case was heavily couched in ‘liberal’ language, 
leaning heavily on the discourse of ‘citizenship’, ‘human rights’, ‘discrimination’ and ‘the 
right to choose one’s living space’; subsuming the open wounds of dispossession, settler-
colonialism and the Judaisation of Arab-space at the heart of the case (H.C.J. 8036/07, 2007; 
H.C.J., decision 8036/07, 2011; H.C.J. 2504/11). However, the petition and deliberations 
during the case also focused explicitly on the construction and maintenance of the dominant 
group’s power (meaning the Ashkenazi elite), through its control of the ‘Admissions 
Committees’ and the lands under their jurisdiction. The petitions further pointed out that the 
Committees are a veil for denying access to land to those already traditionally excluded, 
based on ethnic, religious, racial and class hierarchies in Israeli society, linking the story of 
these different social and political groups within both the individual case, and later in a 
principal petition. Moreover, at a hearing during the Zbeidat case, Justice Dorit Beinish, then 
Supreme Court president, is quoted asking the Rakefet Committee members if the real 
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 For details of the case and the Supreme Court’s decision on it, see H.C.J (High Court of Justice), Decision 
6698/95, 2000. Additional discussion and criticism of the limits of the court’s decision can also be found in 
Barzilai (2000), Dalal (2000), Shamir (2000), Abu-Hussein & Makay (2003) and Dalal (2000). 
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 See in particular Barzilai (2000), Shamir (2000), and Dalal (2000), among many others. 
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intention of this term ‘social unsuitability’ “is that an Arab couple is unsuitable for this 
community.” (Glickman, 2011) That said, the Supreme Court decision in the Zbeidat case 
does not mention any of the substantive, constitutional issues of the case, but refers only to 
procedural issues that prevented the couple from accessing land that should effectively be 
open to all citizens. This is in part because, before a final decision was reached, the 
‘respondents’ retreated and changed their position, negating the need for the Court to insert a 
precedent into the legal books. However, something was clearly shaken in this process – 
enough to provoke a more direct intervention by the state’s representatives in protecting the 
power of these elite communities. 
In 2009, the Prime Minister’s Office proposed an Amendment to the Community Associations 
Law to enshrine the decision-making powers of the Admissions Committees
165
. It was passed 
in March, 2011, just ahead of my first interviews. Several of my interlocutors saw in this law 
the passing of the first overtly apartheid law by the Knesset, despite the fact that the language 
of the Law, itself, is carefully constructed so as not to belie the true colour and shape of 
individuals to be excluded from the tree-lined streets of places like Rakefet
166
. This feeling is 
linked to their experience of 66 years of land expropriations, the denial of equal citizenship 
and deep spatial, economic and political discrimination against the Galilee’s residents. It is 
borne of absolute frustration but also clarity as to the nature of the colonial legacy of the 
project (Shbeta, 2012).  
In this Law, the methodology of spatial control is institutionalised, highlighting two 
intersecting arguments of this thesis: first, that in the all Arab periphery, it is not 
demographics but the hegemonic ordering of land and life that bolsters Judaisation of Israeli-
territory – turning gates into borders; roads and public works into frontiers; jurisdictions into 
enclaves. Or, as Sabbagh-Khoury (2011) eloquently put it, by making Palestinians disappear 
from Jewish lived experience and consciousness. Second, the Law emphasises the idea that 
the key to maintaining hegemonic order is the division of space and communities. As Koenig 
claimed in 1976, it was Jewish dependency on the Palestinian-citizen public that informed the 
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 The principal petition responds directly to the new Admissions Law, although it also incorporates the details 
of the Rakefet case, in order to link the principal argument to the intentions and potential impacts of the Law on 
vulnerable, non-elite communities, in particular Palestinian citizens (H.C.J. 2504/11, 2011).  
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 In one example, the Law mandates the absolute control of the state’s land resources to a group almost devoid 
of elected officials; the five committee members are made up of two from the community in question, a member 
of the ‘movement’ to which the community belongs, a member of the Jewish Agency or WZO, and a member of 
the regional council. There are also no clear criteria for who can be excluded from such a community, giving the 
Admissions Committee members near-exclusive autonomy (H.C.J. 2504/11, 2011; Law to Amend the 
Cooperative Societies Ordinance (No. 8), 2011).   
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‘shock’ of Land Day on Jewish political and economic life; and the only way to protect 
Jewish spaces against Palestinian encroachment is to separate the two ‘sectors’ as much as 
possible. This is exemplified in statements like those by MK Israel Hasson, who helped to 
formulate the Law, who argues that the Law embodies “the state’s commitment to the 
achievement of the Zionist vision in the Land of Israel” (Sofer, 2010).  
As discussed above, Judaisation in the Galilee has internalised the bifurcation and 
segregation of space; a reciprocal set of actions, in which enclaves, ghettos and peripheries 
are normalised in the essential practices of the state and its Jewish and Palestinian residents 
of the Galilee. It is important to note that the legislation only came into being when the 
separated space, and thus the resources the gated communities control, was directly 
threatened.  Thus a foundational, but unarticulated assumption about the spatial order in the 
Galilee was challenged through the struggle for living space; through everyday, bureaucratic 
and legal tools, a spectrum of colonial borders were activated and then reified in law. These, 
in turn, became new, clearer and more coercive boundaries, against which the Palestinian 
political community in the Galilee have continued to fight.  
The story only has a partial happy ending. Although the Zbeidats inevitably were awarded 
land in Rakefet, the principal petitions launched against the Amendment to the Associations 
Law were dismissed in September, 2014 (Adalah, 2014)
167
. Five out of nine judges on the 
panel voted to uphold the Law, claiming in their decision that they “could not determine at 
this stage whether the law violates constitutional rights (ibid)”. 
The Right of Return – the Tangible Struggle 
“There are two sides to the issue of return: Palestine, and the refugees. Both exist and will 
continue to do so, and thus return cannot be merely symbolic, formal or figurative. The right 
and the content thereof are clear: what the Palestinians must do is to reformulate the 
components of the equation of the Right of Return, based on Palestine the land, and Palestine 
as refuge.”  
Haneen Naamnih, The Two Sides of Return: Palestine and the Refugees, 2009, p.2 
Naamnih, an activist and (then) a lawyer working for Adalah, is responding to the 2009 Land 
Reform Law that had legalised the selling of 800,000 dunams of Palestinian refugee land 
(mentioned in Chapter Two). This property has supposedly lived in limbo, held by the 
Development Authority as a temporary phenomenon of a state whose future and borders are 
still elastic and undecided; despite the fact that the land has been appropriated and used for 
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 A second petition was launched by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), in 2011 (Zarchin & J. 
Khoury, 2012).  
141 
 
Jewish settlement for more than 60 years
168
. In the Galilee, Cook (2012b) sees the 2009 Land 
Reform as one of the impetuses for the New Admissions Law
169
, a formal way of standing 
guard against Palestinian-citizen access to state-lands, opened through these new tenders for 
Jewish space on the free market. However, in her critique of the Reform, Naamnih (2009) 
also points to the Law’s formal reproduction of the now-internalised hegemony, expressed by 
both Palestinians and Jews, over who owns this space.  
Naamnih’s argument has particular significance in the Galilee, where, as discussed above, 
there is a general consensus that land is no longer contested and the hegemonic ordering of 
space is near completion, including its partition into separate enclaves. This situation persists, 
despite the fact that approximately 12.8% of Palestinian residents of the Galilee (88,000 
people) are members of communities that were displaced in 1948, or later (Badil, 2009).
170
 It 
is for this reason that Sabbagh-Khoury (2011), among a plethora of others, suggests that the 
struggle for land in this place – and thus the struggle for return – is today almost exclusively 
housed in the right to remember and commemorate; in the right to share one’s personal and 
collective narratives and to inform the public discourse around what really happened in 1948. 
The struggle for Return has been removed from the material, daily struggle for living space, 
and is articulated primarily through Land Day and Nakba Day marches, in annual visits to the 
destroyed villages and in abstract projects that ‘imagine’ the Return of refugees, without 
tangible actions to see it happen
171
. In a sense, the ‘border’ surrounding expropriated Refugee 
lands has become official, seemingly permanent and impenetrable.    
Naamnih’s suggestion is, therefore, a glimmer into an unruly politics; a challenge to what has 
become fixed in space and in the Palestinian imagination. George Ghantous, an activist and 
“expellee”172 from Birim, a village whose residents have been fighting for return since their 
lands were expropriated in 1948, says something similar: “If you talk about a law as being 
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 For a more detailed discussion of properties held by the Development Authority, see Chapter Two. 
169
 Details of the New Admission Law are expanded on in the table on Israel’s Legal Land Regime that appears 
in the Appendices to this thesis. 
170
 The internal Palestinian refugees throughout Israel number 250,000, or 15% of the Palestinian population in 
Israel. The largest concentrations of internal refugees live in the Naqab (the Bedouin Arabs displaced through 
the Nakba, as discussed in Chapter Four). 
171
 A counter-mapping project being led by Zochrot, in which ‘Return’ is imagined, conceived and mapped by a 
group of Jewish activists and Palestinian internal refugees from villages erased in 1948, is one example of these 
practices (Manoff, 2011). Zochrot is an Israeli-Jewish NGO, founded on the idea that without remembering and 
acknowledging the Nakba within Israeli-Jewish discourses, there will never be an end to the conflict.    
172
 The term ‘expellees’ is used by activists on the ground, who see the Israeli rhetoric of ‘Present Absentees’ or 
the international humanitarian/human rights lexicon of ‘Internally Displaced Persons’ as missing an important 
political analysis of a responsible party for the act of expulsion. ‘Expellees’, as a term, better understands the 
catastrophe of 1948 as an active project, in which one group did the expelling and the other was expelled. See 
Ghantous (2012), for more details. 
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undemocratic, where you use ‘democracy’ to show that a law is racist… then this is a tool 
that shows the law’s true face, but it is not a tool to go back.” (Ghantous, 2012) Through this 
prism, the battlefield for Return is radical in and of itself, regardless of the arena in which it is 
fought. The struggle to reclaim land is a direct transgression against the hegemonic lines that 
have determined Palestinian Refugee lands a lost cause, and seek to erase the history that 
links all Palestinians to Zionist ‘redeemed’ space (Cook, 2012a). It is, therefore, a powerful 
and subversive struggle in the colonial geography, and worth investigating more concretely, 
even if it has been truncated into a fractured and limited set of resistance practices.  
Today, the main tool for attempting to articulate the internal Palestinian return is primarily 
bureaucratic
173.  These cases directly and intentionally engage the ‘state’ in the process 
toward reclaiming refugee lands; in contrast to the cases of natural growth and encroachment 
discussed above, as with the re-Arabisation of Upper Nazareth and Karmiel. At the same 
time, they stay away from official, precedent-setting proceedings, and are clearly limited by 
the arena in which their actions take place. 
These bureaucratic actions have orchestrated several ‘success stories’. Two examples are 
discussed here, one of which has already been mentioned, briefly, above: The first is Yafa an-
Naseriyye (Shadi Shbeta’s home town), located within the Nazareth metropolitan district; the 
second is Tamra/al-Ruways, located 14 km east of Acre. Heads of each locality have been 
negotiating with the state, through the Ministry of Interior, various planning authorities, and 
in the case of Yafa, its neighbouring Jewish locality, to expand into territories that had been 
confiscated in 1948. In the case of Tamra, the lands in question actually belong to al-Ruways. 
The village was destroyed in 1948, and the majority of those dispossessed became refugees in 
Tamra. I visited Al-Ruways with expellees from the village, as part of a tour organised by 
Zochrot on Land Day, 2013
174
. Its ruined buildings remain scars on the landscape, and were 
never re-appropriated for Jewish settlement. However, as Tamra has grown, the urban sprawl 
has begun to encroach and blur the lines between the destroyed and the inhabited Palestinian 
spaces. As a result, the Tamra municipality began procedures to expand its jurisdiction into 
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 There is also a new trend of using a legal loophole in the Law of Acquisition for Public Purposes (1964), 
which considers the return of appropriated lands to private owners, if they have not been used for their intended 
purpose. The statute of limitations for claiming return of properties through this avenue is limited to 25 years; 
placing a border around all refugee properties expropriated by the state during the Nakba, or the years of 
military administration, which is when the majority of properties in the Galilee (and elsewhere) were absorbed 
by the state. Known cases using this tool are situated outside the Galilee, and, thus, further discussion of them 
are beyond the scope of this chapter, although further details of the Law itself are discussed in the table on the 
Legal Land Regime, in the Appendices to this thesis.     
174
 An essential component of Zochrot’s work is the organisation of tours to villages destroyed in 1948, such as 
the one I joined to al-Ruways.    
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these areas. According to a speech delivered by Tamra’s mayor, Aadel Abo Elhega, on Land 
Day, 2013, the negotiation has been successful (although the agreement is tentative, and as of 
writing, is yet to be finalised). That said, the agreement hinges on the condition that nothing 
new will be built in al-Ruways; the land will not be reclaimed by living on it.   
The lands that constitute the core of the Yafa case were slated by the British Mandate for 
Yafa’s use pre-1948. After the Nakba, the state appropriated these lands and inevitably used 
them to establish Migdal Haemek, a Jewish development town, in the area, in 1953. The 
village filed an appeal to the Supreme Court immediately following the confiscation, and it 
sat there, in limbo, ever since. The village won back its lands through negotiation with 
Migdal HaEmek and state prosecutors, in 2012.  
In Shbeta’s telling of Yafa’s story, there is a similar ending to that of Tamra’s absorption of 
Al-Ruways. While Yafa has negotiated the return of some of its lands, the agreement took 
place in back rooms, off the record. Moreover, their status and development still rely on 
mechanisms of bureaucratic control, i.e. the state. As a result, Yafa’s local council has not, at 
the time of writing (September 2014) managed to obtain permits to build on or expand into 
the returned lands. They are still waiting in limbo.  
As an observer, it is difficult to see either win as something more than a win on paper, as 
neither village exerts autonomous control of the new jurisdictions, nor truly shifts the 
discourse around return, at least not in official channels. However, then again, I witnessed the 
speeches in Tamra last Land Day and visited al-Ruways with the descendants of its displaced 
community. I saw the children spell out the word ‘Palestine’ in Arabic with rocks painted red, 
green and white. So maybe it does mean something. 
The Stories of Birim and Iqrit
175
 
The stories of Iqrit and Birim serve as unique examples within the ‘Tangible Return’ 
advocacy landscape. They are not contained within hidden, backroom and technical 
negotiations. They express direct, overt claims for Return, with national and international 
support-systems (among Jewish and non-Jewish constituencies), and a series of legal, 
administrative and political exceptions that have been incorporated into the case, since the 
campaign began. Their stories have been treated together in this thesis and in multiple 
sources on the cases, because they share a similar trajectory, with similarly loaded 
repercussions for the expellee struggle and for the state. 
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 These stories are primarily following George Ghantous’ (2012) testimony on Birim, Joseph Ryan’s (1973) 
detailed description of both cases and Jonathan Cook’s (2013) discussion of Iqrit. Other sources, and specific 
quotes from these resources are referenced, as indicated in the text. 
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Sitting nine miles apart, both villages straddle the Lebanese border with Israel. Their 
residents and descendants are from different sects of the Catholic Church and neither one 
fought with the Palestinian or Arab armies during the war. In fact Birim’s story includes the 
villagers’ decisive siding with the Jewish Haganah, and their housing and feeding of the 
soldiers coming through the village (Ryan, 1973)). Both villages were captured in the 
October 1948 march northwards by the Haganah (discussed as part of Plan Dalet, above); and 
in November that year, both communities were asked to move to neighbouring villages for a 
number of weeks in preparation for a series of counter-offensives in the area. The people of 
Iqrit were driven in trucks to Rameh, about 30 km south (Cook, 2013); the people of Birim 
were taken to Jish, which is just seven km east of the village (Ghantous, 2012)
176
. All were 
promised a swift return to their homes. However, weeks became months and then years, and 
the villagers are still waiting.  
In 1949, the first requests to the Prime Minister were made; and multiple promises of return 
were given. Representatives of the villages also sought and gained attention from their 
religious leadership, internationalising their plight among Archbishops and eventually the 
Vatican, who all assured the villagers of their impending return. In 1951, the first court cases 
were petitioned before the High Court of Justice, first concerning Iqrit, and then Birim. In 
July of that year, the Court recognized the Iqrit villagers’ rights – not as refugees but as 
Israeli citizens – to their lands and their right to return to them. According to Ryan (1973), 
the decision was explicit in cultivating the ‘exceptional’ circumstances of the case, 
distinguishing them from the threat of Palestinian return to the Zionist project. The Court’s 
decision claimed that the village lands “had not been abandoned and could not be placed, like 
other deserted Arab property, under the Custodian of Enemy (Absentee) Property.” (ibid, 
p.61) In spite of this, the military, in contempt of court, continued to prevent their entry to the 
village, even issuing expulsion orders after the fact to the residents and criminalising their 
attempts to re-enter the village boundaries and work their lands while they waited for the 
state to legalise their situation.  
On Christmas Day, 1951, the military dropped fire bombs on Iqrit, destroying every structure, 
except the church and graveyard. And still, the villagers continued to haunt the courtrooms 
for the next 60 years. On the issue of Birim, the judgements were more ambiguous. The 
Court upheld the military orders in 1952, and yet argued that the villagers should be allowed 
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 In the first years after the expulsions, several families from Birim also headed north to Lebanon, where they 
remain to this day (Ghantous, 2012). 
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to return in a decision made in September, 1953. Then, as with Iqrit before them, on 
September 16
th
, 1953, Birim was also bombed. Today, a Kibbutz and national park sit on 
Birim’s lands; but, like Iqrit, the villagers continue to visit, continue to pray at their Church 
and continue to bury their dead among their ruins (Ryan, 1973; Rosen, 2013). 
The story has a long narrative, with attempts by the state to resettle and compensate the 
villagers in the 1950s and 1960s without returning them to their lands, but the communities 
have never conceded (Ghantous, 2012). In the 1970s, the popular struggle was reignited, this 
time with a media campaign to accompany the ongoing court cases. Iqrit and Birim were 
spotlighted in the US and Europe, and the international community, including its Jewish 
communities, once again joined the call for the return of the villagers – in their exceptional 
case – to their lands (Ryan, 1973). All the while, the state made promises and then broke 
them; up to and including a decision by Yitzhak Rabin’s (1992) government to set aside lands 
in Iqrit for the re-building of the village (Cook, 2013)
177
.  
In 2001, then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon forever shifted the political and legal landscape 
concerning the villages. In an affidavit he submitted to the Supreme Court, Sharon rejected 
any claims by the evacuees, warning that, in light of the current political arena, it would set a 
precedent for other Palestinians seeking to reclaim their land and right of return (Benvenisti, 
2003; Jamal, 2011). The Supreme Court followed suite, and, on the basis of the state’s 
recommendations, administered the final blow in its rejection of last of the villages’ five legal 
appeals
178
. There ended the ‘exceptionalism’ of the case as far as the state was concerned; but 
not the exceptionalism inherent in their struggles, which have continued their battles, on the 
ground and in the public sphere. 
The struggle for Return is inherent in the villagers’ lives, language and politics. Its tangibility 
is kept alive in the narratives of the families, in yearly summer camps in the villages, in 
regular visits with the village elders, in returning to work in the fields and in monthly services 
at the Church. To the village-descendants, Birim and Iqrit are not ‘living memories’ or 
symbols of what was lost; the struggle is ongoing and material. As Ghantous (2012) 
explained to me: 
“…People from Birim, every child was raised to be from Birim. Wherever you were born, you 
say I’m from Birim; this is the first identity we have. This is my land. The Zionists took the 
land and I want my land back. I want to return there. I want to raise my children there… This 
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 For additional details in the chronology of the cases, see the Iqrit community website (www.iqrit.org) and 
Jamal (2011). 
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 For additional details of the court’s decision and the legal arguments in the case, see H.C.J. 840/97 (2003). 
See also Benvenisti (2003) and Haaretz Opinion (2001) for additional details. 
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was always the language, the discourse that shaped my relationship to Birim… but there was 
always the going there, spending summer in camps living in the village, visiting with my 
grandfather. There was also a material relationship with the land, to work there, to have 
your experience there as a child, an adolescent, as a mature person, as an activist. It’s 
somehow, until now, all the people, no matter what the age they are, they talk about the 
land…”179 
In August, 2012, after the annual summer camp ended, the young people of Iqrit, bypassing 
the hegemony of law and state, moved back in. A year later, a group of activists from Birim 
did the same. Since then, in both villages, the returnees have been taking turns living on the 
edges of the Church yards. They live off the grid, with no running electricity or water. They 
grow their own food, collect timber for fire, tend to the village ruins and lands. In Iqrit, they 
even developed a physical plan for the entire community’s return, mapping the space, the 
buildings and the necessary infrastructure to see it happen. The state raided Iqrit in June, 
2014, destroying anything that had been built beyond the limits of the churchyard; but the 
villagers continue to squat on their lands. In Birim, the activists celebrated “366 days of 
return” on July 30th, 2014 (Birim’s ‘Anouncing Our Return’ Facebook Page, 2014). Birim 
was then raided on August 11
th
, 2014; but this didn’t stop them from returning to the site to 
begin the countdown anew on August 12
th
. It seems that, for now, the state remains 
ambivalent about how to deal with these communities, beyond the occasional sweep of the 
premises. 
Despite an empowering story for the communities, these small ‘moments’ of activism seem 
to be just that: they are small, surveyed, kept under check. Moreover, considering the violent 
reaction to such actions taking place concurrently in the Naqab, in particular in al-Araqib, 
there is some indication that other areas and villages do not produce the same ambivalence. 
Thus, in addition to the way Iqrit and Birim seem to have been abstracted from the general 
story of the Internal Palestinian Refugees, we should consider the space within which their 
tangible struggle has taken place. Situated deep within the Palestinian enclave, at the edge of 
the frontier-zone, this act of return is practiced spatially, institutionally, and publicly off the 
grid. Unlike in the Naqab, there is no attempt to work through the system to gain rights to 
water, building permits, electricity, or anything else that would stipulate the communities’ 
rights and recognition, through the state. There is also little attempt to work through the 
Israeli-Jewish media to gain attention or recognition. The act of return feels contained and 
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 Testimonies from Iqrit mirror Ghantous’ depictions of the Birim. See for example interviews with Iqrit 
villagers in F. Jiryis (2012), Cook (2013) and Matar (2013a), for examples. 
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separate, an act that seeks to circumvent the state. Thus, the state does not seem to feel a 
threat to its hegemonic ordering of the space.   
At the same time, in reclaiming Birim and Iqrit, the habitus of power is, at least to some 
degree, disrupted. This is an act of struggle that re-imagines Judaised lands as the frontier, a 
space to be battled over, and reclaimed. It is an act that clashes against the internalised 
hegemony over land, and the right to return to it. As Mohammad Zeidan, head of the High 
Follow Up Committee, claimed at the time of Iqrit’s return:     
“This really is a historic moment for the Palestinian community… For the first time, we are 
acting rather than just talking. The villagers are not waiting for Israel to respond to their 
grievance, they are actively showing Israel what the return would look like.” (quoted in 
Cook, 2013) Ghantous takes this a step further, seeing the struggle to return as the struggle to 
redeem control over one’s life. He told me, “I am not just asking for my return, I am asking 
for my freedom, for my future. I want to be the person who decides my future, not just told, 
not just contained.”  
The Struggle for Autonomy – Living within the Boundaries 
Throughout this chapter, the Galilee is presented as an enclosed space, oscillating between 
Falah’s ‘enclave’ and what Yacobi & Tzfadia (2010) have called ‘the periphery’. These 
metaphors imply different, albeit complementary, things: an enclave describes the bounded, 
closed spatial and social relationship between state and Palestinian subject. The periphery 
still implies a connection to the core, even if distant and increasingly disengaged and 
alienated. Perhaps the difference depends both on the prism through which you see and 
experience the ‘border’. From the perspective of the state that seeks to encircle and constrict 
Palestinian space, as well as those that seek shelter within it as far as possible from the centre, 
the enclave seems a more appropriate metaphor. For those that must continue to engage with 
the state, and encounter their increasing marginalisation, for example, as the mayor of 
Nazareth, this is the periphery. However, in both theoretical frames, the state is the traditional 
unit of analysis. 
In so far as Palestinians re-imagine and reposition their marginal space and status on the edge 
of Israeli society, they are agents as opposed to mere objects of this process. As argued in the 
quote by Yiftachel (2009) that introduced this chapter, margins created and initiated by the 
state in response to the resilience of the community become the basis for an alternative 
politics, in which the new centre is localised within the Central Galilee; wherein, Nazareth 
takes the place of Tel Aviv, or even Haifa (Cook, 2012a; Y. Jabareen, 2011). Because of this, 
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the space both shrinks – away from the edges of Jewish space – and grows: The limits are no 
longer individual villages, which are restrained by the ‘blue jurisdiction outlines’ of the 
state’s Master Plans; but, rather, the southern and eastern borders, the imagined dotted lines 
of the Judaised map. The new phenomenon of migration to Jewish towns and 
neighbourhoods, discussed above, seems to highlight this fact; as does the community’s 
disengagement from the frontlines of the Zionist siege on Palestinian land and space. What 
begins to unfold is what life and struggle look like, as they increasingly disentangle 
themselves from the Jewish spatial order and begin to entrench and retrench a Palestinian 
space that is separate, independent, and disengaged; at least in theory – in reality, this is 
always the periphery.  
The Daily Struggle – Active Disengagement 
In some ways, the progress towards disengagement is expressed unconsciously; an 
internalisation of the enclave, in ordinary and everyday life. At the same time, in many ways, 
it is very conscious and intentional – and particularly acute in the aftermath of the October 
events, even when it is expressed individually, in one’s personal choices and actions; and is 
being articulated in the aesthetics and practices of a ‘different space’.  
After 2000, the Israeli flags were stripped from Nazareth (Cook, 2012a; Tabari, 2002). In 
general, people stopped visiting Jewish or even Mixed Cities for their shopping and 
entertainment. They also stopped watching Israeli television and switched to Al-Jazeera and 
Egyptian satellite channels (Y. Jabareen, 2011; Kashua, 2006; Rouhana, Suhel & Sultany, 
2003). More and more girls began to wear the hijab (Cook, 2012a), and the discourse in 
homes and in public space shifted even further towards Palestine and the practice of Islam 
(Rosmer, 2012). The political language – on facebook and in social gatherings – turned to 
concepts like ‘boycott from within’, ‘normalisation’ and ‘the de-Israelisation’ of Palestinian 
identity and experience (Cook, 2012a; Ghantous, 2012; Sabbagh-Khoury, 2011). However, 
mostly, ‘disengagement’ is expressed in daily practices of avoidance, to keep one’s personal 
space safe from the state. Sabbagh-Khoury’s (2011) testimony to life ‘in the squeezed 
places’, quoted above, portrays this as a natural reaction to daily life in struggle; to life as a 
Palestinian in Israel. Y. Jabareen (2011) sees something similar: 
“Coming back to the daily practices, the small things… I used to listen to Galei Tzahal180 or 
Reshet Beit
181
, to Israeli news, on the radio in my car, every morning. And now I am 
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 Galei Tzahal is the Army Radio Channel 
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 Reshet Beit is a Jerusalem-based, national radio station 
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overwhelmed. I can't do it anymore. I can't listen to Lieberman
182
, to racist laws, to racist 
news anymore.  I stopped opening Israeli TV and got a satellite in my home. Because I can't. 
I need my own space – of freedom, of respect. This is what people are looking for. You avoid 
the state to be a normal person. And you build your daily resistance in many different ways. 
In the economy, and even where you spend your time. At one time, many people came to the 
Carmel, here
183
, to spend their money. Today you don't see anybody… there is something like a 
great disengagement happening. I think it's part of the protest.” 
The material infrastructure and social environment in which these personal escapes take place 
are now catching up. In Nazareth, new shopping plazas, chef-restaurants, coffee houses and 
bars are popping up to soak up the dollars and leisure time of the still growing middle class. 
New music scenes, outdoor parties and festivals, situated in the Galilee countryside have 
replaced the once common (pre-2000) Friday night excursions to the Jewish centres. This 
scene, brimming with nationalist, Palestinian lyrics, sounds and talent, has been cultivated as 
an exclusive Palestinian haven in the North (Maira, 2013; Karkabi, 2013). Finding its centre 
in Haifa in recent years, it is closed off from the Jewish-owned clubs and bars, cultivating a 
safe place for fun and play, distinct from politics and separate from the state’s watchful eyes 
(Karabi, 2013)
184
.  
This phenomenon is also being replicated in the centre of Haifa, with a growing line of 
Palestinian-owned bars and restaurants along Ben Gurion Boulevard, adjacent to the refugee 
neighbourhood of Wadi al-Nisnas, and serving an almost exclusive clientele of Palestinian 
NGO activists and other professionals
185
. These are not grey-spaced slums on the margins of 
the city, or the margins of the state. These are not poor, weak members of the Palestinian-
citizen community, although they, too, carve out their own space and survival, away from the 
Jewish centre. These are the middle and upper classes, the university students, the politically 
active and professional success stories. As Karkabi (2014), a resident of Haifa studying the 
new ‘scene’ of separation, suggests, the northern communities have begun to circumvent their 
dependence on the other, for their survival, for their economic successes, and for their 
popular cultural icons. As Yiftachel (2009) suggests, the Galilee Palestinians have turned 
inwards, towards new geographic and social markers; made all the more possible because of 
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 Y. Jabareen is referencing MK Avigdor Lieberman, head of the Yisrael Beiteinu right-wing party, who is 
famous for his plan to transfer the main concentrated areas of Palestinian citizens in Israel to the Palestinian 
Authority, in exchange for the settlement blocs of the Occupied Territories, as part of a peace agreement.  
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 By the ‘Carmel’, Y. Jabareen is referencing the centre of Haifa, where we were sitting for coffee. 
184
 The same party-organisers have also increasingly pushed the boundaries eastwards, into the open spaces of 
the West Bank as a way to transcend the imposed divisions between the different Palestinian occupations 
(Karkabi, 2013) 
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 This is the same main thoroughfare that hosted the Days of Rage Protests in 2013, and the anti-war 
demonstrations in June, 2014. 
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their internalised and externalised segregation from Jewish spaces, at least so long as they 
don’t need to encounter the state, and the boundaries that surround them.  
The Official Politics of Autonomy 
These personal struggles for separation, distance, survival and difference seem to mirror a 
process on-going in the Palestinian-citizen intellectual, political and religious leadership. As 
implied above, these trajectories are not new. Rather, they are explicitly tied to the spatial and 
social entrenchments of the military regime, and the state’s early retreat from the borders of 
the Central Galilee
186
. However, as discussed in the works of Ghanem (2001, 2010), Rouhana 
et al (2003), Jamal (2011) and Pappé (2011), this process has been explicitly evolving since 
the fault lines articulated on Land Day, and is exemplified in the proliferation of Palestinian 
nationalist and anti-Zionist movements, discourses and actions produced by Palestinian 
citizens in their political encounters with the state. These same authors, along with Bishara 
(2001), Cook (2012a), H. Jabareen (2013) and Rouhana & Sultany (2003) point to October 
2000 as the watershed moment for the drive towards a separate Palestinian politics, in 
response to a new and expanding ‘hostility’ against the Arab minority (Rouhana et al, 2003). 
That said, the emphasis of this section (and those below) is not so much the constructions and 
achievements of an autonomous politics, but of the ambiguities inherent in the evolution of a 
‘separate’ and yet entangled political landscape.    
The Umbrella of National Leadership 
In the aftermath of Yom al-Ard, the ad hoc popular committees were tunnelled into the first 
internal Palestinian coordinating committees, and then into a generation of increasingly 
nationalist and almost exclusively Palestinian parties. Pappé (2011) marks the initiation of 
this chronologically with the (1981/2) establishment of the High Follow-Up Committee
187
, 
which was the result of attempts to consolidate the coordinating bodies that sparked Land 
Day (i.e. the Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands and the Committee for the Heads of 
the Arab Localities) (Pappé, 2011). The first High Follow-Up Committee was chaired by then 
mayor of Shefa Amr (and chair of the Committee of Arab Mayors), Ibrahim Nimr Husayn, 
and included 11 heads of the largest Arab localities (ibid). Its first headquarters was in Shefa 
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 One expression of this is the voting patterns and political affiliatons of large segments of the Palestinian 
community in Israel, which continue to follow clan, traditional leadership and kinship relations in the place and 
community in which the voter lives (A. Bishara, 1996; Jamal, 2011; Ghanem, 2000; and Rouhana et al, 2003).    
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 It was first established as ‘the Supreme High Follow-Up Committee but was eventually overtaken by the 
Follow-Up Committee on Arab Education in Israel, a body that initially worked under the Supreme Committee. 
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Amr, but it is currently housed in Nazareth; in a sense reflecting the moving geography of 
Palestinian politics in Israel. 
By the 1990s, representatives to the council included the directors of many national civil 
society institutions, the heads of the Palestinian-led political parties, both inside and outside 
the Parliament, mayors of the local Palestinian localities and Palestinian council members 
from the Mixed Cities. The Committee’s membership is representative of Palestinian 
leadership throughout the state. However, in a reversal of the core-periphery relationship, the 
majority of participants are situated in the north. This is also the case of the main offices of 
the political parties and the headquarters of most of the Palestinian NGOs in Israel. This has 
meant that – at least until recently – the Committee’s spotlight has been fixated on the north, 
on the problems of ‘living space’, on discriminatory budgets, on the issues of land-
jurisdiction, and other problems of the Palestinian enclave (Miari, 2012). While there has 
been a shift over the last few years to focus on the siege on Arab space in the Mixed Cities 
and the Bedouin unrecognised villages, it is still possible to argue that the Committee’s 
struggle is primarily infused with the political discourses of the north. In other words, it 
functions to protect and enshrine the all-Arab space, in effect carving it out, against and away 
from the state. Zeidan (2012) looks at the Committee’s potential in this way: 
“The state is trying to divide us, but in general we are working towards being a collective 
body against this state, against the policies of the state. The High Follow-Up Committee is 
creating an autonomous leadership to stand in front of the state and its policies. To create a 
strong body that can challenge the state’s treatment of the Arab people.” 
Zeidan sees the collective umbrella, and its ability to consolidate the Palestinian leadership 
into a coordinated, national body as essential to establishing Arab autonomy vis à vis the 
state. He continues, “because this is the organisation that represents the rights of all Arab 
Citizens of Israel. It gives us strength.” (ibid)  
The Committee works via consensus, attempting to bridge the various factions, the secular 
and religious, the Christian and the Muslim, the extra-parliamentary and parliamentary 
groups (Mustafa, 2012). According to Mohanad Mustafa (2013), whose research focuses 
explicitly on Palestinian Nationalist and Islamic politics in Israel, this methodology for 
negotiating agreement across the spectrum of Palestinian leadership has contributed to the 
cohesion of the Committee; a sentiment many of my interlocutors confirmed. However, its 
decisions are not binding and the Committee has never quite exceeded its status as ‘a 
coordinating body’ (Pappé, 2011). For this reason, several of its members have called 
repeatedly for the Committee’s reform through representative elections (Mustafa, 2012a); a 
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call that has failed to achieve consensus across the different political factions. In a more 
critical tone, Jamal (2011) discusses the members’ deadlock on democratic mechanisms and 
decision-making processes within the High Follow-Up Committee as having led to its 
paralysis; downplaying its leadership role for Palestinian citizens. 
Continuing from this critique, as Mustafa (2013), Miari (2012) and Zeidan (2012) have each 
explained, rather than work to strengthen the internal systems and structures of Palestinian 
society in Israel, the Committee has been forced into a narrow political terrain that seems to 
exclusively focus on the state. Its campaigns reflect this mission, as it builds committees to 
struggle against state policies on the control of Arab education, Arab economic arenas, Arab 
jurisdictions, and most acutely, on Arab lands (ibid). To its credit, it articulates a Palestinian 
resistance politics against the limits imposed by the state. However, this has meant that its 
main actions are determined and perpetuated by the borders it encounters with the state, as 
opposed to the inward running of Palestinian society and the cultivation of a different, 
Palestinian space, independent of this relationship
188
. Despite the fact that the state is forced 
to negotiate with the Committee in situations of emergency
189
, it has no official capacity to 
organise Palestinian life, and respond to the needs of the community. In many ways, the 
Committee embodies the ambivalence of being Palestinian inside Israel: articulating a new 
Palestinian discourse in contravention to state policies and practices, and yet contained within 
the Judaised lines of spatial and social control.  
The NGOisation of Autonomous Politics 
There is a long-standing debate among researchers and practitioners of struggle, surrounding 
the capacity of civil society, in particular its proliferation into NGOs and professional activist 
networks, to politicize Palestinian space within the Israeli state
190
. The debate is anchored in 
concern for the absorption of the political struggle – for land, for space – into professional 
practice; with good reason. These NGOised practices get bogged down and atomised within 
the fetishisms of law, human rights, planning, budgets and bureaucracy, because of the nature 
of the arena in which they each function (Yacobi, 2009; Sfard, 2009; Roy, 2004). At the same 
time, as discussed in previous chapters, this does not negate the extensive evidence of 
Palestinian civil society, including its NGOs, challenging the boundaries of Zionist 
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 Perhaps one clear exception to this was the fact that the High Follow-Up Committee was key to initiating one 
of the three Future Vision Documents, discussed more extensively below.   
189
 For example, during the events of 2000, efforts to contain the riots inevitably forced the state to negotiate 
directly with the High Follow-Up Committee (Or Committee Report, 2003; A. Bishara, 2001) 
190
 See Chapter One for more details of this debate. 
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hegemony, and deeply engaging in the politicisation and radicalisation of Palestinian 
struggle. These debates are important, in large part, because they feature prominently among 
the community (S. Bishara, 2012; Ghntous, 2012; Shbeta, 2011). However, the focus of this 
discussion is not the efficacy of civil society and NGO activism in their engagement and 
challenge of hegemonic boundaries. Rather, what is relevant to this research is, as Jamal 
(2011; 2008) argues, how the NGOisation of Palestinian politics participates in retrenching 
and reshaping the borders of Palestinian space in Israel. In addition, it is important to 
highlight the fact that the location of these actions are shaped and situated in the northern 
enclave, where the majority of Palestinian professional, political and civil society institutions 
are situated.  
It has been written elsewhere that NGOs and civil society, in general, have taken the place of 
political parties and movements in culling the intellectual and political elite of Palestinian-
citizen society
191
. This was confirmed in several interlocutor-interviews, which pointed to the 
organisations as an alternative to the marginal space Palestinians hold within state political 
institutions
192
. However, the NGOs also provide a new professional alternative to working for 
Israeli-Jewish organisations, even those that work within the peace and democracy camps in 
Israeli political society. For example, in Farah’s (2011) ‘origin’ story, he left the field of 
journalism and founded Mossawa, because his Jewish editor demanded he be more objective 
in his coverage of the demolition of Arab homes, in the 1990s. Hassan Jabareen left the 
Jewish-led human rights organisation, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, to found 
Adalah, as a separate and autonomous space for the litigation and articulation of Palestinian-
citizen rights (H. Jabareen, 2000).  
The NGO ‘revolution’ mushroomed in the 1990s as thousands of NGOs were publicly 
registered in the Oslo years (Payes, 2005). Farah (2011) links this evolution of civil society to 
the ‘Great Divorce’ with both the Jewish-left and the Palestinian state-building project in the 
occupied territories (after the Oslo Accords). A. Bishara (1996, 1997) argues similarly that 
Palestinian-citizen politics reach a turning point by the mid-1990s, culminating with the 
elections that established his own party, the National Democratic Assembly (NDA), as part of 
the Knesset in 1996. He calls it the end of the process of ‘Israelisation193’, when Palestinian 
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 See in particular Payes (2005); Haklai (2005); Jamal (2011) and Pappé (2011).  
192
 See in particular Farah (2011), S. Bishara (2012), Cook (2012a). As well, see Hatim Kanaaneh’s (2010) re-
telling of his own story of leaving the Ministry of Public Health to found the Galilee Society for Health 
Research and Services, in 1981.  
193
 For A. Bishara (1996), ‘Israelisation’ takes form in the failed attempt by Palestinian citizens to find the 
balance between two discordant identities, ‘Palestinianisation’ and ‘Israelisation’; betwee their position as 
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citizens begin to redefine what it means to be an Israeli, “with their rejection of the idea that 
Israel has to be a Jewish state.” (A. Bishara, 1997, p.77)   
Farah (2011) explains further: 
“After 1993, 1995 there was this euphoria that there would be peace and we can now deal 
with our own business. You know, many of the organisations, the structures that had been 
built before, to promote peace… and all the political game in the Arab community had been 
changed. We were busy in rebuilding our institutions, and in this process, many of the 
intellectuals in the Arab community divorced the Jewish left. The elites of the Arab 
community said we will not beg you (the Jewish left) to support us. The whole relationship for 
the future will be different. We will rebuild our institutions and come back as your partners. 
If you want to live in co-existence, we work with you, not for you. This was the new discourse 
that was created. And it was also part of the period. It was also a result of the PLO saying 
‘you are not part of the peace-building deal’.”194  
Farah’s articulation of the separate Palestinian-citizen sphere is mirrored in the charters, 
actions and politics of the Galilee NGOs that became interlocutors of this study: Adalah, the 
Arab Association for Human Rights (AHR), Mada al Carmel, The Mossawa Center, the Arab 
Center for Alternative Planning (ACAP), the Galilee Society, and endless others, promote a 
separate Arab space – a microcosm of life in the Galilee. Their workers are almost 
exclusively Palestinian
195
. They are directed by members of the Palestinian leadership (many 
of whom are active in the High Follow-Up Committee and with the Arab political parties), 
and focused exclusively on Palestinian needs and sites of struggle
196
. When they create 
advocacy campaigns and legal coalitions against the state, they tend to partner with one 
another. Although they will work with their more radically politicised Jewish peers, the 
cooperation will be on a project focused explicitly on the needs of Palestinian citizens, and 
led by the Palestinian partner. As Karkabi (2014) also explained, in the ‘North’, the structures 
for cross-community engagements are highly pre-conceived, superficial, limited and tightly 
controlled, to prevent any descent into the ‘co-existence’ framework that previously 
dominated the sphere. This is very different from Jaffa’s Popular Committee, which functions 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
citizens and their cultural/national identity as Palestinians. According to A. Bishara (1996, 1997), as the Arab 
population became more integrated into Israeli politics, economics, and society, their Palestinian (national) 
identity became overwhelmed by their civil allegiance. He finds clear evidence of this crisis of identity in the 
more than 60,000 Palestinian-citizens who joined the Labor Party just ahead of the 1992 elections (ibid).    
194
 Both Payes (2005) and Haklai (2005) describe similar phenomena in their analysis of Palestinian NGOs in 
Israel. 
195
 There are some individual Jews working for some of the organisations (i.e. one of Adalah’s founders, Rina 
Rosenberg), but they are highly politicized and they are not the norm. As Rania Lahab-Grayeb (2011), the 
deputy Director of Mossawa told me, they hire exclusively within the Palestinian community, as part of their 
commitment to creating professional opportunities for Palestinian citizens, and contributing towards building 
their capacity as independent and strong communities. 
196
 This is discussed more extensively below, through the analysis of the Future Vision Documents.  
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as part of a joint struggle and joint campaign against the removal of Palestinians and poor 
Jews from the municipal centres. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that 
despite a seemingly common language and consciousness regarding the state and the position 
of Palestinians within it, we should not assume uniformity among the politics, practices, tools 
and interests of the Palestinian NGOs, or the constituencies with whom they work (Jamal, 
2011). There is ongoing fragmentation of NGO-based Palestinian-citizen resistance, 
stemming from and reproducing the matrix and ghosts discussed above. This is further 
enhanced by the organisations’ dependence on and competition over limited funds from 
international donors (ibid; Payes, 2005).   
It is also relevant to emphasise the state’s role in promoting the alienation of the Northern 
Palestinian civil leadership, as part of the hegemonic practice in which bifurcation of space 
and people is the norm. However, the enclaving of Palestinian “ethnic civil society” also 
evolved from the inside (Haklai, 2005), as part of a process of self-empowerment; reinforcing 
the argument articulated above that Palestinian space in the Galilee has evolved through a 
process of mutual segregation and enclaving. An increasingly educated Palestinian minority, 
frustrated with the system, have left to lead their own Palestinian institutions, businesses and 
localities. They have created alternative services and opportunities within their own spatial 
borders, in search of their own voice. The NGOs, in particular, enable the increasing distance 
from Jewish politics and priorities, even if the majority of their work, like the High Follow-
Up Committee, engages directly with the state. The argument here is not that this changes the 
centre of power. The state ultimately controls the material functions of the space, in so far as 
it still controls the budgets, the land-access, and the permit-infrastructure. Moreover, 
discrimination along these lines will always be inherent to a system of ethnic hierarchies and 
Jewish privilege (H. Jabareen, 2013). However, we can also argue that this sphere of 
‘disengagement’ has been a necessary and powerful instrument of Palestinian empowerment, 
distinct from its capacity to re-articulate the field of force in which it operates. It is, as 
Yiftachel (2009) connotes, a potentially alternative politics, essential to the shifting 
geography of the new margins and borders of Palestinian space inside Israel.  
As mentioned above, for many years, the community was silenced in Jewish spaces, where 
they were dependent, subjugated and marginalised. Much as bell hooks (1994) advised in her 
work on transgressive and transformative pedagogies in the African American context, it is 
within this separate space that the Palestinian community could create and articulate its own 
collective discourse, as an independent and distinct political group; one that reflects the 
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ambiguities of Palestinian citizenship in Israel. It is within this enclave that it could recognise 
and politicise its own trajectory, within the Jewish state, as an autonomous, indigenous 
community with collective rights (even if its politics are always determined in its encounter 
with the limits and borders of Jewish space). The most comprehensive expression of this is in 
The Future Vision Documents. Published in 2006 and 2007 by three different collectives from 
Palestinian civil society
197, ‘The Future Vision’, as Farah (2011), who took an integral part in 
their development, explains:     
“…was a statement of where we want to go, where we want to be in the future. And this is 
related to our ability to build a university, to build our own institutions, our ability to decide 
what we want to do with our agriculture, our land, with the Jewish population, what kind of 
cooperation we want to build with the Jewish population, or the relationship we want to have 
with the rest of the Palestinian communities; which kind of relationship and culture we want 
to have. So it is a new discourse.
198”  
These documents represent the first attempts by a cross-section of Palestinian political and 
civil society to collectively and publicly express the experience and needs of their 
community, as a Palestinian entity surrounded and informed by their position within Israeli 
society (H. Jabareen, 2013).  
Despite their articulation of evolving ideas emerging from within Palestinian political and 
civil society since the 1990s (exemplified in the work of Bishara, 1993), the documents were 
initiated as an “urgent reaction” to the political arena in which the Palestinian-citizen 
leadership found itself in the early 2000s (Jamal, 2011, p.166). The project was sparked as a 
response to currents within the Israeli-Jewish mainstream leadership – in both official and 
unofficial circles – calling for new constitutional models for the Israeli state (Journal of 
Palestine Studies, 2007; Rouhana, 2004; Jamal, 2011)
199
. Starting with a baseline assumption 
that the Israeli state is both ‘Jewish and Democratic’ (Waxman, 2006; Rouhana, 2004), the 
Israeli-Jewish organisations and coalitions behind the constitution-building projects either 
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 The three documents to which the ‘Future Vision Documents’ refer are: 1) The Future 
Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, produced by The National Committee for the Heads of Arab Local 
Authorities in Israel; 2) The Haifa Declaration, produced by Mada al Carmel; 3) The Democratic 
Constitution, produced by Adalah: The Legal Center for Minority Rights    
198
This sentiment is repeated across the spectrum of interlecutors to this study, and in literature devoted to an 
analysis of its implications. See in particular Jamal (2011) for an in depth discussion of the documents, and the 
new discourse they represent of “an alternative model of co-existence” with Jewish-Israelis, in which 
Palestinians are equal citizens of a democaic state (p.166).  
199
 Examples include the Israel Democracy Institute’s (IDI) ‘Constitution by Consensus’ (2007), the Committee 
for National Responsibility’s (organised by the Rabin Center) ‘Kineret Declaration’ (2005), and the 
Constitution, Law and Judiciary Committee of the Knesset’s (unsuccessful) project to produce an Israeli 
constitution. Further details of these projects are discussed in Jamal (2011), Rouhana (2004) and Waxman 
(2006). See also IDI’s website (www.idi.org.il), for a draft copy of their document. 
157 
 
directly excluded the participation of Palestinian stakeholders, or (through their hegemonic 
rhetoric) disregarded Palestinian citizens’ positions within these discussions200. Moreover, the 
documents were developed without acknowledging the surronding political upheavals and 
violences of the state towards the Palestinian Intifada, the still open wounds of the events of 
October 2000 and the increasing securitisation of Palestinian life inside Israel (Jamal, 2011); 
by contrast, all of these were pervasive issues among the Arab constituency at the time 
(Rouhana, 2004).  
What began as an idea within Mada al Carmel in 2002 (Jamal, 2011), the Future Vision 
Documents represented months – sometimes years – of consensus-building and roundtables, 
with many of their constributors participating in two or even three of the fora that led to the 
published documents. Together, they unpack the story of an indigenous national minority, 
whose Palestinian identity is anchored in their experience of living in the Jewish state. From 
this platform, the documents explore the vision they hold for their future relationship with(in) 
Israel and with the entire Palestinian people, albeit from different, complementary 
perspectives
201
. The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, the document 
coordinated by the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities
202
 (2006) breaks down the 
community’s key encounters with the state, looking at the historical trajectory of the 
Palestinians’ marginalisation within Israel, since the Nakba. The Haifa Declaration, the 
document published by Mada al Carmel (2007), speaks in the collective voice of the 
Palestinian citizens of Israel as a declaration of independence and self-determination. The 
Democratic Constitution by Adalah (2007c) integrates the research and vision from the other 
two documents, into a conceptualisation of what an equal, democratic state for all its citizens 
could look like. Overall, the documents (collectively and individually) come to the 
conclusion that Zionism has been an illegitimate colonial enterprise. Therefore, an equitable 
future is dependent on the decolonisation of the system constructed on this basis. In effect, 
they are calling for a bi-national state that represents the needs, claims and interests of all 
citizens.  
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 The Constitution, Law and Judiciary Committee actually included one Arab MK, but his voice was primarily 
silenced by the content of the programme and the views of his fellow participants (given that the other members 
did not contradict the idea of a constitution that conceptualised Israel as ‘Jewish and Democratic’) (Rouhana, 
2004). 
201
 In the case of the Haifa Declaration, the process took more than 4 years to complete.  
202
 The Committee for the Heads of the Arab Local Authorities, is also referred to above as ‘the Arab Mayors’. 
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Delving deeply into these materials is beyond the scope of this chapter; and moreover, a 
wealth of literature covers their meaning, implications and articulations
203
. Rather, they are 
treated briefly here as a lens through which to see an essential turning point in Palestinian 
politics in Israel; and to provide insight into the main drivers and agents of these new politics, 
as well as the limits of the space in which they are housed. As discussed in Jamal (2008, 
2011), the Future Vision Documents, while reflecting on and expressing a general will and 
discourse on Palestinian life in Israel
204
, also disclose key problems of mobilising a cohesive 
political program within the spatial, social and political fragmentations of the Palesitnian-
citizen communities in Israel. According to Jamal (2011), the fact that there were multiple 
publications is a window into the internal conflicts and fragmentations of Palestinian-citizen 
civil and political streams (discussed briefly above). Despite their clear similarity in tone and 
complementary content, their individual organisers were unable to orchestrate a consensus 
that would combine the projects. Jamal (2011) also argues that one of the key reasons the 
Heads of the Arab Local Authorities initiated their own document (a process led by then 
chairman of the High Follow-Up Committee as well as the Arab local authorities, Shawki 
Khatib), was in order to include the multiple political actors excluded from the Mada al 
Carmel process. Moreover, none of these projects included the participation of members of 
the Islamic civil society in Israel, speaking to the existence of a clear schism between the 
secular and religious Palestinian-citizen leaderships (ibid). Thus, we should assume that a gap 
exists between the ‘vision’ and the ‘reality’ of a collective Palestinian political and social 
space in Israel as described within the documents.  
Overall, however, as argued in Jamal (2011) and H. Jabareen (2013), even with their 
limitations, the documents represented a new oppositional consciousness, aroused among 
Palestinian citizens in the Oslo and post-Oslo period. The burgeoning articulations within the 
documents have since become central to the present-day ‘separate’ politics of the enclave 
(Rekhess, 2007a). Reproduced in the ordinary, everyday disengagements (discussed above), 
and in the disengagement discourses of some members of the political leadership (discussed 
more thoroughly, below), they embody a way of thinking that cannot be extrapolated from 
the distinct space the intellectual elite has built; moving the Palestinian ‘centre’ away from 
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 For deeper analysis of the Future Vision documents, see for example, Jamal (2008, 2011), Ozacky-Lazar & 
Kabha (2008) and Smooha (2009).   
204
 In most writings on the documents, they are discussed in terms of their cohesion and collective voice; see in 
particular H. Jabareen (2013), Journal of Palestine Studies (2007) and Ghanem (2007).  
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the state and the frontier lines it controls, and further activating and entrenching the borders 
between them.   
In Jamal’s (2011) final critique of the documents, he describes them as “a safe space of 
protest”, balancing on the edge of what the Israeli control system can and can’t tolerate 
(p.168). Perhaps we can extrapolate further, arguing that the ‘Arab sector’ and this example 
of creative disruption, were contained physically, politically and socially by the boundary-
lines that surround their spatial practice: as discussed above, the NGOisation (and alienation) 
of Palestinian politics has turned civil and political action in the North into heightened 
professional practice and abstract political discourses. These maintain the NGOs’ political 
space vis a vis the state
205
, but also isolate them from ‘street politics’ and the needs of 
everyday Palestinian life (Algazi, 2011), preventing their contribution to any large-scale 
transformations of Palestinian protest. Then again, the extreme, adverse reaction of 
mainstream ‘Jewish-Israel’ to the documents are a clear sign that they – and the practices of 
Palestinian-citizen NGOs more generally– are more than the articulation of ‘safe politics’206. 
They exemplify a genuine disarticulation of Zionist hegemony, which ultimately changed 
how the Palestinian leadership (and to some degree its constituencies) expressed their 
situation inside Israel, and resulted in changing how the state and its publics saw them. Since 
then, the path taken by Palestinian-citizen NGOs (and Palestinian-citizen society more 
generally) seems similar to the High Follow-Up Committee. Their construction of an 
increasingly ‘autonmous space’ from which to practice a uniquely Palestinian-citizen politics, 
while bolstering a bifurcation of spatial relations, at the same time functions to challenge the 
state’s hegemonic boundaries, and clashes with its vision of and programme for a dependent, 
under-developed and weak Palestinian ‘minority’.  
The Inside and the Outside 
The NGOisation of Palestinian politics describes a paradox inherent in the struggle for 
autonomy. In a sense, this process speaks to the evolution of an autonomous politics, from 
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 While the NGOs are regulated through Israel’s Law of Amutot (1980) (‘Law of Non-Profit Associations’), 
their funding and political mandates are heavily supported by international donor institutions; as a result of 
which, they function somewhat, although not entirely, separate from the state. That said, they are also heavily 
monitored by the Israeli Security Services, and their leadership is often threatened (H. Jabareen, 2012). There 
are even cases of members of the Palestinian-citizen civil society leadership being imprisoned, as was the case 
of Ameer Makhoul, who was the director of Ittijah, an umbrella organisation for all Palestinian NGOs in Israel, 
and chairman of the Popular Committee for the Defense of Political Freedoms (Abdu & Makhoul, 2010). 
206
 These ranged from an ‘anguished’ open letter to ‘Israeli Arabs’ by IDI’s then-president, Arye Carmon (2007) 
to the direct condemnation of Palestinian-citizens as a fifth column throughout mainstream Israeli-Jewish media 
and public fora (Rekhess, 2007b). 
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below; as institutions attempting to gain their distance from the state, that are increasingly 
entangled in a border-skirmish over Palestinian space with the state’s hegemonic forces. A 
parallel process is ongoing among the different political streams, movements and parties that 
helm Palestinian politics, as they likewise eek out a Palestinian space that is at the same time 
entrenched in the Zionist production of the Israeli social, political and physical landscape. 
Despite their physical and ideological locations in the all-Arab peripheries of the Galilee and 
Triangle Regions, each is embroiled in the same ‘inside-outside’ problem of being Palestinian 
inside Israel, notwithstanding the different locations, discourses, tools, ideologies and 
participants with which they construct their programmes. As national leaders, with the 
responsibility and capacity to unify their constituencies across Israel’s invented cantons 
(Bishara, 1996), there is no possibility for genuine disengagement from the state. Each of the 
streams discussed below attempt different ways of resolving the ambiguity, while challenging 
the containers in which Palestinian politics are held.    
Three main streams historically make up the Palestinian-citizen political map: the 
Communist, the Nationalist and the Islamist
207
. The ‘Communist’ is the oldest stream to take 
part in articulating a ‘Palestinian-citizen’ politics208; and, as Ghanem (2001) argues, has 
played a critical role in disrupting Zionist hegemony over Palestinian political discourse. In 
1948, the stream was housed within the Israeli Communist Party (known by its Hebrew 
acronym Maki). Its main ideologies were initially, and, to a degree, continue to be bound to 
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 We can also consider a forth stream, which Ghanem (2001) calls the ‘Israeli-Arab stream’ and Rekhess 
(2007a) calls ‘the Moderate Camp’. This stream – which Rekhess (2007a) discusses primarily in terms of its 
predominance during the Military Regime – has a voting history with the Zionist parties and their satellite Arab 
lists, until these disappeared from the political scene in 1984 (by which time the majority of the Arab vote had 
shifted to the Communist and Nationalist Streams). It is discussed in Ghanem (2001) as an ideological stream 
that seeks rights for Arab citizens, without questioning the structures of the system within which they are 
positioned. However, Rouhana et al (2003) de-link these votes from their ideological significance, and see them 
as being cast on the basis of “parochial identifications” (p.221). The political party most associated with this 
stream is the Arab Democratic Party (ADP), founded in 1988 by Abdul Wahab Darawshe to fill the gap left by 
the Arab lists. Today the ADP is part of the United Arab List (known for its Hebrew acronym Ra’am), which is 
currently helmed by the head of the Southern Islamic Movement (discussed below) and also shares a joint 
Knesset platform with the Arab Movement for Change (known by its Hebrew acronym Ta’al). In the 2013 
Knesset elections, there was still a significant percentage of the Arab public that voted for Zionist parties 
(Rudnitzky, 2013; Ghanem, 2013). At the same time, as Ghanem (2001) and Rekhess (2007a) both argue, the 
different Arab parties (including the ADP) are increasingly converging, with common demands regarding the 
Palestinian public in Israel. A more in depth discussion of this stream is beyond the scope of this research, but 
can be found in Ghanem (2001), Rekhess (2007a), Rouhana et al (2003), and Jamal (2011), along with further 
discussion of those featured in the main text, above.  
208
 The Communist Party began to organise in Palestine before the establishment of the state. While relevant to 
the evolution of its early influence in Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-citizen politics (particularly its split along 
ethno-national lines in 1944, and then its reunification in 1948), a discussion of its pre-1948 history is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, and can be found in Ghanem (2001, 2010), Jamal (2011), Kaufman (1997) and Rekhess 
(1993).  
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Marxist-Communist thinking around social redistribution, inter-community equality and 
workers’ rights. However, it was also the first party to challenge the Zionist make-up of the 
state, call for a Palestinian state alongside Israel, campaign for the return of the Palestinian 
refugees, and cultivate a joint constituency of Arab and Jewish members (Ghanem, 2010). 
The party split in the mid-1960s, with the majority of its Palestinian members forming the 
New Communist List (known by its Hebrew acronym Rakah)
209
. At the same time, joint 
membership and a vision for ‘co-existence’ with Israel’s Jews have remained a core 
ideological platform and strategy for the party (Ghanem, 2001, 2010)
210
.  
During its heyday of the 1970s and 1980s – when it held more than 50% of the Arab vote 
(Rouhana et al, 2003) – Rakah was active at multiple levels of Palestinian resistance in Israel. 
In addition to securing seats at the Knesset – beginning in 1977, leading the DFPE (Hadash) 
coalition – party members pursued municipal leaderships (winning the Nazareth election for 
the first time in 1975), published mandates and strategies in public platforms, organised a 
growing number of strikes and protests, and, as discussed above, were integral to the 
organisation of Land Day and the committees that stemmed from it (Rekhess, 2007a; 
Ghanem, 2001, 2010; Jamal, 2011; Pappé, 2011). However, with the shifting political arena 
of the 1980s and 1990s, and in particular, the formation of new Arab parliamentary parties in 
the Oslo years, Rakah lost hold of its position as primary representative of the politicised 
Palestinian-citizen constituencies.  
The lines activated by the Communist Party have always teetered on the compatability of 
promoting a national Palestinian identity, while emphasising the community’s ongoing civil 
relationship with(in) Israel (Rekhess, 2007a; Ghanem, 2001). According to Rouhana et al 
(2003), while Rakah played a central role “in entrenching the demand for civil equality and 
the concept of equal citizenship” (p.220), it did so without reshaping the politics and political 
meanings of such a demand. Thus, at multiple points in the party’s history, it gave form to 
new, more insurgent nationlist movements that sought to cross these boundaries. By the 
1990s, the reshaping of these lines through movements that prioritised Palestinian identity 
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 The remaining, more Zionist-oriented activists, disappeared from the political landscape by 1969, when Maki 
failed to gain a seat in parliament (Ghanem, 2010). 
210
 Although in practice, there is only a few thousand Jewish members left in the DFPE (Noy, 2015) and only 
one Jewish MK in the 2013 Knesset (MK Dov Khenin). With Khenin living in Tel Aviv and promoting a strong, 
equality-based platform in the urban and peripheral contexts of poor Jews in Israel, there seems to be minimal 
everyday engagements between him and his fellow Arab party representatives (although he also advocates for 
equal rights and access for Palestinian citizens, and has consistently challenged the laws and structures of the 
state that determine their separate and detrimental treatment). See Dov Khenin’s facebook page for details of his 
platform and activities.   
162 
 
and autonomy, siphoned off a large portion of the Communists’ political base (Ghanem, 
2001). It can therefore be argued that the Nationalist Stream has always had a home within 
the Communist Stream, and has grown out of it; in some ways in a radical departure from the 
Communists’ civil and political locations, in some ways reproducing them. In other ways, the 
new discourses of the later manifestations of the Nationalist Stream have also shifted the 
language and ideology of the Communist Stream. 
The first formal (and separate) articulation of the Nationalist Stream occurs in the 1950s, with 
the al-Ard Movement (the Land Movement). Born from within the Communist Party, inspired 
by then President of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arab movement, the party was banned 
in 1964 for its direct challenge to the Zionist nature of the Israeli state
211
. After the split 
between Rakah and Maki, and with the regional shift after the 1967 war
212
, the nationalist 
forces re-organised themselves, pushing at and reshaping the boundaries that housed 
Palestinian-citizen politics. These first take hold with the creation of Abna al-Balad (the Sons 
of the Country) in 1973, an extra-parliamentary movement that sought to challenge the 
Communists’ strategy of working with and within Israeli institutions, and what they saw as 
the Party’s legitimisation of Zionist hegemony. They saw Palestinians in Israel as indistinct 
from the larger Palestinian people, whose self-determination could only be realised in a 
Palestinian state (Rekhess, 2007a). While their anti-legitimisation platform from the 1970s 
onwards has focused on the boycott of Parliamentary elections – working instead towards 
galvanising public protest – they consistently mobilised for and attained seats in local 
councils (until their movement stagnated in the 1990s) (Ghanem, 2010; Agbariyeh, 2012; 
Ghanem, 2012).     
As discussed above, situated within Rakah, itself, the Nationalist Stream gave form to the 
Committee for the Defence of Arab Lands (which helmed Land Day) (Miari, 2012). As 
discussed above, post-Land Day, the Committee’s key leadership worked to further embed 
the nationalist programme in the Galilee, with the political reshaping of the Heads of the 
Arab Local Authorities and the institutionalisation of a national coordinating body, the High 
Follow-Up Committee (Pappé, 2011). This same group later divested entirely from the 
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 As is discussed in multiple texts, the 1967 war changed the playing field for Palesitnian nationalism, inside 
and outside Israel. For further discussion of the impact of these new geopolitical realities on the Palesitnian 
citizens of Israel, including their reconnection with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, the birth of the 
PLO and the end to Nasser’s Pan-Arab Movement, see for example, Ghanem (2010), Pappé (2011), Jamal 
(2011) and Bishara (1993), among many others.   
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Communists in the creation of a new political party, the Progressive List for Peace (PfP) in 
the early 1980s (Rouhana et al, 2003; Miari, 2012). Led by Mohammed Miari, the PfP 
ultimately disappeared from the political map by the 1992 elections
213
. However, their legacy 
lived on as some of their members were part of the collective that helped to found the 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) (Tajamo/Balad) in the mid-1990s. Led by Azmi 
Bishara, in coordination with large tracts from Abna al-Balad, the PfP and other left-wing 
Nationalist groups (Ghanem, 2001), the NDA became the axis for a new discourse for 
unsettling what they saw as the false balance between Palestinian identity and citizenship in 
the Jewish state (Ghanem, 2010).  
As A. Bishara (1993, 1996, 1997) explains, the new political arena after the end of the 
Intifada demanded a distinctly Palestinian-citizen politics, which would not be associated 
with the PLO or the International Communist Party. It would specifically target the 
Israelisation of Palestinian-citizen life, and attempt to carve out a distinct space to be 
Palestinian in Israel. The core of this programme balanced on two pillars, equal citizenship 
and the Palestinianisation of the Arab minority. As mentioned above, A. Bishara’s (1993, 
1997) vision for articulating these dual prongs required the redefinition of the Jewish state to 
reflect its binational polity
214
, and the institution of particular protections for maintaining the 
autonomy of the national minority, with collective rights to and control over their cultural, 
economic and religious institutions
215
. His programme, articulated by his Party as a call for 
‘A State for All its Citizens’, has since become a central fixture across the fabric of 
Palestinian politics in Israel (as is clear from the tone and rhetoric of the Future Vision 
Documents). In light of this, Jamal (2011) considers A. Bishara to be one of the most 
influential political actors and thinkers in the history of the Palestinian-citizen community; 
and Ghanem (2010) argues that the NDA is the most organised expression of the Nationalist 
Stream.  
In the current (2014) political arena – as the state has enhanced its siege on Palestinian 
political space – new Nationalist forces are brewing again. These are re-emphasising the 
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the expense of civil equality, at a time when a new political process was emerging that demanded both. 
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 In A. Bishara’s writings, there is discussion of the need for Palestinian citizens to have autonomy over their 
‘cultural’ institutions. However, in reading this work (1993, 1997), we understand that to A. Bishara, culture 
implies a wide sphere which includes autonomy over the institutions that tell Palestinian history, devises their 
education, determines their religious practices, and informs their economic relationships.  
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questions raised by Abna al-Balad, as to the legitimate arena for engaging in anti-Zionist, 
nationalist Palestinian politics in Israel. However, before contending with this issue, we turn 
now to the third stream, the Islamists.    
The Islamist Stream begins taking shape inside Israel in the 1970s (Rubin, 2014), organising 
itself around the protection of Muslim holy places, strengthening the Palestinian and Muslim 
identity of the Arab citizens of Israel, and protecting their rights as citizens of the country 
(ibid)
216
. Many of its initial founders were educated in the West Bank and Gaza Strip’s 
religious institutions, which only became available to Palestinian citizens after 1967 (Bishara, 
1993; Ghanem, 2010). Its first leader, Sheikh Abdallah Nimr Darwish, who began his 
political activism in the Communist Party (Rubin, 2014), initiated the new Islamic politics in 
his home village of Kafr Qasim in the Triangle Region, which remains a core base for the 
Movement’s present-day activities.  
From the beginning, the Islamic Movement – which is today divided into two conflicting 
streams, the Northern and the Southern Branches
217
 – evolved its arena of struggle in the 
everyday and grassroots arenas of what it saw as the ‘othered’ Muslim communities in Israel 
(Mustafa, 2013; Rubin, 2014). Their tactics stand in opposition to the Nationalists and the 
Communists (both of which are deeply secularist), whose targets have always been the 
hegemonic arenas controlled by the state, on issues of land, political access, development 
infrastructure and budgets. The Islamists had and have a very different approach, and one that 
has since infiltrated the political fabric of the other two streams (Mustafa, 2013). They built 
their institutions from below, working with, and developing the religiosity of communities 
that had been left out of both Jewish and Palestinian structures of class and power (Ghanem, 
2010). On this basis, they mobilised a network of ‘self-reliant systems’ to respond to the 
needs of the poor, dislocated and newly proletariat communities of the North and Centre 
(many of whom were located in the Triangle, away from the power centres of the enclave in 
the Galilee). They built their base with those who were most vulnerable to the neglect of the 
state and the increasingly abstract political discourses of the Palestinian leadership (Rosmer, 
                                                          
216
 Ghanem (2010) distinguishes between different periods in the foundations of the Movement, with a more 
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Rubin (2014) pinpoints the founding of Darwish’s movement in 1971, when he returns to Israel from his 
religious education in Nablus.   
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 The labels ‘Southern’ and ‘Northern’ are a confusing misnomer. The distinction is based on the fact that the 
‘Northern’ Branch (led by Sheikh Raed Salah) has its head office in Umm Al-Fahm, while the ‘Southern’ 
Branch (initially led by Darwish; and today led by Shaykh Hamad Abu Daabes) has its head office in Kafr 
Qasim, approximately 15 kilometres south of Umm Al-Fahm. 
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2012; Mustafa, 2013)
218
. The Movement created its own civil and religious institutions, and 
mobilised funding and volunteers from within the community, to build the sites that house 
them (Ghanem, 2010). They established hundreds of schools, situated throughout the region, 
independent from the state curriculum, although these are closely monitored by the state’s 
security apparatuses (Edres, 2013). The different branches of this stream also held and 
continue to hold annual work camps in different parts of the country, as a collective act to 
strengthen communities in need. Over the last five years, the majority of this work and 
volunteerism have been in the Naqab, in the unrecognized villages. However, its foundations 
stem from the period following Markovitz’s (1985) Report and the crackdown on illegal 
structures that spanned the late 1980s and early 1990s (Mustafa, 2013). While the 
Communists and Nationalists protested the home demolitions and campaigned for new laws, 
the Islamists went into the villages and rebuilt the destroyed homes and communities (ibid). 
Parallel to their grassroots mobilisations, the Islamists progressed quickly from outside to 
inside, working through the municipal arena to gain hold of the governing systems of 
Palestinians in Israel. In 1984, the Movement contested and won the mayoral election in Kafr 
Bana (also in the Triangle); then, expanding its efforts in 1989, it won 45 seats and five 
mayoral positions, including in Umm al-Fahm (held by Raed Salah until 2001), the second 
largest Arab city in Israel. Today, different factions of the Movement still hold mayoral and 
council positions throughout the country (Rubin, 2014).    
In 1996, the Movement, inspired by a similar set of political attunements to A. Bishara’s 
Nationalist Stream, sought to enter the Parliamentary arena (Rubin, 2014; Ghanem, 2010; 
Mustafa, 2012b). This decision split the Islamist Stream, with Salah seceding with what 
thereafter became known as the ‘Northern’ faction. The Northern Branch saw participation in 
parliamentary politics akin to recognising the legitimacy of the Zionist project, its ethnic 
cleansing of the Palestinian people, and the state’s ongoing colonisation of Palestine. It 
mobilised its constituents around a boycott of all Israeli institutions and called for the 
Movement’s autonomous control of Islamic sites, lands, institutions and symbols, in 
particular the al-Aqsa Mosque (Mustafa, 2012b; Salah, 2007). For its part, the ‘Southern’ 
Movement has since been deeply integrated into the national political arena, with a similar 
mandate to the other parties of the Knesset: to protect the collective and individual rights of 
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Palesitnians in Israel (particularly the Muslim population)
219
. It currently leads the United 
Arab List and sits on a Knesset Coalition with the Arab Movement for Change. Known 
collectively as Ra’am Ta’al, in the 2013 election their combined list held the largest 
percentage of the Arab national vote (Rudnitzky, 2013).  
The distinct paths taken by the two branches return us to the conundrum of the various 
streams and movements within Palestinian politics. Each of the streams is dealing with a 
methodological-political question of how to protect Palestinian space, whether in direct and 
constant contestation with the Israeli state, or as a distant and disengaged space, functioning 
(as much as possible) autonomously from the structures of hegemonic power. The 
conundrum, as alluded to above, is anchored in the ambiguity of the eternal inside-outside 
paradox. For example, Salah, even as he purports to divest his Movement of any connection 
to the state (Rosmer, 2012; Salah, 2007), sat at the head of Umm al-Fahm’s Municipal 
Council for more than 10 years, and as deputy-chair of the Heads of the Arab Local 
Authorities. As A. Bishara (1997) argues, the municipal leadership is embedded in the 
governing structures of the state, through their dependence on the state for budgets, permits 
and jurisdictional authority.  
The Islamic Branches’ intra-movement conflict also persists at the heart of political debates 
among the Nationalists, and between the Nationalists and the Communists. These have 
caused new rifts and alliances that seem to dilute the borders between the ideological streams, 
depending on where they practice their politics. Within the Nationalist Stream, there are those 
who see parliamentary politics as the epicentre of Zionist hegemony, a space from which 
there is no escape from the language, history and culture of the oppressor and coloniser of 
Palestine. For instance, this is the political discourse of present-day Abna al-Balad activists, 
like Ghantous (2012) of Birim, who argues that the Israeli state cannot be both the cause and 
the solution to the problems of the Palesitnian people. As mentioned above, this has also 
become a popular platform for several new grassroots movements, seeking alternative spaces 
to promote and provoke social change. These groups – inspired by the Arab Uprisings – seek 
to function outside both Israeli state institutions and those promulgated by their own 
traditional leaderships, particularly the political parties, whether inside or outside the system. 
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This is the story behind the al-Hirak al-Shebabi (the Independent Youth Movement)
220
, a 
collective of Palestinian citizen activists from across the political-ideological spectrum, who 
led the anti-Prawer Movement in the North. This is also the rhetoric of the community behind 
the nationalist alternative music and arts scene, mentioned above, and discussed extensively 
in the work of Karkabi (2013) and Maira (2013), which likewise appeals to young 
Palestinians from across the different ideological networks. 
At the same time, those Nationalists – in particular the NDA – who work within the system, 
do not see the state as any more legitimate than their extra-parliamentary counterparts. 
Instead, they participate in parliamentary politics because they see this as a necessary arena in 
which to nationalise the community, and break down the divisions inherent in the spatial 
alienations orchestrated by the settler-colonial state (Bishara, 1996). They also claim to 
participate in order to activate new borders and antagonisms with the state; to sit in its field of 
practice, using its tools and institutions, in order to unveil its violences and contradictions.  
As Zahalka (2012) explained to me:  
“… there is a paradox. Our voice is heard more because we are in the Knesset. And because 
we are in the Knesset, we can give a voice for our community. So, the question is not ‘to go 
or not to go’ to the Knesset, but what you do in the Knesset. Do you dance to their music or 
just make them nervous… For the Israelis, if you 'play in their square', they can tolerate it, 
but if you go out of the square, they don't like you and they try to ban you. We are making 
problems. If we are dancing with them, then we don't have the right to be there; we are just 
serving them.”  
In this statement, Zahalka is framing the politics of being inside and outside, of claiming a 
space to be Palestinian within the very institutions that seek to silence his community. 
Whereas some of the extra-parliamentary movements are seeking a false retreat from the state 
–as indicated in the discussion above of the Northern Islamic Movement – the NDA seems to 
be seeking out an encounter, to provoke it into responding to them. This seems very different 
from Palestinian-citizen advocacy within the other hegemonic arenas discussed in this thesis. 
In the courts or planning arenas, stakeholders attempt to play the rules of the game in order to 
win it. When working in these institutional fields, they often subdue the politics of a case in 
order to attain rights for their Palestinian-citizen constituents. In contravention, the 
Nationlists within the Knesset – and more and more often, all Palestinian Party MKs – use 
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this arena as a mouthpiece; to make the state uncomfortable, as it makes increasingly violent 
and debilitating decisions affecting Palestinian life inside Israel. This was the case when the 
Arab party representatives each physically destroyed Prawer’s Draft Law to Regulate 
Bedouin Settlement, calling it an act of apartheid in the midst of the Knesset plenum in June, 
2013 (Yagna & Lis, 2013); or when Zahalka was expelled from an Interior Knesset 
Committee meeting in June 2014, when he condemned the occupation of East Jerusalem, and 
the violence of the police against Palestinian demonstrators challenging the state’s control of 
the al-Aqsa Mosque (Lis, 2014). Rather than reproduce the logics of Zionist hegemony, by 
entering the Knesset, these parties force the state to contend with a community it has done its 
best to contain and excise from its ‘consciousness’.  
The provocation has worked. The state has consistently responded with increasingly 
detrimental results for the Palesitnian parties. For example, in 2002, the Knesset introduced a 
new amendment to the Basic Law: the Knesset, that gave the power to the Central Elections 
Committee to ban a political party if it challenges the ‘Jewish and Democratic’ nature of the 
Israeli state. This has enabled the Committee to attempt to ban the NDA from standing in 
parliamentary elections, ever since; although the Supreme Court has also overturned the ban, 
every time (Jamal, 2011; Gross, 2015). The same law also allows the Committee to ban 
individual candidates from standing in elections. This turned A. Bishara into a constant 
target, beginning with the 2003 elections, until the state shifted its tactics into a more direct 
campaign for his expulsion from politics: in 2007, A. Bishara was accused of “betrayal and 
cooperation with the enemy in time of war”, and forced into permanent exile (A. Bishara, 
2007c).  
The Knesset Law, along with an additional 2002 amendment to the Political Parties Law, 
which states that “support for an armed struggle of an enemy state or a terrorist organisation 
against the state of Israel” is grounds for prohibiting a Party list from registering for elections 
(Jamal, 2011; Gross, 2015; Rouhana & Sultany, 2003), continue to be used in the current 
political arena. Moreover, since 2013, Haneen Zoabi has become the Elections Committee’s 
newest target, first for taking part in the Mavi Marmara protests, and again, in the latest 
elections run in 2015, for statements she made against Israel during its last war in Gaza
221
.  
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A potential final assault on Palestinian space within the Knesset was launched by Avigdor 
Liberman in 2014, with his successful campaign to raise the electoral threshold for a party’s 
entrance into the Knesset from 2% to 3.5%. With the new threshold higher than the 
individual electoral base of any of the Arab parties, it is understood by many to be a direct 
move by the right-wing political parties to excise them from the Knesset (Isacowitz, 2014). 
Interestingly, this has provided the necessary incentive for a “historic” unification, between 
the Islamist, Communist and Nationalist streams inside the Knesset (Zahalka, quoted in Noy, 
2015)
222
. Then again, while this may be the first formal articulation of a unified parliamentary 
politics, as discussed above, the parties have long-since shared their language and practice – 
informed by a constant, oppositional encounter with the state – at least within the Knesset’s 
walls (Ghanem, 2010).     
That said, the Knesset is not the only ‘frontline’ with which to engage the state. A boycott of 
the state’s institutions does not necessarily mean disengaging from the realm of politics, nor a 
reproduction of the spatial apartheids that produce the segregated enclave. Ghantous (2012) 
explains the boycott methodology of the popular and extra-parliamentary movements as 
shining a mirror up to the state from the outside
223
: 
“Boycotting the parliament is about alienating ourselves from the state. It’s about building 
our identity as being part of the Palestinian people. It emphasises our identity and gives us 
our immunity from Israelisation. Because, being alienated, you are not part of this. And if 
you are included as part of this, your identity becomes shattered. The state doesn’t want us, 
doesn’t want us to feel like its people, to return, doesn’t want us to be free. Good. So, on the 
principle side of this, we say we are not Israelis. We don’t want to be part of the system. We 
need to maintain our community, so we need to sometimes engage with the state, and if we 
get something, this is also our right to get it. But we don’t want to give the state legitimacy. 
We don’t want to give it a good name...”  
To Ghantous, there is no room for Palestinians inside the Jewish state, and the only way to 
transgress its borders is to disentangle themselves from it; to sever their actions from a shared 
hegemonic language, and from its inherent restrictions. At the same time, this does not mean 
that the movement advocates disengagement from the borders, nor from direct provocations. 
For this reason, Ghantous and his cohort protest in shared public space, on the street in front 
of the Knesset, in the middle of Haifa’s main boulevard and at Haifa University; as part of a 
larger Palestinian movement that no longer sees the state as defining the limits to Palestinian 
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space. In practice, this has meant a focus on protest-activities divorced from the needs of 
daily life in the Galilee, while at the same time promoting the rights and tangible return of 
refugees to their lands. For example, the majority of grassroots public activities in the north 
over the past two years – until 2013’s Days of Rage demonstrations – have been on the issue 
of political prisoners or the siege on Gaza, as opposed to the control of jurisdictions, plans or 
community development. Moreover, these actions are increasingly produced as a separate 
Palestinian space, distinct from the activities of Jewish organisations and activists.  
Interestingly, the rhetoric to which the boycott movements speak, is somewhat similar to the 
separate sphere Farah (2011) advocates, within the NGO and professional spheres that work 
with(in) state institutions. For both, it is about being Palestinians, and disrupting the cycle 
and norms determined by the state. These should, therefore, be considered complimentary, as 
opposed to contrasting politics, which together construct a spectrum of actions through which 
to challenge the Israeli colonisation of Palestinian space (Elian Weizman, 2013). However, 
for Farah and Ghantous the borders are very different; as well as the tools with which to 
challenge them. The following section concludes this chapter with a discussion of the new 
border, from the perspective of these different voices that share the Arab-space.  
Re-imagining the border – Concluding Thoughts 
In each of the struggles discussed above, there are alternate conceptualisations of where the 
border is vis à vis the hegemonic project; and each contributes to spotlighting the cracks and 
crevices inherent in it (Yiftachel & Ghanem, 2004). In the personal and political struggles for 
living space, the ‘line’ is the constriction of space, development and growth. As Sabbagh-
Koury (2011) argues, “this is not only a struggle over land; this is a struggle for the very 
details of your life.” Thus, its ethos is about choosing where you live, how you live, where to 
work, where and with whom you spend your time and money, which narratives to share, 
which flag to raise, and so on. It is a struggle to live, and thus defy at least the basic project of 
Judaisation, which came to usurp Palestinians of their lands and their identities, and 
ultimately to physically remove and replace them.  
In the struggles for return – the last tangible struggles for land in the Galilee – the line cuts 
through an essential hegemonic assumption of the Zionist project: that the battle for land has 
been settled, that Eretz Yisrael belongs to the Jews, and that the colonial project, while still 
unfinished, is a fait accompli. The politics of Palestinian return, direct and hidden, clash 
directly with this narrative, and the legal and political regimes that support it. With the 
spotlight on 1948, their actions immediately bring into question the way the state was 
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established, the accuracy of its hegemonic narratives and the legitimacy of the legislative 
framework that was built to protect the Zionist state from the internal-external threat.  
In the struggles for autonomy and ‘difference’, the ‘line’ is the link to the core; to the state’s 
definitions and determinants of Arab space. The struggle thus shrinks back from the state, and 
its control over Palestinian life and politics, but not necessarily from provoking and targeting 
the regime. While the tools are debated, the focus is on how to reimagine the border. They 
work to define a new geographic centre, independent of the Zionist programme. This is 
perhaps only possible because the Palestinian space in the Galilee has been cut out from the 
hegemonic centre, and daily life can be lived distant from the state. The struggle for 
autonomy revels in that distance, which empowers and entrenches the community against the 
erasures and impositions of the state.   
The state, for its part, contends with the different aspects of land struggle in the Galilee by 
reshaping itself around these threats to the political order; reconstructing the trajectories of 
Judaisation through containment, segregation and marginalisation. To keep it from impacting 
the state, the Palestinian space must remain an enclave, albeit under constant surveillance and 
tight control. Herein lies the paradox of the separate space, in its dialectic relationship with 
the colonial and ethnocratic ethos, within which it is housed. The enclave is both 
strengthened by and trapped within the boxes the state created to separate and fracture 
relations between the different Palestinian communities, and their varying threats to the 
territorial project, inside and outside the country. However, as the boundary-lines of the 
Northern struggle shifts, some of those boxes begin to break down; the borders and the 
threats becoming diffused as part of this process. 
Several interlocutors of this case spoke explicitly of a re-spatialisation of the Palestinian 
struggle, pushing the boundaries of these boxes
224
. However, to circumvent the internal 
borders, as exemplified in the various cases discussed above, it has been necessary to 
disentangle the struggle from the fight for land, in and of itself. This dislocates and 
disconnects the struggle from its anchor in this space, in the daily needs and daily lives of the 
Palestinian inhabitants of the Galilee. Farah (2011) sees this as a positive development, 
arguing that so long as there is a struggle over land, the Palestinian community merely 
reproduces and projects the colonial programme. He says: 
“They keep us in a situation of struggle over land, while they invest in education and 
technology. The gaps are not only based on land. There is enough land between Beersheba 
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and Eilat, there’s enough space for 5 million more people. So, why did the state create this 
struggle with the Bedouin community (in the Naqab)? To keep controlling them, to keep them 
under constant pressure so they can’t develop, can’t increase their education and become 
more productive communities. Promoting this (the struggle for land) as a nationalist mission 
and making it so that every Jew has to promote this was a part of the state’s propaganda, and 
somehow we (the Palestinian citizens) adopted it. And we start to behave as if it will succeed. 
I don’t think it was successful, I don’t think we disappeared. The Palestinian community in 
the Galilee continues to develop itself, continues to challenge itself. There is development, 
even if the government is discriminatory – and it is, in housing, in land – but if you look at the 
Koenig document and his plan in 1976, that we will leave, we will emigrate. So, if you take 
his plan, and evaluate his plan, and our reaction, and the results, the community is here, and 
it (the state) has failed…”  
Farah (2011), in this statement, speaks of a reclaimed Palestinian space; of borders that have 
been imposed upon and re-defined by the communities that live away from the state and 
beyond the struggle over land. He speaks of a new language, a new rhetoric and a new lens 
for struggle and survival; to live a life truly separate from the colonial ethos and limits of the 
state. That said, according to Cook (2012a), Ghantous (2012) and S. Bishara, as well as 
several other interlocutors to the thesis, the struggle for a separate, genuinely autonomous 
Palestinian space does not end with disengagement from the state or its colonial trajectory; its 
focal practices move beyond the limits and borders the state has created to confine the 
community. This new struggle is about re-connecting the ‘boxes’, and re-imagining the 
relationship between the different ‘trapped’, internal Palestinians, as well as the Palestinians 
outside.  
This is evident in the growing number of Palestinian activists from the Galilee
225
 who 
challenge the ‘Two State Solution’, and call for ‘One State’ between the Jordan River and the 
Mediterranean Sea. It exists in the re-alignment with the Palestinians in the occupied 
territories, alluded to in Abna al-Balad’s protests on behalf of the political prisoners and in 
the mass protests of July 2014, against the state’s siege on the Gaza Strip. It persists in the 
discourses around the Nakba, the internal and external refugees, and the links being made 
between colonial and apartheid actions on both sides of the Green Line. It is exemplified in 
the shifting methods and addressees of the struggle; in the fact that the language of 
Palestinian-citizen politics is increasingly in either Arabic or English – as expressed in social 
media; that partners in the struggle are found in international solidarity movements, as 
opposed to Jewish-Israelis; and that they are seeking deeper connections to their Arab and 
Middle Eastern neighbours and by-passing Jerusalem in the process, as journalists, as 
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 This spectrum of transgressive political discourses is not exclusive to Galilee activists; but its largest and 
most vocal proponents are housed within the Northern enclave. 
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political activists, and as academics. It lives in the discourse about boycott and the increasing 
and intentional distance being cultivated between the Galilee’s Palestinian political 
communities and their Jewish counterparts, who are discouraged from sharing either political 
or social spaces in the north
226
.  
Understanding the impact of these shifts on the internal borders is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. As Cook (2012a) explains, it will take some time until we can analyse their resonance 
for spatial relations in Israel/Palestine. Instead, this chapter points to them as a dynamic of 
struggle in the all-Arab enclave. However, thus far, one thing is clear: The active struggle for 
land and space is leading us away from the Galilee, away from the struggle for its 
constituents’ everyday needs, and across previously distant peripheries, to where land is still 
under siege, and thus the struggle for it is significant and existential.  
Epilogue – the Return to ‘Land’ as Unit of Struggle   
Over the last three years, I have watched as the Galilee’s key NGOs, political parties, general 
leadership (in particular the High Follow-Up Committee) and grassroots activists have slowly 
re-adjusted their lenses southward, to the Naqab and the newest threat to Bedouin space, 
embodied in the Prawer Plan. Adalah opened an office in Beersheba in 2010, when Prawer 
first came into being
227
. By July, 2011 (when I began my field-research), the first Northern 
Steering Committees emerged in the south to work with local leaders on organising their 
campaign against the state. From 2010 to 2014, hundreds of documents, policy papers, 
reports, expert opinions, articles, panels and interviews have been written and presented by 
the main NGOs, political parties and grassroots activists from the north, whereas there had 
been almost none previously. In 2012, the High Follow Up Committee organised a 
Beersheba-based Land Day commemoration, as the main event that year. Since 2011, 
representatives from the northern NGOs and political parties have travelled to advocate the 
Bedouin case before the UN Human Rights Committees and Councils, the European 
Parliament, the US Senate, and South African Parliament. As mentioned previously, The 
High Follow Up Committee announced a National Strike Day on July 15
th
 and al-Hirak al-
Shebabi took up the mantle of protest and brought the campaign to the ‘street’ with the 
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 This is acutely expressed in the fact that al-Hirak al-Shebabi discouraged any cooperation with Jewish 
activists in the organisation of the Days of Rage protests. For more details, see the concluding epilogue to this 
thesis.    
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 Although Adalah had been working with several villages on cases of dispossession and education since 2006, 
the length and breadth of their involvement increased exponentially since the drafting of the Prawer Plan. 
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‘Prawer Shall Not Pass’ campaign, and the first mass-solidarity demonstrations, since Land 
Day.   
This shift from North to South shines a light on the historical fragmentation of the enclave 
from other Palestinian spaces inside Israel; and the new attempts to repair it. The ghosts of 
1948 had left their mark, de-linking the communities and places of the Naqab from the North. 
The participation of the Galilee players exemplifies (at least for them) the new links being 
defined as part of the new alternative, Palestinian politics. However, it also describes a 
search for new frontlines. With the state so far removed from this place, there is a vacuum 
within which to practice resistance in tangible, practical and direct actions. To these Northern 
stakeholders, the battle for the Galilee is over; and the struggle for the Naqab has become 
their opportunity to continue to articulate their losses. 
Through this prism, the story of the Bedouins has become the transposed and essential seat of 
the colonial project; experiencing the same policies, the same system, the same Judaisation 
blueprints that they – the Northern residents – did (S. Bishara, 2012). Moreover, the Galilee 
activists deal with the story with the same tools as they have developed for struggling in the 
north: through the NGOs, through addressing the international community, through de-
linking the struggle from the space within which it happens and linking it to struggles 
throughout the Palestinian sphere. In the words of many of my interlocutors, they have 
brought “the capacities of the north to the communities of the south.” (Cook, 2012a; Y. 
Jabareen, 2011; Ali, 2013) Moreover, after so many years in which the links were severed, 
they have (allegedly) Palestinianised the struggle, turning the localised Bedouin movement 
for their rights into the “Last Palestinian Stand for Land” (Swaid, 2011; Ali, 2013; Cook, 
2012a; S. Bishara, 2012). These sentiments were reproduced among almost every activist and 
interlocutor I spoke with from the north; whereas interlocutors from the South tell a much 
more complex and rich story, as is demonstrated in the chapter to follow.  
Finally, as I have watched the struggle move southwards, one more thing becomes clear. The 
Palestinians of the Galilee, as elsewhere, are forever entangled in a dialectic relationship with 
the settler-colonial state; they are surrounded and permeated by this relationship, which has 
constructed the Palestinians as challengers to/on their shared territory. Thus, despite Farah’s 
(2011) claims to the contrary, there is no getting away from ‘land’ as the essence of 
Palestinian protest and the key to their collective and unruly mobilisations.  
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Chapter 4: The Naqab – Bedouin Struggles In Grey Space 
 
Insurgent Map of the Naqab Bedouin 
  
Map of the Unrecognised Bedouin-Arab Villages of the Naqab 
A map devised by the Unrecognised Villages of the Naqab to show the history and present-day 
existence of Bedouin localities, erased by the Israeli state. The area outlined in blue (by the author) is 
the region currently under siege by the Prawer Plan/Law, and home to the 35 villages at the heart of 
the case of struggle discussed in this chapter.  
Source: Regional Council for the Unrecognised Bedouin-Arab Villages of the Naqab (RCUV) (2006) 
 
Jaffa Popular Committee for the Defence of Arab Land and Housing Rights, 2007. 
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The Symbol of the Struggle – The Story of Al-Araqib228 
“If we let go of our land, so who are we, where is our identity? If I let go of the cemetery 
where my father and grandfather were buried, then who am I in this country? The land 
defined me, defined my identity, who I am, who I was.”  
Sheikh Sayah al-Turi, key activist and leader of al-Araqib, Personal Interview, 2011 
On July 27
th
, 2010, representatives from the Israel Lands Administration (ILA), accompanied 
by 1300 police officers, a cavalry of bulldozers, and a helicopter brigade, razed the 
‘Unrecognised Village’ of al-Araqib to the ground:  Homes, businesses, animal pens, 
electricity generators, water tanks, and more than 850 olive trees were wiped clean from the 
desert landscape (J. Khoury & Yagna, 2010). Al-Araqib’s 500 residents were helmed into the 
cemetery that hosts the graves of their ancestors to watch the destruction
229
; its chain link 
fence acting as a barrier between them and the demolition forces that had come to execute the 
Knesset’s newest plan to ‘settle’ the problem of unruly and ungovernable Bedouin 
communities in the desert. This Plan – the Prawer Plan mentioned in previous chapters – or 
more officially (since it received approval by the PMO office in 2012), the Draft Law to 
Regulate Bedouin Settlement in the Negev, had been building for decades, through various 
legal, political and geographic clashes over land claims in the Naqab
230. Prawer’s Plan was 
initiated to resolve what the state views as ‘spontaneous Bedouin settlement’, and to prevent 
the ongoing Bedouin practices of invading and overtaking State Lands, with official 
permissions. The Plan’s legal status is currently stalled at the Knesset, due to a variety of 
actions that include the Days of Rage Protests and the resignation of Benny Begin, the 
official who was mandated to turn Prawer’s Plan into law. However, the state has already 
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 This story is based on testimonies from a long list of interlocutors from al-Araqib, as well as other 
stakeholders involved in their struggle; these include, but are not restricted to, Sheikh Sayah al-Turi (2011a, 
2011b), Azez al-Turi (2011, 2012), Awad Abu-Freih (2012), Yosef Ziad (2012), Nuri el-Uqbi (2013), Oren 
Yiftachel (2011, 2012), Gadi Algazi (2011a, 2011b), Atef Abu Rabia (2011, 2012a, 2012b) and Mansour 
Nasasra (2012). Specific quotes are attributed to their individual sources.  
229
 According to activists, lawyers and residents of al-Araqib, in the 1970s, the village residents had petitioned 
the Supreme Court to protect the cemetery from demolition (Sfard, 2011; Sayah al-Turi, 2011a; Algazi, 2011). 
According to these sources, this is the reason it was left intact and became a temporary home for many of the 
families after the demolitions began, until their cemetary’s immunity was rescinded in June, 2014 and all 
structures within it were destroyed (as recorded on the Negev Coexistence Forum’s facebook page on June, 12 th; 
see also Couzinet, 2014, and Cook, 2014, for details).   
230
 Details of the Prawer Plan can be traced back to 1975 and the first committee (headed by Plia Albeck) to 
develop systematic recommendations to ‘deal’ with Bedouin settlements. However, its closest predecessor was a 
report developed by Supreme Court Justice Eliezer Goldberg in 2008, in which he recommended recognising as 
many villages as possible in order to rectify the conflict over land claims (Goldberg, 2008). Prawer was meant 
to implement Goldberg’s recommendations, and (ex)MK, Ze’ev Binyamin (Benny) Begin was given official 
mandate to turn the ‘Prawer Plan’ into Law. 
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begun implementing its vision in the Naqab. Not unlike other ‘Plans’ discussed in previous 
chapters, the demolitions were initiated before any official approval was sought or given
231
.  
Al-Araqib – which sits 8 km north of Beersheba, the metropolitan ‘capital’ of the Naqab – 
could be seen as a preview for how and where the Plan would be enforced, as well as a test to 
see if there would be any outcry among Israeli-Jews against the demolition and subsequent 
expulsion of the village residents (Weingarten, 2011). However, with the exception of a small 
community of supporters, organisations and activists, as well as a few articles by local 
journalists, there was no widespread response (ibid). July 27
th
 ended with the dust settling on 
empty space, just as the state had imagined and mythologized the Naqab since it began its 
settlement project in the 19
th
 century (Nasasra, 2012). Even the rubble was carried away with 
the community’s possessions.  
However, the symbolic power of al-Araqib does not stem from the totality of its destruction 
by the state, but from the act of collective agency with which the residents responded. By the 
morning of July 28
th
, the first tents had already been erected outside the gates of the 
cemetery. A week later the new shelters were demolished again, and this time arrests made, 
using additional forces and violence. The next day, the residents, and their encampments, 
returned to the site. The tents were torn down again a week later, then rebuilt, then torn down, 
over and over again. The cycle has continued unabated ever since. A protest tent was 
constructed on a hill a few steps beyond the cemetery gate and the space it inhabits is never 
empty. A resident member of al-Araqib – usually the village Sheikh, Sayah al-Turi – is 
always present, rooted against the village’s removal and replacement; along with a seemingly 
never-ending string of local and international visitors. The Sheikh and his family have 
become the voice of the struggle that now epitomises the phenomenon of ‘Sumud’ – of 
resilience and steadfastness – in the desert.  
The resistance-story unfolding in al-Araqib since July, 2010, exposes the essential violences 
of the state, as the boundary lines constructed to protect and segregate the Zionist paradigm in 
the desert are increasingly challenged, revealed and disarticulated. This has moved the 
struggle beyond the village to become a central symbol of Palestinian resistance. Like the 
case of Ester Saba in Jaffa, al-Araqib has become the catalyst for a new wave and approach to 
a long-term struggle for Bedouin lands, the survival of the Unrecognised Villages, and 
Palestinian land struggles, in general.  
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 For example, the ‘Jaffa Slopes’ project discussed extensively in Chapter Two, which was pre-emptively 
implemented 30 years before a version was officially approved in 1995. 
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The Unrecognised Context 
“Do you know what is the meaning of an ‘Unrecognised Village’? You don’t recognise the 
people, you don’t recognise the village. You are saying to citizens of the state… ‘I don’t 
recognise you’.” 
Dr. Awad Abu Freih, key activist and resident of Al-Araqib, Personal Interview, 2012 
Al-Araqib’s ‘narrative’ is both similar and dissimilar to that of the 34 other Unrecognised 
Villages that persist off the maps and grids of official state plans for the Naqab. The daily life 
of al-Araqib residents – at least until 2010 – mirrored the survival practices of the others, all 
maintaining their villages without electricity, access to water, rights to government services, 
public transportation, schools or formal infrastructure; and living with an ongoing fear of 
state retributions in the forms of demolitions, evictions and hefty fines. Like the others, al-
Araqib is situated outside the norms and practices of laws that do not recognise the Bedouins’ 
histories, their legitimacy, or the spaces they have each carved out for themselves. Also, like 
the others, there is no common ground with the state’s conceptualisation of their village as 
non-space, and the set of legal, bureaucratic and policing apparatuses used to frame al-Araqib 
residents as trespassers on state lands (Amara, 2008; Algazi, 2010; Sfard, 2011).   
While the details are particular to each village, all Unrecognised Villages share a narrative 
and living experience that challenge the Zionists’ self-imposed proprietorship over Bedouin 
spaces. This narrative has become a core piece of the communities’ resistance arsenal, and 
one that is regularly shared with local and international visitors to the region, through 
political tours devised for this purpose – much like Sami Abu Shehadeh’s tour in Ajami. This 
chapter was conceived in part through the author’s own participation in such tours, and their 
power to reveal and contradict Zionist colonial practice. It is therefore relevant to share it, as 
part of the Bedouins’ struggle. However, because the state’s comprehensive razing of Al-
Araqib points to an acute clash with the hegemonic order, it is their narrative that will be 
emphasised here, as part of the larger Bedouin story. 
The Zionist version of Bedouin history begins with the retroactive construction of the Naqab 
as ‘legally empty’. According to several Israeli-Zionist researchers, the communities found in 
the Naqab during the 1948 war had migrated “recently” in the 18th and 19th centuries “from 
the deserts of Arabia, Transjordan, Sinai and Egypt”, and therefore held no indigenous claims 
to the territory (Yahel, Kark & Franzman, 2012, p.3). Economic and ecological determinants 
informed their nomadic movements across the desert, as opposed to proprietorship over 
specific territories and resources. Maps, travelogues and surveys by visitors to the region in 
the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century, as well as land and tax ordinances in place since the Ottoman 
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period, confirm that no Bedouin permanent settlements outside of Beersheba existed prior to 
the establishment of the state (B.D.C. (Beersheba District Court), Decision 7161/06/06/07/08, 
2012). Accordingly, in the immediate aftermath of the 1948 war, the entire Naqab was 
expropriated to the state, following Land Ordinances initiated by the Ottoman and British 
Regimes (Shamir, 1996).  These open territories were appropriated under the legal 
categorisation of ‘dead lands’ (known as Mewat in the Ottoman Land Registry) (ibid). Dead 
lands have no owners, no development or cultivation history and no private legal claims 
attached to them. They were deemed state lands during previous colonial regimes, and have 
continued to maintain this status under the Israeli regime. 
By contrast, according to interlocutors of this thesis, the Bedouins of the Naqab “were always 
here”, as part of the tribal communities indigenous to the entire Sinai region (Marx, 1967). 
Their once fluid tribal boundary-lines became fixed with the increasing interest of the 
Ottoman Empire in the region, in light of the influx of foreign powers and the opening of the 
Suez Canal in 1867, which brought with it new tax systems, land registries and the 
establishment of military outposts in Palestine (ibid). Kedar, Yiftachel & Amara (2012), 
critical legal and geographic scholars actively involved in the Bedouins’ struggle, trace the 
Naqab communities’ shift towards subsistence farming and semi-nomadic settlement to this 
same period; and maps prepared by the Ottoman authorities in 1917 confirm the rooting of 
the different tribes within specific geographic locations of the region (Marx, 1967). The tribes 
passed their lands from one generation to the next, establishing residential camps that 
inevitably evolved into mud and then stone houses in the 20
th
 century, clustered around their 
permanent cultivation areas (Kedar et al, 2012). By the time the Zionists came crashing 
through the desert in 1948, it was through lands already settled, cultivated and organised, 
along traditional and living systems of Bedouin land holdings (Bailey, 2009; Falah, 1989). 
Approximately 91,000 Bedouins, from 95 different tribes, inhabited the entire area of what is 
termed today the Beersheba Sub-District, an area consisting of more than three million 
dunams of land and equalling 62% of the total area of the Israeli state (Marx, 1967; Falah, 
1985; Bishara & Naamnih, 2011
232
). 
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 Figures regarding the number of Bedouins living in the Naqab prior to the establishment of Israel are 
contested, ranging from 65,700 (Marx, 1967) to over 95,000 (Falah, 1985). Throughout this thesis, the figure of 
’91,000’ is used, as it was repeated in a majority of interviews and texts. 
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The War of 1948 brought with it the end of the Bedouin Naqab. As was the case on the 
Northern coast
233, the military’s path through the desert resulted in the consolidation of 
Jewish territory, to a large degree along the perimeters of the UN Partition Plan; according to 
which, the majority of the Naqab, excluding Beersheba, had already been slated for the future 
Jewish state. They destroyed villages and tent encampments, and – in some cases – forced 
entire villages to march towards the new borders with Egypt and Jordan (Neumann, 2011; 
quoted in Zochrot, 2011
 234
). When the first censuses were taken after the Nakba, only 11,000 
Bedouin-Arabs, from 19 tribes, were recorded; their communities severely fragmented and 
fractured by the new Armistice Lines (Falah, 1985; Marx, 1967).  
The Bedouins who remained were concentrated into an area of approximately 1000 square 
kilometres in the north eastern Naqab, designated as the Seyag or ‘enclosure-zone’, by the 
Israeli military
235
. Marx (1967) furthers the metaphor of the contained space and the life of 
those within it, labelling it ‘the Bedouin Reservation’. As Marx (1967) explains, the 
Bedouins’ containment within the “compact and easily accessible reservation in the Eastern 
Beersheba plain, facilitated the policing of these ‘unsettled’ people (p.40)”, and, in particular, 
prevented their use of lands the state sought to consolidate for its own territorial project. 
According to Swirski & Hasson (2006), two thirds of those inhabiting the Seyag in 1960 had 
been dispersed from elsewhere in the Naqab. Today, the communities are still haunted by the 
divisions imposed on them through their enclosure, with status and inter-family relations still 
accorded on the basis of land holdings. The categories have essential reverberations in 
present-day social-spatial relations, with those who held lands in the Seyag prior to 1948 
continuing to live on their lands, albeit without recognition of their official ownership claims; 
those who lost their lands in the Western Naqab, and were forced to lease lands from the 
state; and those who were landless labourers (the fellahin) and were also given access to 
leasing agreements after the establishment of the state.    
Except for a small pocket of land north-west of Beersheba (today home to Rahat, the 
Bedouins’ largest township), the Seyag looks like an upside-down triangle. It is flanked by 
Beersheba in the west, Dimona in the south, and Arad in the east. Its north eastern boundaries 
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 See discussion in Chapter Three on Plan Dalet and the method by which the state constructed the border 
between Jewish and Palestinian space in the North of Israel. 
234
 Amnon Neumann’s testimony about his participation in the Nakba, as a Palmach (Zionist pre-state militia 
unit) soldier, was filmed for a project initiated by Zochrot. According to Neumann (2011), his unit burned down 
villages and forced the Bedouins they encountered, to march to the borders at gun point, in order to “clear a 
path” through the desert. 
235
 The word Seyag is a Hebrew term, meaning ‘fence’, and was the military’s official name for the enclosed 
zone that housed the Bedouin after 1948. A map of the Seyag can be found in Appendix 3.3 to this thesis.  
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are situated on the Armistice Lines that cut through the south-Hebron hills of the West Bank; 
and its western limit is Highway 40, the north-south crossway that connects the centre of the 
country with Eilat, Israel’s most southern city. The Highway also acts as the border between 
the Bedouins and the rest of Israel (Abu-Freih, 2012; Prawer, 2011)
236
. It frames the bounded 
and shrunken territory in which Bedouins, citizens of Israel since 1954, exist, separate from, 
secured and controlled by the state. The Prawer Plan officially marked the division, but it has 
been entrenched in both Jewish and Bedouin societies through more than 60 years of 
urbanisation and relocation policies, land expropriations, planned erasures and movement 
restrictions. No villages and land claims east of Highway 40 will be recognised under the new 
Law
237
. Al-Araqib sits on the southern edge of the small north western pocket, a few 
kilometres east of the Highway; just outside the official Seyag zone.   
Until the state arrived in al-Araqib, the community’s presence on its lands could be traced 
back centuries (S. al-Turi , 2011; Nuri el-Uqbi, 2013; Michael Sfard, 2011). Evidence of their 
continuous geographic cultivation of at least a majority of the land has been found throughout 
the claimed territory; along with ancient building-ruins, long-standing wells and since 1914, 
the dates on the tomb stones in their cemetery. Al-Araqib also holds Ottoman tax and 
registration documents that date back to at least 1905, further tax documents from the British 
Mandate, dating back to 1917, and land purchases conducted between Al-Araqib land-owners 
and Jewish organisations from the turn of the 20
th
 century (Sfard, 2011; B.D.C., Decision 
7161/06/06/07/08, 2012).  
The army’s displacement of village residents in 1951 shares a set of familiar tropes to the 
stories of Birim and Iqrit, discussed in the previous chapter; as well as countless other 
villages (S. Abu Rabia, 2012; Nasasra, 2012). The villagers were told that the area in which 
they were living, was a security concern, and had been marked as a military zone. Al-Araqib 
lands would be ‘closed’ for six months, but once the region was stabilised, the community 
would be able to return. In the meantime, the residents were transferred to the Seyag and 
scattered among its settlements. However, before they could return, the area was allocated to 
the Development Authority, sharing the fate of the majority of cultivable lands in the Naqab 
and throughout the new state. However, unlike Birim and Iqrit, the state expunged al-Araqib 
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 See Appendix 3.4 for details. 
237
 The Draft Law also implements tighter borders to the south and to the west, along Highway 25 and Highway 
80, respectively; both more than 10 km inside the original Seyag lines. A map of these limits is included in the 
appendices section of this thesis. 
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from the formal record, as if it never existed; as if there was nothing to which they could 
return
238
.   
For over 60 years, the residents – like so many other victims of the state’s policy – have been 
trying to find a lawful path to reclaim their village
239
. For more than a decade, village leaders 
directed letters to the authorities in Beersheba and Jerusalem, including the Prime Minister, 
trusting they could convince the officials that a mistake was made (el-Uqbi, 2013; Nasasra, 
2012). When the state introduced the 1969 Land Registry to systematically engage with the 
question of Bedouin land claims, al-Araqib’s land-owning families registered their lands and 
continued to appeal to the state through endless legal and bureaucratic chains, including 
contesting the transfer of their lands to the JNF and to Jewish settlements in the late 1990s. In 
2006, a new set of private land claims were initiated by the el-Uqbi family against the state. 
These are, at the time of writing (July 2014), being adjudicated at the Supreme Court
240
.  
At the same time, there are several families who continued to cultivate their lands and 
circumvent the military order to maintain their homes in the village. Awad Abu-Freih, 
another leader from the current struggle, was born in al-Araqib in 1962, from a family that 
never relocated (Abu-Freih, 2012; Algazi, 2011). Many others, also without state permission, 
returned after the end of the military regime; and others still, after another 20 years of 
rejections, returned in the 1980s and late 1990s (Nasasra, 2012). Sheikh Sayah al-Turi, who 
by then had been re-settled to Rahat, was among this more recent wave of returnees, arriving 
back in al-Araqib in 1999. In S. al-Turi’s words:  
“I’ve been waiting for more than forty years to be allowed to return to my land, but this 
dream has never come true. As a consequence, we decided to return to our native land and to 
build shacks and houses without obtaining the permission of the Israelis. This is our land, 
and I will live here forever, and I will not wait for the Israeli authorities to defraud us any 
longer.” (2009 interview with S. al-Turi, quoted in Nasasra, 2012) 
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 In other areas of the country, such as the Galilee, Israel respected Palestinian private ownership, based on 
British documentation. However, almost no such land rights were respected in the Naqab (Yiftachel, 2006). That 
said, as discussed in Chapter Three, an extensive spectrum of laws and planning policies were implemented to 
expropriate private Palestinian lands in these other regions.  
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 See Bishara & Naamnih (2011) and Nasasra (2012) for additional examples.        
240
 The el-Uqbi family’s claims have been through a legal rollercoaster. The Magistrate and District Courts in 
Beersheba supported the state’s argument (see for example, B.D.C., Decision 7161/06/06/07/08, 2012); but in 
the ongoing case at the Supreme Court (H.C.J. 4220/12), the state’s request for automatic transfer of al-Araqib 
lands to its name was denied (Aslosoroff, 2012; Sfard, 2011). In addition, in June, 2014, the Court requested the 
two sides enter into mediation (NCF Website, 2014; Jahalin Association Website, 2014; Keller, 2014) (a 
proposal which, according to Yiftachel in a personal communication in July, 2014, the state rejected). The other 
families, including al-Turi, have also submitted legal petitions to settle their claims, but as yet, none have 
reached the court.   
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S. al-Turi’s emphasis on ‘Return’ is key to al-Araqib’s entanglement with the hegemonic 
order, and its differential position within the state’s land lexicon. As will be discussed more 
comprehensively below, the Unrecognised Villages of the Seyag primarily fit into one of two 
categories: They were either settlements that existed prior to 1948, but have no official status; 
or they were created by the state, through on-going displacement from outside and within the 
enclosure zone and are, nevertheless, still excluded from the future vision of the region. The 
struggle for the villages’ collective and individual recognition weaves together several 
strategies and discourses that attempt to connect both kinds of cases. These include 
indigenous claims to property based on continuous presence and cultivation of lands; private 
ownership rights, based on traditional systems of customary law; rights of citizens to choose 
where and how they live; and the rights of all people to lives of dignity and respect. These 
clash directly with the state’s narratives, and with the logic that determines unredeemed – un-
Judaised – land, a threat to the Zionist project, and to the plans and maps that have made 
claims to Bedouin space. However, until al-Araqib, the challenge had been contained by the 
lines imposed on the reservation. While many Bedouins lament the loss of their lands and 
their right to return to them (S. Abu Rabia, 2012), their present demands are bound to the 
places they currently inhabit. Al-Araqib intersects the ‘right to recognition’ – and thus to 
‘legal’ existence within/through the state – with the ‘right to return’ – the right to reclaim 
refugee lands expropriated by the state during the Nakba. In so doing, it constitutes a 
challenge to the boundary-lines of the Reservation and cultivates a new frontline through 
which to engage the state’s hegemony over the Naqab. 
Wars of Attrition – Creating the New Border 
The state responded to al-Araqib as if under siege, slowly escalating the confrontation from 
surreptitious to increasingly direct and violent attempts at evicting the community. Until the 
late 1990s, the state maintained control of the lands via bureaucratic distance; expropriating 
lands on paper, rejecting the legal appeals but making no direct move to colonise the area 
(Algazi, 2014). Then, in 1998, the al-Araqib family-holdings (primarily el-Uqbi and al-Turi 
lands) were transferred to the Jewish National Fund (JNF) for forestation purposes. On this 
basis, a court order was instituted in 2000 with the first set of evictions. When the families 
didn’t leave, in 2002, then again in 2003 and 2004, the state sent crop-dusters filled with 
pesticides to destroy their fields and fauna. Thousands of trees and plants, and hundreds of 
animals died as a result (Yiftachel, 2006; al-Turi, 2011; Algazi, 2011). Still, the village 
remained, leading to partial demolitions in 2005, while the state worked towards 
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implementing a new development plan to hasten investment and Jewish migration in the 
south (Yiftachel, 2009a). In the meantime, the state approved and settled Kibbutz Givot Bar 
in al-Araqib territory, while the courts consistently rejected the community’s objections (Or 
Movement; Jewish National Fund, 2004
241
).  
Today, the structural and direct violence instituted as part of the Prawer Plan is just another 
reconfiguration in this war of attrition. Under the guise of the new Plan, the village was 
demolished 65 times between July 27
th
, 2010 and June 12
th
, 2014. In addition, the state has 
charged the Al-Araqib activists with criminal offenses, sued them for damages and costs of 
the demolitions, and vilified them in the Jewish public arena
242
. During the 55
th
 demolition-
day, on August, 25
th
, 2013, the police arrested 4 leaders of the struggle – all members of the 
al-Turi family – for their ‘illegal’ occupation of the site (Tarabut-Hithabrut, 2013). The 
release of the detainees was initially conditioned on their never again being able to step foot 
on al-Araqib lands; an attempt by police to circumvent on-going court cases on the question 
of land ownership and de facto recognition of the community’s rights to their village. They 
refused, and with the support of lawyers, activists, family members and intensive 
international pressure, managed to thwart the restraining order. However, the state still would 
not concede. On the day of the 65
th
 demolition, the cemetery compound was invaded by 
demolition forces. The array of structures built since 2010 to hold together life in al-Araqib 
were torn down and the last haven of resistance destroyed. A final evacuation order, 
promising the removal of all people and belongings from the village-site, was delivered on 
July 12
th
, 2014; however, at the time of writing (August, 2014), had yet to be implemented
243
.  
Al-Araqib, in turn, has entrenched itself in Israeli space, against increasing programmes of 
erasure. Before 2010, acts of Sumud and survival strategies helped to carve out and demand 
space beyond the Seyag line. After 2010, in addition to continuously rebuilding the village, 
residents have evolved a range of advocacy tactics to spotlight their struggle, in public, legal 
and legislative arenas. An international campaign primarily targeting JNF funders and the 
international Jewish community, which exposes the JNF’s forestation and colonisation of al-
Araqib lands, has been led by residents of the village and promoted by several local Jewish 
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 The OR Movement (established in 2002) is a Zionist-settler movement, seeking to forward the Judaisation 
programme in the Naqab and the Galilee; Kibbutz Givot Bar is one of their projects. 
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 For an example of the rhetoric used to discredit al-Araqib and the Bedouins’ claims for recognition, see 
Franzman (2014); Yahel, Kark & Franzman (2012); Tal (2013); Segev (2010); and B.D.C., Decision 
7161/06/06/07/08, 2012. 
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 There is currently an injunction from the Supreme Court, protecting the villagers from their ‘final’ eviction 
until a decision is made on the issue of land ownership. 
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NGOs; the Negev Coexistence Forum (NCF), Rabbis for Human Rights (RHR) and Tarabut-
Hithabrut are its main partners in these activities. However, many other Jewish and 
Palestinian organisations have developed their own al-Araqib solidarity campaigns
244
. The 
public campaign runs parallel to the legal campaign for private property rights, litigated by 
Michael Sfard, one of Israel’s most prominent human rights lawyers. Through the case, the 
community has mapped the extensive physical and legal evidence that exists to corroborate 
the claims of a continuous indigenous presence and rights to this land. Al-Araqib activists 
have linked their protest to the ongoing work of Palestinian and Jewish NGOs seeking to 
‘legalise’ all Bedouins’ claims; they have propelled the northern Palestinian activists and 
politicians to initiate collective action, on their behalf, and informed the critical geographic, 
legal and political research of multiple local and international academics, exemplified in the 
work of Nasasra (2012) and Kedar et al (2012). Their politics have also extended to the 
public street, with residents organising almost weekly demonstrations at the “Lehavim 
Junction”, at the point where Highway 40 reaches the entrance to Beersheba; and with their 
leaders taking the helm of multiple demonstrations in Beersheba and Jerusalem. They have 
shared their story with countless outsiders, and their narrative has appeared in thousands of 
articles, human rights reports and public fora, inside the country and across the globe. They 
have developed several platforms through which to speak directly to their Jewish/Israeli 
audience, seeking justice and recognition of their rights through the courts, at the Knesset and 
in the mainstream media (el-Uqbi, 2014). Most significantly, they have held onto the 
mourners’ protest tent, without interruption, since the first demolition day; although since the 
June 2014 eviction of the cemetery, the al-Turis hold the space without the tent, on mats, 
underneath the night sky.    
When I began mapping the Bedouin case in 2011, a human rights lawyer warned me against 
spotlighting Al-Araqib in my research (Human Rights Lawyer, 2011)
245
. She explained that 
the case is an exception that harms the larger legal campaign of the Unrecognised Villages; 
many of its residents were relocated and given plots of land elsewhere, which implies that 
they gave up their land claims in the move. Within the restrictions by which Israeli law has 
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 NCF, located in Beersheba, was founded to cultivate Jewish and Palestinian co-existence in the Naqab and 
has become a major resource on village demolitions, as well as key actors in the anti-Prawer campaigns. 
Tarabut-Hithabrut is a joint Jewish-Palestinian grassroots activist organisation (sitting under the umbrella of the 
DFPE), seeking social and political justice for all who share the territory between the Mediterranean and the 
Jordan River; Rabbis for Human Rights is an international Jewish (Rabbinic) organisation, whose mandate in 
Israel is the protection of all vulnerable communities. 
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 This kind of statement can be harmful to the lawyer’s reputation; although she consented to the use of her 
real name, it is not given here. 
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contained the Bedouin struggle, in accordance with a deeply ethnocratic and colonial 
hegemony, there is little chance of their success. However, it is for precisely this reason that 
this case is crucial to a study of resistance; an unruly and transgressive component of the 
spectrum of actions to retain and protect Bedouin space. It is also the reason so many of those 
interviewed for this study are inspired by the case, many pointing to the fact that Sheikh 
Sayah has a home in Rahat, and yet chooses to live and fight in a protest tent in al-Araqib. 
Al-Araqib, which is reclaiming land outside the reservation, which has proof it existed prior 
to 1948, which seeks recognition and return, has forced the state to define and defend its 
limits. It has become the contentious outsider, disarticulating the hegemonic order as others 
engage and reshape the discourse from within more sanctioned, albeit grey lines and spaces.  
Dynamics of Power and Resistance  
“We should transform the Bedouins into an urban proletariat in industry, services, 
construction, and agriculture. 88% of the Israeli population are not farmers. Let the 
Bedouins be like them. Indeed, this will be a radical move which means that the Bedouin 
would not live on his land with his herds, but would become an urban person who comes 
home in the afternoon and puts his slippers on... This would be a revolution, but it may be 
fixed within two generations. Without coercion but with governmental direction ... this 
phenomenon of the Bedouins will disappear.” 
Moshe Dayan, (then) Minister of Agriculture, Haaraetz interview, July 31
st
, 1963  
(quoted in Ben-Amos, 2013) 
“The objective of the formalization of the settlement is to provide an opportunity to Bedouins 
in the Negev, and particularly to their children, to leap within a few years to a better future 
through integration in the economic prosperity expected in the Negev in the coming decade, 
and the ending of a situation in which a large population resides in homes that were built 
illegally. The need for the development of the Bedouin settlements derives from this objective; 
from it derives the need for planning regulation and from it derives the need to settle land 
ownership claims.” 
Benny Begin, Summary Consultation Report: Draft Law for the Regulation of Bedouin 
Settlement in the Negev, 2013 
These two statements are separated by 50 years, like book ends to the evolution of the state’s 
plan for the Bedouin residents contained within the Seyag zone. The time in between them 
frames the dialectic that positioned the Bedouin as outsiders, and their struggle for 
recognition ‘inside’ the hegemonic order. It starts with Dayan’s vision for Bedouin 
urbanisation and ends with Begin’s schematic for integrating the Bedouin community into 
‘the future prosperity’ of the Naqab. Their shared rhetoric articulates the Bedouin 
communities as a problem for the development of the Jewish state; their spatial and social 
relations antithetical to the modern, colonial settlement project. Their shared solution is 
configured through the state’s legal and planning frameworks, through which contentious 
populations can and should be controlled and re-ordered to fit the development needs of the 
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national programme. Although, contrasting with Dayan, Begin’s document proposes a 
process of dialogue with the Bedouin communities, it works to impose a solution that 
functions with the same logic as that of his predecessor, and ultimately holds the same result: 
“to move the Bedouin off their lands and to continue to control them as aliens, refugees or 
simply unseen in their own homeland.” (Abu Kafr246; quoted in Yiftachel, 2006, p.208)  
Despite the difference in language and approach, the prism with which Begin and Dayan each 
shaped their policies remains the same: the state, its lands and its institutions belong 
exclusively to the Jewish people; and sovereignty is established primarily on the basis of 
physical presence and conquest of territory, through demographic, jurisdictional or symbolic 
control. The Zionist-project is enshrined in the material and spiritual ‘redemption’ of land, 
based on Jewish ethnicity and the purity of the space (Yiftachel, 2006). Through this lens, the 
indigenous Palestinian has no claim, no legitimacy, and no place, despite their factual 
presence in the midst of Israeli territory (Piterberg, 2008). The Judaisation project, for which 
each of these lawmakers is at least partially responsible, seeks to entrench this ‘truth’, 
through ongoing segregation and exclusion of Bedouin communities from the state’s 
political, social and spatial organisation; leading to their removal, replacement and 
redemption by Jewish spaces.  
The distance between Dayan and Begin is informed by more than time. It speaks to the clash 
between state hegemony and Bedouin frontier resistances, causing a long-term stalemate in 
the state’s attempts to forcefully reorganise Bedouin settlement in the Seyag zone (Yiftachel, 
2006). The shift in trajectory is expressed in Begin’s acknowledgement that some of the 
Bedouins were expelled to the Seyag; in his support for settling Bedouin land claims 
according to their historical rights, even if he negates their legal rights; in his understanding 
that Bedouin spatiality needs to be respected; and in his commitment to recognising some of 
the unrecognised villages (Begin, 2013). Dayan sought to remove any evidence of a Bedouin 
presence in the Naqab by encouraging their ‘transfer’ and absorption into ghetto-enclosures 
within the Mixed Cities
247
. He had no intention to maintain the Seyag; to create separate 
Bedouin localities, which would require services, infrastructure and support from the state; or 
to recognise Bedouin space or history (Yiftachel, 2006).  
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 When Jaber Abu Kafr made this statement, he was the chairman of the Regional Council of the Bedouin-
Arab Unrecognised Villages of the Negev (RCUV). The RCUV acts as a collective leadership council for the 
Unrecognised Villages; more details of which shall be discussed below. 
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 Until the establishment of the Bedouin planned townships in the 1970s and 1980s, many of the non-land-
owning Fellahin Bedouin migrated to Bedouin neighbourhoods in the central and southern Mixed Cities to find 
work at the lowest rungs of the Israeli economic strata (Khadra Elsana, 2011). 
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The enclave was imposed from above as a colonial construction, and reshaped from below by 
those upon whom it was imposed; entanglements that have prevented Dayan’s prophecy from 
coming true. The state devised physical and ideological boundaries through a two-pronged 
methodology, intersecting myth and law on one hand, planning and punishment on the other. 
However, the state’s limits and encroachments evolved in dialectic encounters with a border 
entrenched by the Bedouin community, in their resistance against erasure.  
Dead Spaces 
The legal-mythological frame with which the state approaches the desert is an evolving 
practice, performed as an ongoing and unabated expropriation of Bedouin space – an ongoing 
Nakba. The erasure begins with the Zionist pioneer dictum, in which the Naqab was the 
empty landscape that would house the Jewish refugees. It encapsulated the romance of the 
‘frontier’; a land without people for a people without land, to be conquered, tamed and settled 
by the Zionist project (Kark, 1981). The Bedouin communities were incorporated into the 
myth, as nomads without competing legal claims to what became State Lands. At the same 
time, the violent events of 1948 were whitewashed in the Judaisation of native names, places 
and symbols (Benvenisti, 2000), and legitimised in the long-term nation-building project that 
developed in their aftermath. 
Key to this process was the official untying of the Bedouin people from their lands, first by 
displacing them and then by denying the existence of village names and geographic markers 
(al-Asem, 2011). Bedouin identification cards include tribal affiliations, where there should 
have been an address; as is the case in all official state documents. As of 1949, there were no 
more Arab ‘villages’ in the Naqab. As Abushbeikh (2011), a Bedouin activist and ex-
fieldworker for the RCUV, explains: 
“In my ID, it says that I am from the tribe of Abu-Grinat, although I am from al-Bat 
village
248
. They put my address according to my tribe, because a tribe can be anywhere, but a 
village is something that exists in a place. The state does not want us to have a hold on the 
village. If the state writes that my address is ‘Al-Bat’ then it means that it recognizes this 
village… In Israel, there isn’t a single map with us on it. Only tribes – and tribes aren’t 
geographic places, they’re just tribes.” 
The empty space myth was further facilitated through legislation and policy; what Kedar et al 
(2012) labelled the ‘Dead Negev Doctrine’ (DND), in their collation of the various legal, 
planning and policing methods used to efface Bedouin land claims on either side of the Seyag 
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border. Bedouin territory became State Lands through the Land Acquisition Law (1953)
249
. 
The state then created a legalese for erasing Bedouin ownership claims, in accordance with 
their categorisation as primarily Mewat Lands that had never been registered under the 
Ottoman Land Ordinance (1858) or British legal regime’s Mewat Land Ordinance (1921), 
mentioned above
250
. The Land Regime was entrenched in the cultivation of the reservation as 
a frontier border, a holding place for the ‘Bedouin dispersion’ (Hapsura, in Hebrew; the 
state’s official term for the Bedouin inhabitants of the Naqab) that could be controlled, 
monitored and regulated
251
. The empty spaces were enforced through laws that limited over-
grazing and cultivation outside ‘recognised’ land holdings252; and further checks to Bedouin 
movements were orchestrated through tribal leaders, appointed by the state to funnel 
resources to their newly dependent and trapped communities (Marx, 1967; al-Haj, 1993; 
Cohen 2010). Water, land-access, work and travel permits were transmitted as part of a 
system of punishment and reward, nepotism and co-optation, bargaining and negotiation 
(Cohen, 2010; Marx, 1967)
253
. In parallel, a Military Unit – known as Unit 101 – was 
established to intimidate and coerce Bedouin communities into acquiescence and forced 
sedentarisation (Falah, 1985; Swirski & Hasson, 2006). Aside from daily acts of harassment, 
Unit 101 was responsible for the destruction of encampments, the killing of herds, and, in 
1953, the massacre of women and children from the el-Azazmeh tribe (Falah, 1985).   
The containers marked by the military regime were made official in the Planning and 
Construction Law (1965), and the evolution of the central planning mechanisms upon which 
consecutive District Plans have excluded and negated Bedouin claims. It paved the way for 
resolving the ‘Bedouin question’ through a second mass transfer of the population, from 
‘spontaneous’ and, according to the state, illegal agricultural clusters on large swathes of land 
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 For further details of the Law, see the table on the Legal Land Regime, in the Appendices to this thesis. 
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 The Ottoman Land Ordinance (1858), upon which the Israeli Land Law (1969) is based, determined several 
land-categories for according ownership; Mewat, which refers to uncultivated/dead lands more than 1.5 km from 
the closest ‘permanent’ settlement, was one of them. The British Land Ordinance prohibits the acquisition of 
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promulgation of the order in 1921 (Falah, 1989). The Israeli state utilised the two ordinances and the lack of 
registered land titles as evidence that the Bedouin had no official claims to Naqab lands. For more in-depth 
discussion of the ‘doctrine’, see the table in the Appendices to this thesis, as well as Kedar et al (2012); Shamir 
(1996); Falah (1989); and Swirski & Hasson (2006). 
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 The ‘Dispersion’, a rhetorical tool that effaces the idea of a rooted and settled Bedouin community, is 
discussed more comprehensively below. 
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 For example, the ‘Black Goat Law’ (1953) was set to prevent Bedouin goats from grazing on land 
appropriated for forestation or Jewish settlements. For more details, see Falah (1985) 
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 To discuss the breadth of actions used in the first decades of the state to ‘divide and rule’ the Bedouin 
communities of the Naqab is beyond the scope of this thesis. For further details, see Cohen (2010) and Marx 
(1967).  
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into condensed, urban arenas. The state established seven ‘Planned’ Townships in the Naqab: 
Tel el-Sab/Tel Sheva (1969), Rahat (1971), Shaqib al-Salam/Segev Shalom (1979), Ararat 
an-Naqab/Arara Ba Negev (1982), Kuseife (1982), Lakiya (1985) and Hura (1989)
254
. These 
could be seen as the state’s first major concessions to Bedouin resilience, as a majority of 
communities resisted the move to Mixed Cities, and re-oriented themselves to live within the 
reservation. However, the towns also represent a darker reality that further entrenched the 
“spatial isolation” of the Bedouin peripheries and the border between worlds (Yiftachel, 
2006, p.201). In addition to the ghetto experience of the townships, which were built without 
the economic or social infrastructure to sustain them, all space outside them mirrored the 
nothingness of Zionist mythology. The unplanned areas of Bedouin settlement were either 
left blank on maps and regional plans, or designated for public uses such as sewage plants, 
forests, industrial zones, and, in the case of the Unrecognised Village of Assira, an airport 
(Yiftachel, 2006)
255
. In parallel, the state reconfigured the DND to apply to the Seyag, as 
well. New legal precedents were concretised in the 1970s and 1980s (beginning with the 
1974 decision in the el-Huashlia case), as Bedouin communities sought formal avenues 
through which to prevent their forced displacement to the new urban centres. These early 
cases continue to provide the state with legal justifications for denying land rights in current 
legal actions
256
. 
The slow, evolving intersection of myth, law, planning, construction and destruction has 
produced a near-impenetrable hegemony. It hides the purposeful ordering of an ethnically 
pure Jewish state inside the Zionist colonial prism, which cannot ‘see’ the native, and has 
constructed its framework in the Naqab on this basis. Shamir (1996), in his review of the first 
Bedouin legal cases, argues that “law plays a crucial role – through its distinct logic of 
ordering and its techniques of surveillance – in turning the Zionist vision into a taken-for-
granted objective reality.” (p.7) Yiftachel (2006) and Falah (1985, 1989) make similar 
arguments concerning the Planning regime’s spatialisation of the Naqab to support Jewish 
control and disbursal. Benvenisti (2000) unveils this process in the state’s re-mapping and re-
writing of the Naqab, in the first decades of the state. The result, according to Sultany 
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 On Israeli maps the Hebrew names are used (i.e. Tel Sheva as opposed to Tel el-Sab). They are mentioned 
here for clarity, but henceforth only the Arabic names will be used.  
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 According to Swirski & Hasson (2006), more than 235,000 dunams of Bedouin lands have been appropriated 
within the Seyag, since 1948, for the sake of public works, industrial development and Jewish settlement. 
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 For extensive analysis of the initial legal precedents, see Shamir (1996); Kedar (2003); and Sultany 
(forthcoming, 2014). For discussion of the relevance of the legal precedents in present day cases, see B.D.C., 
Decision 7161/06/06/07/08 (2012); and Kedar et al (2012). See also Begin’s (2013) report, p.10, for his allusion 
to legal precedents that negate the legality of the Bedouins’ claims. 
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(forthcoming, 2014), is the construction “not of a mere binary between nomad and ‘western’ 
perceptions of property (p.16)”, but of a methodology that in and of itself has determined 
where and how Bedouin live; and is “part and parcel of the ongoing dispossession of the 
Bedouin from their lands (ibid)
257
.” Within this frame, the Bedouins cannot win. Regardless 
of official documentation, expert testimony or physical evidence to the contrary, Israeli legal, 
geographic and planning arenas have constructed a ‘dead-zone’ where once there was 
Bedouin life. 
At the same time, Bedouin life persists, cultivated as external to the hegemonic order; 
‘unseen’ in official terms, but key to the relations of space that have produced ‘the Naqab’ 
since 1948. The critical legal and planning scholars discussed in the previous paragraph posit 
the evolution of Bedouin subalternity as the result of the ‘dark side of planning’, legal 
ethnocracies and intentional neglect and marginalisation
258
. They see Bedouin space 
primarily in terms of its victimisation, with informal space considered an essential tool of the 
planning landscape as a way to contain ungovernable populations (Yacobi, 2009; Yiftachel, 
2006). Accordingly, Bedouins exist in ‘non-space’ – unrecognised space – because the 
hegemonic frame excludes them; enabled by the fact that there is no ‘legal’ mechanism 
through which to contest or threaten state ownership of the Naqab. However, it is also 
possible to consider the same processes as unruly resistances that are difficult to remove; the 
line in which they are contained as evolving, mediated in the dialectics of power and struggle. 
The Bedouins, in entrenching themselves in the margins, behind the border, negotiate a 
complex paradox. They become complicit in the segregation and marginalisation of their own 
communities, and the hegemonic ordering of the Naqab without Arab space; similar to what 
we have seen in the state’s treatment of the northern border zones. At the same time, the 
Bedouins have reclaimed their lands from the erasures of Zionist hegemony, carving grey 
spaces out of dead ones. 
Grey Spaces 
“… In our rightful Sumud, we have no choice but to break the law… because the law and its 
plans came to this place and tried to erase it many years after we were here… our community 
belongs to this place, and the place belongs to our community… even if our houses are 
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demolished again, we shall remain on our land… we cannot ever accept the plan that 
destroys our only community.”  
Attiyeh al-Athamin, council leader for the Unrecognised Village of Chasem Zaneh at a public 
hearing in Beersheba, 2008 (quoted in Yiftachel, 2009a) 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the starting point for the theorisation of grey space is 
within the work of Oren Yiftachel, in which he conceives of the Unrecognised Villages as 
enclaves positioned “between the lightness of legality/approval/safety and the ‘darkness’ of 
eviction/destruction/death.” (Yiftachel 2009, p.243) Grey spaces are “neither integrated nor 
eliminated… and exist outside the gaze of the state authorities and city plans (ibid)”. 
Accordingly, Bedouin grey spaces function outside the state. They survive because they live 
off the map, separate from the system of power. Grey space thus implies a mutual ‘bargain’, 
in which the state contains the threat of dissonance and disarticulation in this othered, 
external frontier; and those that inhabit it, in a sense, comply with and entrench themselves 
within these limits. However, while it is relevant to understand the evolution of Bedouin 
struggle in light of Yiftachel’s theory – encircled and yet excluded, developing in the shadow 
of the state’s darkened lenses – this is not the whole story of this case. The Bedouins use their 
position in non-space to engage the internal borders; while the state continues to isolate, 
delegitimise and remove that which breaches its hegemony over ‘dead’ and ‘living’ spaces.  
Throughout this thesis, ‘grey space’ has been discussed in reference to nearly all Palestinian 
space, which is marginalised in its exclusion and segregation from the social, political, 
economic and living spaces of Jewish society. By the same token, such an analysis resonates 
with the experience of all marginalised peoples, particularly indigenous groups in settler-
colonial settings; wherein the space they occupy is always ‘grey’, whether or not they are 
sanctioned as part of the map that is devised by colonial geographies. All Bedouin geography 
functions according to the same logic, determined as peripheral space within the Zionist 
landscape. However, there are shades to ‘grey’ that are particularly relevant in the Bedouin 
case. These are reinforced in the sub-divisions of Bedouin spatiality, ‘recognised’ versus 
‘unrecognised’, ‘planned’ versus ‘spontaneous’; divisions which are imposed, on one hand, 
via mass forced displacements, and on the other, by debilitating anti-development policies. 
The state’s intention is to close in on the ungovernable spaces, developing the conditions by 
which they can be regulated, controlled and manoeuvred as needed, and ultimately segregated 
and erased from Jewish space. The gradations of grey contribute to this process, as the state 
paints some Bedouin space as illegal, and some permissible, often in conjunction with a 
community’s acquiescence to different ‘transfer’ policies (Raanan, 2011; Shamir, 1996).  
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Bedouin space is categorised in one of three ways in the Naqab: There are seven Planned 
Townships, 11 Recognised Villages
259
 and 35 Unrecognised Villages (RCUV, 2006). The 
Townships are formally included on maps and in the Beersheba Metropolitan plans, but little 
attention or budget allocations have been afforded them (Abu-Saad, 2008). The ‘Recognised 
Villages’ were previously ‘Unrecognised Villages’ that gained their status, most in 2004-
2006, through mechanisms introduced by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2003, to regulate 
Bedouin settlement; to some degree, these were established in response to the refusal of a 
majority of the communities to relinquish land claims outside the townships
260
. The 
Unrecognised Villages are those villages without any status, boundaries or permanency in the 
eyes of the state.  
The lines between these categories are largely elastic, with many of the townships acting as 
home to unplanned and unrecognised neighbourhoods; and with the Recognised Villages still 
having no formal plans that can legalise housing situations, infrastructure development and 
municipal services. Many of the buildings are still under demolition orders, and the 
communities are as vulnerable as before Recognition. Even their representation in two new 
District Councils – founded explicitly to govern the needs of the newly recognised localities – 
has not evolved into formal, elected bodies. Their residents still have little to no control over 
the space and the lives lived within it. That said, it is important to carve out a distinct analysis 
for the Unrecognised Villages, and the type of resistance that is formed through/inside the 
legal-political bubble in which they exist: un-addressed, un-seen, and “suspended in space” 
(Shamir, 1996).  
The Bedouins’ darkest spaces – resilient and rebellious, a counter-point to the colonial and 
allegedly modern order of Judaised territory – are articulated, first, in physical and aesthetic 
terms. Nili Baruch (2011), an urban planner from Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights, 
who worked with the Unrecognised Villages to create an ‘Alternative Master Plan’ (2012)261 
to the official state version, explains: “The state plans as if there’s nothing here. But there is 
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 In January 2003, Sharon’s ‘5 Year Plan’ for the Naqab, known as the Sharon-Livni Plan, was approved. The 
plan sought to recognise an additional seven Bedouin villages in exchange for relinquishing claims over 
additional lands. Some saw this plan as a breakthrough of the Bedouin lobby, particularly since it resulted in an 
additional four villages being recognised, bringing the grand total to 18. However, nearly 40% of the plan’s 1.8 
billion shekel budget was allocated to “law enforcement”, a well-known euphemism for home demolitions; 
particularly since the remaining Bedouin communities would be “relocated” to the newly recognised villages or 
planned townships, in exchange for some monetary compensation, and tracts of land within the recognised 
areas. See Swirski & Hasson (2006) and Yiftachel (2006) for a more detailed discussion of the Plan. 
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 A Map depicting the Plan and its ‘vision’ for the Unrecognised Villages of the Seyag can be found in 
Appendix 3.5 of this thesis. 
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something here, and the way the space is planned and used by the community has a function”. 
Bedouin spatiality, like Bedouin systems of law, grows and develops as it is lived, according 
to community relations in space (Karplus & Meir, 2014). For example, in a traditional 
Bedouin village – a model reproduced in the majority of the Unrecognised Villages – the 
family units are marked by clusters of houses; tribal relations linked in concentric circles. 
They grow out of each other, and yet each unit is segregated, private and protected from 
intrusion (Raanan, 2011; Baruch, 2011). According to Yeela Raanan (2011), a Jewish 
anthropologist and RCUV case-worker, there is nothing in the Israeli planning model that 
looks like this, and there is nothing in the Israeli hegemonic order that can accommodate this. 
The Bedouin village space reflects and is produced by deep ties to land and family identities, 
and the continuation of a lifestyle that is independent from an urban reality. Moreover, it has 
become a particularly distinct alternative to the modern grids, condensed space, and 
increasingly impoverished havens for drugs and criminal activities, that have become 
pervasive in the planned townships. 
This image of a ‘different’ living space is then punctuated by a lack of schools, infrastructure, 
electricity, even water. Homes are built out of temporary materials, mirroring their temporary 
status. The villages do not appear on the state registry; as a result of which there are no 
addresses through which to register one’s identity, and thus no right to local services, 
government representation or for their residents to run for governmental positions. 
Demolitions and evictions are an ongoing and recurring reality, constructed as part of 
Bedouin lived-experience in their grey-zoned space. The villages have continued to survive 
here at a high cost, consciously, intentionally; not a mere by-product to being forgotten or 
excluded victims of the ethno-colonial mythology of dead, empty space, but produced and 
embedded through struggle.  
The villages evolved as enclaves against an endless series of urbanisation policies, 
compensation schemes, and registration programmes set to encourage, then coerce and finally 
force the Bedouins into the townships. At first, relocation policies were orchestrated through 
the offer of extensive subsidies and compensations to all residents who gave up their 
traditional land claims. The Bedouin Land Registry (1969), mentioned above, was initiated to 
collate and track the claims, and facilitate the new mechanisms in place for transfer and 
compensation. For their part, the Bedouins used the Registry as a method through which to 
legalise their land holdings, establishing their first mass attempts to cultivate recognition 
within and through hegemonic tools of the system. More than 3000 individual memoranda 
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claims (on behalf of more than 12,000 claimants) were registered, in reference to 990,000 
dunams of land; a puzzle that fit together to cover the spectrum of Bedouin territory, inside 
and outside the Seyag (Bishara & Naamnih, 2011; Swirski & Hasson, 2006; Sfard, 2011)
262
. 
After five years, the state closed the Registry, and left the claims to sit in bureaucratic limbo 
for 30 years, while orchestrating its own counter-claims and using a multitude of para-legal 
actions to build its own facts on the ground (Sfard, 2011; Swirski & Hasson, 2006). When the 
courts finally began adjudicating the claims in 2005, after years of lobby by the Bedouin 
communities, the DND precedents and planning mechanisms were reaffirmed. Out of the 200 
that finally reached the courts, all have been decided in the state’s favour.  
Within the 30 year gap in legal mechanisms, the enclosure of the Seyag and increasing 
isolation of the communities were an essential response of the state to its unruly populations. 
Ties were severed with the centre of the country, and the communities were ordered through 
proxy institutions established in Beersheba. At the pinnacle, sits the Bedouin Development 
Authority, the local arm of the ILA in the Naqab (Swirski & Sasson, 2006). Established in 
1986, the Authority’s initial mandate was to conduct negotiations with the Bedouin who 
submitted land-title claims. However, over the years, its jurisdiction has expanded to include 
all services, planning, construction and policing of the Bedouin Recognised Villages; and to 
deal with any hindrances to these processes (ibid; S. Abu Rabia, 2012). It has been 
responsible for the creation of such organisations as the Green Patrol, a descendent of Unit 
101 with a similar mandate to uphold agricultural and environmental policies initiated to 
contain Bedouin “unregulated grazing” and land-cultivation, through any means necessary. It 
also inaugurated the new Authority for the Regulation of Bedouin Settlement, charged with 
implementing the Prawer Plan/Law and recruiting a new, expanded military unit (called 
‘Yoav’) to enforce it.  
Alongside the institutions, more direct acts of harassment constructed the boundaries of 
recognised and unrecognised living situations. Direct violence initiated by The Green Patrol 
was a mainstay of the 1980s, through which over 900 Bedouin encampments were destroyed 
and over 100,000 goats killed (Falah, 1985). House demolitions became the central policy for 
coercion following the publication of Markovitz’s (1985) report on illegal construction and 
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 The amount of land to which the claims refer varies, in accordance with different sources. In addition to the 
amount qupted above, the Land Settlement Department statistics offer a figure of 776,856 dunams (Falah, 
1989), Begin quotes 559,000 dunams as registered through Bedouin claims (Begin, 2013), and the highest 
approximations mention 2.4 million dunams claimed by Bedouin communities (Falah, 1989).  
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grey buildings
263
; and since the late 1990s/early 2000s, whole villages began receiving 
eviction orders. The demolitions have escalated along with the number of evictions, 
throughout the 2000s – up to and including the razing of Al-Araqib; with yearly numbers 
reaching the 200 mark or higher since 2007, and peaking at more than 1000 demolitions each 
year since 2011, when the Prawer Plan was approved (Yiftachel, 2009a; Adalah, 2013; Negev 
Coexistence Forum, 2013). Although it should be noted that every time a home is torn down, 
the villagers – through support from the RCUV and the Islamic Movements – rebuild it 
(Yiftachel, 2009a; al-Asem, 2011; Mustafa, 2013). 
Still, a more surreptitious stick remains the key frame for enforcing the border between white 
and dead space; and slowly encroaching and removing the grey ones. For those who have 
refused to move, the state set up a clear contrast between the ‘modern’ townships and the 
unregulated settlements. Yiftachel (2009) has labelled this process ‘creeping apartheid’; 
where no formal division of rights and communities has been accorded through the law, but 
in practice the segregation is exceptionally clear. The state orchestrated a blanket negation of 
the right of the unrecognised residents to any state services, benefits or protections; and then 
rationalised the division, explaining that it is only by containing Bedouin settlement within 
the townships that the state can ensure the Bedouins receive benefits and the support they 
need to acclimatise to ‘modern life’264. Interlocutors to this thesis – both Bedouin and Jewish 
– consistently describe this policy in contrast with the differential treatment for Jews in the 
Naqab, whose single-family farms receive state services, and thus approval and legitimacy.  
Despite these pressures, only half the Bedouin population of the Naqab – approximately 
100,000 of 190,000 – have moved to the townships, and of these, the majority were either 
Fellahin, which had no traditional land holdings and sought to reverse their status within the 
Bedouin social infrastructure; or were among those whom had lost lands outside the Seyag. 
Moreover, only 30,000 dunams out of nearly 1 million have been ‘settled’ through the legal 
machinery. This points not only to the state’s prolonged stagnation of the claims process, but 
to decades of resistance to the systematic ‘resolution’ of the Bedouins’ (non)place within the 
hegemonic order (Abu-Saad, 2008).  
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 The Markovitz Committee Report (1985) is discussed more fully in Chapter Three, in reference to the policy 
of home demolitions it initiated in the Galilee region. 
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 See the Bedouin Development Authority’s (2006) letter to Physicians for Human Rights (PHR), for an 
outline of their policy on Bedouin relocation, subsumed within a response to PHR’s request for information on 
water installation for the Unrecognised Villages.   
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The Unrecognised Villages represent a key encounter, in the interplay between the hegemony 
of empty space and those who inhabit it. They encapsulate a physical arena through which the 
capacity and desire to resist the state continues to evolve by living without it; by surviving its 
aggressions and cultivating relatively autonomous social and political relationships; and by 
living outside the parameters of what can be assimilated by the state, and is, instead, bordered 
and contained. However, the Bedouins’ grey-spaced resistance is neither limited nor 
protected by their position on the margins. In contravention to the segregated peripheries in 
the north, which are to some degree protected by a stronger and more concentrated 
Palestinian demographic, their ‘borders’ have not produced paradoxical havens from the 
state.  
In maintaining a ‘rightful Sumud’, as al-Athamin calls it, the Bedouins directly contravene 
the Judaising logic that seeks to swallow Arab space (in the Naqab and throughout the 
country), and a range of activities have developed out of this ‘steadfast resilience’. Many of 
their resistance practices were orchestrated on the basis of the villages’ exclusion and 
expulsion from the hegemonic order. For example, the Bedouins have produced alternative 
maps, plans and political organisations from their positions in non-space and of non-
recognition. However, the Bedouins’ engagement in the struggle to recognise, plan, organise, 
own and develop the villages pits them directly against the boundaries that have determined 
their outsider status. Framed as a struggle for recognition, from outside-in, the clash between 
Bedouin grey space and state space have revealed, activated, breached and disarticulated the 
borders between them. The remainder of this chapter will be focused on these issues. 
The Bedouin Struggle – Engaging the Lines 
In the Bedouin case, there are multiple ‘struggles’ occurring simultaneously, weaving in and 
out of each other, sometimes in conflict and sometimes in concert with one another. There is 
a struggle for indigenous land rights, which challenges both the colonial and ethnic logics of 
the Zionist regime. There is a struggle to plan and order life, in accordance with a slowly 
evolving Bedouin spatiality, that can be simultaneously modern, in terms of modern 
infrastructure and economic opportunities; and traditional, in terms of agricultural space, 
lifestyles and social relations (Abu-Freih, 2012; Baruch, 2011). There is an anti-hegemonic 
struggle against the state’s tools of erasures, maps, plans, legal infrastructure, colonial 
narratives and historical mythologies. There is also a struggle against the ongoing limbo and 
vulnerability of grey space by citizens that seek their rights to be part of the state, without 
giving up their identity, their connection to the past, and their capacity to develop in the 
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future. These pieces intersect to form a comprehensive, existential struggle, against a siege on 
Bedouin space that negates their past, present and future in this place. According to Khalil el-
Amour (2011), a founder of the RCUV and resident-activist from the Unrecognised Village 
of Assira, if the state is successful:  
“it will eliminate the Bedouin lifestyle. If they succeed, and force all of us to relocate to the 
towns and cities, there wouldn’t be any more Bedouins in Israel… If it will happen, this will 
be our next disaster. We had one disaster in 1948, with the loss of 90% of our population. 
Now, no one will stay outside. Everyone will be concentrated into these concentration camps, 
and will need to survive there. To be or not to be, this is the issue
265.”  
Hence, the struggle, which has been framed by interlocutors to this thesis as ‘a last stand over 
land’, has evolved as a symbol for all Palestinian resistance against their erasure in and by 
Israeli territorialisation. 
Each element of the above begins in the same place, outside the hegemonic order, in the dark, 
blank spaces of the Zionist colonial map. Yet each is shaped by constant interactions, 
engagements and negotiations with the state, its frontiers and its limits. While Bedouin space 
is re-claimed, redrawn, and re-visibilised through struggle – in particular through the creation 
and maintenance of grey spaces – recognition is, ultimately, awarded from top-down. The 
following sections unpack the trajectories of these engagements and permeations in the 
Naqab. The discussion follows two key anchors of Bedouin resistance, which intersect and 
build on one another; particularly since the Prawer Plan came into being and fixed the border 
between them.  
The first of these is the case of the initiation and development of the RCUV; the second, to 
which we have already been introduced, is that of Al-Araqib. The RCUV, founded nearly 20 
years ago, set the frame for Bedouins’ radical contentious politics. While it has constructed 
its resistance arsenal within the arenas of the political system, mirroring the state’s language, 
professionalism, governance structures, maps and plans, it works from outside them; in large 
part because they have been excluded from all formal systems within the state. Al-Araqib 
uses many of the same methods, language and tools as the RCUV, but, at the same time 
pushes the frontline further, as it directly protests the physical and political ‘lines of 
apartheid’ drawn by the Seyag zone (Abu-Freih, 2012). Together, these case-examples are a 
window into the evolution – and explosion – of Bedouin struggle, in dialogue with the state’s 
increasing assault on their communities. They also unveil the different types of hegemonic 
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boundaries activated and challenged by Bedouin resistances, and the resulting disarticulations 
and re-articulations of black, grey and white spaces on the colonial map. 
The Regional Council for the Unrecognised Bedouin-Arab Villages of the Naqab
266
  
“The RCUV is made by the community for the community. The community created this on its 
own.” 
Ali Abushbeikh, Personal Interview, 2012 
The RCUV, like the Popular Committee in Jaffa, was established through a spark that shifted 
the shape and collective capacity of the various campaigns for Bedouin land rights (Raanan, 
2011; el-Amour, 2011, al-Asem, 2011). In the 1970s and 1980s, as the Land Registry, 
compensation schemes and forced urbanisation became failed solutions to the state’s 
“Bedouin problem”, rumblings from the community were dismissed by the state’s claims that 
‘The Bedouin have no leaders; no one to negotiate with’. The community saw many of their 
traditional leaders as vassals of the state, through whom benefits and punishments were 
distributed and whose protections could not hold back the rampant home demolitions and 
mass transfers. As the elders flailed, a burgeoning young leadership arose to engage the state 
and the repercussions of its new plans for the Seyag. Many of this young leadership were 
among the first to attain higher education, to challenge the state on Bedouin land rights and to 
join the larger Palestinian political infrastructure that slowly infiltrated the desert during and 
after Land Day, in 1976
267
.  
A small, but viable network was in place by 1995, when one of their members, Dr. Amer al-
Huzeil, organised a conference to discuss the future of the “Bedouin Dispersion”, in light of 
increasing pressures from the state to relocate. The conference theme is significant to the 
transformative nature of this origin story. The Bedouins referred to settlements outside the 
townships in the same way the state had, as part of a “dispersion”. This linguistic mechanism 
perpetuated the legal mythologies of empty lands and nomadic Bedouins, and defined the 
communities’ concentration and sedentarisation within the Seyag, as a spontaneous act that 
inherently denied their land claims. This framed the spectrum of resistances until this point, 
containing the Bedouins’ demands within individual settlements and families, either through 
more formal arenas, like the Land Registry or at the court system, or through informal, 
everyday actions that put facts on the ground, like rebuilding demolished homes and 
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continuing to survive outside the planned-zones (Abu Rass, 2011). It was at this meeting that 
a truly collective struggle – and thus collective recognition – was conceived, through their 
(self) articulation of the Unrecognised Villages. Raanan (2011) describes the moment like “a 
bang”: 
“And they were in this meeting, about how to re-do the leadership, and that’s how the idea of 
the villages came up. It was electrifying. Somebody said, I don’t belong to a tribe, but I live in 
a village. Because their IDs said they belonged to this or that tribe, and the government 
called them ‘dispersed’, ‘the dispersion’. And they said no, we are not ‘the dispersion’, we 
are villages. And they went around the room, and just started asking where people were from, 
what was the name of their village. And then they re-Christened their villages with their 
names.” 
According to Attiyeh al-Asem (2011), the first chairman of the RCUV, the leadership group 
concretised the existence of the villages, confirming to themselves that they were fixed, in a 
particular geographic place, with historic resonance that could be claimed not by tribes, but 
by residents. Over the next two years (and beyond), they sent out geographers, planners and 
case-workers to determine the boundaries and re-claim place-names erased by the Judaising 
project. Their work involved talking to their fellow villagers, sharing the idea and creating an 
insurgent process from the ground up that has since been embedded in the communities; 
evolving as a shared struggle for self-recognition and self-democratisation
268
. As Abushbeikh 
(2012) remembered in our interview:  
We went to talk to the elders, to young people, to everyone in the villages and asked them, 
what is this village called? And they would say, ‘this is Rahame’, or ‘Assira’ or ‘Wadi al-
Naam’. And (we asked) ‘where are the borders?’ And they would show us, and say here is 
where it starts, here is where it ends. And we did this over and over again…This helped us to 
be able to organise ourselves, the fact that we knew what and where each village was. Then 
we put the symbols on the map and we recognized them.” 
The RCUV came into being with the recognition of the villages and with the creation of the 
map Abushbeikh references. This map, in keeping with discussions from previous chapters, is 
much more than an ‘alternative’ to the state’s hegemony over cartographic imagery269. It is a 
physical expression of the Bedouin’s reclamation of the space, in its direct clash with and 
disarticulation of the state’s hegemony over Bedouin territory, before and after 1948. This 
was further reinforced in the fact that as each new village joined ‘the map’, the RCUV put up 
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(2004) and Zochrot (2012).  
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a sign-post and paved a gravel road to the entrance to mark the space (Payes, 2005). The 
initial map started with 45 villages, collected through the participatory process described 
above
270
. However, successive and increasingly radical maps have been developed to 
describe a more comprehensive Bedouin story. These maps now include the more than 60 
destroyed villages that once existed beyond the Seyag, differentiating between those 
established before and after 1948, and pointing to the multiple transfers suffered and survived 
by many of these communities. They also distinguish between the Planned, State Recognised 
and still Unrecognised Villages, compare Jewish and Arab jurisdictions and population 
densities, and incorporate a highly politicised discourse. In the 2006 version that introduces 
this chapter, the townships are called ‘concentration townships’. It also directly points out the 
state’s attempt to absorb the campaign by calling the Recognised Villages, “State Established 
Villages”, on official district plans and maps.  
The map represents a complex documentation of past and present, of unequal development 
and ethnic discrimination, of recognised and unrecognised space; and of the narrative 
discussed at the start of this chapter. According to Abushbeikh’s (2012) analysis it helped 
shape the Bedouins’ own understanding of their relationship to the state, to their neighbours 
and to their own villages. It was “the most important thing (they) achieved (ibid),” 
constructing the lines against and around which they organised their resistance.   
The mapping process also shaped who would be included in a collective struggle for 
recognition; wherein recognition was not about individual property rights – a battle that 
continues alongside it – but a collective right to justice. Communities became bound to a 
particular name, and thus, a particular place. This gave the founding activists the idea of 
establishing a representative council, a democratic body that could intervene on the 
Unrecognised’s behalf. This body became the RCUV. 
Insurgent Methodologies – Working From Outside-In 
The RCUV has four main strategies, each evolving a set of methodologies that attempt to 
force recognition from the state (Payes, 2005; el-Amour, 2011; Raanan, 2011; Abushbeikh, 
2012). Each strategy stems from a place from which the Bedouin have been erased or 
completely left out: the creation of a governing body; developing an alternative plan for the 
villages; empowering their communities; and visibilising the struggle in national and 
international platforms. With each layer, the practical reality of being ‘Unrecognised’ has 
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been, to some degree, chipped away, unbinding the limits of grey space, as the struggle 
activates and crosses over the hegemonic borders imposed by the state.   
The first recognition strategy evolved as the RCUV organised itself into an alternative 
governing body, cultivating their position as the ‘frontline’ for negotiations with the state. 
The RCUV functions like any other regional council in Israel (Payes, 2005)
271
. Each of its 
member-villages elects its own community council, which acts as an address through which 
to resolve internal issues within the villages and to articulate their needs and interests with the 
regional body (RCUV, accessed 2013; Abu Gharbiyeh, 2012). The head of the community 
council becomes the village’s representative to the RCUV. In 1997, when it was first 
founded, 22 villages sent representatives to the council. Today, all 35 still Unrecognised 
Villages, including al-Araqib, are members. Their goals, according to el-Amour (2011) have 
remained unchanged:  to achieve recognition for all the Unrecognised Villages and attain the 
services and infrastruction that allegedly accompany legitimacy. This ethos of ‘recognition’ 
has transformed the struggle, integrating the villages’ demands of the state with their 
communities’ development as a (somewhat) cohesive collective, with joint legal rights and 
indigenous claims. Other than its registration as an NGO, the state has never accorded the 
RCUV official status. However, as the RCUV became more organised and more vocal, the 
State was forced to contend with them.   
The work on the Map evolved into two additional tactics, as part of the strategy to carve out 
recognition through the state. First, they sought to negotiate with the central planning 
bureaucracies that define the infrastructures, services and development of Bedouin spaces, 
akin to the central planning mechanisms that negate growth and development of Palestinian 
communities in the Galilee and Jaffa. Second, they began to implement these alternative 
plans through legal arenas. In both cases, the intention was to create an alternative discourse 
and counter-reality to the Planning Ministry’s long-term invisibilisation of Bedouin 
settlements and their “development needs”; as well as to challenge the logic and inevitability 
of the District Master Plan for the Beersheba Metropolitan Area (14/4)
272
, upon which the 
Prawer Plan and Draft Law are based. The Metropolitan Plan has been under development 
since 1995. In its current iteration, it expands the district plan for Beersheba eastward deep 
into the Seyag, swallowing the main drag of Unrecognised Villages between Arad and 
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 Further details on the Beersheba District Master Plan can be found in the table of relevant Planning 
Documents in the Appendices to this thesis.  
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Dimona. It includes a budget for the establishment of 10 additional Jewish settlements, which 
will replace the Bedouin villages to be displaced by the new Law (Swirski & Hasson, 2006; 
Mair, 2008; Bishara & Naamnih, 2011).   
In Meir’s (2005) study of the RCUV, he chronicled the organisation’s development of a 
methodology he labelled ‘insurgent planning’273. The process took form in the development 
of an “Alternative Plan”. It utilised the professional tools and criteria with which the state had 
planned the region, in order to create the conditions through which Bedouin space could be 
made ‘visible’ in official, hegemonic channels. The Bedouins’ counter-vision was then fed 
back into the establishment, through hearings with the Planning Councils, lobbying at the 
Knesset, presenting the Plan in a variety of national public arenas, and working with local 
and international media (ibid). The document, A Plan for Development of a Municipal 
Authority for the Unrecognised Bedouin Arab Villages of the Negev (published by the RCUV 
in 1999), was coordinated by al-Huzeil in collaboration with the spectrum of RCUV 
constituents, like the Map before it. The plan is a concrete articulation by the Bedouin 
communities of what their space could and should be. As alluded to above, in 2012, after two 
years of field-based consultations, al-Huzeil’s plan was updated and expanded in a new 
configuration, jointly produced by the RCUV, Bimkom (through a team led by Nili Baruch 
and Oren Yiftachel), and Sidre, a women’s empowerment organisation in Lakiya. The 
Alternative Master Plan for Bedouin Villages in the Negev (published collectively in 2012) 
builds upon the first plan, but then takes the professional planning process further. It 
contributes a full district plan for all 46 Bedouin villages in the Naqab, and incorporates 
specific models for planning the villages according to both traditional living space and the 
evolving needs of the community, as part of a modern state. This includes plans for how to 
connect the villages to public services and infrastructure; how to develop their industrial 
potential; and how to expand their open and green/leisure spaces
274
.  
The legal stream was a complementary funnel through which to embed the Plan within 
hegemonic arenas, and expand the boundaries within which Bedouin spaces are recognised. 
The RCUV worked with several lawyers and organisations, including Adalah, the 
Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), and Physicians for Human Rights in Israel 
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 The 2012 plan produced some key tensions in the community when it was launched in 2011, as al-Huzeil 
challenged some of its findings; but after it was carefully vetted by a Palestinian planner hired by the High 
Follow Up Committee, at the request of Bedouin representatives to this body, the plan was approved and signed 
by all 46 communities included within it.  
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(PHR-I), a medical rights association, to create a methodology for ‘backdoor recognition’ 
through human rights litigation in Israeli courts. These were called ‘creeping recognition’ 
cases, based on the idea that if the state recognised a village’s right to water, education or 
other integral services, it was akin to recognising the right of the village to exist and giving it 
physical form within Israeli territory. The majority of cases are advocated through the lens of 
citizen rights and policy discriminations, with the issue of Bedouin territorial justice hidden 
and subsumed within the court-room transcripts
275
. However, despite – or, rather, because of 
– the lack of direct political challenge, the tactic often works, with the villages receiving the 
technical right to access public water grids and build schools. At the same time, the state 
often neglects to implement the courts’ decisions, or finds ways to circumvent them.  
Darijat – situated 20 kilometres north-East of Beersheba – which was recognised in August 
2004, offers a direct window into how these strategies and processes converge to exploit the 
cracks in the Israeli system (Yiftachel, 2006). Darijat was the first Bedouin village to be 
recognised; and the first non-urban Bedouin locality to be incorporated into the official state 
map, breaking through the lingering legacy of Dayan’s policy of forced urbanisation (ibid). 
Its resistance arsenal incorporated the spectrum of actions discussed above, primarily using 
the courts and appealing to the planning infrastructure. Working within the system, the 
villagers negotiated the more direct ‘recognition’ route, producing evidence that documented 
their presence on their lands since long before 1948; as well as the back-door route, building 
and then receiving permission for establishing social facilities for the community, including a 
school and health clinic. Then again, the timing of the village’s recognition coincides with 
Sharon’s 2003 plan (The Sharon-Livni Plan, discussed above); and Darijat is one of the 11 
that were recognised through its mechanisms.   
Parallel to the work outside – on the frontlines with the state – the RCUV worked on the 
inside, to cultivate a concrete resistance with(in) the villages themselves. The resilient 
networks and survival mechanisms of the villages became sources of empowerment; and their 
residents became integral constituents in the implementation of the Alternative Plan and 
essential to their third recognition strategy. As Abushbeikh (2012) explains, the RCUV 
worked with the different leaders, including the tribal sheikhs and traditional leaderships, as 
well as council representatives, on developing the autonomy of the different villages, and 
enhancing their capacity to manage them as grey spaces, off the grid and beyond direct 
                                                          
275
 See Adalah’s website for multiple examples, as with: H.C.J. (High Court of Justice) 5108/04 (2004); C.A. 
(Civil Appeal) 9535/06 (2006); C.A. 2541/12 (2012). 
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control of the state. They taught them how to ‘find’ electricity and water; how to survive the 
pressures of life without state services; and how to share their story with the media and 
general (Jewish) public. They also worked directly with the constituent communities 
themselves, “to empower them in order to be able to live under such difficult conditions. We 
went from community to community, working with them to understand the Plan; to learn it 
for themselves and to get them to agree to it; to understand how to work with the state and the 
media; and to help them manage the daily life in the villages.” (ibid) A conscious and radical 
Sumud has evolved out of these activities, and are exemplified in the paved roads, solar 
panels and generators that exist in every village; the olive groves that are planted in just the 
right spot, to collect water running down from public water utilities in the area; the mobile 
schools and health clinics that are constructed before the court-based efforts to legitimise 
them; and even the sign posts that signify the geographic entrenchment of the villages. 
The RCUV’s fourth strategy seeks ‘recognition’ beyond the Seyag, and beyond the lines of 
the state. This has been organised through the RCUV’s spectrum of public actions, geared to 
spotlight the Bedouins’ story to national and international platforms, and to prevent their 
erasures from going unnoticed and unchallenged. Since the beginning of the new millennium, 
the RCUV has organised an endless number of protests, in Beersheba, in the recognised 
villages, at the edge of the different highway junctions, and in Jerusalem, outside the 
Knesset
276
. They have either initiated or contributed to hundreds of reports, missions, public 
campaigns and media articles, often in collaboration with local and international human 
rights organisations
277
. Then there are the tours, led by different RCUV members and 
community leaders. As mentioned above, the community sees the ‘tour’ as a direct and 
radical challenge to the state’s rhetoric on Bedouin histories, memories, identities and above 
all, Bedouin spaces. They are an active expression of all that was consolidated into the Map 
and the hopes of the Alternative Plans: of self-recognition and self-mobilisation, resilience 
and survival. The tours have become central in articulating the Bedouin narrative to the rest 
of the world, and reclaiming their story from the mythologies of the state.  
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 One such series of protests, which culminated with a sit-in, in front of the Knesset, led to the establishment of 
the Goldberg Committee in 2007 (Noach, 2011; Algazi, 2011).  
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 Examples include Human Rights Watch’s (2008) Off the Map; the 2012 Country Report on Israel to the UN 
Council for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ECOSOC); Adalah’s (2011) Nomads Against their Will; the 
Adva Center’s (2006) documentation of government policies toward the Bedouin called Invisible Citizens;  
position papers by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel & Bimkom (2012, 2013); campaigns by Rabbis for 
Human Rights (see www.rhr.org) and Jews for Justice for Palestinians (see www.jfjfp.com); articles in Israeli 
media (see for example Curiel, 2009; J. Khoury, Rinat & Rosenberg, 2011; and Jacobs, 2013) and international 
media (see for example, White, 2010; Humphries, 2007; and Sherwood, 2011).     
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There is a long list of local partners that have been enlisted – or enlisted themselves – in 
mobilising their publics in solidarity with the Unrecognised Villages, an in depth discussion 
of which is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is worth mentioning the most 
relevant, which includes those mentioned above, the Negev Coexistence Forum, Rabbis for 
Human Rights, Tarabut/Hithabrut, as well as AJEEC, a joint Jewish-Arab organisation that 
has been providing monetary and infrastructure support for Bedouins since its establishment 
in 1998; and Adalah, which has developed an international advocacy campaign against the 
Prawer Plan and litigated multiple creeping recognition cases and collective 
recognition/eviction cases, including Assira and Umm al-Hieran (which are discussed below). 
Another constant partner has been Shatil, the advocacy arm of the New Israel Fund (NIF) 
charity, a progressive international Jewish organisation, which works with the Unrecognised 
Villages to develop services, programmes and human rights advocacy. It is worth mentioning 
as well, the extensive community of predominantly Jewish legal and academic experts that 
have become part of the struggle; the extensive support system that has been mobilised 
among Jewish communities locally and abroad; and the fact that both groups’ participation 
pre-dates and dwarfs the mobilisations initiated by the Palestinian northern advocacy 
organisations and political parties until the establishment of the recent anti-Prawer 
movement. The Northern and Southern Islamic Movements are the exception, as each, 
according to Mustafa (2013) have been directly involved in supporting the Sumud of the 
villages and rebuilding demolished structures for more than a decade.   
The previously missing Palestinian support systems highlight the historical divisions between 
the north and south, as discussed in the previous chapter. The boxes imposed to fracture 
Palestinian struggle since 1948 has concentrated Bedouin struggle within its internal 
boundary lines, much like they have kept the Northern struggles contained and localised 
within the Galilee enclave. Thus, the significance of the expanding number of Northern and 
external Palestinian solidarity movements over the last four years refers also to their capacity 
to reconnect the different land struggles, and disarticulate the border that has enforced their 
separation.   
At the same time, the participation of so many Jewish – and even Zionist – activists and 
organisations brings to the fore multiple questions about how the Bedouins’ struggle for 
recognition has been absorbed, interpreted and reframed to fit within the hegemonic spheres 
of the state. These intertwine with debates forwarded in the Jaffa and Galilee cases regarding 
the power of the hegemonic project to reshape itself around rhetoric and practices that do not 
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directly counter its legitimacy and territorial control. The RCUV has developed an extensive 
and effective array of practices with which to carve out space for the villages inside the state: 
11 villages were officially recognised since the establishment of the RCUV; the state has 
been forced to contend with the council leadership and with the narrative they have shared 
with the world; and the communities, recognised or not, have entrenched themselves 
physically within space the state claims is dead, empty and open for Jewish settlement. They 
have even changed how the state negotiates and deals with the communities. As Begin’s 
(2013) report confirms, they are ‘Unrecognised Villages’, as opposed to disbursed tribes. In 
his language, they are an impoverished and disadvantaged community, deserving of rights, 
that will not just disappear into the state, as Dayan once suggested. At the same time, 
‘recognition’ – and the spheres through which it can be achieved – is and always has been 
determined by the state, which enshrines the limits and lines it has defined to protect itself. 
The limits of the ‘recognition discourse’ have particular reverberations in the various 
hegemonic tools utilised by the RCUV. One example of this is the overly professional 
language of the 2012 Alternative Master Plan, which outlined a methodology for recognition 
on the basis of the state’s own planning frame, without directly questioning how space is 
designed or imposed
278
.  Another example can be found in the court cases, in the way they 
either limit the legal petitions and claims to the ‘erroneous’ application of Mewat to village 
lands, or to a recognition of citizens’ rights without tackling the political history that creates 
empty maps, plans and unrecognised settlements, in the first place. Even when a village 
succeeds in winning its collective eviction/recognition case, the limits of the hegemonic 
frame are maintained. For example, the Beersheba District Court denied the state’s request to 
evict the residents of Assira, el-Amour’s village. However, the Judge’s decision still 
supported the legality of the state’s appropriation of Bedouin lands under the Land 
Appropriation Law (1953), while at the same time arguing that evicting Assira’s 350 
residents would serve no public purpose (B.D.C, Decision 62341-01-12, 2014). Moreover, 
the same logic enables the state to displace a village, when this act does serve a ‘public 
purpose’. This is the reasoning given in judgements surrounding the collective 
recognition/eviction case of Umm al-Hiran, which, according to the Beersheba Metropolitan 
District Plan, is to be replaced by a new Jewish settlement, Hiran. Umm al-Hiran was 
displaced from the Western Naqab in 1948, and despite documented evidence that the current 
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thesis, for an articulation of the problematic usage of planning tools, without questioning the frame within which 
they are implemented.   
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settlement was designated by military order, the residents are considered invaders of State 
Lands (Bishara & Naamnih, 2011). Moreover, the Court’s decision, which accepted the 
argument that Umm al-Hiran was given permission to settle in the Seyag, still claimed that 
the state has the right to revoke its ‘permission’ at any time (B.M.C. (Beersheba Magistrate 
Court), Decision, 3326-04; 3341/04, 2009).       
Altogether, the RCUV sits in a precarious position, in which it cannot escape its dependency 
on the state. As Begin’s (2013) report on the Draft Law reminds us, there are no legal 
mechanisms through which the villages can be recognised, and so an extra-legal framework 
(i.e. the Prawer Plan) must be devised to resolve the ‘problem’ of the Bedouins in the Naqab. 
This has made it possible for the state to hold the communities’ futures hostage, while 
villages are bulldozed in the present; or for planning mechanisms to be left in bureaucratic 
limbo for all the Bedouin villages and townships, until the land claims are resolved. It has 
also left the RCUV vulnerable to the manipulations of the state, which targets its strongest 
leaders and holds ‘recognition’ ransom. In several cases, chairmen of the RCUV have been 
pressured to accept recognition deals for their own villages in exchange for leaving their 
posts. In parallel, the state has worked to strain ties between the communities represented by 
the RCUV, negotiating with some, while ignoring or demolishing others (Raanan, 2011). The 
result of this has been a slow hollowing out of the RCUV, until, in 2012, it almost 
collapsed
279
. Despite this, the RCUV’s cultivation of Sumud within the different villages has 
sustained the autonomy of the individual councils, and their ongoing resistance to the Prawer 
Plan. These have rallied around different leaderships and established new alliances that 
include networks within the Recognised and Planned Townships, and the Northern 
Palestinian NGOs, political parties (including the Islamic Movements) and grassroots 
activists, as well as their Jewish counterparts (Abushbeikh, 2012)
280
. 
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 Tensions discussed above regarding the Alternative Master Plan became a turning point for the RCUV; a few 
months after the document was signed, the RCUV split into two factions. Its then chairman, Ibrahim al-Wakili, 
had been accused of various acts of corruption and yet refused to step down as leader of the RCUV. With the 
resulting loss of faith and support from the larger council and community, several of the organisations, activists 
and academics involved in the struggle, stepped in. They negotiated the return of Attiyeh al-Asem, who had 
been the first leader of the RCUV, to the position; and Raanan (2011), who had left the RCUV during al-
Wakili’s term, returned in order to support him (Yiftachel, 2014). At the time of writing, the RCUV is still in 
limbo, and, despite Abushbeikh’s (2012) assertions, quoted above, its future is clearly uncertain (A. Abu Rabia, 
2013; Yiftachel, 2014).       
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 In 2011, these groups organised themselves, together, into a ‘Follow-Up Steering Committee’ that includes 
the RCUV; but it is only an umbrella group for coordinating activities and has no ground-based traction within 
the communities themselves (A. Abu Rabia, 2012; Raanan, 2011). At the same time, as Raanan (2011) and 
Abushbeikh (2012) both explained, they have organised several effective protests, and became an important unit 
of solidarity for the villages. 
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The efficacy of the RCUV’s struggle comes from the grey space it has helped reclaim from 
the dead zones of the hegemonic project; as outsiders, their encounters with state 
infrastructures informed by colonial and ethnocratic logics, are innately insurgent. At the 
same time, their reliance on these hegemonic structures ultimately enables a set of discourses 
and practices that continue to contain them and can be understood as the source of their 
integral demise. The concrete expression of this can be found in the Prawer Plan’s 
entrenchment of a border (Highway 40) to surround and segregate the Seyag, formally and 
permanently. In so doing, the state is able to limit discussions of ‘recognition’ to the 
reservation – and not even to all of it – concurrent to legitimising the laws that created the 
Seyag and the empty lands outside and inside it, in the first place. The border, produced 
through 60 years of struggle, is now being used to formally sever ties to any land claims 
beyond the Seyag. Thus, the Bedouins’ physical connection to the Nakba’s ethnic cleansing 
of non-Jewish territory is also being institutionally severed; as well as to the other Palestinian 
communities which lost their lands and rights through the establishment of the state. 
However, the binary the state is seeking to enforce – between the Seyag and the wider Naqab, 
between unrecognised and legitimate settlements, between Bedouin and Judaised space, and 
between the Bedouin and other Palestinians – has cultivated a new frontline; one that was 
provoked and then targeted by the struggle’s evolution in al-Araqib.  
And Then, Along Came Al-Araqib 
Al-Araqib has become the lead protagonist in the Bedouins’ struggle. It resonates as both a 
symbol of what Prawer’s Plan has in mind for the residents of unrecognisable settlements and 
the efficacy of stubborn, unruly and steadfast resilience in reclaiming land from dead spaces. 
It is also the provocateur that does not allow the state to contain Bedouin struggle within its 
legal-mythologies, as spontaneous settlements that have invaded Zionist territory. This is 
because al Araqib is calling for return, alongside recognition; the nexus of which has 
expanded and exploded the RCUV’s methodology for insurgent resistance.   
Much of al-Araqib’s arsenal replicates and grows out of those used by the RCUV. They come 
from outside, and seek to be included inside. As discussed above, they have produced several 
private legal land claims against encroachment by the state, the JNF, and their neighbouring 
Jewish settlements. They use the DND frame and multiple forms of ‘evidence’ and 
documentation to prove their continuous presence and rights to their lands; and have been 
incorporated into the Alternative Master Plan and Alternative Map, as one of 46 localities 
calling for their full recognition and integration into the state’s official planning and legal 
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frames
281
. There are weekly vigils and large-scale mobilisations alongside official reports, 
political tours, expert opinions, journal articles and public information sessions. They have 
also promoted a campaign that directly calls on local and international Jewish audiences to 
support the village and the rights of Bedouins to their lands, and stand against the state’s 
racism and discrimination against its own citizens
282
. 
Where tactics begin to differ is in the fact that al-Araqib never developed its own ‘creeping 
recognition’ cases; in light of the fact that the village has no legal avenue to manoeuvre 
through the state’s ‘back door’ (Human Rights Lawyer, 2011). Moreover, al-Araqib’s 
primary activism since 2010 is not Sumud – although residents maintain the land through 
their presence on it – but direct Protest; in so far as they are no longer trying to survive 
without the state, but to survive the state, itself. They are not quietly working through the 
hegemonic tools at their disposal –although this is part of their struggle – but are intentionally 
direct, vocal and transgressive. When al-Araqib refused to accede to their victimisation by the 
Prawer Plan, they became the symbol for all anti-Prawer advocacy. Inevitably, they also 
became the portal through which the northern activists joined the struggle in the Naqab, and 
the spark for the new collective politics transcending the internal borders.    
Thus, al-Araqib’s disarticulations are situated inside and outside the ‘Apartheid Line’ Prawer, 
and all those who have come before and after, devised to maintain hegemonic order in the 
Naqab (Abu Freih, 2012). The village is fixed just west of the physical border that is 
enclosed, separate and peripheral to the Zionist story of a land without people for a people 
without land. As a result of this, it has never been complicit in the boundaries that seem to 
keep the rest of Israel’s enclaves – Jewish and Palestinian – in place: those that inherently 
concede the war over land is over, and the winner (the Zionist state) has entrenched its 
hegemony over these territories. Al-Araqib has forced the struggle from grey space into black 
space, articulating a clear zone of illegal activity to be bombarded and emptied. However, 
because it is still part of the RCUV, part of the collective struggle, and still forwarding a legal 
and public battle for recognition that utilises the state’s hegemonic infrastructure (the 
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 Interestingly, according to one of Bimkom’s field workers, the inclusion of al-Araqib posed a difficult 
obstacle (Ben Arie, 2014b). The Plan was designed within the limits of the Metropolitan District Plan, and the 
borders of the Seyag. In order to circumvent these limits, and in essence, prevent opening the Pandora’s Box of 
Bedouin land claims beyond the Seyag, the Plan’s designers linked al-Araqib to another village, Karkur, which 
appeared on the original 2001 RCUV Alternative Map.  
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 See for example Blumenthal, 2014, in which S. al-Turi is quoted, pleading his village’s case, “to all Jews 
who believe in equality, and who believe that Jews and Arabs can live together.” 
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Knesset, the court system, the Jewish activists and the media), it is not so easily isolated, 
contained, erased or forgotten.  
The Limits of Recognition – Concluding Thoughts 
“We didn’t choose to live life this way. The state put us in this situation, where you can’t see 
us as human beings.  We wanted to be participants in the Plan, to plan our own villages, to 
plan all the things we as a Bedouin community might need, our culture, our way of life; all of 
this should be included in ‘the plan’. Instead, the state plans according to its own criteria.”  
Abushbeikh, personal interview, 2012 
This chapter has focused in on the dialectic that produced the spatialities of Bedouin struggle 
in the Naqab: the encounters and entanglements between legal mythologies of empty/dead 
space and the material presence and determination of the Bedouin communities. These 
embedded and rooted the unrecognised villages within the colonised and contained 
‘reservation’; a paradox of bounded, spatial apartheids that keep the Bedouin in and away 
from the hegemonic centres of the state, and yet enabled their survival. The ‘boundaries’ have 
been intrinsic to the evolution of the Bedouins’ ‘rightful Sumud’, and to carving out a 
Bedouin frontier inside the state. This has produced limitations, a border which the RCUV 
has reinforced by working within the state’s legal, planning and political arenas and accepting 
the rhetoric and framing that situates their minimal rights to the Seyag zone. At the same 
time, the state never intended to concede ownership of the Seyag to the Bedouin, nor any 
‘State Lands’, for that matter. The battle now taking place, inside and outside the hegemonic 
rhetoric of ‘recognition’, would not have been possible without the Unrecognised Villages – 
through the RCUV – drawing their own lines in the sand.  
Al-Araqib seems to embody an evolutionary moment in Bedouin resistances, moving from 
individual to collective action, from grey-spaced struggle within the borders to direct 
contestation and provocation of those lines; and scaling up from localised to national and 
international protest. However, it is important to recognise that this is not a linear process, but 
a spectrum of practices that fit together to produce transgressive struggle against an 
increasingly opaque container. Bedouin resistances are and always have been complex, 
including actions that are acquiescent as well as antagonistic, passive as well as intentional. 
The Bedouins oscillate between working with the state’s machinery and working to dismantle 
it. Rather than seeking to disentangle themselves further from the Zionist state, they negotiate 
with and through the Jewish public, hegemonic tools and the rhetoric of state recognition. Al-
Araqib produced a new frontline along which to fight for recognition; one that breaks down 
the divisions between the Seyag and the rest of the Naqab, and perhaps pushes the state 
212 
 
furthest in revealing its violences, the chasms and fractures inherent in the ethnocratic/settler-
colonial project. However, they are still vulnerable to the plans and policies of the state, and 
ultimately, will need the state to accept them and incorporate them into its map.    
Epilogue 
On December 12
th
 2013, Benny Begin stepped down from his position and devolved himself 
from implementing the Prawer Plan (Aderet & Lis, 2013). Begin’s announcement came days 
after he publicly admitted that the Plan had been devised without consultation with or 
agreements from the affected Bedouin communities (ibid). His statements came during 
second-round discussions by Knesset committee members, and within days of the 
penultimate ‘Days of Rage’ protest (November, 30th, 2013). The various Movements against 
Prawer, caught up in the enthusiasm of the moment, called this an end to the Law and a 
success for Bedouin/Palestinian struggle (Adalah, 2013, among others).  
As an observer from a distance, having watched the protests and community reactions to 
Begin’s announcement in the media, the excitement and feeling of triumph was contagious. It 
seemed as if the subaltern struggle had, indeed, galvanised enough strength and collective 
power to push the state into submission; and the links made through the Days of Rage 
solidarity movements encouraged the sense that this was a collective and potentially 
transformative Palestinian win against the Zionist state.   
However, as time passed has passed, our schepticisms have returned. A battle was won, but 
the state did not concede. The Law – and the hegemonic formulation it represents – is not 
gone. It has merely been stalled, with responsibility for its implementation passed onto the 
Minister of Agriculture, Yair Shamir. There are new rumblings in the media that describe 
more direct negotiations – and thus direct pressures – on tribal groups to agree to 
compensation deals with the state; as well as Shamir’s continuation of “carrot-stick methods” 
of compensations and demolitions, in his imposition of order on the Naqab (Ben Solomon, 
2014). Moreover, since Prawer was allegedly frozen, dozens of homes were demolished in 
the Naqab, hundreds of dunams of crops were destroyed, and al-Araqib, in addition to 
witnessing multiple demolitions and the destruction of its cemetery, is awaiting its final 
eviction to take place.  
Yet, there is still a residual hope produced through al-Araqib, as its residents continue to 
maintain the space (albeit now on mats and under tarps, instead of inside a canvas protest 
tent); and mobilise for their weekly protests in the Lehavim Junction. On July 27
th
, 2014, the 
villagers celebrated their fourth anniversary of the struggle, with a community feast on their 
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lands. As al-Araqib continues to challenge the binaries of the Zionist hegemonic landscape, it 
is resilient, resistant and unruly, to the end. 
  
  
214 
 
Chapter 5: Understanding Ordinary and Extraordinary Resistances – A 
Concluding Comparative Framework 
 
 
An Act of Unruly Politics – Reclaiming Palestinian Space 
 
  
Jaffa Activists Re-Palestinianise Ajami’s Zionist Street Signs 
Rehov Shivtei Yisrael was transformed into Naji al-Ali Street by a group 
of anonymous Palestinian activists in Jaffa on January 20
th
, 2014. 
Source: Facebook Friend’s Page, January 21
st
, 2014 
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Carving Out Palestinian Resistance 
On January 20
th
, 2014, a series of photographs spread across Facebook, as Jaffa residents 
headed out into the street that morning. The photos captured a small act of guerilla politics, a 
moment of unruly disarticulations, in which street signs that normally highlight a Zionist and 
Jewish-Israeli historiography in Jaffa were removed and replaced with the names of 
Palestinian heroes and symbols. Rehov Shivtei Yisrael (‘The Tribes of Israel Street’) became 
Naji al-Ali Street, named for a Palestinian cartoonist, whose work is highly critical of the 
Israeli regime; and Rehov Olei Tzion (‘Returnees to Zion Street’) was changed to Mahmoud 
Darwish Street, whose namesake was originally a Palestinian citizen of Israel and a cultural 
icon for nationalist Palestinian poetry. Within days, the majority of street signs were taken 
down, but not before multiple news sites in Hebrew and Arabic recorded the act
283
. 
Moreover, not before the clear lack of Palestinian symbols – and the reason behind it – were 
spotlighted in Israeli public discourse. As discussed in previous chapters, the Zionist 
appropriation of street names was a concrete method for erasing pre-1948 Palestine from 
Israel’s urban centres. In this small moment, this group of activists attempted to reclaim the 
streets of Jaffa
284
.   
This act of subversive cartography has become a common practice of Palestinian subaltern 
resistances; marking public spaces that have been Judaised with the language, memory and 
praxis of Palestinian communities. They intersect with the spectrum of actions that seek to 
physically entrench Palestinian space within the fabric of the Jewish state, and thus expose, 
and even transgress, the Zionist hegemonic order that seeks to erase and sequester itself from 
the Palestinian story in and of this place. As an essential repertoire of Palestinian-citizen 
resistance, we have seen this practice in multiple variations, across the different case studies 
of this thesis. In the Bedouin case, it takes form in actions that carve out Bedouin space from 
the “empty” desert: The RCUV’s Alternative Map of the Naqab, the political tours in the 
desert, and the sign-posting of Unrecognised Villages on roads built by the villagers 
themselves. We have seen the practice evolve in other aspects of the Housing Protest in Jaffa. 
For example, the maps the Popular Committee produced that denote hundreds of homes 
targeted for eviction, to be shared with Jewish audiences from Tel Aviv; and Sami Abu 
Shehadeh’s political tour of Ajami, which reintegrates Palestinian lived experience into the 
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 The activists are rumoured to be from Jaffa’s Palestinian youth movement, although no one has taken credit 
for the act, for fear of retribution. 
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ethnically gentrified urban space. From the Galilee Case, the acts of Return by Birim and 
Iqrit offer yet another example, as actions directed at unveiling the hidden geography of the 
indigenous landscape and disarticulating the map upon which the state established its 
legitimacy.   
There is a clear pattern that emerges across these different stories of resistance, as to where 
and how the Palestinian internal frontier is cultivated and entrenched within the Zionist state; 
and how the border, determined in the clash between power and resistance, is unveiled and 
activated. As discussed in Chapter One, together, they form a methodology for disruptions to 
what Charles Tripp (2013) calls “the norms and habits of power” (p.3)285, as disarticulations 
of the boundaries that were created to contain and constrain them. The pattern takes us back 
to questions that inaugurated this study, regarding how dialectics of power and resistance 
encounter and transform one another; how the perpetual struggle of Palestinian-citizens, 
which is both inside and outside, integral and external to the Zionist political order, engages, 
impacts, produces and reproduces the field of force that surrounds it; and how Zionist 
geographies are reshaped and rearticulated in its confrontations with Palestinian-citizen 
struggles over land and space.  
The opening chapters to this thesis attempted to produce a conceptual frame for analysing 
Palestinian-citizen resistance. They begin by exploring the construction of the Palestinian 
other, and the struggle that stems from their subaltern relationship vis à vis the hegemonic 
productions of the Israeli state. The locus of this relationship is the Palestinian citizens’ 
paradoxical positioning as ‘present and absent’ in the structures, systems and spaces of 
Zionist Israel (Piterberg, 2001). Through laws that incorporated Palestinian citizens into the 
political structures of the state (as citizens) while at the same time denying them access to its 
material and ideological productions, these Palestinians are included and excluded, inside and 
outside. There is no room for the indigenous Palestinian within the Zionist state’s dual 
rationales of ethnic-nationalism and settler-colonialism. However, there is, nevertheless, an 
ongoing encounter between the Zionist state and subaltern Palestinian-citizen that is essential 
to the shape and journey of both.  
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 As mentioned in Chapter One, Charles’ Tripp (2013), in his study of the politics of struggle in the Middle 
East and North Africa, develops an analysis of how ‘power’, normalised in the daily practices of life, is unveiled 
and disrupted through public acts of resistance. The clear link between Tripp’s analysis, Gramsci’s (1999) 
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spaces) in the case chapters. 
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For all its attempts to segregate the Palestinian other from its story, the state has outlined its 
limits and frontiers, as much as its methods, plans and narratives, in dialectic relation to the 
colonised Palestinian demos in its midst (Piterberg, 2008). This has resulted in the 
construction of a highly segregated and stratified society, in which the ethnic other, and the 
space they inhabit is endlessly and necessarily targeted for de-legitimisation, removal and 
replacement. An ethno-colonial ethos of de-Arabisation and Judaisation has evolved as the 
foundation of the state, internalised in its political, material, social and symbolic landscapes; 
because it cannot escape its encounter with the other.  
However, through the lens of struggle, as told through the cases of Ajami/Jaffa, the Galilee 
and the Naqab’s Unrecognised Villages, we see a pervasive Zionist hegemony clash with a 
real, contextualised, material history; with a Palestinian community surviving, resisting, 
antagonising and engaging the structures of power. This encounter produces the particular 
story, the particular space, in which both are housed, the lines and boundaries of which are 
articulated and disrupted through unique spatial relations. This implies that while each case is 
an expression of the evolving ethno-colonial project in Israel/Palestine, each space is not a 
mere reproduction or microcosm of the colonial map. To extend Lefebvre’s (1996) thinking 
on cities to include a multiplicity of spatial relations, each locale of struggle featured in this 
thesis is a “mediation among mediations” (p.101); each is distinct in its depiction of how 
Zionist hegemony is experienced and transformed, in light of its particular entanglement with 
Palestinian struggle. Such an analysis has informed a new way of understanding the lived 
experience of Palestinians trapped within the colonial state, while negating a spectrum of 
social and political research which analyses the state and the communities who live there, 
exclusively through a Zionist tautology
286
.  It, moreover, challenges the idea that the colonial 
act of Judaisation determines all social and spatial relations; and the idea that the structures of 
the state, and the Palestinian space and position within it, are pre-determined, permanent and 
unchangeable.  
As discussed in Chapter One, my theory of resistance has evolved on the basis of the idea that 
hegemony is disarticulated and rearticulated through perpetual struggle (Laclau & Mouffe, 
1985; Roseberry, 1994; Haynes & Prakash, 1991; Chalcraft & Noorani, 2007). Rather than 
obtuse, the hegemonic order is constantly changing and evolving in its encounter with its 
other; and thus struggle should be analysed in light of its entanglements with lines of power, 
                                                          
286
 See in particular Rabinowitz (1997); Martieu (2009); Naamnih (2013); Molavi (2013); Hamdan-Saliba 
(2014);Pappé (2011); White (2009); and Sabbagh-Khoury (2013), for examples of the opposing argument.  
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as a likewise changing and evolving process. The case chapters give further form to the idea 
that power is negotiated, transformed, and reshaped, through slow processes of encroachment 
and creative, unruly moments that unveil the hegemonic order. This does not simply imply 
that ‘resistance’ and ‘power’ impact one another, but that they each evolve and transform the 
other; not as cause and effect, but as a dialectic, ongoing process. Thus, struggle that is 
authentic, impactful, and transgressive seems to exist in the clash, in the moments of 
conscious and unconscious exchanges between the powerful and the subaltern
287
.  
In Elian Weizman’s (2013) article on the efficacy of protesting discriminatory Israeli 
litigation
288
 through the use of legal channels, she articulates a methodology through which 
struggle can disrupt and reshape the hegemonic outlines of the Israeli case. She argues that 
only an ensemble of resistance that acts simultaneously inside and outside the system, 
constructing and disrupting, building and dismantling, can effectively counter the hegemonic 
structures of the state, exposing its weaknesses and contradictions. In this thesis, wherein the 
dialectic of power and resistance is analysed through the ‘mediations of space’, her 
conclusion is taken a step further. Each case spotlights the very different trajectories of these 
encounters, and the resulting space specific boundary lines that inform very different modes 
and methods for disruption and transformation. Thus, what is inside and outside, what reveals 
and dismantles, disarticulates and re-articulates the hegemonic order is different for different 
groups and different places. It is this point with which this final chapter will grapple, as an 
attempt to collate and understand the evolution of struggle in multiple spatial, and thus, social 
relations, contained within the overall frame of the Zionist state. 
Border Lines 
Zionist hegemony functions to perpetuate Jewish control over the Israeli state (institutions, 
bureaucracies and legislature) and Israeli space (spiritual, symbolic and physical 
representations). The cultivation of the Palestinian as other, as threat, has been integral to the 
project; informing the problematique of the incorporation and containment of the minority of 
Palestinians who became part of the new state. Accordingly, the paradox of this ‘inclusion’ 
turns on processes of ‘exclusion’, in accordance with the ethno-colonial logics of the state 
(Yiftachel & Yacobi, 2003; Piterberg, 2001; Robinson, 2013). Entrenched through internal 
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 In this case, the Nationality and Entry Into Israel Law (temp. order), which denies family unification between 
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borders that are veiled in the norms of a sophisticated legal-planning regime, these processes 
are normalised as the common sense of life in Israel.  The frontiers constructed in this habitus 
of segregation have become the key to sustaining the hegemonic order, in so far as they 
attempt to erase the Palestinian encounter with and genuine impact on Jewish-Israel. This 
section spotlights the moments when Palestinian struggle clashes and permeates these 
‘borders’ (which are constantly changing and reforming themselves), within each case; to 
understand where they are, how they are activated and where there is potential for 
dismantling and transforming them. 
Jaffa/Ajami 
Ajami is the nexus of an alleged “binational contact zone” (Montersecu, 2011, p.272), where 
the gaps between ‘Jewish’ and ‘Arab’ Jaffa have been almost completely eroded; and the 
neoliberal ‘State of Tel Aviv’ – supported by infiltrations from the nationalist-settler 
movement – has shifted the aesthetics of Jaffa’s last grey, Palestinian space. The struggle by 
Ester Saba and her fellow Amidar residents to retain their place in the neighbourhood, point 
to the methods by which the state has attempted to build the border there; and how the 
Popular Committee’s (non)movement – building upon previous waves of resistance – has 
activated it and made it visible. We see in this case the trepid marking out of a Palestinian 
‘territory’ in response to a long-term siege and bombardment of Palestinian space. The lines 
were drawn in the initial (1948) containment of the leftover Palestinians within the newly 
Mixed City, and the overt incompatibility of this space with the Zionist project, which 
survives by cutting out, constricting and marginalising its other; a process that cannot be 
sustained in the face of daily encounters. The ‘border’ between Ajami and Tel Aviv is still 
marked by Wallah’s (2010) urban scars of empty parking lots, dilapidated buildings, 
graffitied concrete and forgotten spaces. The frontier was etched into the neighbourhood, 
with resident-Palestinians staying on ‘their side’, building their own survival networks, 
empowering their own religious and community leaders, and establishing their own internal, 
enclaving mechanisms. Concurrently, the state sought to permeate, encroach, and mark this 
space as its own, in order to subordinate and erase the impact of a Palestinian presence within 
the Mixed City (Monterescu, 2011).  
The construction of a subaltern Palestinian space in Jaffa-Tel Aviv evolved in response to a 
set of intertwining and ongoing practices of Judaisation: first, erasing Palestinian claims to 
this place by physically removing evidence of the community’s entrenchment within Ajami; 
then, concretely imposing Zionist propriety over the space, in the everyday and overarching 
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structures that determine the shape and culture of ‘Jaffa’. The onslaught is not only on the 
borders, which are reinforced through a multitude of ghettoising processes, as depicted in 
Ester Saba’s story: Absentee properties, Absentee status, “protected” rental contracts, and 
planned slum clearing zones, converge with the destruction of names, signs and even 
buildings that communicate a Palestinian past or present in the city. Then, working from 
inside-out, the state infiltrated itself into Jaffa’s social relations and networks, through Jewish 
bodies (first refugees and now gentrifiers and settlers); economic and material resources, 
through acts of de-development and then ‘planning’; and political and local governance 
structures, through absorption into and dependence on the municipality of Tel Aviv. In Jaffa, 
there can be no escape, no safe enclave from the state that sits inside and outside, present and 
absent; a mirror to the Palestinian internal frontier, which is separate and integral, marginal 
and central to the Zionist project. Paradoxically, this has become essential to the culture of 
protest that has evolved here, and has produced the spectrum of tensions and contradictions 
now endemic to this case. 
The state sought to establish the Palestinians of Ajami (as elsewhere) as rootless; vulnerable 
to the Judaisation project, on this basis. Thus, it is on this point that the fault lines appear, 
where the Popular Committee and resident resistances clash with and reveal the hegemonic 
‘lines’ of an urban ethnocracy that seeks to contain, remove, and replace. For example, in al-
Rabita’s confrontation with the Jaffa Slopes Plan (which resulted in the Mountain of 
Garbage); in the Housing Intifada’s collision with neoliberal privatisation and development 
planning schemes of the 1990s; in the Popular Committee’s campaign to expose ethnic 
gentrification and community transfer policies; and in the unruly street politics and insurgent 
mapping that seek to reclaim Palestinian history from its 1948 erasures. Palestinian struggle 
in Jaffa is, at its core, about cultivating permanence and anchoring the community against the 
state’s construction of the Palestinian citizen as subaltern, transient and disconnected, in 
symbolic and material terms. It functions as a struggle for survival, in multiple forms and 
modalities, or to use a term clearly familiar in the context of Palestine – and in this thesis – as 
Sumud. Moreover, as exemplified in the spectrum of actions discussed in Chapter Two, it is a 
Sumud that is direct, conscious and active in its struggle for material change to systems of 
ownership, privilege and displacement.  
The multi-layered legacy of Sumud-style resistance in Palestinian Jaffa is rooted in two 
intersecting and often antithetical frames, reproducing the position of Palestinian citizens in 
Israel, and yet reshaping and rearticulating it through living experience and struggle. On one 
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hand, they are carving out a community of difference against a colonial, ethno-national ethos, 
rooted in the physical space of Jaffa. In other words, Ajami’s residents/activists are using the 
hegemonic imposition of ‘otherness’ to articulate a distinct material, aesthetic and ideological 
sphere, thus producing a Palestinian identity in the middle of and separate to Jewish space. 
As discussed in previous chapters
289
, this construction of a different and rebellious space is 
infused with the capacity to unveil the spatial order, even challenging the hegemonic modes 
that ultimately disenfranchise citizens from engaging their rights to conceive, produce and 
control the space in which they live. On the other hand, this ‘enclave of resistance’ is part of 
the Mixed City
290
. Moreover, it is not part of just any Mixed City, but Jaffa, where the 
pressures of neoliberal Tel Aviv have directly infiltrated Palestinian space. This ‘othered’ 
space is ever in contact, ever under siege, ever dependent on the state, even if alienated, 
marginal and grey. Thus the community’s Sumud is cultivated and articulated from inside 
and outside, contained within state structures of power, and yet crashing against them.   
The Galilee   
In the Galilee, the ‘borders’ – and thus the fault lines – seem clearer, marked as they are by 
distinctly ethno-national divisions; the outlines of which were entrenched in the ‘clash’ of 
March 30
th
, 1976. In this first major politicised encounter between Judaisation, in the form of 
bureaucratic plans, and the democratically dense and politically active Palestinian core, in the 
form of a national strike, an explosive bifurcation of Palestinian space and the Jewish state 
came into being. The new border traced lines embedded since before 1948, with the UN 
Partition Plan influencing military and administrative actions that emptied the coastal plains 
and enclosed the Carmel region; and, since 1948, with the military regime that concentrated 
the leftover Palestinian land-owners and internal refugees into an Arab-periphery, contained, 
segregated and divested from the trajectories of Zionist hegemony. As mentioned in the 
chapter, these ‘ghosts’, in turn, produced the grey space that cultivated new Palestinian 
leadership, subaltern arenas for action, and the strong networks needed to collectively erupt 
and interrupt the state-building project. Land Day revealed the line that had been evolving 
since the establishment of the state. This line kept the state out and Palestinians in, and, 
thereafter, informed the mechanisms by which the Galilee would and could be colonised, 
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 This term appears in the work of Yael Allweil (2013), as a way to conceptualise the spaces in which 
resistance flourishes outside and separate from the structures of the state. In this thesis, the concept is used, 
instead, to understand Palestinian space as being carved out of the ethnocratic urban space, but is still entangled 
within it.      
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although it took another decade for their activation and implementation. Rather than Jaffa’s 
story of Jewish penetration and the overwhelming of Palestinian material and symbolic 
propriety over the landscape, the state was forced to retain its place outside, patrolling the 
borders, keeping to the edges that still enabled its control of Palestinian movement, 
development, advancement and expansion. Land Day became the watershed moment, after 
which the Palestinian enclave became a dialectic goal of both ‘power’ and ‘resistance’; and 
the border surrounding it, the new target of unruly politics. 
The Galilee case unravels an array of examples in which Zionist hegemony is consolidated in 
response to the presence and power of the other, and their resistances to encroachment and 
removal, to being Judaised and replaced. Confronting a demographic and territorial wall, the 
state constructed the excluded frontier through a series of spatial apartheids, expressed 
through and integrated into legal, planning, bureaucratic, and security arenas (Falah, 2003). 
Primarily following the post-1948 contours, jurisdictional lines were orchestrated to cut 
through, fragment and limit Palestinian social and spatial relations – between villages, 
between Palestinians inside and outside of Israel, between the Palestinian Galilee and Jewish 
space, inside and outside the area.  
The parameters were then infiltrated without the need or capacity for Jewish ‘return’ or 
‘redemption’, but through multiple dynamics of control. The chapter describes myriad 
examples of how this system functions, as with the creation of the Misgav Council, whose 
decision-making powers over the Sakhnin corridor’s open agricultural lands exclude 
representation from the Palestinian localities that share this space. The new industrial zones, 
which are built on private Arab Lands and yet pay taxes exclusively to Jewish municipalities, 
are another example. The creation of the Mitzpe settlements, which have evolved into the 
gated protectorates at the heart of the New Admissions Law, also exemplify this method of 
instituting and expressing control of the landscape; as does the use and abuse of Public 
Ordinances to appropriate and fragment Palestinian land. A final, key dynamic of control is 
the structure of local, district and regional governance structures, which ensure that decision-
making power over land and planning is situated in the Jewish councils and extra-
parliamentary parties. This is due in part to the convoluted outlining of regions and districts, 
which skew statistics and limit the powers of Palestinian local authorities, and are maintained 
in the lack of Master Plans for dozens of localities in the region.  
As Falah (2003) argues, hegemonic order was inscribed on the Galilee through the 
“enclaving” of Palestinian space, while “exclaving” control of its resources and capacity for 
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growth to a sprinkling of Jewish settlements. The structural norms of a separate, but still 
dependent Galilee, are expressed in the designing of roads and train lines that bypass Arab 
towns, and limit the region’s ties to Jewish-Israel. They are expressed in the negation of 
permits for expanding neighbourhoods and development of new construction projects; the 
demolition of Arab homes; and, most violently, in the events of October 2000 and the Or 
Commission that came afterwards. This was then mirrored in the main resistance 
methodology of the all-Arab space, in which the construction of internal border lines are 
rearticulated as limits to the entry of Jewish-Israel, and protects the space in which a strong, 
unapologetic and politicised Palestinian community evolves its own centre and its own 
margins, inverting those imposed by the state. These are embodied in the chapter’s 
discussions of everyday disengagement, the circumscription, circumvention and replacement 
of Jewish spaces, services and networks, and the localisation of governance structures and 
extrastate political institutions to the north. However, a paradox emerges as a somewhat 
unique production of space in the Galilee. Here, the ethno-colonial rationale is reproduced, 
not through engagement with the arenas of power, but in the mutual retrenchment of the 
frontier border that separates one from the other. Therefore, conversely to the Jaffa case, the 
carving out of a seemingly separate, but bounded Palestine, does not necessarily crash against 
the lines, but ambiguously follows them; at times convoluting the spatial hegemonies in the 
north, rather than unveiling or challenging them.  
At the same time, within the excluded periphery, an additional paradigm for resistance has 
evolved in light of the state’s removal from the everyday material, cultural and symbolic 
arenas of the Centre Galilee. These struggles seek out the hegemonic order that dances on the 
edges, and maintains the frontier from the outside. They seek to provoke the state’s ‘true 
nature’ – its violence, its colonial structures, its ethnic discriminations – in the places where it 
is still present, and its foundations are still threatened. In these clashes, new frontlines are 
formed and reformed, just beyond the internalised borders of the all-Arab space. These are 
the lines engaged by the cases of Birim and Iqrit; the legal actions against the New 
Admissions Law and gated territories; the conscious and unconscious infiltrations of Jewish-
settlements that sit on Arab Lands; the reclaiming of the streets and public life in Haifa; and 
so on. In the chapter, these stories of struggle became the central focus, because they revealed 
both kinds of borders: those that normalise and reinforce spatial apartheids and those that 
disarticulate and attempt to reshape them. However, as shall be discussed more concretely 
below, these struggles are borne out of and could not exist without the strength garnered in 
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the separate space, behind the border that enables the articulation and celebration of 
Palestinian language, culture, identities and politics, in contravention to the forces of 
Judaisation.   
The Naqab 
In the Naqab, the Bedouins’ land-struggles have clashed against and thus revealed some of 
the most pronounced of Israel’s internal borders. These borders, articulated in the Beersheba 
Metropolitan Plan, in the Prawer Plan/Draft Law, and in the daily demolitions in the Naqab, 
have become permanent markers to the Bedouin-Arabs’ acute position on the outside. As 
discussed in the chapter, the Naqab Bedouin were erased in the Zionist myths of empty space, 
Jewish indigeneity and the hegemonic legitimacy of the new nation state. The modern land 
regime institutionalised the process. Moreover, Bedouin attempts to reclaim their land within 
‘modern’ frameworks further embedded their rootlessness in official, legal doctrines, 
entrenching the Bedouins as nomads into the hegemony over land and space in the Naqab. 
The result has been the externalisation of Bedouin narratives, experiences, memories and 
traditional social and spatial relations, from Judaised territory.  
Unlike in the case of the Palestinians of the Galilee, the hegemonic project managed to 
segregate, control and absorb what was left of the scattered Bedouin communities after the 
Nakba; carving out an enclosure (the Seyag) in 1948 that ultimately became a permanent 
dividing line between Judaised and Bedouin space. The line was – and still is –‘policed’ 
through colonial governorates in Beersheba. It has always been patrolled by violent strains of 
military and police units, to contain the communities and prevent their cultivation of lands 
that were emptied during the war and afterwards
291
. The Seyag has since been infiltrated with 
new and constantly changing grids, marked by Jewish settlements, JNF forests, military 
bases, an airport and chemical factories that further constrain Bedouin land-usage, access and 
development; and encourage the ongoing displacement and transience of an increasingly 
vulnerable and neglected community. These intersect with the planning of reservation-like 
townships to further concentrate Bedouin space, and the spectrum of carrot-stick policies that 
make up the state’s urbanisation programme. These include forced migrations to the cities, 
unfair compensation schemes, and the transformation of traditional land holdings into what 
the state calls spontaneous dispersion and illegal settlement. The Prawer-Begin team merely 
revealed the Naqab’s legacy of spatial segregations and apartheid limits; which were formed, 
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in turn, in response to the resiliency of tens of thousands of Bedouins against forced 
urbanisation. In maps, laws and public platforms, the Bedouins’ historical claims to the 
territory were made invisible and replaced with ethnocentric caricatures of nomads, 
trespassers and criminals, appropriating state lands. Then the lines were made indelible, along 
the contours of Highway 40 and surrounding the planned townships, determining the tight 
parameters for Bedouin living space on the margins of the Israeli state and Jewish society.  
The concentric circles of struggle discussed in the chapter – in particular, the campaigns of 
the RCUV and Al-Araqib – clash against the multiple boundary lines produced in this 
relationship; one from inside the Seyag, the other from outside, but both as subaltern to the 
hegemonic construction of the state/space. The RCUV struggles to re-write the limits of 
Bedouin space within the border. It works as a mirror of local council structures, in dialectic 
relation with the ‘white’ spaces of law, institutional decision-making, and central planning 
bureaucracies. As it develops its Alternative Maps and Plans and creates a legal language to 
visibilise Bedouin land claims, it cultivates an alternative political landscape to that imposed 
by the state. In so doing, the RCUV struggles to unveil the arbitrariness of the lines between 
“recognised” and “unrecognised”, and to remove them, and thus carve out a Bedouin 
spatiality that reflects the community’s living experience in/of this place, within the Seyag. 
Al-Araqib, from its place beyond the boundary line, struggles to re-position the border 
altogether. Consciously and unconsciously, Al Araqib pushes at the enclosure, attempting to 
force the state to acknowledge Bedouin land claims beyond the ‘reservations’, while 
disarticulating the legitimacy of these lines and the state’s right to define them.  
Their different positions on either side of the Seyag-zone has produced a physical binary in 
space – not between white and black, inside and outside, but between grey and black, 
subaltern and alien. Both are already outside. It is just a matter of shade and gradation. 
However, through the lens of the state, the internal grey space can be contained, negotiated 
and thus controlled within the hegemonic order, as has been the case for most of the last 60 
years in the Naqab, and throughout the state’s Arab enclaves292. The black space – which 
demands recognition of the Nakba, the right of Return, and the right of Palestinians to share 
space with the Jewish state – engages the foundation of that order, and, in turn, becomes an 
impending target for erasure. This is exemplified in the fact that Al-Araqib has been 
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demolished 65 times in four years. These two spaces and struggles – both insurgent and 
radical, both outside and thus provocative – function together, each attempting to reshape 
what the state can accept and legitimate as ‘white’ space. Together, they pronounce the fault 
line; crashing against it to reveal the essential violence of state power and the nexus of land to 
the Israeli hegemonic project.  
Struggle as the Unit of Analysis:What Happens to ‘Struggle’ within the Borders 
of Each Case? 
In each case, the intricacies of subaltern struggle can be framed and understood vis à vis the 
fault line frontiers, discussed above. In Jaffa, the struggle to anchor Palestinian space inside 
the Mixed City reproduces the spatiality of a community inside and outside, on the margins 
and yet in the centre. In the Galilee, the all-Arab enclave has produced a struggle for separate 
space, sometimes by engaging the border, sometimes limited within its boundaries, 
sometimes by disentangling itself from them. In the Naqab, the Bedouins struggle from the 
outside, clashing with the material and ideological foundations of Zionism in order to be 
recognised inside and through the institutions of the state. The following section spotlights 
the mediations of these ‘borders’, in the spatialities, lived experiences and material histories 
that participate in the cultures and practices of resistance. As the particular trajectories of 
struggle unfold within each case, the dialectic encounters between power and resistance are 
unveiled, and more clearly understood. 
Inside and Outside – The Struggle in Jaffa 
The struggle in Jaffa is informed by a conundrum of dualities, tied to the paradox of a 
Palestinian unruly space that is maintained through its direct dependence and use of the state, 
its tools, and its rhetoric. This is due, in part, to the fact that the right to housing, the planning 
of space, and the limits and lines of legality are all determined by the state (Kallus & Law-
Yone, 2002), even if responsibility for Judaisation has been divested to the ‘open market’; 
and the targeting of Palestinian Jaffa is through individual criminalisation and de-
legitimisation under these terms. However, it is the production of struggle within the specific 
physical and ideological context of the Mixed City/Jewish Metropolitan Centre that dissolves 
the gaps between transgressive street politics, direct or ordinary resistances and the 
sanctioned zones and practices for policy-based campaigns. In Jaffa, this has produced key 
tensions, as activists struggle to radicalise the space in which their politics are automatically 
contained and constrained. In practice, this is transcribed in the multiple debates for action 
discussed in Chapter Two and elsewhere in this thesis, i.e. hegemonic versus non-hegemonic 
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tools; professional versus popular politics; joint (Jewish and Palestinian) versus Palestinian-
only struggle. Each contends with the ambiguity of Jaffa’s Mixed City spatiality, and the 
need to construct difference from inside and through engagement with the boundaries of the 
hegemonic order. 
If we break down some of the particular stories of struggle, the ‘inside-outside’ analogy 
becomes increasingly pronounced in the pragmatisms, methods and outcomes of the housing 
protest. For example, the actions that promoted the end of the Jaffa Slopes project began with 
the collective mobilisation by al-Rabita, which sat – at the time – completely outside the 
formal political system
293
. Al-Rabita coordinated two streams of action, both underscored by 
the need to retrench Palestinian space within the ghetto. The first set of tactics enlisted the 
support of Jewish activists and organisations, and utilised the Supreme Court, the planning 
arena and the Jewish public space, including the media and the streets of Jaffa-Tel Aviv, to 
spotlight the Plan’s detrimental impact on the community and the space they inhabit, to the 
state; whose representatives would ultimately make the decision. As a second layer of tactics, 
al-Rabita worked with the community to reinforce its survival networks and resist their 
removal, outside the parameters of the law. Illegal and condemned buildings were 
strengthened, new infrastructure and services were developed; streets were cleaned, residents 
received monetary support, and the capacity for Sumud was established alongside the 
courtroom appeal. Al-Rabita gave the community the tools to retain the Arab space, which 
the community had already refused to leave. The court, through a technicality, then, merely, 
formalised the presence of grey space in the midst of the White City, without repairing its 
vulnerabilities.  
The Housing Intifada provides a second provocative example of the tensions of Mixed City 
struggle. The action itself was situated outside the sanctioned modes of protest contained 
within the hegemonic order
294
. The tactics were illegal. Al-Rabita activists broke down sealed 
walls, reattached condemned buildings to the water and electricity grids and moved in dozens 
of families to take illegal possession of these sites. The campaign’s rhetoric directly engaged 
the norms of power in Jaffa, linking the housing crisis to 40 years of ghettoization processes, 
which include the demolition of most of the neighbourhood’s public housing and then failing 
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to replace them. The act of squatting also embodied a direct solution to the crisis, peeling 
back the motives and impacts behind the Tel Aviv municipality’s newest plans to privatise 
‘the problem’ of the Arab ghetto, by gentrifying the space and replacing its ‘weaker’ 
demographic.  
At the same time, al-Rabita was tied to negotiations with the Interior Ministry, the 
municipality, the police and with Amidar, in order to attempt to bring real change to the 
neighbourhood. The agreement that removed the squatters – to build and/or unseal 400 
housing units – ultimately depended on state structures to contribute to the permanency of 
Palestinian residents in the city, and disrupt the normal trajectories of the Judaisation project 
embedded in Mixed Space. This dependence has been a key obstacle to shifting the lines 
around which decisions are made, as evidenced in the fact that the state, unsurprisingly, did 
not fulfil its promise; in the fact that budgets were found to turn the Mountain of Garbage 
into Park Ha Midron, as opposed to addressing the crisis; and in the continued practice of 
putting up public buildings for auction on the Free Market, rather than making them liveable 
for the community.  
A third example – the Popular Committee’s defence against the evictions – offers a more 
comprehensive window into the increasing intersections of the dual strategies. A collation of 
tactics was introduced in the chapter, through Ester Saba’s own catalytic story and the 
evolution of practices ongoing since the Committee’s establishment. These include the 
emergency practices of going to court, barricading homes and negotiating with the bailiff, in 
addition to Darna’s ongoing mapping of the crisis and the legal case work, which it develops 
in collaboration with the public attorney system. The list continues, with Darna developing 
short cuts through the bureaucracy, and organising support networks within state institutions 
and with Amidar, to protect the most vulnerable tenants from lapsing in their court-imposed 
agreements. On top of these direct actions, the Committee worked with planning 
professionals to analyse the structural issues facing the neighbourhood and to develop an 
alternative plan to the officially sponsored ones. At the same time, these tools became caught 
in the ‘technical-professional’ arena in which they are used. They reveal the myopia of the 
development plans and their lack of concern for the vulnerability of ‘protected’ tenants, 
without challenging the framework within which their vulnerable positions are created and 
cultivated. These hegemonic tools of the resistance arsenal play out alongside the unruly 
politics discussed at the start of this chapter; the acts that reclaim the right to name and 
reclaim the streets and historicise the distruction of Arab Jaffa. The Committee organises 
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public rallies, political tours, and cultural events within Jewish and joint-arenas, and sends 
teams of activists to Amidar auctions, who protest inside and outside these buildings while 
potential buyers tour the premises. These actions then intersect, again, with the language, 
logic and rationales of the state, as exemplified in the Popular Committee’s initiation of 
round-table discussions in collaboration with all of the ‘Public Housing Stakeholders’, in 
2010.  
The direct actions that protect against individual evictions have become indivisible from the 
protest actions in the street and the policy work with the state authorities, mirroring the 
closing gaps and disappearing border between Jewish and Palestinian space. The Housing 
Protest works with and within the system; and the system is reshaped to incorporate the 
(non)movement. This negotiation in space offers a new clarity to this thesis’ early discussions 
of ‘resistance’ as part of the field of force, as evolving from inside the hegemonic system, 
paradoxically sharing and producing its spatiality, its language and its tools, through its 
clashes with it. Rather than retreating to the margins, the Palestinian space is being rooted in 
Jaffa-Tel Aviv, through the system.  
The interactions between radical, Palestinian-only resistance and the culture of joint struggle 
in Jaffa offer a final window into the complexities of the Mixed City. The Palestinian-only 
struggle constructs a space to be Palestinian through promotion of culture, language, history, 
and lived-experience; a rebellion against Jaffa’s Judaisation. It seeks out the street, in 
insurgent maps, demonstrations, public performances, and night-time guerilla activisms and 
is immediately radicalised by its innate challenge to the Jewish-only space. However, it does 
not protest or protect the constructions of Arab space, without the joint movements. The 
vigils at the clock tower for Palestinian hunger striking administrative detainees; the Days of 
Rage against Bedouin evictions; the walk through Manshiyya with the ‘Echoing Yaffa’ 
project; the public events celebrating Palestinian music and cultural expressions of struggle: 
these are always jointly organised and jointly attended by Jewish and Palestinian activists in 
the neighbourhood. Moreover, they are always focused on the Jewish public and institutional 
arenas, where decisions over their lives are made. As discussed in the chapter, some argue 
that this is a problem of numbers and the lingering legacies of previous phases of co-
existence struggles (Karkabi, 2014; Shbayta, 2011). I see it more as a casualty of the 
immediate presence of Tel Aviv inside Jaffa, and the fact that their ‘frontline’ is inside their 
living space.    
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Enclaving and Exclaving – The Struggle in the Galilee 
Stories of struggle from the Galilee – whether they seek out or retreat from the state –
collectively reveal the ongoing process of determining the frontier and its inhabitants as 
other; mirroring and yet, in many ways, reshaping the state’s production of the subaltern 
northern margins. It is from this position that Palestinian protest against Judaisation engages 
or disengages, threatens or reproduces the norms of Zionist power and privilege in and 
surrounding this place. It is through this lens that the centre and periphery seem inverted; and 
concentrated Palestinian space seems protected from encroachment and engagement by the 
state and vice versa. Thus, the spectrum of land struggles, contrary to the other two cases, 
aims to expand and bolster a separate Palestinian space without the state, as opposed to 
reshaping the Zionist hegemony to include them.  
As discussed above, the culture of struggle in the Galilee is most clearly exposed through its 
entanglements with(in) the border-zones; in spaces where the state is still present, dominant 
and more easily unveiled. ‘The Rakefet Case’ and the ‘Tangible Acts of Return’ to Iqrit and 
Birim are two concrete and complementary examples of this. In both cases, the spatial and 
material contentions between the state and the Arab enclave are revealed, albeit in different 
ways; disarticulating the norms through which the border is produced and reproduced. In the 
Rakefet Case, the lines that protect Jewish space – and thus hegemonic proprietorship – in the 
Galilee are forced to contend directly with Palestinian presence. Given the bifurcation 
trajectory since Land Day, through this case, the border that contains Palestinian 
encroachment and maintains the system of spatial apartheids is challenged and laid bare. The 
case also exposes the mechanisms that determine the locus of control, domination and power, 
which include the illusion of an autonomous Palestinian enclave. Moreover, Rakefet 
provokes these boundaries through its engagement with the courts, the Knesset, the district 
council bureaucracies, and the norms of practice within the community, itself. The case 
encounters and clashes with the hegemonic order at multiple intersections, through the state’s 
own language, on its terms and in its own gated spaces. 
In the cases of Iqrit and Birim, in addition to the direct acts of re-settling the villages in 2012 
and 2013, the long struggle for return activates, reveals and challenges additional borders: 
those that protect the hegemonic order from the ghosts of 1948; those that corroborate, at 
least in practice, the resolution of land contentions in the north; and those that prevent the 
internal refugees from enacting their own right to return. However, this story also begins to 
reveal the elasticity of the hegemonic order, at which point and in which spaces it bends or 
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breaks. The construction of the villages’ exceptional status through the courtroom battles, 
negotiations with the state and the public opinion campaigns, has leaked into their 
exceptional act of return; as a space that exists off the grid, in grey space, and importantly, 
carved out behind the walls of the Palestinian enclave. This seems to contradict what is 
happening in the Naqab, where the Bedouins’ radical acts of self-recognition and return – 
which transgress similar lines of containment and control – have exploded the norms of the 
hegemonic order, provoking the state into extreme acts of violence. The implication being 
that the separate arena in which the villages are situated, to some degree, determines the 
limits of the encounter with the state and its capacity or interest in intervening.  
Following from this train of analysis, the clashes on the borders outline more than just how or 
where to engage the state, but also spotlight where the state is missing. The stories of internal 
migration – to Upper Nazareth or Karmiel – do not seem to instigate a response from state-
representatives, until the Arab residents begin to make claims on the space (e.g. to open an 
Arab-language kindergarten; or to include Arab representatives on the municipal council). 
The state is no longer provoked into violence by Land Day or Nakba Day demonstrations by 
Palestinian citizens, particularly those that take place deep inside the Galilee boundaries, as 
they are now normalised in annual iterations, far from Jewish pubic space. The real clash 
occurs when the marchers occupy Jewish or shared public spaces, as exemplified during the 
2013 Days of Rage demonstrations in Haifa, which provoked extensive police violence and 
arrests of Palestinian activists (Activestills & 972 Magazine Staff, 2013; Matar, 2013b). This 
was again the case in July, 2014, when anti-war demonstrations on Haifa’s Ben Gurion 
Boulevard were attacked by both police and Jewish mobs (Hovel, 2014; Hasson & Kubovich, 
2014), whereas the 20,000 participants in Nazareth’s protest, two days later, were left 
comparatively – although not entirely – unscathed (Sherman, 2014).  
Similar conclusions stem from analysis of the (missing) battle for living space. To some 
degree, the Galilee has been reclaimed – enhanced by post-2000 personal and political 
disengagements from the state – through creating independent economic ventures and 
professional opportunities, new leisure and retail spaces, and separate, often nationalised, 
music and cultural scenes. The conscious and unconscious entrenchment of a separate 
Palestinian Galilee only faces its limits in attempts to expand beyond its jurisdictions, as the 
state persists in bureaucratic and technical arenas that are abstracted from and yet always 
present in the space. For example, when Nazareth seeks to open up new neighbourhoods or 
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expand its industrial park; when the localities attempt to design their own Master Plans; and 
when new construction projects, budgets, or services are needed anyhere in the region.  
The boundaries also disappear when the state sees fit to intervene and impose itself, by 
appropriating and segmenting village lands ‘for the public good’ (meaning the Jewish sector); 
or by assigning Zionist names to the junctions, tunnels and highways, in order to disrupt the 
aesthetics of a Palestinian-only space. When these lines are challenged – as with the cases of 
Majd al-Krum, Yafa an-Naseriyye, or Tamra/Al-Ruways, discussed in the chapter – their 
effect is often swallowed by the bureaucratic, legal and planning arenas in which they are 
housed; isolating the communities’ successes and further incising their impact on the 
hegemonic order.  
The lived spatial practice of the Galilee enclave constructs a sense of autonomy within its 
boundaries, in which a strong, resilient and separate Palestinian arena flourishes. However, 
limiting encounters and entanglements beyond the border makes it possible for the state to 
continue to abstract Palestinian presence from the national consciousness, build highways and 
railroads that circumvent Palestinian space, and control Palestinian life without having to 
encounter it.  
This is somewhat compounded in the disappearance of mass constituent-based politics and 
street protests, in favour of professional struggle and NGOised social movements. However, 
this shift has also allowed Palestinian politics to seek out the state, in increasingly distant 
arenas; again exposing where the state is and isn’t, and pushing the protest space and the 
enclave, outwards. Unlike in the cases of Jaffa and the Naqab, this struggle is increasingly far 
removed from the activists’ own living spaces.  The ‘borders’ are transplanted to the state’s 
hegemonic platforms, into the Knesset, the Supreme Court, academia and civil society. As 
exemplified in the legal land cases developed by Adalah, the collective articulation of 
Palestinian identity in the Future Vision Documents, the call for institutional boycotts by 
Palestinian academics and local leaders, and contentious, anti-Zionist provocations by 
Palestinian political party representatives, this style of protest is hyper-politicised in an 
attempt to circumvent Zionist enclosures and systems of control on the ground. Rather than 
attempt to win the Master’s game with his own tools – a debilitating and disempowering 
exercise – these actors seek to hold a mirror up to and reveal the settler-colonial, ethnocratic 
DNA of the state, from within its hegemonic spheres (Zahalka, 2012). They also move the 
protest to international arenas, to Palestinian space outside the country, or into the other 
Palestinian internal frontier zones. In some ways, their engagement beyond the Galilee 
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clearly expands the boundary within which Palestinian people, memories, experiences and 
national symbols are privileged. However, the ambiguity of this practice also continues to 
reinforce the essential paradoxes of the Galilee, where the state – as everywhere else in Israel 
– is always present, even if distant from and hidden by the enclave.  
Struggle From the Outside-In – The Bedouins and the Unrecognised Villages of the 
Naqab 
To quote from my interview with Avinoam Meir (2012), the Bedouins’ stories of struggle are 
most often measured in metrics of ‘recognition’, in the number of unrecognised villages 
recognised by the state; in the number of water-access points, mobile schools and electricity 
generators claimed and accepted through the courts; in the number of homes and living 
situations legalised by the governorate-institutions and district plans from Beersheba. Like 
the Galilee, the Naqab’s Arab space is segregated from the centre and intentionally 
constructed outside and separate from the hegemonic core. However, the production and 
articulation of Bedouin space in the Naqab faced a different trajectory of colonial prisms that 
did not include the Northern demographic protections, inclusion in the plans for partition, 
registered private land holdings (recognisable in local and international legal frameworks), or 
direct links to the external Palestinian threat. As official maps clearly demonstrate, the 
Bedouins – and their pre-48 histories, their roots, as well as their subject-hoods – were 
made invisible in the process of Judaising the Naqab, as opposed to othered. To some degree 
this has begun to change, as Bedouins evolve their land struggles in direct contrast with the 
spatial apartheids of the desert. However, as a result of the particular forms of erasures in the 
Naqab, much of the Bedouins’ efforts have been focused on making their stories, their 
experiences, and their rights visible within the Israeli hegemonic context – to its legal system, 
its Jewish publics, and its civil and political leaders. As well, they have been directed at 
legitimising Bedouin space as part of the hegemonic ordering of the state, even as the 
struggles stemming from both sides of the Seyag – and in particular Al-Araqib – reveal the 
impossibility of this task.  
The case chapter describes several key lenses through which to understand the formulation of 
a struggle that has evolved from ‘outside’, determined by the lines that have externalised and 
further constricted the Seyag, and seeks to be ‘inside’. The first is the RCUV, and its 
development of a series of mirrors to hold up to the state’s production of space in the Naqab. 
The ‘mirrors’ are not a mere reflection of Zionist reality. Instead, they embody what Foucault 
(1997) conceptualises as the ‘heterotopic mirror-space’. A ‘heterotopic space’ is akin to 
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Yiftachel’s grey space. It is a counter-space that transcends or inverts the dichotomies that 
create borders and divisions, between legal/illegal, planned/unplanned, 
recognised/unrecognised, and white/black. For Foucault, the mirror is a perfect depiction of a 
heterotopia. It – or at least the reflective space inside it – is simultaneously there and not 
there; real and unreal; a perfect expression of ‘other spaces’ (ibid). The RCUV, and the 
Bedouin villages they represent, struggle from their position within the ‘non spaces’ of the 
Zionist map; there and not there, physically present and completely absent. Their space and 
their struggle function in material and metaphoric arenas that exist counter and alternative to 
the Zionist paradigm. They then work to embed their ‘other spaces’ within the Zionist 
landscape. 
For example, the RCUV founders organised themselves around the idea that their 
communities are rooted in particular geographies, anchored in living historical traditions and 
land rights. The state organised and still conceptualises the Seyag around the idea that the 
Bedouin are nomadic tribes, a dispersion of illegal and spontaneous settlements easily 
transferred and replaced. As a result, Bedouin territory was a blank slate for Zionist 
settlement practices. The RCUV then plotted their Map to recognise all Bedouin villages, 
those still present but unrecognised, and those that had been de-populated during and after the 
Nakba, and then institutionally erased in the post-1948 Judaisation projects and the 1965 
Planning and Building Law. On the basis of their map, the RCUV developed an Alternative 
Master Plan to the official Planning document (the Beersheba Metropolitan District Plan). 
The Alternative Plan accords the Bedouins the right to control how and where they live, in 
opposition to the forced urbanisation policies of the state that negate the legality and 
legitimacy of Bedouin living space. The RCUV mobilised the community as a collective, a 
counter-operation to the state’s previous ‘carrot-stick’ dealings with their tribal and family 
leaders. They did so by developing a council of representatives to navigate the political arena 
on behalf of those the state had left off the grid; without addresses, without the right to vote, 
without access to decision-making arenas.   
On one hand – similar to the practices of the Jaffa Popular Committee – the RCUV carves out 
its alternatives by using the language, structures and arenas of the state. It utilises the same 
outlines and institutions that helped to construct the borders of the Seyag, the urbanisation 
programme and the grey margins that contain the village residents. The RCUV frames its 
recognition claims as Israeli citizens, their plans according to professional criteria and their 
legal cases according to the liberal framework that houses them. Even in the unruly politics of 
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street demonstrations, in protest tents outside the Knesset, in the political tours for outsiders, 
and in the practice of Sumud, they maintain this rhetoric. On the other hand – and this is 
unlike Jaffa, whose activists and residents have retained Palestinian space within the Mixed 
City – the RCUV encounters the state, not only without common ground or shared narratives, 
but from empty space, as if they don’t exist. When the Unrecognised Villages articulate 
themselves inside and as part of the spatial order of the Naqab, they force the state to 
reconcile itself with them. These evolve as insurgent clashes between what can be reshaped 
as part of the state and what cannot. This is clearly expressed in the legal actions for 
‘creeping recognition’ and those that confront the Dead Negev Doctrines; the campaigns to 
unveil the policies of creeping apartheid; and the acts of dissonance that directly dismantle 
the efficacy of imposing the Prawer Plan/Draft Law. As a result, even when the RCUV, in 
practice, consents to the limits and hegemonic lines that confine and segregate the struggle to 
the Seyag, its activities, at the very least, unsettle the norms by which the Bedouins were 
made invisible, and succeed in constructing a limited space in which they can be seen. 
Al-Araqib provides the second case through which to understand resistance from ‘outside-in’, 
albeit further along the heterotopic, other-space spectrum. In analysing the practices and 
discourses of al-Araqib, we see the RCUV’s repertoire of tactics being used, with the same 
intended consequences; that is, to force the state to recognise the community’s claims to the 
land and to their right to live on it. As with the other villages, the residents initially lived off 
the grid, in grey space. Their struggle is grounded in the active practice of carving out their 
living-space, without state permission or support. The community’s leaders manoeuvred the 
village’s incorporation into the RCUV’s Alternative Map in 2006, and the 2012 version of 
the Alternative Master Plan, utilising the same professional criteria that recognises the other 
34 villages. Their lawyers constructed the el-Uqbi family land claims and court cases with the 
same evidence-based DND semantics as those used by Assira and others to expose and 
challenge the colonial prism. However, as al-Araqib’s stakeholders forced themselves into 
the recognition discourses, they opened a set of boxes that could not be contained physically 
or ideologically within the hegemonic order of the state, in part because of their geographic 
location, in part because of the story of return intertwined with their continuous presence on 
the land. When the Prawer Plan determined Highway 40 as the absolute limit of Bedouin 
recognition, it intentionally established al-Araqib as incommensurate with that order and 
created the conditions in which the use of extensive force and coercion is legitimate. Much 
the same as in the Galilee in 1976 and 2000, al-Araqib became separate, other and 
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threatening; and the Seyag – or rather pieces of it – became, to a degree, negotiable space295. 
This, in turn, produced the unruly and ‘uncontainable’ practices of the Al-Araqib protest; and 
the increasing institutional and direct pressures of the state to put an end to their claims, as 
expressed in the 65 demolitions of the village and the 65 attempts of the village to rebuild 
itself. It also transformed al-Araqib into a symbol of struggle for the Naqab Bedouins and 
Northern Palestinians, around whom a collective ‘last stand’ over land has been constructed.  
At the same time, while new fault lines are produced in al-Araqib’s escalation of the struggle 
for recognition, it is still a struggle for visibility, legitimacy, and legality within the Zionist 
space. This is not the Palestinian enclave seeking to reclaim its othered space from the Zionist 
project, in order to disentangle itself from it. It seeks out the state – from outside, from the 
other side of the mirror, from the non-space – in order to be included within it. The radical 
impact of this act should not be underestimated; in order to accommodate al Araqib –and to a 
slightly lesser degree the Unrecognised Villages –the state will need to fundamentally change 
its story (Sfard, 2011).     
Disarticulations and Re-articulations – How Struggle Reshapes the Borders 
The essential ‘borders’ activated and disarticulated in the different cases are those that 
attempt to suffocate and segregate Palestinian space from the hegemonic order; borders that 
cultivate the state’s capacity to remove and replace Palestinian roots, histories and/or control 
over land and space. A dialectic entanglement with the Zionist project thus produces the 
antithesis to its intended erasures: the carving out and reclaiming of a Palestinian space that 
cannot be contained or effaced. This Palestinian space is borne out of tangible acts of 
contention, inside and outside the system. It is articulated through hegemonic and non-
hegemonic tools, in the professional arenas of “the state” and the popular arenas of “the 
Street”, in joint and separate (Palestinian-only) actions, through ordinary and extraordinary 
resistances, in everyday lived-experiences and in the catalytic moments that challenge and 
unveil the norms of power. As discussed above, at times this spectrum of resistance practice 
is ambivalent in its confrontations with the Judaisation programme; while changes often 
occur in the minutia of social-spatial relations, the ethno-colonial ethos continues to assert 
and entrench itself. However, each case also points to how borders are negotiated, articulated 
and reshaped. Thereby, highlighting the fact that trajectories of power are fundamentally 
                                                          
295
 This is exemplified in the recognition of some of the villages, as well as the rights of some of the 
communities to stake claims to their own lands and ways of life. As examples, we can consider the case of 
Assira’s court-based win, or the official recognition of Darijat, both discussed more extensively in Chapter Four.  
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transformed through struggle, through the clashes, permeations, and entanglements between 
the state and its subjects, who are subaltern and yet central to the hegemonic project. 
Beginning this time with the Naqab, the reshaping of Bedouin space vis à vis the state is 
articulated in the production of ‘visible spaces’– or as discussed above, ‘recognised spaces’ – 
within the hegemonic order. The fundamental struggle and transformations of spatial-
relations stem from how the communities see and represent themselves, forcing the state to 
respond to the villages as entrenched within the spatial order of the Naqab. They approach the 
hegemonic arenas that plan, map, legalise and legislate space, from this rooted position, as a 
collective that recognises its own history, its own geographic legitimacy, and hence its rights 
to the land. The struggle engages the physical articulation of space in the everyday act of 
Sumud, established in direct contravention to the urbanisation policies; in the Map the RCUV 
created to recognise their physical presence; and in the Alternative Plan that envisions the 
Bedouins’ future in this place. It engages the public sphere – traditionally controlled by the 
state – through the tours and advocacy campaigns that bring outsiders into their story and 
directly challenge the Zionist colonial erasures (even right-wing members of Knesset have 
been to al-Araqib and on a tour of the Unrecognised Villages). In addition, the discourse the 
state has constructed to ‘deal’ with the communities has shifted, through the villages’ 
entanglements at court, which evolved from individual recognition to ‘creeping’ recognition 
and now to collective recognition; and in the Knesset, where the RCUV informed and then 
challenged Sharon’s (2003), then Goldberg’s (2008) and now Prawer’s Plan (2011). Rather 
than spontaneous and easily transferable settlements in Israeli space, the villages have 
become collective and entrenched fixtures with which the state needs to contend. Even when 
a case is lost, as with Umm al-Hiran, the new language and politics of the villages are 
absorbed into the state’s collective treatment – and, sadly, punishment – of the residents.   
There are positive results of these entanglements, as already discussed at length, above and in 
the chapter, which we can consider as ‘evidence’ that the space has changed: Since the 
RCUV was founded, 11 villages were recognised. The Knesset Plans and Committees have 
increasingly been forced to acknowledge some aspects of Bedouin victimisation by the state; 
and recognise formal rights to land and space for some Bedouin communities, even if limited 
entirely to the Seyag. Moreover, the fact that the villages are still present, resistant to direct 
and surreptitious acts of displacement and encroachment, is inherent to reshaping the 
territorial legacies of the hegemonic order in the Naqab. However, the struggle of the RCUV 
and the Unrecognised Villages is still bounded by the enclosure zone within which they have 
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been contained; in a sense, reproducing the narrative that limits Bedouin land claims to the 
areas in which they have lived since 1948. Even if this narrative has forced the state to 
reshape the ‘non-spaces’ that previously housed the Bedouin community, it still, in a sense, 
negates the experience of those Bedouins displaced to the Seyag during and immediately 
after the War; as if these communities have no memories nor hopes of returning to their 
ancestral homes.  
With al-Araqib carving out a place for itself within the ‘struggle for recognition’, the border, 
in both time and space, became visible, entrenched, then challenged and deconstructed. The 
clarity of Prawer’s ‘Highway 40’ finalised the ongoing spatial apartheids constructing Jewish 
and Bedouin, grey and black, negotiable and non-negotiable spaces. The al-Araqib protest, in 
turn, unveiled and targeted the ethno-colonial lines that contain and segregate Bedouin space 
from the Zionist order. The state was confronted with a new border, and sadly, but not 
unsurprisingly, has responded with ongoing demolitions, arrests and acts of brutality. At the 
same time, the Draft Law – albeit only in official circles – has been frozen; and Al-Araqib 
continues to resist the village’s removal from the landscape and increasingly inspires others 
through the region to do the same.  
In the Galilee, the dialectic relationship of the ‘struggle for separation’ and the state’s 
containment of and disengagement from the enclave has transformed the foundational shape 
of the Judaisation project and its spatiality in the north. This entanglement has informed two 
intersecting ‘borders’: one that determines the fabric of control inside the Galilee, and one 
which establishes the limits to Palestinian(ised) living-space inside Israel. Both are anchored 
in the fact that the Galilee is home to a large concentration of Palestinian citizens, who have 
evolved their identities, their politics and their struggle as the ethnic frontier; truncated but 
cut off from the impositions of the Zionist project, because the hegemonic centre could not 
comprehensively infiltrate the area. This has been the cornerstone for establishing a 
resistance arena, in which Palestinian language, symbols, memories, narratives and rights are 
emphasised; in which the Future Vision Documents, political and social autonomy and claims 
on the space and state are made possible. Such a project does not inherently challenge the 
spatial apartheids constructed to maintain the hegemonic order, which still posits control over 
land in the hands of the state; but it informs the capacity of the internally colonised to do so, 
in the Galilee and throughout the country. 
As opposed to the other two cases, the ‘borders’ do not challenge the right to a Palestinian 
space, but rather entrench the limits to it. Thus, reconfigurations to the Galilee-space must 
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always confront those limits, which still exist, even if hidden within the guise of mutual 
distance and disengagement; and forgotten in the lack of popular and grounded struggle in the 
Galilee. The direct acts of return have been key in unveiling these limits. However, the less 
visible, professional negotiations directed at the planning bureaucracies have physically 
changed the lines articulated by municipal jurisdictions. The migrations into Jewish 
communities and towns (sparking formal and informal acts of segregation by the state and its 
representative bodies) have moved the boundaries upon which spatial-struggle in the north is 
performed, from Palestinian space into Jewish space and now into Mixed spaces. The Rakefet 
case – building from the legacy of Katzir – is the pinnacle of this process, but Karmiel, Upper 
Nazareth and Haifa are integral to this shift. The movement into the Jewish sector is further 
(re)produced in the increasingly politicised campaigns that entangle the state on issues of 
land rights, citizenship and democracy within the hegemonic arenas of the state, exemplified 
in Adalah’s court cases; Balad/Tajamo’s provocations within the Knesset; and the 
strengthening of NGO-based advocacy within Israeli public and political arenas. They have 
reshaped the spaces in which the battle over the Galilee takes place and, as discussed above, 
enabled the production and transcendence of new frontlines and frontiers.   
In Jaffa, contrary to the Galilee, there are no lines that mark the beginning and end of Jewish 
or Arab spaces. The boundaries are convoluted in the infiltration, absorption and attempted 
erasures of Jaffa. They are then further confounded by the ongoing, physical presence and 
resilience of Ajami’s Palestinian community. The Popular Committee has engrained the 
neighbourhood against Amidar’s eviction policies by entangling itself into the multiple 
bureaucratic, political, planning and legal spheres that previously sought to remove them. Its 
leaders and other Jaffa activists attempt to reclaim the histories that positioned and 
marginalised this community within the Mixed City. They perform grassroots and other 
street-based activities that counter-map and counter-sign Jaffa explicitly for the Jewish 
public. Their resistance practices aim at unveiling and disarticulating the norms and 
discourses that ignore and erase Palestinian claims to the city. These same stakeholders 
organise demonstrations and performances that emphasise Palestinian identity, but then 
ensure both Jews and Palestinians are present, as participants and audiences.  
Embedded, surrounded and besieged by the Jewish centre, Palestinian space – through the 
various struggles in and for Ajami – is carved in as well as out of the Mixed City. This has, at 
least in some ways, produced a new spatial order in Jaffa. In it, Amidar tenants are to some 
degree protected, hundreds of evictions have been halted, Ester Saba is slowly winning her 
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rights to her home, and the state acknowledges the housing crisis and partial responsibility for 
creating and resolving the problem. In Jaffa, it has also become possible to construct and 
embed a Palestinian identity in the street, to share and produce a joint public space where 
Palestinian voices are pronounced and strong; and through which the state cannot escape its 
encounter and intersections with Palestinian Jaffa. The incumbent losses and limits to this 
‘carved-in’ space have been discussed above and throughout this thesis. It hasn’t forestalled 
the gentrification process nor protected against the new influx of settlers who seek to purify 
the Zionist landscape, nor against the distribution of new eviction notices. Moreover, the 
struggle’s dependence on the joint and Jewish arenas has mediated the politics, rhetoric and 
demands of the movement. However, it is still arguable that the conjoining of the Palestinian 
and Jewish arenas in Jaffa have informed the capacity of the community to open, reinterpret, 
and reappropriate the Judaised space, thereby pushing the borders of the hegemonic order 
further outward. Moreover, the community’s incremental, provocative and unruly practices of 
resistance offer some hope for the re-articulation of Israeli space, and the social relations 
housed therein. 
Theorising Palestinian-Citizen Resistance – Culminations and Conclusions  
The collective story of this thesis unveils power and resistance in dialectic relation, intimately 
engaged, mutually, if asymmetrically, impacting one another. Through the lens of particular 
struggles over land and space, the clarity of this interaction is increasingly pronounced, as it 
manifests in the production of a living context in which each is mediated and informed by the 
other. This shared production of space is incommensurate with the logic and normalisation of 
the hegemonic project, which can only contain the subaltern other in so far as it is positioned 
in the ‘non-space’, a ‘minority group’ intentionally externalised from the core paradigm. 
Thus, the unruly location of the subaltern – which is always inside and internal to the 
structures of power – is essential to its capacity to reveal, dislocate, and disarticulate the 
hegemonic order. It is in the shared contexts, along common borders and frontiers that we see 
change occur; in the unfinished and evolving trajectories formed in and through the dialectic 
encounters between power and resistance. 
However – despite the disruptive capacities of subaltern struggle – the dialogue that unfolds 
is to a large degree uneven. The ordering of space is shaped in the shadow of the hegemonic 
project, wherein the lines, the lens, and the arena in which their relationship plays out 
contends with an overarching field of force that is dominated by the system of power; even if 
that system evolves through its encounter with its other. Resistance, constructed as ‘the 
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other’, is inherent and constant, but the structures of power function primarily to control its 
impact. For this reason, so much of the literature focused on this relationship is confounded 
by dichotomies, conforming to the physical and ideological containers produced by the 
hegemonic paradigm, without seeing how they are activated through struggle. It is also why, 
in practice, there is a desire and need to disentangle Palestinian-citizen struggle from the 
Israeli space in which it happens.  
This thesis was borne out of my own biases, as an Israeli-Jew and a pro-Palestinian/non-
Zionist activist seeking ways to change the structures of the Israeli state; and for ways in 
which power can shift and be reshaped by the struggle of the subaltern other. Through this 
lens, the encounters that unveil and then redefine the boundary lines, that disarticulate and re-
articulate the space in which power and resistance engage one another, became the most 
salient and hopeful sites of analysis. That said, the bottom line does not change. The 
Palestinian internal frontier is embedded in the Zionist construction of space. The enclosures 
that mark the state’s attempts to contain, segregate and exclude the other, which is also inside 
and included, have become the foundational expression of the ethno-colonial project; not 
because of an innate Zionist trajectory, but as an evolution of Zionist hegemony in its clash 
with Palestinian resistance. To maintain control over the insurgent enclave, the heterotopian 
spheres, and the shared margins, the state retrenches itself behind protective lines. These have 
been cultivated to enable the state to erase the Palestinian historic, symbolic and material 
proprietorships over land and space inside Israel, and the threat this produces for the Zionist 
project.   
The acts of struggle studied here seek to carve out and protect Palestinian space through 
challenging and transforming their borders and frontiers with(in) the hegemonic order. They 
articulate how power is entangled, produced and transformed through struggle that is both 
inside and outside, included and excluded, absent and present; and offer an acute lens as to 
how struggle is shaped by the same conditions. This project is an attempt to spotlight the 
intersecting journeys of Zionist state and Palestinian citizen, because they have evolved in 
dialectic relations that cannot be abstracted from one another. Even in their mutual attempts 
to cut out, disengage and erase one another from their seemingly separate norms of practice 
and daily experience, they are still connected in the space and borders they share. The fact 
that Palestinian-citizen struggle seeks out those borders is innate to the condition of its living-
space, surrounded and bombarded by the paradoxical logics of the Zionist project. Thus its 
most extraordinary resistances – whether they exist in ordinary moments or catalytic events – 
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will persist in the contact-zones; and attempt to transform the containers that truncate 
Palestinian life in Israel.  
Epilogue – One Last Story296 
On the last ‘Day of Rage’ (November 30th, 2013) a series of protests were organised in urban 
centres throughout the country and around the world, as a culminating moment in the 
campaign to ensure that ‘Prawer Would Not Pass’. While a general consensus existed as to 
the goals of the protest, the intricacies of how each event played out, speak to very different 
modes and contexts within which each took place. In the North, the main protest was held in 
Haifa, with more than 2000 people gathering on Ben Gurion Boulevard
297
. The event was 
organised by al-Hirak al-Shebabi, without political party representative support, without the 
necessary permits normally attained for public demonstrations and without Jewish co-
coordinators
298
. These operational decisions were based on the fact that the organising 
committee wished to circumvent the mechanisms that institute state control over their dissent 
and dependence on the Jewish sector for legitimacy (Ali, 2013). Their Day of Rage was a 
Palestinian struggle against Zionist occupation and colonisation of Palestinian lands; the 
space had been appropriated from the state for a brief moment in time, and there was no room 
for its representatives here. The Palestinian flags and symbols that decorated Haifa’s main 
thoroughfare reinforced this fact. There were no hidden transcripts in the spectrum of signs, 
slogans and speeches that focused on the link between Palestinian dispossession in the 
Galilee – and elsewhere in the country – and that of the Bedouins in the Naqab; and the 
pinpointing of the Prawer Draft Law as the latest expression of apartheid and ethnic cleansing 
by the Jewish state. By nightfall, riot police had rampaged the site, ending the radical 
takeover of downtown Haifa with extensive violence.  
The event in the Naqab took place on the edges of the recognised town of Hura, and 
participants included Bedouin-Arabs, Non-Bedouin Palestinians, and Jews. The Southern 
demonstration was negotiated with police permission
299
, and its main coordinators 
                                                          
296
 Details of the various protests were collated from a range of interlocutors and secondary sources. These 
include, Nijmi Ali (2013), Eldad Zion (2014), Abed Abou Shhadeh (2014) and Eran Hakim (2013), as well as 
various local social media postings and coverage of events by journalists and bloggers. Specific quotes are 
attributed to their individual sources.      
297
 According to Ben Arie (2014a), in his research on protest-spaces in Haifa, the site was chosen for its 
visibility, but also because it has been transformed into a safe space for Palestinian protest and activism.  
298
 According to Nijmi Ali (2013), a Palestinian activist from the DFPE and an active participant in the anti-
Prawer campaign, Jewish activists were encouraged to organise their own demonstrations and actions; but 
separation was a key and recurrent theme throughout the Days of Rage (which began on July 15
th
).  
299
 It is important to note that the Bedouin-Arab youth-movement activists were against securing permits from 
the police, but the older activists overruled this decision. Moreover, while younger activists were raging against 
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encouraged a joint rhetoric and joint representation with Jewish organisations and activists. 
Both decisions were made in disregard of recommendations by the northern activists (with 
whom the events in the Naqab were jointly developed), who wished to ‘protect’ the 
Palestinian character of the protest and its demands. Palestinian flags were present but less 
prominent in Hura. The key ‘target’ was the Draft Law, itself: its impact on Bedouin-Arab 
lives in the Naqab and the anger of the communities most affected, as opposed to its links to 
other Palestinian struggles over land in the region (although this rhetoric was still present 
even if out of the spotlight). The Naqab protest, like the demonstration in Haifa, hosted a 
violent clash between the police and the demonstrators. In both cases, the police treated 
participants as it did those demonstrating throughout the West Bank; as enemies to be 
contained, with whatever ‘tools’ deemed necessary. Protesters were brutally beaten, water 
cannons and tear gas were used to disburse the crowds, and more than 50 protesters were 
detained, with several appearing the next day in court with bruised and broken body-parts 
(Adalah, 2013)
300
.  
In Jaffa, the protest occurred later that night in front of the Clock Tower, jointly attended and 
orchestrated by Jewish and Palestinian residents
301
. Signs and protest slogans were in 
Hebrew, English and Arabic. The action was spontaneous, erupting primarily as a response to 
the day’s brutalities. Slogan themes volleyed between ‘recognition of Bedouin rights in the 
Naqab’, release of the protesters detained during the day and more radical political rhetoric, 
including signs calling for a ‘boycott of Apartheid Israel’ (Schwarczenberg, 2013). The 
protest numbers swelled with the return of those protesters who had been in Hura and Haifa 
earlier in the day. Frustrated and angry, they moved into the streets, walking from the Clock 
Tower to Jerusalem Boulevard, and back to the Clock Tower (Abou Shhadeh, 2014). No 
permits were obtained for the march through the public sphere, and yet no police showed up 
in riot gear, even if the Saturday evening crowds were disrupted and disquieted by this piece 
of political theatre.  
In collating the stories of this day of action, the production of space as an encounter between 
power and resistance continues to reveal itself. The highly politicised and hyper-nationalised 
northern protest describes the moving Palestinian frontline, to the Mixed City of Haifa, where 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and inevitably broke through the police barricades, the older leaders were attempting to hold them back 
(Activestills & 972 Magazine Staff, 2013).  
300
 28 protesters were arrested in Haifa, 27 were arrested in Hura, including one Jewish activist.  
301
 While no protest was organised for November 30
th
, several demonstrations were held in Jaffa, in the lead up 
to the final Day of Rage, including one on November 28
th
, in which streets were also blocked by participants 
without provoking a violent response from the police (Abou Shhadeh, 2014). 
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the state is still present. The southern demonstration spotlights the increasing tension between 
the Bedouin community’s struggle for recognition – negotiated with and inside the state – and 
their evolving struggle as the Palestinian other – which is separate, outside and discordant 
with the hegemonic order. Jaffa’s protest illuminates the safe haven they have developed for 
radical, joint actions in the midst of the Jewish enclosure. Looking from the other side, at the 
state’s violent treatment of the Arab enclaves versus its approach to the joint/Jewish space, 
there seems to be some credence to the idea that the state is seeking to further marginalise, 
contain and incise Palestinian space; while Jaffa’s protest-space is, or at least seems to be, 
somewhat protected in its mediations from within the hegemonic centre.  
Taken together, these moments of deep contention point to the assumption that sparked this 
study and its theorisations of dialectics of power and resistance: the foundational clash 
between Palestinian citizens and the Zionist state is and always will be over land. This is the 
material realty that enforces Zionist hegemony over Palestinian space, and thus becomes the 
essential contact-zone between the state and its Palestinian citizens. It is the line around 
which the state will enforce its best defences; and around which the Palestinian-citizen 
community will mobilise its largest repertoires of resistance. Thus, engagement with this 
‘border’ is always the key to disarticulating, reshaping and transforming the hegemonic order 
inside Israel.  
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“Welcome to al-Araqib” 
 
 
 
  
Al-Araqib Marks its Own Place on the Map 
After several months in which even the protest tent has been outlawed, the villagers put up this 
signpost at the entrance to their lands, on a road they themselves paved. The sign says, in Hebrew and 
Arabic, “Welcome to al-Araqib”. The fact that Hebrew is used first, imitiating the style of official 
signs in Israel, fits into the ongoing discussion of hegemonic tools as potential containers/constrainers 
to the unruly creativity of subaltern struggle. However, the sign also acts as a final reminder of the 
complexities of Palestinian citizen resistance, and spotlights one of its main achievements: to 
recognise, carve out and embed Palestinian space against Zionist colonial erasures. 
Source: Friend’s Facebook page, September 6
th
, 2014 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: The Legal-Land Regime 
Selected Israeli Statutes and Planning Policies Informing Palestinian-Citizens’ Struggles For 
Land and Space 
I. Israeli Land Statutes 
The Main Blueprints of the Israeli Land Regime 
 
Legal Statutes  Key Points of Relevance to the Cases 
The Abandoned Areas 
Ordinance (1948) 
This was the first law enacted to provide a legal basis for seizure of 
Palestinian lands (Holzman-Gazit, 2007). It was a temporary order that 
enabled the government to assume control over lands either abandoned by 
their inhabitants, or captured by the Jewish armed forces. It gave the 
government the right to declare any area or property ‘abandoned’; and to 
enact any regulation it deemed to serve public security, defence of the state, 
or supply of services. This was among the emergency regulations used to 
transfer Arab properties to the state until it was replaced by permanent 
legislation (see Absentees’ Property Law, below).    
Emergency Regulations 
(Cultivation of Waste 
Lands) Ordinance 
(1949) 
This emergency order gave the Agricultural Minister the power to take 
possession of lands in cases where the Minister feels the land is not being 
effectively or appropriately cultivated. According to Yiftachel (1992), the 
ordinance was used to expropriate Palestinian lands during the chaotic first 
years of the state. Holzman-Gazit (2007) and Lustick (1980) each point to 
the fact that the Law was used in conjunction with emergency regulations 
that empowered military commanders to close areas for security reasons. The 
closures would prevent Arab cultivators from reaching their lands, and 
enable the state to accord ‘waste status’ to said lands, to be expropriated as 
part of the “general land reserve for Jewish settlement.” (Lustick, 1980, 
p.178)   
Emergency Land 
Requisition Law (1949) 
This law enabled the state to take control over land for reasons of defence, 
public security, maintenance of essential supplies or public services, the 
absorption/settlement of immigrants and the rehabilitation of ex-soldiers and 
‘war invalids’. Initially, the Law was used for temporary (and immediate) 
requisitions; but later amendments to the Law allowed the state to hold onto 
and occupy requisitioned properties for extensive periods, which they could 
then pass onto ‘benefitted tenants’, who then gained statutory status, under 
the order (Holzman-Gazit, 2007).  
The Absentees Property 
Law (1950) 
According to Yiftachel (1992), this is the most important statute in terms of 
transferring Palestinian lands to the state (p.313). It assigned status to both 
properties and people, with ‘Absentee’ referring to any land-owner who had 
left his ‘ordinary place of residence’ during the “period of emergency” 
(November 29
th
, 1947 to 19
th
 May, 1948). The property was then 
appropriated to the state, through the ‘Custodian’. The Law forbids the sale 
of Absentee Properties, but may be transferred to a ‘Development 
Authority’, which was established under the ‘Development Authority 
(Transfer of Property) Law, 1950 (see below). Through the Law, the 
Custodian/Development Authority was empowered to award tenancy 
contracts and building permits; and to confer demolition and eviction orders 
to those in breach of their contracts. According to Abu Hussein & McKay 
(2003), 40% of all lands owned/claimed by Internal Palestinian Refugees 
(the Present Absentees) were appropriated under this law, as part of a total of 
4.6 million dunams of Absentee Palestinian Properties that became state 
Lands (p.135-136).  
The Land Acquisition The legal mechanisms that pre-date this law (from 1948-1952), enabled the 
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(Validation of Acts and 
Compensation) Law 
(1953)  
state to take possession of territory/property, while the previous Arab land-
owners retained official title to them. This law created a procedure by which 
lands appropriated for “essential development”, “settlement” or “security” 
and were still required for these purposes, would be officially transferred to 
state ownership. At the same time, the Law granted the right of 
compensation to the land’s previous owner. In practice, the Law was passed 
in order to retroactively legitimise and regulate the massive land transfers of 
this period, which were often chaotic and uncoordinated and included lands 
to which Palestinian citizens claimed ownership (Yiftachel, 1992; Lustick, 
1980; Holzman-Gazit, 2007; Abu Hussein & McKay, 2003). It also 
prevented any legal attempts by Arab residents to reclaim access/ownership 
to the previously appropriated lands through legal loopholes that existed in 
previous statutes (ibid).  
Land (Acquisition for 
Public Purposes) 
Ordinance (1943) 
This Ordinance was part of the body of law inherited from the British 
Mandate period. It enables the confiscation of privately owned land for the 
sake of ‘public interest’. It remains one of the most effective tools in place to 
expropriate Palestinian lands (although Jewish private land holdings have 
also been affected by it) (Abu Hussein & McKay, 2003; Kretzmer, 1990). It 
gives the state wide powers to appropriate any land deemed “necessary or 
expedient for any public purpose”. While it includes a section on 
compensation, the issue of compensation need not be settled before the land 
is appropriated. In other words, the land is confiscated with or without 
consent, and agreement is then inferred through an automatic transfer of 
compensation. From the 1950s onwards, the Ordinance became a major tool 
of Judaisation in the Galilee. Lands used to establish Upper Nazareth, 
Karmiel and Maalot were appropriated on the basis of this ordinance. It was 
also this Ordinance that gave legitimacy to the land appropriations (approved 
in the Galilee Development Plan) that sparked Land Day in 1976 (ibid). 
Prescription Law (1958) This Law required all private land owners to demonstrate unchallenged and 
uninterrupted possession of their land for at least 15 years, for lands whose 
titles had not yet been settled; and 25 years for lands whose titles had been 
settled. This meant that land owners/cultivators needed to produce records 
and proof of their continuous cultivation of their lands from the Mandate 
period or earlier. A majority of these documents either did not exist or had 
disappeared in the chaos of the war. An amendment to the Law in 1963, 
extended the period of continuous ownership/use to 20 years. Although there 
is no direct stipulation within the Law as to its target populations, it was used 
to survey and appropriate lands in areas where large concentrations of 
Palestinian citizens held, cultivated and owned land (Abu Hussein & 
McKay, 2003). According to Kretzmer (1990), one source (Sabari, 1972) 
claims that 205,000 dunams of lands were expropriated to the state through 
the effects of the Prescription Law, but he was not able to corroborate or 
refute this figure.  
Basic Law: Israel Lands 
(1960) 
(see also Israel Lands, 
1960) 
This Law asserts that all lands categorized as ‘Israel Lands’, which includes 
Lands held by the state, the Development Authority and the JNF and 
constituting approximately 93% of all land in Israel, “cannot be transferred 
either by sale or in any other manner”. Through this Law, land ownership is 
effectively frozen, and can only be leased for use. The Laws mentioned 
below, which place control of Israel Lands under the auspices of the ILA 
(whose statutes grant shared authority over Israel’s lands to the JNF and the 
Jewish Agency, whose own policies demand exclusive land-usage by Jews), 
effectively restrict Palestinian citizens’ access to a majority of the state’s 
public lands. Yiftachel (1999) argues that the combination of these statutes 
places approximately 80% of Israel Lands off limits to Palestinian citizens of 
the state. This Law was the focal point of Aharon Barak’s Supreme Court 
decision on the Kaadan case (discussed in Chapter Three), in which he 
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determines the illegality of discriminatory policy in land-access, based on 
ethnicity/nationality. 
Planning and Building 
Law (1965)  
This Law provides the formal legal framework for planning in Israel and 
orchestrates a central, coordinated system for all development and planning 
authorities in the state (which had previously operated independently). The 
Law created a three tiered-system of planning bodies, comprised of the 
National Planning Board, six District Planning Commissions and 110 Local 
Planning Committees (Yiftachel, 1992). The pyramid system it devised 
operates as a hierarchy in which permits and plans must be approved first at 
local, then district and finally at national levels; and all local (authority) 
outline plans must fit into the outline schemes of the upper levels. It 
provided a system by which building permits would be regulated, again in 
accordance with this hierarchy of planning; and any development/building 
not in compliance with the Law/planning outlines could be demolished, and 
its owner fined and/or arrested. Moreover, the Law stipulates that the local 
planning commission can expropriate any land deemed necessary for public 
purposes, under any planning scheme.  
As discussed throughout the thesis, this Law became the main ‘container’ by 
which development, growth and land-access of Palestinian citizens is held in 
check. Uncoincidentally, its approval coincided with the end of the more 
direct, coercive violence of the Military Regime. It devised a spectrum of 
spatial controls, which were then used to devise planning schemes that 
erased Palestinian localities and created tight jurisdictions for the rest. It is 
on the basis of this Law that the 1985 Markovitch Commission criminalised 
all ‘grey buildings’, which led to the demolition of thousands of homes in the 
north and south; the fact that northern localities cannot expand their 
infrastructure or neighbourhoods; and the fact that the Unrecognised Villages 
were left off the map in the Naqab and the Galilee.    
Ottoman Land 
Code/Ordinance (OLC) 
(1858) 
 
British Mewat Land 
Ordinance (1921) 
These two Ordinances were used as the essential framework through which 
to create the retroactive erasures/dispossessions of Bedouin land claims, 
discussed as the basis of Bedouin land struggles (Kedar et al, 2012). First 
articulated in the Allbeck Commission (1975) and then entrenched in a series 
of precedent-setting Supreme Court cases, beginning in 1974 (both 
mentioned in Chapter Four, on the Bedouin case), these Ordinances 
determined the categories by which land could be owned or sold in the 
Naqab.  
 
The OLC defined five categories by which land-titles could be registered: 
These were Mulk (fully privately owned land, rare in Ottoman Palestine); 
Muwaqfa (land set aside for religious use, elsewhere known as ‘Waqf 
lands’); Matruka (public lands set aside for shared, common use); Miri 
(public land transformed into private land through long-term cultivation by 
individuals or family-groups); and Mewat (uncultivated/dead lands, applied 
to any uncultivated lands more than 1.5 km from a ‘settled area’). The 
majority of Bedouins did not register their lands under the OLC, and the 
state uses this as part of its legal mechanisms for denying systematic 
cultivation, possession, or settlement of the Naqab, before the British 
Mandate. While the 1969 Land Law repealed these separate categories, they 
are still used in areas where settlement of title has not been registered. 
 
The British Ordinance was designed to regulate and limit the acquisition and 
cultivation of State Lands, although it left a window of 2 months (after 
promulgation of the order), during which anyone who had ‘revived’ Mewat 
Lands (i.e. through cultivation) could register their ownership rights; 
although in practice, the Mandate authorities tended to recognise possession 
of lands without title deeds, even after 1921. In Israeli law and policy-
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practice, 1921 became the final date by which Bedouins needed to have 
registered their land claims. Israeli interpretations of the Ordinance stipulate 
that without official certification recorded by this day, land claims are 
considered nullified (Falah, 1989; Kedar et al, 2012; Abu Hussein & 
McKay, 2003).  
Israel Land Law (1969) The Land Law sets out the terms by which private property can be ‘owned’, 
transferred, used and shared (i.e. in cooperative settlements or buildings). Its 
significance to this thesis is its repeal of the Ottoman and Mandate Land 
Ordinances, related to private lands. In particular, it cancelled the separate 
land categories outlined in Ottoman Law, and collapsed them into a single 
form of ownership. At the same time, the Law reinforces the fact that public 
lands (Israeli Lands) are non-transferrable.   
Israel Land Administration 
Law (Amendment No 7) 
(2009) 
(The 2009 Land Reform)  
The significance of this Amendment to the Land Administration Law is its 
introduction of new mechanisms for privatisation of Israel Lands that repeal 
the absolute prohibition of the transfer of public property, as outlined in the 
ILA Law (1960), Israel Lands Law (1960) and Israel Land Law (1969), 
discussed in these appendices. According to an analysis developed by 
Adalah’s urban and regional planner, Hana Hamdan, and attorney S. Bishara, 
the majority of properties affected by the amendment were expropriated to 
the state from Arab communities, and held in trust by the Development 
Authority as Absentee Properties (S. Bishara & Hamdan, 2009). The 
Amendment also gives further decisive powers to the JNF within the Israel 
Lands Council (which directs the ILA) and orchestrates a series of land 
exchanges with the JNF that further entrench restrictions on Arab-ownership 
of lands meant to be administered by the state. The Land Reform it 
introduces is, according to Naamnih (2011) and S. Bishara & Hamdan 
(2009), intended to sever the claims of refugees to these properties. It is 
discussed in this thesis as part of the privatisation processes underlying the 
gentrification and ‘transfer’ of Palestinians from Ajami/Jaffa (see Chapter 
Two). As well, the Law is discussed in Chapter Three as one of the 
impetuses for the New Admissions Law (see below).  
The Law to Amend the 
Cooperative Societies 
Ordinance (No. 8) (2011)  
(Discussed throughout this 
thesis as The New 
Admissions Committee 
Law) 
This law grants formal and legal legitimacy to the use of ‘Admissions 
Committees’ to review applicants for membership (meaning applicants for 
property/land leases) in a ‘cooperative society’, with less than 400 family-
units in the Naqab or Galilee regions of Israel. The Law impacts 
approximately 700 small community towns, which collectively control 
access to 81% of the country’s total land space but act as home to only 5% of 
the population (Adalah, 2007b). The Law details the Committee’s 
membership, which must include at least one member from the Jewish 
Agency or World Zionist Federation. It also outlines the criteria by which an 
applicant may be rejected, which includes the amorphous category of ‘social 
unsuitability’ to the fabric of community life; and the procedures by which a 
rejected applicant can appeal the Committee’s decision.  
While the Law is careful to stipulate that a candidate cannot be rejected on 
the basis of race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or political opinion 
(among others), according to interlocutors of this study, the Law, functions 
explicitly to restrict applicants on the basis of their racial, social and 
religious ‘difference’ and reinforce current hierarchies of class and 
ownership, constructed through Israel’s settler-colonial/ethno-national 
legacies (Algazi, 2011; S. Bishara, 2012; Shbeta, 2012). Israel’s ‘cooperative 
societies’ are part of the privileged inheritances of the upper echelons of 
Israeli Ashkenazi (settler) society. The Law enshrines their continued control 
of land, not only against Palestinians, but against all Israeli communities, 
outside this elite group. This law is part of the story of the Rakefet Case 
(featured in Chapter Three), and acts to circumvent the Supreme Court’s pst 
decisions in the Kaadan (2000) and Zbeidat (2007) cases, which stipulate 
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that discrimination against non-Jews in the use of and access to public lands, 
even lands of the JNF/WZO, is illegal. The Law was upheld by a panel of 
Supreme Court judges on September 17
th
, 2014, when Adalah’s and ACRI’s 
principal petitions on the cases were dismissed (Adalah, 2014). 
The Draft Law to Regulate 
Bedouin Settlement in the 
Negev (2013)  
(The Prawer Law)
302
 
The Law articulates a plan for resolving the Bedouins’ ownership claims and 
regulating Bedouin settlement in the Naqab. According to its own articles, 
the Draft Law has been orchestrated for the development of the Naqab for 
the benefit of all its residents, and offers a “necessary and needed solution to 
the problems currently facing Bedouin settlements.” It outlines the 
boundaries within which Bedouin land claims will be dealt, which areas will 
be set aside for Bedouin use and settlement, the type of compensation  
(monetary or land exchanges) to which the different communities are 
entitled, and sets out compensation options for those communities living 
outside areas relevant to the compensation scheme. It also establishes the 
‘Authority’, which will be responsible for negotiating compensations and 
land allotments, as well as implementation of the plan, i.e. through the 
demolition and evacuation of the villages. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the Draft Law constructs the framework 
through which the Bedouins will be dispossessed of their lands. It outlines a 
two-sided coin for the regulation of the space: by physical enforcement and 
compensation – a stick and a carrot. The compensation scheme is designed to 
finalise a solution to the Bedouins’ land claims, while reinforcing the logic 
underlying the Law: that the Bedouins have no legal-historical claims to the 
Naqab, and any lands/compensation they receive is ‘ex-gratia’, through the 
benevolence of the state. 
The Draft Law passed its first round reading in the Knesset on June 24
th
, 
2013; but was then tabled when Benny Begin recommended its withdrawal 
and stepped down from his post, on December 12
th
, 2013. Responsibility for 
re-drafting the Law has been passed on to the Agricultural Ministry, and MK 
Yair Shamir, head of the Ministry, has taken on the duty to turn the Prawer 
Plan into law.  
 
II. Additional Statutes  
Another Layer of the Land Regime – Determining who Owns, Controls and Administers 
Israeli Space 
 
Legal Statutes 
(Chronological Order) 
Key Points of Relevance to the Case 
The Law of Return (1950) This Law establishes the right of all Jews to immigrate to the state of Israel, 
on the basis of ancestry or religious affiliation, in contrast with policies that 
intentionally deny the same right to the Palestinian refugees. It also changed 
the status of all Jews already present in Israel, at the moment when the state 
was established; all of whom became immigrants to give them the same 
rights as those who came after the promulgation of the Law. Quoting 
Robinson (2013), the Law created a separate legal category, “one above and 
beyond citizenship”, by which to distinguish the Jewish polity from others 
that might call Israel their homeland; and through which, create a legal 
hierarchy in which the ‘Jewish national’ has greater rights to Israel than the 
‘Israeli Citizen’ (p.97-98). Kretzmer (1990) underlines the fact that it is one 
                                                          
302
 While this Law is still in draft form, its impact on Palestinian struggle and state retribution is extensive. 
Moreover, the state has already begun implementing its basic framework, without official legitimisation through 
the Law. Progressive implementation is evident in the ongoing demolitions of al-Araqib, the closing and 
relocation of mobile schools to the recognised villages, as well as the recruitment and deployment of the Yoav 
Unit for enforcing the boundaries formalised through the Plan.    
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of the only laws in Israeli legislature to explicitly distinguish the rights of 
Jews from non-Jews.  
The Law contributes an integral layer by which Israeli hegemony veils 
Jewish/settler-colonial privileged ownership of the state, its institutions, and 
territories, within the liberal rhetoric of its ‘democratic’ regime, which 
maintains a neutral discourse around equality for all citizens. It expresses a 
cornerstone of the Zionist project – the ‘ingathering of the (Jewish) exiles’ – 
and is woven into the entire spectrum of laws that legitimise the 
dispossession and replacement of Palestinian people and space, throughout 
the area controlled by Israel. 
Development Authority 
(Transfer of Property) Law 
(1950) 
This Law establishes the Development Authority as the body which will 
manage refugee lands expropriated to/by the state, in place of the 
‘Custodian’ alluded to in the Absentees Property Law (discussed above). The 
Law stipulates the Development Authority’s responsibilities and powers 
regarding these lands (to lease, buy, build, settle, etc…). All property under 
its auspices is ‘public’ (Israel Lands), and cannot be ‘sold’ or otherwise 
‘transferred’, except: back to the state, to institutions settling Arab internal 
refugees, or to local authorities, so long as the WZO be given the first option 
to purchase the land. The Law determines the mechanisms for control of 
Arab property and space and has had extensive ramifications for Palestinian 
citizens living in public property, particularly in urban spaces, as with the 
Ajami case.  
World Zionist 
Organization (WZO) -
Jewish Agency for Israel 
Status Law (1952) 
The first line of the Law articulates its significance for Palestinian-citizen 
struggle against the (hegemonic) boundaries of the Israeli state: “The state of 
Israel regards itself as the creation of the entire Jewish people, and its gates 
are open, in accordance with its laws, to every Jew wishing to immigrate to 
it.” It gives legal legitimacy to the WZO/Jewish Agency, as the body 
empowered to absorb and settle Jewish immigrants and to coordinate all 
Jewish institutions within the country; effectively giving a para-state 
organisation, whose mandate is exclusively geared toward Jewish access and 
control of Israeli space, a share of State powers and territorial control.  
This law, in combination with the Law of Return, enables the state “to 
colonise land and property without violating its obligation to serve as the 
neutral arbiter of its citizens. The state transferred the land it confiscated 
during and after the war, along with the responsibility for settling immigrants 
on that land, to technically private, or (Jewish) national agencies whose 
boards it stacked.” (Hussein & McKay, 2003, p.111) 
Nationality Law (1952) The Nationality Law stipulates the terms by which one can acquire Israeli 
citizenship: By way of ‘Return’ (in accordance with the Law of Return); 
residence; birth; or naturalisation. As only Jews have the ‘Right of Return’, 
the Law effectively accords different rules for Jews and non-Jews. The 
effects of these distinctions are revealed in the Law’s application, in 1952. 
According to Kretzmer (1990), all Jewish residents of the country were 
granted citizenship automatically (by way of Return); whereas Arab 
residents acquired citizenship only if they could prove their residence or 
right to family unification (p.36-45). Moreover, as discussed above, the Law 
is part of the legal lexicon that determines separate categories of privileges in 
and rights to the Jewish state.  
Israel Lands 
Administration Law 
(1960) 
The Law establishes the Israel Lands Administration – later re-named the 
Israel Lands Authority in the 2009 Reform Law, discussed above – to 
administer ‘Israel Lands’, which constitutes 93% of all territories under the 
control of the Israeli state. The Law connotes a unified policy for the 
management of public land (13% of which is controlled by the 
‘Development Authority’; 13% of which is controlled by the JNF; and 74% 
of which is controlled by the state), through the establishment of an ‘Israel 
Lands Council’ (ILC). The Law reiterates the stipulations in the Basic Law: 
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Israel Lands (1960) that prohibit the transfer of ownership of public land, 
and repeals the right of the Development Authority to sell property without 
express permission of the ILC. A 1961 covenant between the state and the 
WZO (which also established the JNF), outlined the conditions by which the 
WZO’s lands would be administered under the auspices of the ILA. Half the 
ILC governing board (minus 1), which sets all Israeli public land policy, 
would be made up by members chosen by the JNF (Keren Kayemeth 
LeIsrael/Jewish National Fund, 1961). 
 
  
253 
 
Appendix 2: The Spatial Order 
Selected State Plans/Policies, Affecting the Struggle to Reclaim and Determine Palestinian Spatiality 
 
Planning Documents  Key Points of Relevance to the Case 
The New Development 
Plan for the Galilee (1975)  
 
 
 
 
 
This was the Galilee’s first formalised Development Plan, published by the 
Prime Minister’s Office in 1975, and fully approved for implementation by 
the Israeli Knesset in February, 1976. The document – building on a set of 
recommendations by the Jewish Agency (1973) – marks the renewed 
commitment of the state to the Judaisation of the Galilee (Yiftachel, 1992; 
Holzman-Gazit, 2007; Hussein & McKay, 2003). Its main goals include: 
orchestrating massive Jewish settlement in the region, strengthening 
industrial and economic capacity in the region, expanding already existing 
Jewish settlements and establishing 15 new rural-industrial villages to 
interrupt the territorial contiguity of the slowly expanding Arab-village 
spaces in the area (Yiftachel, 1992, p.138). Its key significance was its spark 
of the new political movements around land (e.g. the Committee for the 
Defence of Arab Lands) and Land Day, itself.  
Paam Bagalil (1976) & 
The Plan for the 
Distribution of Industry in 
the Galilee (1977) 
 
 
 
Two additional plans were produced in quick succession, as part of a triad of 
planning schemes, discussed in the Chapter Three. Paam Bagalil was an 
innovation of the Ministry of Housing and Construction. It offers alternative 
sites for key development to the 1975 PMO Plan, looking at urban expansion 
– in Karmiel, Safed and Upper Nazareth – as opposed to the establishment 
and development of rural villages, as a way to encourage demographic 
transformations in the Galilee. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce 
produced its plan as a compliment to these other two. The Plan proposes 
future industrial sites for the region (allocated to Jewish settlement areas), 
alongside a strategy for encouraging private industrial development in the 
region. This plan became a blueprint for the creation of the Zipporit/Upper 
Nazareth Industrial Zone, discussed in the Chapter. See Yiftachel (1992) for 
detailed discussion of these plans, and other components of the planning 
mechanisms in the Galilee; see Wesley (2013) for their resonance in the 
economic and industrial development of the region, thereafter. 
Jewish Agency Mitzpim
303
 
Plan (1978) 
The significance of this Plan is its conceptualisation of the Mizpe 
settlements, as a strategic solution to the “threat” of the Palestinian territorial 
enclave (Yiftachel, 1992). As discussed in Chapter Three, these were small 
(6-20 families), hilltop or look-out settlements – also called outposts – used 
to claim lands in the area, for prospective future Jewish settlement; although 
their potential as sites of permanent settlement was less important than the 
immediacy of the land grab (Newman, 1984). The plan specifically 
advocates the settlement of areas essential for protection of state lands 
against Arab infiltration and “illegal” encroachment (Jewish Agency, 1978; 
quoted in Yiftachel, 1992
304
). In 1979, the plan was approved by the 
Settlement Committee of the Israeli Government and became a basic 
mechanism for settlement planning in regions of the country where large 
concentrations of Palestinian citizens reside. It also became a planning tool 
in the occupied Palestinian territories, discussion of which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. It further demonstrates the relevance of para-state 
planning bodies in influencing and infiltrating planning policy in Israel. In 
the Galilee, 52 Mitzpe settlements were established during the 1980s, 
                                                          
303
 Mitzpim is the plural of the word Mitzpe (Hilltop Settlement) – discussed extensively as part of the spatial 
reorganisations of the Galilee in Chapter Three. 
304
 This statement is quoted in multiple texts, including Abu Hussein & McKay, 2003; Holzman-Gazit, 2007; 
Wesley, 2013; but these, as well as most others, refer back to the Yiftachel text. Two exceptions are Falah 
(1991) and Newman (1984), who each source the original materials.   
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including the village of Rakefet. There are clear intersections of the Mitzpim, 
the New Admissions Law and the colonial logic of the ongoing battle for 
Judaisation of Arab space; all of which are discussed extensively in the 
thesis. 
Ajami, Local Master Plan 
No. 2660 (2001) 
This Plan outlines the trajectory for development and rehabilitation of the 
Ajami neighbourhood. According to the planning document, the plan aims to 
rehabilitate the buildings and communities living in Jaffa. Whereas 
interlocutors from the case, as well as Wallerstein & Silverman (2009), 
Shehadeh & Shbayta (2009) and Goldhaber (2010), argue that the plan’s 
focus on economic enterprise, low building density and privatisation informs 
the mechansisms through which to orchestrate the social-demographic 
transformation of the neighbourhood. Following the same methods the 
municipality employed in turning Jaffa’s old port into an artist’s colony, the 
Plan’s map for gentrification and urban renewal has been geared to increase 
rents and slowly ‘transfer’ out the poor Palestinian communities that live in 
Ajami.    
Jaffa Slopes, Local Master 
Plan No. 2236 (1995) 
The significance of the Jaffa Slopes Plan has been discussed extensively in 
Chapter Two as the spatial expression of the Judaising project to erase and 
replace Palestinian Jaffa; and as a watershed moment for mobilising 
collective protest among Ajami’s residents. First submitted for approval in 
1965, it covers what the Plan refers to as ‘Southern Jaffa’, constituting the 
area known as ‘the Jaffa Slope’ (the area west of Kedem Street, down to the 
sea) and the Ajami and Jabaliya neighbourhoods. Its prescriptions to 
rehabilitate the neighbourhood involved what Goldhaber (2010) called a 
brutal “evacuation-construction” project, typical of modernist planning in the 
1960s and 1970s (p.53). The overarching vision for the Jaffa Slope was the 
creation of a 5-star resort area on the coastal borders of Jaffa. The intention 
was to reclaim additional coastal territory from the sea, using the rubble from 
the destroyed buildings of the Ajami and Jabaliya neighbourhoods 
(Rajagopolan, 2002). While the ‘evacuation’ component of the plan was 
implemented, the ‘construction’ was not. Over a 20 year period, 3127 
building units were demolished; with the rubble piled up onto the Jaffa 
Slope, along with a ‘Mountain of Garbage’, causing land to erode and sink, 
making construction impossible (Abu Shehadeh, 2011). Today, the new Park 
HaMidron stands in its place.  
 
The 1995 Plan that replaced the original version from 1965, incorporates a 
more ‘participatory’ and ‘progressive’ planning process, in which Jaffa’s 
buildings are to be preserved and rehabilitated and the demographic 
“strengthened” (Goldhaber, 2010).  
Greater Beersheba 
Metropolitan District 
Master Plan 14/4 (1995, 
2006, 2014, among others) 
The Plan was first approved in 1995, but multiple appeals have informed 
extensive changes to it. The Plan sketches the development trajectory for 
Beersheba and includes the region that constitutes the Siyag. As expected, 
the Unrecognised Villages are not incorporated into the Plan’s development 
vision. Instead, the Plan outlines the most heavily concentrated areas of 
Bedouin settlement for ‘industrial’ use – including chemical plants and 
mineral extraction – or for ‘recreation/forestation’ sites. Each of the Plan’s 
ammendments since 2007 has set aside space for the establishment of 10 
new Jewish-only settlements. These include ‘Hiran’, a settlement which will 
displace the communities of Atir and Umm al-Hieran to Hura (see Chapter 
Four for additional details). In the Prawer Law and in Begin’s Consultation 
Report on the Law, the Metropolitan Plan acts as the basic frame for 
devising policy and as the foundational document for negating Bedouin 
space in the Naqab.         
The Sharon-Livni Plan 
(2003) 
The Sharon-Livni Plan was a 5-year plan initiated by then Prime Minister, 
Ariel Sharon, to finalise a solution for Bedouin settlement and land claims in 
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the Naqab. It was devised without consultation with the Bedouin 
communities, and was also universally rejected by the RCUV. The Plan set 
out a framework for recognition of seven already existing Unrecognised 
Villages, and included a schematic for compensation, alongside a 
programme for the displacement of the remaining Bedouin communities. It 
also developed the bureaucratic strategy of filing ownership counter-claims 
to Bedouin memoranda land claims (Swirski & Hasson, 2006). Nearly 40% 
of the Plan’s 1.8 million shekel budget was geared toward ‘enforcement’, 
meaning the demolition of homes and the transfer of the Bedouin 
communities, whose lands would not be recognised through the Plan. The 
Plan’s significance is in the fact that it constructed the mechanisms through 
which the first non-urban Bedouin localities were recognised. It led to the 
recognition of 11 villages (despite initially outlining only seven villages for 
recognition), bringing the total in 2014 up to 18.  
The Plan to Regulate 
Bedouin Settlement in the 
Negev (2011)  
(The Prawer Plan)  
The Prawer Plan, named for the head of the governmental commission that 
devised it – then head of the Prime Minister’s Head of Policy and Planning 
Division Ehud Prawer – was initiated as a policy response to the 
recommendations of the Goldberg Committee. The Goldberg Committee was 
appointed in 2007 to develop, in consultation with the Bedouin communities 
of the Naqab, a plan for formalising Bedouin settlement that included a 
cohesive policy for resolving the contested land claims issue. Goldberg’s 
report recommendations, which included the recognition of as many 
unrecognised villages as possible within the framework of the Beersheba 
Metropolitan Plan, were then passed on to Prawer’s Committee, for the 
purpose of implementation and to develop it into a legislative document. The 
main components of the Plan include (in order of discussion), a schematic 
for ‘Compensation for Land Ownership’; a plan for how to formalise 
Bedouin settlement, focusing on the absorption of the communities into the 
already existing localities; a time frame for implementation; enforcement; 
the establishment of an Authority in Beersheba to regulate and formalise 
Bedouin settlement, as well as a special committee within the PMO to 
oversee implementation; and an economic and development plan for the 
Naqab. As discussed previously, the Plan specifically draws the boundary 
line for Bedouin settlement along Highway 40 (see Map “Addendum to the 
Draft Law”, in the following appendix for more details). This plan became 
the foundation for the Draft Law discussed above.    
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Appendix 3: Additional Maps 
I. UN Partition Plan 1947 
 
 
  
The UN Partition Plan acts as a blueprint for understanding how the Jewish pre-state militias – the Palmach 
and the Haganah – organised their campaigns. They worked initially to consolidate the territories where 
Jewish settlements were already present, and the future Jewish state had already been planned. The Naqab 
and coastal plains became the sites of the largest number of Palestinian de-populated villages; whereas 
areas with large concentrations of Palestinians were surrounded, constricted and contained (Morris, 1987; 
Kamen, 1987; Wesley, 2013).   
Source: Fawzi Asadi, “Geographies of Conflict”, 1976, p.80 
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II. The Bifurcation of Space  
 
  
This map is an expression of the spatial apartheids described throughout this thesis. Israeli space is 
segregated and stratified, according to ethnicity, nationality and class, with the lack of ‘Mixed’ Space 
an intentional outcome of land and planning mechanisms in place since the establishment of the state. 
The map delineates which regions are ‘Jewish’ and which are ‘Palestinian’, and indicates how 
Palestinian space is physically contained and surrounded by Jewish settlements.    
Source: Ilan Pappé, The Forgotten Palestinians: A History of the Palestinians in Israel, 2011, p. IX 
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III. The Seyag Zone 
 
  
This map depicts the Seyag Zone and includes the different Bedouin localities – planned, recognised and 
unrecognised – and the main sites of conflict discussed in Chaper Four: the Beersheba Metropolitan Plan 
boundaries, lands deemed contested through the Land Registry, and the Forestation Plans for the area. 
‘Forestation’ has been a key tool of the JNF and the ILA to colonise space in which recruitment for Jewish 
settlement has been difficult. 
Source: Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights (accessed 2014) 
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IV. Addendum to the Draft Law – Mapping the Borders 
 
The map denotes the area to which the Draft Law refers; in particular, land that will be considered for 
compensation or as an allotment in exchange for other lands expropriated through the Law. The ‘Blue 
Line’ reproduces the border discussed throughout this thesis, determining the limits to Bedouin space 
and its segregation from the rest of Israel. The western outline is Highway 40 – a close look at the 
image reveals that this is one of very few geographic markers emphasised by the map’s designers. In 
the document itself, the Law further delineates additional limits to land allocation, within the sphere 
marked by this blue line, in accordance with the needs of the Beersheba Metropolitan District Plan, and 
areas set aside for national parks, forests, agricultural use or future development of the area.    
Source: Israeli Government, Draft Law for Regulation of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev, May 27
th
, 
2013; ‘Highway 40’ (in English), ‘al-Araqib’, author’s additions. 
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V. Regional Strategy – Alternative Master Plan for the Naqab  
 
 
This is a planning sketch from the Alternative Master Plan (2012). In this map, the plan’s designers 
integrate their ‘vision’ for the Bedouin localities of the Seyag into the Beersheba Metropolitan District 
Plan. It exemplifies the ambiguities of ‘planning advocacy’, which necessarily works within the 
hegemonic lines of official planning schemes. It does not challenge the plan’s basic shape (which is 
limited to the Seyag), nor draw attention to lands previously appropriated by the state. It continues to 
incorporate the new military base, the industrial areas, the airport and roads that are part of the state’s 
plan for the development of the Naqab. However, the logic of how space is used is immediately 
challenged in the inclusion of all Bedouin localities in planned, recognised space, including al-Araqib. 
See Chapter Four for further discussion of this topic. 
Source: RCUV, Bimkom & Sidre, Alternative Master Plan for the Unrecognised Bedouin-Arab Villages 
of the Negev, 2012; ‘Highway 40’ marker, author’s addition     
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VI. The Prawer Plan for Transfer 
    
This map depicts the same region, as above in the ‘integrated’ metropolitan plan. In this version, the 
map describes the expected framework for transfer if Prawer’s Plan is implemented. In truth, the 
Draft Law went even further, outlining even larger arenas of land and people for transfers and 
appropriations. However, it is still uncertain what the final map will look like.  
Source: Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights, 2012 
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VII. Palestinian Populations in the Northern Region  
 
 
This map outlines the northern natural regions, emphasising the areas with majority Palestinian 
populations and the district boundary lines that cut through them. It also describes the way space is 
bounded and contained, with the concentrated Palestinian regions surrounded and cut off by 
concentrations of Jewish districts. It is included here as a reference to the discussion in Chapter 
Three, on the skewing of borders and statistics to inform spatial controls in the Galilee. 
Source: David Wesley, State Practices and Zionist Images: Shaping Economic Development in Arab 
Towns in Israel, 2013, p. 24  
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VIII. Misgav Region in the Galilee 
 
This is a map of the area under the jurisdiction of the Misgav Regional Council in the Central Galilee 
Region. The Misgav controls 183,000 dunams of land (Challenge, 1999), and is home to 22,000 people, 
comprising 37 community settlements; 30 of these are Jewish, 6 are Bedouin and one is a mixed Bedouin 
and non-Bedouin Arab community (Misgav Regional Council, 2014).  
The areas of the map shaded green are lands that are administered by the Misgav; the localities marked by 
purple dots are included in and represented by its council. The Jewish settlements are all ‘collective 
communities’, affected by the New Admissions Law (2011), and nearly all of them were established as 
Mitzpe settlements in the 1980s.  
The areas in white – as well as the localities signified by the green dots – are outside the control and 
responsibility of the Council. It should be noted that the Misgav surrounds the Sahnin-Arrabeh-Deir Hana 
corridor, where the Land Day expropriations were supposed to have taken place. The Misgav Regional 
Council is discussed extensively in Chapter Three, in its exemplification of the shifting spatiality of the 
Judaisation project after 1976 in the Palestinian Galilee. It is also the site of the ‘Rakefet Case’ and the 
struggle of the Zbeidat family for entrance into its gated landscapes.  
Source: Misgav Regional Council Website, 2007  
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IX. Mapping Ajami – Sami Abu Shehadeh’s Political Tour 
 
 
  
This is a map of the Ajami neighbourhood, marked by the main sites of conflict depicted in Chapter Two, 
as the essence of Jaffa’s Housing Protest. The blue line follows the route of the political tour I took 
through the neighbourhood with Sami Abu Shehadeh, in November 2011. Titles and shapes in red 
highlight discussions from the case chapter. 
Source: Map: Google Maps, accessed 2014; Data: Sami Abu Shehadeh, November 4
th
, 2011  
             Map Design: Author, based on political tour, multiple visits to the neighbourhood and  
                                   interlocutor interviews 
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This map depicts the area and boundary lines of Jaffa and Tel Aviv, in 1948, just before the Nakba. 
It helps to situate past and current relations in space, pinpointing the boundary lines that existed to 
segregate Jaffa and Tel Aviv. It also spotlights the borders that were constructed since 1948 to 
contain Ajami and erase the neighbourhoods that once constituted the City of Jaffa. 
Source: Arnon Golan, “War and Postwar Transformation of Urban Areas: The 1948 War and the 
Incorporation of Jaffa into Tel Aviv”, 2009, p.1024 
  
X. Jaffa and Tel Aviv “On the Verge of War”305, 1948 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
305
 This is a direct quote, used by Golan (2009) to describe the map. 
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List of Interviews 
 
Name of Interlocutor Position/Organisation Date of Interview(s) Case(s) 
Abbas, Wasim Naqab/Unrecognised 
Villages Project 
Coordinator, Physicians 
for Human Rights-Israel 
(PHR) 
July 4
th
, 2011 Naqab 
Abed, Gabi Founding member, al-
Rabita 
March 23
rd
, 2012 Jaffa 
Abu Al-Qiaan, Salim Council Chair, 
Unrecognised Village of 
Umm al-Hiran 
June 28
th
, 2012 Naqab 
Abu Freih, Awad Activist & Resident, al-
Araqib 
January 2
nd
, 2012 Naqab 
Abu Gharbiyeh, Najib Spokesperson, 
Unrecognised Village of 
Wadi al-Naam 
June 28
th
, 2012 Naqab 
Abu Rabia, Atef (Ex) Field-Worker, 
RCUV 
November 3
rd
, 2011 
Political Tour & 
Interview 
January 1
st
, 2012 
Political Tour 
January 2
nd
, 2012 
Political Tour 
Naqab 
Abu Rabia, Rawia Lawyer; Head of Naqab-
Bedouin Programme, 
Association for Civil 
Rights in Israel (ACRI) 
July 6
th
, 2011 Naqab 
Abu Rabia-Queder, 
Sarab 
Lecturer, Department of 
Education, Ben Gurion 
University of the Negev; 
Activist, Bedouin 
Women’s Rights 
March 26
th
, 2012 Naqab 
Abu Rass, Thabet Director, Adalah Naqab 
Office 
November 2
nd
, 2011 Naqab 
Abu-Saad, Ismael Professor of Educational 
Policy and 
Administration, 
Department of 
Education, Ben Gurion 
University of the Negev 
January 2
nd
, 2012  
Abu Sabur, Said Urban Planner, Rahat 
Municipality  
January 1
st
, 2012 Naqab 
Abushbeikh, Ali (Ex) Field Worker, 
RCUV  
January 2
nd
, 2012 Naqab 
Abu Shehadeh, Sami (Ex) Jaffa-List, Jaffa-Tel 
Aviv Municipal Council 
Representative; 
Founding Member, Jaffa 
Popular Committee for 
the Defence of Arab 
Land and Housing 
Rights 
July 5
th
, 2011 
November 2
nd
, 2011 
(political tour, Ajami) 
 
Jaffa 
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Abou Shhadeh Activist & Founding 
Member, Jaffa Youth 
Movement 
November 5
th
, 2011 
December 31
st
, 2011 
 
Jaffa 
Abu Zaed, Yosef Council leader, al-
Araqib 
January 2
nd
, 2012 Naqab 
Acre Political Tour 
Participant/ Anonymous 
Acre Local Activist; 
Activist, Communist 
Party 
December 23
rd
, 2011 Galilee 
Agbariyeh, Raja Chair, Abna al-Balad July 3
rd
, 2012 Galilee 
Al-Asem, Attiyeh Founding Member, First 
& Current (2014) 
Chairman, RCUV 
December 26
th
, 2011 Naqab 
Al-Araqib group 
interview  
Residents of al-Araqib, 
in the Protest Tent 
December 26
th
, 2011 Naqab 
Al-Athamin, Attiyeh Council leader, 
Unrecognised Village of 
Chasem Zaneh 
November 3
rd
, 2011 Naqab 
Algazi, Gadi  Professor, Department 
of History, Tel Aviv 
University; Founding 
Member, Tarabut-
Hithabrut 
November 6
th
, 2011 
December 28
th
, 2011 
Naqab, Jaffa 
Ali, Nijmeh Activist, DFPE; 
Activist, al-Hirak al-
Shebabi  
December 4
th
, 2013 Galilee 
Ali, Sami Personal Assistant, MK 
Jamal Zahalka 
(Tajamo); Activist, Jisr 
al-Zarqa 
June 30
th
, 2013 
Interview & Political 
Tour 
Galilee 
Al-Turi, Mariam Abu 
Madegham  
Resident & Activist, al-
Araqib 
July 2
nd
, 2012 Naqab 
Al-Turi, Azez Resident & Activist, al-
Araqib 
December 26
th
, 2011; 
political tour, al-Araqib 
lands 
July 2
nd
, 2012 
Naqab 
Al-Turi, Sheikh Sayah  Sheikh, al-Araqib; 
Resident & Activist, al-
Araqib 
November 2
nd
, 2011 
December 26
th
, 2011 
Naqab 
Al-Wakili, Ibrahim (Ex) Chairman, RCUV November 3
rd
, 2011 Naqab 
Amouri, Hana Co-Director, Sadaka-
Reut; Founding 
Member, Jaffa Popular 
Committee for the 
Defence of Arab Land 
and Housing Rights 
July 5
th
, 2011 
September 15
th
, 2011 
Jaffa 
Asfour, Yousef Coordinator Mixed City 
Projects, Amnesty 
International (Israel); 
Activist, Jaffa Popular 
Committee for the 
Defence of Arab Land 
and Housing Rights 
November 5
th
, 2011 Jaffa 
Ashqar, Zuhair Naqab Programme 
Coordinator, 
Community Advocacy 
July 4
th
, 2011 Naqab 
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(NGO in Beersheba) 
Assira Group Interview Residents of the 
Unrecognised Village of 
Assira; In a Village 
Home   
June 28
th
, 2012 Naqab 
Badran, Amir Lawyer; Activist, Jaffa 
Popular Committee for 
the Defence of Arab 
Land and Housing 
Rights 
July 1
st
, 2012 Jaffa 
Baruch, Nili Urban Planner, 
Bimkom: Planners for 
Planning Rights 
November 10
th
, 2011 Naqab 
Ben Ari, Ronen (Ex)Urban Planner & 
Field Worker, Bimkom: 
Planners for Planing 
Rights 
May 26
th
, 2014  
Bishara, Suhad  Lawyer, Head of Land 
& Planning Section, 
Adalah  
June 30
th
, 2011 
March 22
nd
, 2012 
 
Galilee, Naqab 
Bronstein Aparicio, 
Eitan 
Founder, Zochrot  July 1
st
, 2012 Jaffa 
Chomski-Porat, Chassia Co-Director, Shared 
Public Space Project, 
Sikkuy – The 
Association for the 
Advancement of Civic 
Equality 
November 7
th
, 2011 
December 30
th
, 2011 
(Political Tour, the 
Misgav Regional 
Council) 
Galilee 
Cook, Jonathan Journalist/Blogger, 
Nazareth 
June 29
th
, 2012 Galilee 
Dabit, Busayna (Ex) Mixed Cities 
Project Coordinator, 
Shatil; Activist, Jaffa 
Popular Committee for 
the Defence of Arab 
Land and Housing 
Rights    
March 23
rd
, 2013 Jaffa 
El-Amour, Khalil Founding Member, 
RCUV; Resident & 
Activist, Unrecognised 
Village of Assira 
November 2
nd
, 2011 Naqab 
Elsana, Amal Founder, AJEEC-
NISPED, the Arab-
Jewish Center for 
Equality, Empowerment 
and Cooperation – 
Negev Institute for 
Strategies of Peace and 
Development 
July 12
th
, 2012 Naqab 
Elsana, Hanan Activist, Unrecognised 
Villages; Staff Member, 
Sidreh 
July 2
nd
, 2012 Naqab 
Elsana, Khadra Director, Sidreh – 
Lakiya Negev Weaving; 
Activist, Unrecognised 
November 3
rd
, 2011 Naqab 
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Villages 
El-Uqbi, Nuri Founding Member, the 
Association for the 
Support and Defence of 
Bedouin Rights in 
Israel; Resident & 
Activist, al-Araqib 
September 23
rd
, 2013 Naqab 
Farah, Jafar Founder, Mossawa 
Center: The Advocacy 
Center for Arab Citizens 
of Israel 
November 9
th
, 2011 Galilee 
Ghantous, George Activist, “Return to 
Birim”; Activist, Abna 
al-Balad  
July 3
rd
, 2012 Galilee 
Haider, Ali  (Ex) Director, Sikkuy – 
The Association for the 
Advancement of Civic 
Equality 
December 22
nd
, 2011 Galilee 
Hakim, Eran Activist, Jaffa Popular 
Committee for the 
Defence of Arab Land 
and Housing Rights 
June 19
th
, 2013 Jaffa 
Hamdan, Alaa Activist, Acre Popular 
Committee; Co-
Director, Shared 
Regional Tourism 
Project, Sikkuy – The 
Association for the 
Advancement of Civic 
Equality 
March 22
nd
, 2012 Galilee 
 
Hliwah, Fatmeh Activist, Palestinian 
Youth Movement; 
Palestinian Director, 
‘Community in Action’ 
Project, Sadaka-Reut 
June 29
th
, 2012 Jaffa 
Ighbarieh, Umar Group Facilitator & 
Landscape & Space 
Project Coordinator, 
Zochrot 
March 29
th
, 2012 Galilee 
Ilani, Yudit Activist & Founding 
Member, Jaffa Popular 
Committee for the 
Defence of Arab Land 
and Housing Rights; 
Darna Case-Worker  
December 29
th
, 2011 Jaffa 
Inbari, Itamar Journalist/Specialist in 
Islamic Movements in 
Israel 
March 20
th
, 2013 Galilee 
Izhaki, Anat Board Member, Sadaka-
Reut; Activist,  Jaffa 
Popular Committee for 
the Defence of Arab 
Land and Housing 
Rights 
July 5
th
, 2011 Jaffa 
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Jabareen, Hassan
306
 Director & Founder, 
Adalah 
March 22
nd
, 2012 Galilee 
Jabareen, Yosef Senior Lecturer, Faculty 
of Architecture and 
Town Planning, 
Technion – Israel 
Institute of Technology 
November 4
th
, 2011 
December 25
th
, 2012 
Galilee 
Jaffa Land Day March 
Participant/ Anonymous 
Ajami Resident & 2012 
Jaffa Land Day March 
Participant 
March 31, 2012 Jaffa 
Jaffa Tent Encampment, 
Group Interview 
Residents of the Gan 
Hashnaim (J14) Tent 
Encampment; In Their 
Tent 
December 31, 2012 Jaffa 
Jaffa Youth Movement, 
Group Interview 
Activists from the Jaffa 
Youth Movement; On a 
Rooftop, in Jaffa 
July 1
st
, 2012 Jaffa 
Jamal, Amal Professor, Department 
of Political Science, Tel 
Aviv University  
April 9
th
, 2012 Galilee 
Jaraysi, Ramiz (Ex) Mayor, Nazareth June 26
th
, 2012 Galilee 
Jisr al-Zarqa Group 
Interview 
Residents of Jisr al-
Zarqa; At Jisr al-Zarqa 
Beach 
June 30
th
, 2012 Galilee 
Kada, Samira Activist, Jaffa Popular 
Committee for the 
Defence of Arab Land 
and Housing Rights  
December 28
th
, 2011 Jaffa 
Karkabi, Nadeem Doctoral Student,  
Department of 
Anthropology, School 
of Oriental & African 
Studies; 
Participant/Organiser, 
Haifa Music Scene 
February, 27
th
, 2014 Galilee 
Kedar, Alexandre 
(Sandy) 
Professor, Legal History 
& Critical Legal 
Geography, Law 
Department, Haifa 
University 
November 9
th
, 2011 Naqab 
Khouri, Raja Director, the Arab 
Center for Alternative 
Planning (ACAP) 
December 21
st
, 2011 Galilee 
Kohn, Orna Lawyer, Adalah June 6
th
, 2011 Galilee, Naqab 
Lahab-Grayeb, Rania Deputy Director, 
Mossawa Center: The 
Advocacy Center for 
Arab Citizens of Israel 
November 9
th
, 2011 Galilee 
Manna, Ayema Activist, Majd el Krum; 
Blog Manager, 
March 22
nd
, 2012 Galilee 
                                                          
306
 H. Jabareen did not sit for a full interview. He is included in this list because he is quoted in the thesis, as 
speaking to his persecution as a leader of the Palestinian community in Israel. H. Jabareen refused to sit for the 
interview in light of this persecution by the state, and the danger to which he and the organisation is exposed 
when he gives an interview. He asked that this statement be attributed to him, and is discussed here for this 
reason. 
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Mossawa Center: The 
Advocacy Center for 
Arab Citizens of Israel 
Meir, Avinoam Professor, Department 
of Geography and 
Environmental 
Development, Ben 
Gurion University of the 
Negev  
March 26
th
, 2012 Naqab 
Miari, Muhammad Founding Member, 
Committee for the 
Defence of Arab Lands  
March 25
th
, 2012 Galilee 
Mohsen, Salah Arabic Media 
Coordinator (Current 
Position) & Jaffa-based 
field researcher 
(2007/2008), Adalah 
December 22
nd
, 2011 Galilee, Jaffa 
 
Mustafa, Mohanad PhD/Academic Expert, 
Islamic Movements in 
Israel 
March 28
th
, 2013 Galilee 
Naamnih, Haneen (ex) Lawyer, Adalah; 
Activist, Abna al-Balad 
June 30
th
, 2011 Galilee, Naqab 
Nassar, Shahin Journalist; Activist, 
Wadi al-Nisnas Housing 
Protest; Activist, Haifa 
J14 Movement; (Ex) 
Web Manager, Mossawa 
Center: The Advocacy 
Center for Arab Citizens 
of Israel  
March 22
nd
, 2011 Galilee 
Noach, Haia Director, Negev 
Coexistence Forum 
July 4
th
, 2011 Naqab 
Raanan, Yaela Anthropologist; Case-
Worker, RCUV 
November 8
th
, 2011 Naqab 
Rawan Bisharat Palestinian Programme 
Director, ‘Building a 
Culture of Peace’ 
Project, Sadaka-Reut; 
Activist, Jaffa Popular 
Committee for the 
Defence of Arab Land 
and Housing Rights 
March 26
th
, 2012 Jaffa 
Saba, Ester Activist & Founding 
Member, Jaffa Popular 
Committee for the 
Defence of Arab Land 
and Housing Rights 
March 25
th
, 2012 Jaffa 
Sabbagh-Khoury, Areej Project Coordinator, 
Mada al Carmel 
November 9
th
, 2011 Galilee 
Sallam, Ali (Ex) Deputy Mayor of 
Nazareth (As of March 
2014: Current Mayor of 
Nazareth)  
March 28
th
, 2012 Galilee 
Saifi, Johayna Activist & Founding 
Member, Tarabut-
November 6
th
, 2011 
December 23
rd
, 2011 
Galilee, Jaffa  
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Hithabrut; Founding 
Member, Acre Popular 
Committee 
(Political Tour, Acre 
Old City) 
March 30
th
, 2012 
Satel, Abed Chair, Darna; Activist, 
al-Rabita  
 March 28
th
, 2012 Jaffa 
Sfard, Michael Human Rights Lawyer; 
Lead Legal Advocate, 
al-Araqib land cases 
December 25
th
, 2011 Naqab 
Shbayta, Fadi Founding Member, Jaffa 
Popular Committee for 
the Defence of Arab 
Land and Housing 
Rights 
June 19
th
, 2011 Jaffa 
Shbeta, Shadi Personal Assistant, MK 
Hanna Swaid (DFPE) 
June 29
th
, 2012 
(Political Tour, Central 
Galilee/Nazareth) 
Galilee 
Shnaydor, Ishai Human Rights Lawyer, 
Expert in Land and 
Planning Rights 
March 29
th
, 2012 Galilee 
Siqsiq, Omar Founding Member, al-
Rabita 
March 29
th
, 2012 Jaffa 
Swaid, Hanna Member of Knesset, 
DFPE; Urban Planner; 
Founder, Arab Center 
for Alternative Planning 
March 27
th
, 2012 Galilee 
Tourk, Rifaat (Ex) Israeli National 
Football Team Player; 
(Ex) Deputy Mayor/ 
Council Member, Tel 
Aviv Municipality 
(Meretz List); Jaffa 
Resident 
December 29
th
, 2011 Jaffa  
Wadi al-Naam, group 
interview 
Residents of the 
Unrecognised Village of 
Wadi al-Naam; In a 
Village Home 
June 28
th
, 2012 Naqab 
Waxman, Dov  Professor of Political 
Science, International 
Affairs and Israel 
Studies, Northeastern 
University 
February 2
nd
, 2012 Galilee 
Weingarten, Miri EU lobbyist, Coalition 
of Israeli Human Rights 
NGOs 
April 18
th
, 2011 
June 15
th
, 2013 
Naqab 
Tawat, Hasan Principal, Jisr al-Zarqa 
High School 
June 30
th
, 2012 Galilee 
Yacobi, Haim Lecturer, Department of 
Politics, Ben Gurion 
University of the Desert; 
Urban Planner & 
Architect; Founder, 
Bimkom: Planners for 
Planning Rights 
June 13
th
, 2012 Jaffa 
Yiftachel, Oren Professor in Critical 
Geography, Ben Gurion 
November 8
th
, 2011 
July 2
nd
, 2012 
Naqab 
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University of the Negev  January 28
th
, 2014 
Ongoing personal 
communications, 2012-
2014 
Zahalka, Jamal Member of Knesset & 
Party Chair, Tajamo 
March 27
th
, 2012 Galilee 
Zbedat, Amarat Activist, Unrecognised 
Villages 
November 2
nd
, 2011 Naqab 
Zeidan, Mohamad Chair, High Follow-up 
Committee; Director, 
Arab Human Rights 
Association 
June 26
th
, 2012 Galilee 
Zion, Eldad Activist, Days of Rage 
Protests 
August 26
th
, 2014 Naqab 
Zoabi, Haneen Member of Knesset, 
Tajamo 
December 12
th
, 2011 Galilee 
Zuabi-Omari, Rajaa (Ex) Acivist, Abna al-
Balad 
July 3
rd
, 2012 Galilee 
 
